# Gladding

> District Court, N.D. New York · February 10, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11256547

## Case

- **Full name:** Michael A. Gladding v. Rachel Rounds, Parole Officer, Pamela Vamburgh, Senior Parole Officer, John/Jane Doe, Regional Director, NYS DOCCS, and New York State Department of Corrections and Community Supervision
- **Court:** District Court, N.D. New York
- **Decided:** February 10, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11256547

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- noting that Earley “clearly established that where the [sentencing] court has not included [post-release supervision] in a defendant’s sentence, DOCS may not add that term without violating federal law”

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

MICHAEL A. GLADDING,

Plaintiff, 1:25-cv-1702 (BKS/DJS)

v.

RACHEL ROUNDS, Parole Officer, PAMELA
VAMBURGH, Senior Parole Officer, JOHN/JANE DOE,
Regional Director, NYS DOCCS, and NEW YORK
STATE DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS AND
COMMUNITY SUPERVISION,

Defendants.

Appearances:

Plaintiff pro se:
Michael A. Gladding
Clifton Park, NY 12065

For Defendants:
Letitia James
Attorney General for the State of New York
Shawn C. Graham
Assistant Attorney General, of Counsel
300 S. State Street, Ste. 300
Syracuse, NY 13202

Hon. Brenda K. Sannes, Chief United States District Judge:

MEMORANDUM-DECISION AND ORDER
I. INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff Michael A. Gladding brought this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that
Defendants violated his due process rights by imposing conditions of his parole that were not
imposed by a sentencing judge. (Dkt. Nos. 1, 1-1).1 Plaintiff, who was convicted of promoting a
sexual performance by a minor, challenges parole conditions, including internet restrictions,
device-search requirements, password and identifier disclosure mandates and social-media
prohibitions. (See Dkt. Nos. 1-1, 1-3, 1-4). Plaintiff also filed a motion to proceed in forma

pauperis (“IFP”). (Dkt. No. 2). This matter was referred to United States Magistrate Judge
Daniel J. Stewart for an initial review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and Local Rule 72.3(d).
On January 12, 2026, Magistrate Judge Stewart granted Plaintiff’s application to proceed IFP,
(Dkt. No. 30), and issued a Report-Recommendation recommending that the Complaint be
dismissed with leave to amend. (Dkt. No. 31). On January 13, 2026, Plaintiff filed timely
objections to the Report-Recommendation. (Dkt. No. 37). For the reasons that follow, the
Report-Recommendation is adopted in its entirety.2
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
This Court reviews de novo those portions of the Magistrate Judge’s findings and
recommendations that have been properly preserved with a specific objection. Petersen v.

Astrue, 2 F. Supp. 3d 223, 228–29 (N.D.N.Y. 2012); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). “A proper
objection is one that identifies the specific portions of the [Report-Recommendation] that the

1 As Magistrate Judge Stewart observed, Plaintiff filed two documents identified as his Complaint. (See Dkt. No. 31,
at 3 n.2). In light of Plaintiff’s pro se status, and like Magistrate Judge Stewart, the Court has considered both
documents in reviewing the Report-Recommendation and Plaintiff’s objections thereto.
2 On February 4, 2026, Plaintiff filed both a notice of appeal and an emergency petition for writ of mandamus. (Dkt.
Nos. 52, 53). The notice of appeal, which argues that this Court’s “inaction in the face of a date-certain threat to
liberty has the practical effect of refusing an injunction,” is more appropriately characterized as a petition for writ of
mandamus to the Second Circuit. (See Dkt. No. 52, at 1). In any event, this Court has jurisdiction to consider the
Report-Recommendation despite the notice of appeal, because the Report-Recommendation was not a final order or
judgment and the notice of appeal was clearly premature. See Demuth v. Cutting, No. 18-cv-795, 2020 WL 918739,
at *1 n.1, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32588, at *1 n.1 (N.D.N.Y. Feb. 26, 2020) (citing United States v. Rodgers, 101
F.3d 247, 252 (2d Cir. 1996), and Burger King Corp. v. Horn & Hardart Co., 893 F.2d 525, 527 (2d Cir. 1990)).
The Court also assumes, for the purposes of this decision, that Plaintiff’s petition for writ of mandamus does not
divest this Court of jurisdiction. See Justice v. King, No. 08-cv-6417, 2009 WL 3644242, at *2, 2009 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 99993, at *6 (W.D.N.Y. Oct. 27, 2009) (noting that “the law does not clearly indicate that jurisdiction over
the underlying action [ ] shifts exclusively to the appellate court” where plaintiff filed petition for writ of mandamus
with Second Circuit rather than notice of appeal).
objector asserts are erroneous and provides a basis for this assertion.” Kruger v. Virgin Atl.
Airways, Ltd., 976 F. Supp. 2d 290, 296 (E.D.N.Y. 2013) (citation omitted). Properly raised
objections “must be specific and clearly aimed at particular findings” in the report. Molefe v.
KLM Royal Dutch Airlines, 602 F. Supp. 2d 485, 487 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). “[E]ven a pro se party’s

objections to a Report[-]Recommendation must be specific and clearly aimed at particular
findings in the magistrate [judge]’s proposal . . . .” Machicote v. Ercole, No. 06-cv-13320, 2011
WL 3809920, at *2, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 95351, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 25, 2011) (citation
omitted). Findings and recommendations as to which there was no properly preserved objection
are reviewed for clear error. Id.
III. DISCUSSION
In reviewing the Report-Recommendation, the Court accepts as true the Complaint’s
well-pleaded factual allegations to determine whether Plaintiff has “state[d] a claim to relief that
is plausible on its face.” Hardaway v. Hartford Pub. Works Dep’t, 879 F.3d 486, 489 (2d Cir.
2018) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)); Milan v. Wertheimer, 808

F.3d 961, 963 (2d Cir. 2015) (per curiam). The Court has reviewed Plaintiff’s specific objections
de novo.
A. Report-Recommendation
In recommending dismissal of Plaintiff’s due process claim, Magistrate Judge Stewart
first noted that the New York Department of Corrections and Community Supervision
(“DOCCS”) is immune to suit in federal court under the Eleventh Amendment. (Dkt. No. 31, at
4-5). Turning to the merits of Plaintiff’s claims, Magistrate Judge Stewart found that Plaintiff’s
due process claim must fail. (Id. at 5-7). Magistrate Judge Stewart noted that, “[i]n the context of
a due process claim, the Court must undertake ‘a two pronged inquiry: (1) whether the plaintiff
had a protected liberty interest . . . and, if so, (2) whether the deprivation of that liberty interest
occurred without due process of law.’” (Dkt. No. 31, at 5-6 (quoting Bedoya v. Coughlin, 91
F.3d 349, 351-52 (2d Cir. 1996))). With respect to the first prong, Magistrate Judge Stewart
found that Plaintiff had not alleged a protected liberty interest, because parolees do not have a

constitutionally protected interest in being free from special conditions of release. (Id. at 6 (citing
Burdick v. Town of Schroeppel, 2017 WL 5509355, at *36, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13859
(N.D.N.Y. Jan. 31, 2017), report and recommendation adopted, 2017 WL 1284864, 2017 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 52664 (N.D.N.Y. Apr. 6, 2017), aff’d, 717 F. App’x 92 (2d Cir. 2018))).3 As to the
second prong of the inquiry, Magistrate Judge Stewart found that, even assuming the existence of
a liberty interest, Plaintiff had not alleged that this interest was deprived without due process. (Id.
at 5-7). Magistrate Judge Stewart noted that Plaintiff could (and apparently did) pursue an
Article 78 proceeding, and “the mere availability of an Article 78 proceeding” is a meaningful
postdeprivation remedy. (Id. at 6-7 (quoting Eldars v. State Univ. of New York at Albany, 2020
WL 2542957, at *6, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87697, at *15 (N.D.N.Y. May 19, 2020))).

B. Objections to the Report-Recommendation
1. Eleventh Amendment
Plaintiff objects to Magistrate Judge Stewart’s recommendation that his claims against
DOCCS be dismissed on Eleventh Amendment grounds. Plaintiff notes that, “[w]hile sovereign
immunity is jurisdictional, dismissal is premature because [t]he Ex parte Young exception may
apply.” (Dkt. No. 37, at 6).4

3 While the Report-Recommendation purports to quote Burdick, it appears (at the time of writing) that a formatting
error on Westlaw causes the decision in Pena v. Travis, No. 01-cv-8534, 2002 WL 31886175, at *13, 2002 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 24709, at *37 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 27, 2002), to embed on the same page as the Burdick decision, (See Dkt.
No. 31, at 6 (quoting Burdick, 2017 WL 5509355, at *36). Burdick does not actually contain the quoted text in the
Report-Recommendation.
4 Plaintiff does not object to the Report-Recommendation insofar as it recommends dismissal of Plaintiff’s claims
for damages. The Court agrees that any claim for damages against DOCCS—or against the DOCCS officials in their
The Eleventh Amendment generally prohibits lawsuits against a state without that state’s
consent. Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 54 (1996). This prohibition extends to
individuals sued for damages in their capacities as state officials. Davis v. New York, 316 F.3d
93, 101 (2d Cir. 2002) (citing Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 169 (1985)). However, under

the Supreme Court’s decision in Ex parte Young, “[a] plaintiff may avoid the Eleventh
Amendment bar to suit and proceed against individual state officers, as opposed to the state, in
their official capacities, provided that [the] complaint (a) ‘alleges an ongoing violation of federal
law’ and (b) ‘seeks relief properly characterized as prospective.’” In re Deposit Ins. Agency, 482
F.3d 612, 618 (2d Cir. 2007) (quoting Verizon Md., Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of Md., 535 U.S.
635, 645 (2002)).
“[I]n determining whether the doctrine of Ex parte Young avoids an Eleventh
Amendment bar to suit, a court need only conduct a straightforward inquiry into whether [the]
complaint alleges an ongoing violation of federal law and seeks relief properly characterized as
prospective.” Doe v. Annucci, No. 14-cv-2953, 2015 WL 4393012, at *15, 2015 U.S. Dist.

LEXIS 91861, at *37 (S.D.N.Y. July 15, 2015) (quoting Virginia Office for Prot. & Advoc. v.
Stewart, 563 U.S. 247, 255 (2011)). However, “[b]ecause Ex parte Young recognizes a federal
court’s authority to grant injunctive relief only in order to ‘vindicate the federal interest in
assuring the supremacy’ of federal law by ‘end[ing] a continuing violation’ of that law, a
complaint must allege that the defendant's violation of law is continuing or ongoing.” Safe Haven
Home Care, Inc. v. United States Dep't of Health & Hum. Servs., 681 F. Supp. 3d 195, 208

official capacity—must be dismissed. See Brown v. New York, No. 17-cv-1036, 2018 WL 3130593, at *3, 2018 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 106347, at *6 (N.D.N.Y. June 26, 2018) (“It is well settled that ‘DOCCS is an arm of the state’ and
entitled to sovereign immunity as if it were the State of New York.” ) (quoting Johnson v. New York, No. 10-cv-
9532, 2012 WL 335683, *1, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12105, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 1, 2012)); Marshall v. Lilley, No.
19-cv-11829, 2020 WL 905989, at *6, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32007, at *15 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 21, 2020) (“[T]he
Eleventh Amendment bars any official-capacity claim for damages under § 1983 against these defendants, who are
all DOCCS employees and thus state agents.”).
(S.D.N.Y. 2023), (internal citations and quotations omitted) aff’d, 130 F.4th 305 (2d Cir. 2025).
Further, “such claims cannot be brought directly against the state, or a state agency, but only
against state officials in their official capacities.” Olivo v. New York State Dep't of Corr. & Cmty.
Supervision, No. 17-cv-0357, 2017 WL 2656199, at *3, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94384, at *8

(N.D.N.Y. June 20, 2017) (citing Santiago v. New York State Dep't of Corr. Serv., 945 F.2d 25,
32 (2d Cir. 1991)).
In his Complaint, Plaintiff seeks an injunction “prohibiting DOCCS and its officers from
enforcing any condition not imposed by the sentencing court[.]” (Dkt. No. 1-1, at 5). Because
such claims cannot be brought directly against DOCCS itself, the Court agrees with Magistrate
Judge Stewart that all claims against DOCCS are properly dismissed without prejudice as barred
by the doctrine of sovereign immunity. See Olivo, 2017 WL 2656199, at *3, 2017 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 94384, at *8 (dismissing claims for prospective relief against New York State
Department of Corrections and Community Supervision).
The Complaint does not clearly identify whether the individual Defendants are sued in

their official capacity. (Compare Dkt. No. 1, at 1 (“All Defendants are sued in their individual
(personal) capacities.”) with Dkt. No. 1-1, at 2 (identifying Defendants Rounds and Vamburgh as
“sued in [their] individual and official capacities”)). However, even if Plaintiff sought to proceed
against the DOCCS officials in their official capacities, the Ex parte Young exception does not
apply because Plaintiff has failed to allege an underlying constitutional violation, as set forth
below. See Nelson v. Sullivan, No. 23-cv-878, 2025 WL 2494272, at *10, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
168775, at *28 (D. Conn. Aug. 29, 2025) (holding, on summary judgment, that in light of the
court’s conclusion that there was no underlying constitutional violation, the court could not find
that there was “an ongoing constitutional violation” that entitled the plaintiff to injunctive relief).
2. Failure to State a Claim
In Plaintiff’s first and fourth objections, Plaintiff contends that Magistrate Judge Stewart
“misidentified the protected liberty interest” and “ignores controlling Second Circuit authority.”
(Dkt. No. 37, at 1, 6). Plaintiff argues that the cases cited in the Report-Recommendation

“correctly hold that parolees have no protected liberty interest in being free from supervision
conditions.” (Id. at 1-2). However, Plaintiff asserts that his claim “is fundamentally different[,]”
because Plaintiff “challenges conditions whose violation subjects him to arrest, detention, and
reincarceration[.]” (Id. at 2). In support of this proposition, Plaintiff cites three cases pertaining
to sentencing and post-release supervision.(Id. at 2, 6 (citing Hill v. U.S. ex rel Wampler, 298
U.S. 460, 464 (1936); Earley v. Murray, 451 F.3d 71, 74-75 (2d Cir. 2006); Betances v. Fischer,
837 F.3d 162, 169-70 (2d Cir. 2016). Plaintiff objects to the Report-Recommendation because it
“does not cite, analyze, or distinguish” Earley or Betances. (Dkt. No. 37, at 6).
“Parolees are not entitled to the same level of absolute liberty afforded other citizens.
Instead, their liberty rights are ‘properly dependent on observance of special parole restrictions.’”

Rodriguez v. City of New York, 623 F. Supp. 3d 225, 245 (S.D.N.Y. 2022) (quoting Cusamano v.
Alexander, 691 F. Supp. 2d 312, 319 (N.D.N.Y. 2009)); see also Singleton v. Doe, 210 F. Supp.
3d 359, 372 (E.D.N.Y. 2016) (collecting cases). “Under N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs., tit. 9, §
8003.3, parolees may be subject to special conditions – the imposition of which is left to the
discretion of the New York State Board of Parole and parole officers.” Rodriguez, 623 F. Supp.
3d at 246. “Because the imposition of special conditions is left to the discretion of the Board of
Parole and parole officers, [a] plaintiff does not have a protected liberty interest in being free
from special conditions.” Pena, 2002 WL 31886175, at *13, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24709, at
*37; Maldonado v. Fischer, No. 11-cv-1091, 2012 WL 4461647, at *4, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
137634, at *11-13 (W.D.N.Y. Sept. 24, 2012) (collecting cases).5
Here, the cases Plaintiff cites contain no support for Plaintiff’s distinction between “non-
custodial supervisory conditions” and “custody-triggering conditions.” (See Dkt. No. 37, at 1-2).

These cases stand for the proposition that DOCCS cannot add a term of post-release supervision
to a defendant’s sentence where one has not been imposed by the sentencing judge. See Hill v.
U.S. ex rel Wampler, 298 U.S. 460, 464-65 (1936) (“The only sentence known to the law is the
sentence or judgment entered upon the records of the court . . . The prisoner is detained, not by
virtue of the warrant of commitment, but on account of the judgment and sentence.”); Earley v.
Murray, 451 F.3d 71, 75 (2d Cir. 2006) (“Only the judgment of a court, as expressed through the
sentence imposed by a judge, has the power to constrain a person's liberty.”); Betances v.
Fischer, 837 F.3d 162, 171 (2d Cir. 2016) (noting that Earley “clearly established that where the
[sentencing] court has not included [post-release supervision] in a defendant’s sentence, DOCS
may not add that term without violating federal law”).

Plaintiff misses a critical distinction between these cases and his own: Hill, Earley, and
Betances pertain to post-release supervision, which “commences when a defendant’s prison term
expires[.]” Newman v. Annucci, No. 17-cv-0918, 2018 WL 4554494, at *3 n.2, 2018 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 161387, at *6 n.2 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 21, 2018) (citing N.Y. Penal Law § 70.45). In August
of 2024, Plaintiff was released on parole, (see Dkt. No. 1-5, at 1)—which, unlike post-release
supervision, “is discretionary release before the expiration of a prison term[,]” see Newman,

5 As Magistrate Judge Stewart correctly observed, “[c]ourts have recognized that ‘parolees have some liberty
interest in being free from certain special conditions of parole.’” (Dkt. No. 31, at 6 n.3 (quoting Rodriguez, 623 F.
Supp. 3d at 246)). This means that parolees have a “limited due process right” that entitles them to “conditions of
parole that are reasonably related to [their] prior conduct or to the government’s interest in [their] rehabilitation[.]’”
(Id. (quoting Singleton, 210 F. Supp. 3d at 374)). Here, as Magistrate Judge Stewart noted, Plaintiff does not allege
that the special conditions of his parole were inappropriate “for some factual or offense-related reason,” but rather
that they “are void ab initio based on the manner in which they were imposed.” (Id.).
2018 WL 4554494, at *3 n.2, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 161387, at *6 n.2. As a parolee, Plaintiff
has no protected liberty interest in being free from special conditions of his parole. See Pena,
2002 WL 31886175, at *13, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24709, at *37. Accordingly, the Court
agrees with Magistrate Judge Stewart that Plaintiff has failed to allege a protected liberty
interest. (See Dkt. No. 31, at 6-7).6

The Court has reviewed Plaintiff’s other objections and found them to be without merit.
The Court has also reviewed the remainder of the report-recommendation for clear error, and
found none.
C. Plaintiff’s Remaining Motions
In addition to the Complaint, Plaintiff has filed several emergency motions seeking
injunctive relief. (See Dkt. Nos. 3, 4, 5, 9, 19). Because the Court dismisses the underlying
Complaint for the reasons set forth above, Plaintiff’s motions for injunctive relief are denied as
moot.7 Plaintiff’s motion to amend the caption to substitute a named Defendant in place of the
previously designated John/Jane Doe Defendant is likewise denied as moot. (See Dkt. No. 41).

D. Instructions for Filing an Amended Complaint
In light of Plaintiff’s pro se status, Magistrate Judge Stewart noted that “it may be
appropriate to permit Plaintiff to amend his complaint as to the individual Defendants.” (Dkt.

6 Because Plaintiff has no protected liberty interest in being free from special conditions of his parole, the Court
does not reach Plaintiff’s due process arguments. (See Dkt. No. 37, at 3-7).
7 The Court notes that, in any event, the Younger abstention doctrine would almost certainly require abstention with
respect to Plaintiff’s claim for injunctive relief. Under this doctrine “federal courts should generally refrain from
enjoining or otherwise interfering in ongoing state proceedings.” Spargo v. N.Y. State Comm’n on Judicial Conduct,
351 F.3d 65, 74 (2d Cir. 2003). The doctrine applies in ongoing state criminal prosecutions, and courts have held
that proceedings “stemming from [a] parole revocation hearing[ ] are sufficiently ‘akin to criminal proceedings[’] to
warrant abstention under the Younger doctrine.” See Kelsey v. Rosa, No. 24-cv-05179, 2025 WL 1779100, at *4,
2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 124326, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. June 27, 2025) (citation omitted); Brickhouse v. DuBois, No. 20-cv-
4759, 2020 WL 4676476, at *3, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 144416, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 11, 2020) (“As Plaintiff's
ongoing parole revocation proceedings are akin to a criminal prosecution, Younger abstention is warranted in this
case.”).
No. 31, at 8). Although it does not appear likely that the Plaintiff has a cause of action, the Court
will allow Plaintiff an opportunity to file an amended complaint as to the individual Defendants
within thirty (30) days from the date of this Order. Any amended complaint will entirely replace
the existing complaint and must be a wholly integrated and complete pleading not combined with

any other document. See Shields v. Citytrust Bancorp, Inc., 25 F.3d 1124, 1128 (2d Cir. 1994). It
also must not rely upon or incorporate by reference any pleading or document previously filed
with the Court, including the existing complaint. Instead, the amended complaint itself must
contain all the specific factual allegations Plaintiff wishes the Court to consider.
IV. CONCLUSION
For these reasons, it is hereby
ORDERED that Magistrate Judge Stewart’s Report-Recommendation (Dkt. No. 31) is
ADOPTED in its entirety, as set forth above; and it is further
ORDERED that Plaintiff’s claims against the New York State Department of
Corrections and Community Supervision are DISMISSED without prejudice, but without

leave to amend, and it is further
ORDERED that Plaintiff’s remaining claims are DISMISSED without prejudice, and
with leave to amend; and it is further
ORDERED that, if Plaintiff fails to file an amended complaint within 30 days from the
date of this Order or to request an extension of time to do so, the Clerk is directed to enter
judgment without further order of the Court; and it is further
ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion for Declaratory and Preliminary Injunction (Dkt. No.
3); Emergency Ex Parte Motion (Dkt. No. 4), Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and
Preliminary Injunction (Dkt. No. 5), Emergency Motion for Temporary Restraining Order (Dkt.
No. 9), Emergency Motion/Notice of Custody (Dkt. No. 19), and Motion to Amend Caption
(Dkt. No. 41) are DENIED as moot, and it is further
ORDERED that the Court certifies pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal at
this stage of the proceedings would not be taken in good faith; and it is further
ORDERED that the Clerk serve a copy of this Order on Plaintiff in accordance with the
Local Rules.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 10, 2026
Syracuse, New York ( Canes
PALA ba
Brenda K. Sannes
Chief U.S. District Judge

1]

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11256547. Public record. Not legal advice.