# Crawford

> District Court, W.D. Tennessee · February 11, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11256541

## Case

- **Full name:** Janice M. Crawford v. Pamela Bondi, Attorney General
- **Court:** District Court, W.D. Tennessee
- **Decided:** February 11, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
WESTERN DIVISION

)
JANICE M. CRAWFORD, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
)
v. ) No. 23-cv-02456-SHM-atc
)
PAMELA BONDI, ATTORNEY )
GENERAL, )
)
Defendant. )

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Plaintiff Janice M. Crawford sues Defendant Pamela Bondi,
Attorney General of the United States of America, alleging a
claim under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-3(a). Before the Court is Defendant Pamela Bondi’s
Motion for Summary Judgment. (ECF No. 75.) For the reasons below,
the Court GRANTS Defendant’s Motion.

I. Background1
In July 2017, Plaintiff Janice M. Crawford applied for a
job as an administrative officer (“AO”) with the United States

1 In her response to Defendant’s statement of undisputed facts in
support of Defendant’s Motion for summary judgment, Plaintiff
submits no facts of her own. She only disputes some of Defendant’s
facts. (ECF No. 83-2.) The Court’s narrative relies on Defendant’s
Marshals Service (“USMS”) in Seattle, Washington (the “Seattle
Position”). (ECF Nos. 75 at 2 & ECF No. 83 at 2.) Plaintiff
interviewed for the Seattle Position with three people: Jacob

Green, the Selecting Official and Chief Deputy United States
Marshal; Charles Daniels, the Assistant Chief in the Office of
Compliance; and Grace McGrath, an Administrative Officer in
California. (Id.)
On September 11, 2017, Plaintiff was informed that she had
not received the Seattle Position. (ECF No. 83-2 at ¶ 50.)
Another applicant, Wilma Thompson, had been selected. (ECF Nos.
75 at 1 & 83 at 2.) In December 2018, Plaintiff filed an Equal
Employment Opportunity (“EEO”) claim after she was not selected
for a different, unrelated Property Management Specialist
position with the USMS. (ECF Nos. 83 at 2-3 & 83-2 at ¶ 59.)
While reviewing the Report of Investigation about that claim in

August 2019, Plaintiff represents that she, for the first time,
read an affidavit in which a USMS employee, Steven Moody, said
that Jacob Green learned of Plaintiff’s prior, unrelated EEO
claims and did not hire Plaintiff for the Seattle Position
because he “didn’t want to deal with that.” (the “Moody
Affidavit”) (ECF No. 83 at 3.)

statement of undisputed facts and on documents Plaintiff cites in
the record.
On September 6, 2019, Plaintiff filed an EEO claim alleging
retaliation by the USMS for protected activity under Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act (“Title VII”) for failing to select her

for the Seattle Position. (ECF Nos. 75 at 11-12 & 83 at 10.)
Plaintiff represents that filing that claim “start[ed] the [EEO]
process.” (Id.) Plaintiff’s EEO claim was adjudicated by the
U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (the “EEOC”), which
made its Final Agency Decision on March 30, 2023. (ECF No. 1-3.)
In that decision, the EEOC rejected Plaintiff’s claim and
concluded that management had offered legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reasons for its hiring decision. (ECF No. 1-2
at 2.)
Plaintiff filed this case on July 31, 2023, in accordance
with the EEOC’s Final Agency Decision, which granted Plaintiff
the right to sue in the appropriate U.S. District Court. (ECF

No. 1.) On May 29, 2024, the Court denied Defendant’s motion to
dismiss (the “May 29 Order”). (ECF No. 17.) In its May 29 Order,
the Court equitably tolled the deadline for Plaintiff to initiate
contact with an EEO counselor based on the allegations in the
Complaint and determined that Plaintiff had adequately alleged
retaliation. (Id.)
Since the May 29 Order, the parties have conducted discovery
for more than a year. On August 20, 2025, Defendant filed the
pending Motion for Summary Judgment. (ECF No. 75.) Defendant
argues that the record now shows that Plaintiff is not entitled
to equitable tolling, and that, even if she were, no reasonable
jury could conclude that Plaintiff was retaliated against for

protected activity when she was not hired for the Seattle
Position. (ECF No. 75.) Plaintiff responds that she remains
entitled to equitable tolling based on the record and that the
case should go to trial. (ECF No. 83.)

II. Jurisdiction
Federal district courts have original jurisdiction over all
civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties
of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Plaintiff brings a
claim under Title VII. (ECF No. 1.) The Court has original
federal question jurisdiction over that claim.

III. Standard of Review

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a), a court must
grant a party’s motion for summary judgment “if the movant shows
that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ.
P. 56(a). The moving party must show that the nonmoving party,
having had sufficient opportunity for discovery, lacks evidence
to support an essential element of its case. See Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(c)(1); Peeples v. City of Detroit, 891 F.3d 622, 630 (6th
Cir. 2018). All inferences must be drawn in the light most
favorable to the nonmovant. Bledsoe v. Tenn. Valley Auth. Bd. of
Dirs., 42 F.4th 568, 578 (6th Cir. 2022).

“The moving party has the burden of showing the absence of
a genuine issue of material fact as to at least one essential
element of the non-moving party's case.” Kurtz v. Sec'y of Army,
No. 3:06-1209, 2009 WL 5066901, at *1 (M.D. Tenn. Dec. 21, 2009),
aff'd sub nom. Kurtz v. McHugh, 423 F. App'x 572 (6th Cir. 2011)
(citing Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322–23 (1986)). Once
the moving party has satisfied its burden, the burden shifts to
the non-moving party to set forth “specific facts showing that
there is a genuine issue for trial.” Guptill v. City of
Chattanooga, Tennessee, 160 F.4th 768, 776 (6th Cir. 2025)
(citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(e))).

The Court “is not required to speculate on which portion of
the record the nonmoving party relies, nor is it obligated to
wade through and search the entire record for some specific facts
that might support the nonmoving party's claim.” InterRoyal Corp.
v. Sponseller, 889 F.2d 108, 111 (6th Cir. 1989).
Although summary judgment must be used carefully, it “is
‘an integral part of the Federal Rules as a whole, which are
designed to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive
determination of every action’ rather than a ‘disfavored
procedural shortcut.’” F.D.I.C. v. Jeff Miller Stables, 573 F.3d
289, 294 (6th Cir. 2009) (quoting Celotex, 477 U.S. at 327).

IV. Analysis: Equitable Tolling
A. Standard

Defendant argues that this case is time-barred because
Plaintiff did not diligently pursue her rights by timely
initiating contact with the EEOC. Plaintiff waited two years
after she learned she had not been hired for the Seattle Position
to initiate the EEO process by filing her EEO claim alleging
retaliation. (ECF No. 75 at 3-12.) Plaintiff does not dispute
Defendant’s timeline, but argues that she is entitled to
equitable tolling to allow her claim to proceed. (ECF No. 83 at
10-11.)
“A plaintiff who alleges that a federal agency has engaged
in race discrimination must initiate contact with an EEO

counselor within forty-five days of the date of the alleged
discriminatory act.” Dixon v. Gonzales, 481 F.3d 324, 330 (6th
Cir. 2007). This forty-five-day limitation is a prerequisite to
filing suit, but “it is subject to equitable tolling, waiver,
and estoppel.” Id.
As the Court noted in its May 29 Order denying Defendant’s
motion to dismiss, the forty-five-day clock began to run when
Plaintiff learned of the USMS’s decision not to hire her, not
when Plaintiff learned the decision might have been
discriminatorily motivated. (ECF No. 17 at 9.) Plaintiff learned
of the hiring decision on September 11, 2017, and did not

initiate contact until September 6, 2019, when she filed her EEO
claim to start the EEO process. (ECF Nos. 1 at 5 & 83-2 at ¶
50.) The Court must equitably toll Plaintiff’s deadline if the
case is to proceed.
“Equitable tolling is an issue of law suitable for
disposition on summary judgment.” Kurtz, 2009 WL 5066901, at *6
(citing Chavez v. Carranza, 559 F.3d 486, 494 (6th Cir.2009)).
At the summary judgment stage, the decision to equitably toll
the limitation period for filing a charge of discrimination is
“within the discretion of the district court and should be made
on a case-by-base basis.” Black v. Columbus Pub. Schs., 211 F.
Supp. 2d 975, 981 (S.D. Ohio 2002), aff'd, 79 F. App'x 735 (6th

Cir. 2003).
Title VII and subsequent amendments are the exclusive
judicial remedy for claims of discrimination in federal
employment. Steiner v. Henderson, 354 F.3d 432, 434 (6th Cir.
2003). In allowing federal employees to sue under Title VII,
“Congress conditioned the government's waiver of sovereign
immunity upon a plaintiff's satisfaction of rigorous
administrative exhaustion requirements and time limitations.”
Steiner, 354 F.3d at 434–35 (citing McFarland v. Henderson, 307
F.3d 402, 406 (6th Cir.2002)). The Supreme Court has made clear
that tolling in a Title VII case should be allowed “only
sparingly.” Steiner, 354 F.3d at 435 (citing Irwin v. Dep't of

Veterans Affs., 498 U.S. 89, 96 (1990)). The “procedural
requirements established by Congress for gaining access to the
federal courts are not to be disregarded by courts out of a vague
sympathy for particular litigants.” Baldwin Cnty. Welcome Ctr.
v. Brown, 466 U.S. 147, 152 (1984).
Courts consider the following five nonexhaustive factors
when determining whether equitable tolling is appropriate in a
Title VII case: (1) lack of notice of the filing requirement;
(2) lack of constructive knowledge of the filing requirement;
(3) diligence in pursuing one's rights; (4) absence of prejudice
to the defendant; and (5) the plaintiff's reasonableness in
remaining ignorant of the particular legal requirement. Dixon,

481 F.3d at 331.
B. Application
1. Factors One, Two, and Five
Factors one, two, and five favor Defendant. Plaintiff has
nowhere argued that she lacked notice, knowledge, or constructive
knowledge of the filing or legal requirements for Title VII
claims in general or for this claim in particular. (ECF Nos. 1
& 83.) She timely initiated EOO counseling as a federal employee
in at least three other cases alleging Title VII violations
before this one. See Crawford v. Skinner, 35 F.3d 565, 1994 WL
443453 (6th Cir. Aug. 15, 1994) Crawford v. Winter, No. 08-2105
(W.D. Tenn.), (ECF No. 12-8); and Crawford v. Carter, No. 13-

2439 (W.D. Tenn.) (ECF No. 12-9). Prior experience with the EEO
process is sufficient to infer a plaintiff’s knowledge of the
relevant procedural requirements. Kurtz, 2009 WL 5066901, at *6
(“plaintiff therefore had experience with the EEO process and
direct contact with an EEO Officer before any of the alleged
incidents of retaliation took place. Because of this, it is
unreasonable that Plaintiff remained ignorant of the procedural
requirements of the EEO Office…and therefore the magistrate did
not err in refusing to apply equitable tolling of the filing
requirement”). Based on Plaintiff’s experience in prior cases,
the Court attributes relevant knowledge of the EEO process to
Plaintiff.
2. Factor Three

The parties’ arguments center on factors three and four.
Factor three addresses whether Plaintiff was diligent in pursuing
her rights. Plaintiff argues that she was diligent because she
“had no reason to believe that she [w]as [sic] the victim of
discrimination or reprisal at the time of her nonselection in
2017.” (ECF No. 83 at 10.) Plaintiff filed an EEO claim to begin
the EEO process about the Seattle Position a few days after she
read the Moody Affidavit. Therefore, Plaintiff argues that she
diligently pursued her rights. (Id. at 10-11.) The Court agreed
with Plaintiff when it denied Defendant’s motion to dismiss and
equitably tolled the filing deadline. (ECF No. 17.)

Defendant argues that the record, as it has developed since
the dismissal stage, should change the Court’s prior conclusion.
(ECF No. 75 at 6-7.) First, Defendant shows that Plaintiff was
generally suspicious about potential retaliation as of April 25,
2017, when Plaintiff told the union president that Plaintiff
“may be getting retaliated against” based on a desk audit. (ECF
No. 83-2 ¶ 49.) That occurred three months before Plaintiff
interviewed for the Seattle Position (ECF No. 1 at 4.) Second,
Defendant shows that, when Plaintiff “did her interview, she
thought she did well, and she was being told that she did well,
but was not selected,” as Plaintiff stated to the EEO
investigator later on. (ECF No. 83-2 at ¶ 50.) Defendant also

shows that two or three weeks after Plaintiff’s interview,
another employee told Plaintiff that he gave her a “good
recommendation” for the Seattle Position.2 (ECF No. 83-2 at ¶
51.) Defendant shows that a different employee said he was

2 Plaintiff appears to dispute whether that employee, Brian Sanders,
actually gave Plaintiff a positive recommendation. (ECF No. 83-2 at
21.) Any such objection is not relevant here, because whether
Sanders gave a positive recommendation and whether Green considered
it does not change what Sanders told Plaintiff. The Court does not
consider Sanders’ statement for the truth of the matter asserted,
but for its effect on the listener, Plaintiff.
“shocked” when Plaintiff was not selected. (ECF No. 75-34 at 1.)3
None of that evidence was in the record or otherwise before the
Court for consideration at the dismissal stage.

Defendant argues that many things have emerged in the record
that should have alerted Plaintiff to the possibility that she
was being retaliated against before she learned of the Moody
Affidavit. Defendant argues that these new facts show that
Plaintiff did not diligently pursue her rights.
The Court said in its May 29 Order denying Defendant’s
motion to dismiss that there were two questions to consider in
deciding Plaintiff’s diligence: whether Plaintiff diligently
sought the information necessary to learn whether she should
consider an EEO action and whether Plaintiff diligently initiated
contact with an EEO employee after being put on notice that she
had a potential claim. (ECF No. 17 at 13) (citing Amini v.

Oberlin Coll., 259 F.3d 493, 499 (6th Cir. 2001)).
Here, Plaintiff did not seek information about the Seattle
AO employment decision until after she had read the Moody
Affidavit, nearly two years after she learned she had not been

3 Defendant also cites other evidence in the record surrounding a
different EEO complaint Plaintiff was considering filing about a
different position. (ECF No. 75 at 8-9.) Although that evidence
might show a generally litigious disposition on the part of
Plaintiff, it does not necessarily show that she could or should
have suspected retaliation when she was not selected for the Seattle
Position.
hired for the Seattle Position. (ECF No. 83 at 10.) In its May
29 Order, the Court, considering a motion to dismiss, reasoned
that “it is difficult to determine how Plaintiff could have

surmised that her non-selection was retaliatory.” (ECF No. 17 at
15.) The evidence that has emerged in the record now shows that
Plaintiff was or should have been on notice that there was the
possibility she was subject to retaliation. Plaintiff testified
that “she thought she did well, and she was being told that she
did well, but was not selected.” (ECF No. 83-2 at ¶ 50.) Two or
three weeks after her interview—and well within the 45-day period
to initiate contact with an EEO counselor—another employee told
Plaintiff that he had given her a good recommendation for the
Seattle Position. (ECF No. 83-2 at ¶ 51.) Other employees were
“shocked” that Plaintiff had not been selected. (ECF No. 75-34
at 1.) These facts combine to show that Plaintiff could have

surmised that her non-selection was retaliatory and that she was
not diligent in pursuing her rights. Although Plaintiff later
discovered additional evidence of potential discrimination, that
information was not critical to initiating the EEO process in
the initial 45-day period. “A plaintiff need not know all the
facts of [her] case in order to comply with Title VII's
administrative exhaustion requirement.” Tenenbaum v. Caldera,
45 F. App'x 416, 421 (6th Cir. 2002).
Other courts have equitably tolled the deadline for a Title
VII claim when the plaintiff has lacked information critical to
her case. See Dixon, 481 F.3d at 330 and Seay v. Tenn. Valley

Auth., 339 F.3d 454, 469 (6th Cir.2003). In those cases, however,
“the defendant withheld information or provided misleading
information that plaintiff needed to raise a suspicion that the
defendant's actions were motivated by discrimination or
retaliation.” Taylor v. Donahoe, 452 F. App'x 614, 618 (6th
Cir. 2011) (describing Dixon and Seay). There, “the period was
tolled, but only until [plaintiff] was aware of the possibility
that he had suffered an adverse employment action because of
illegal discrimination.” Taylor, 452 F. App'x at 618. Dixon
and Seay are inapplicable here, where there is no allegation of
employer wrongdoing in withholding information or providing
misleading information.

“To successfully raise a claim of equitable tolling, a party
must show either fraudulent concealment of the critical facts
that would lead one to know that [she] can sue, or a
misrepresentation of those facts—whether made in good faith or
not—that was calculated to induce a plaintiff to forego the right
to sue.” Tenenbaum, 45 F. App'x at 421 (cleaned up). Plaintiff
does not argue that she was prevented or hindered from inquiring
or accessing evidence about her case. Although it was possible
that concealment or misrepresentation would emerge in the record
during discovery after the dismissal stage, the record does not
contain any such evidence.
Because Plaintiff was aware of the possibility that she had

suffered an adverse employment action motivated by illegal
discrimination when she learned she had not been hired for the
Seattle Position, and because there is no evidence or allegation
of employer concealment or misrepresentation that prevented
Plaintiff from pursuing her rights, Dixon and Seay are
distinguishable. Plaintiff did not diligently pursue her rights.
As the Sixth Circuit held in Amini, courts “will not, absent
other circumstances weighing in favor of equitable tolling,
suspend the running of the statute of limitations in a
discrimination action until the plaintiff learns sufficient
facts that would lead [her] to suspect that the defendant acted
with discriminatory intent.” 259 F.3d at 502. There are no

such circumstances here. Factor three favors Defendant.
3. Factor Four
Factor four addresses prejudice to the defendant. “The
Supreme Court has held that the absence of prejudice to the
defendant employer ‘is not an independent basis for invoking the
doctrine and sanctioning deviations from established
procedures.’” Steiner, 354 F.3d at 437 (citing Baldwin Cnty.
Welcome Ctr., 466 U.S. at 152. “Although absence of prejudice
is a factor to be considered in determining whether the doctrine
of equitable tolling should apply once a factor that might
justify tolling is identified, it is not an independent basis
for invoking the doctrine.” Graham-Humphreys v. Memphis Brooks

Museum of Art, Inc., 209 F.3d 552, 562 (6th Cir. 2000) (citing
Andrews v. Orr, 851 F.2d 146, 151 (6th Cir.1988)). “Prejudice
may only be considered if other factors of the test are met [by
the plaintiff] and therefore can only weigh in [the defendant’s]
favor.” 3799 Mill Run Partners, LLC v. City of Hilliard, Ohio,
839 F. App'x 948, 951 (6th Cir. 2020) (citing Townsend v. Soc.
Sec. Admin., 486 F.3d 127, 132 (6th Cir. 2007)).
“Prejudice for purposes of the doctrine of equitable tolling
means the disposal of evidence and the inaccessibility of
witnesses, the dimming of recollections and other disadvantages
incident to the lapse of time.” Monnheimer v. Nielsen, No.
1:08CV356, 2008 WL 5333808, at *5 (S.D. Ohio Dec. 19, 2008)

(citing Salins v. City of Dayton, 624 F.Supp. 632, 634 (S.D.Ohio
1985)).
The Court need not consider prejudice to Defendant because
no other factor favors Plaintiff. Courts have denied requests
for equitable tolling even when no prejudice to the defendant
had been shown. See, e.g. Steiner, 354 F.3d at 437; Graham-
Humphreys, 209 F.3d at 562; Garrett v. Structured Cabling Sys.,
Inc., No. CIV. 10-55-DLB, 2010 WL 3862994, at *12 (E.D. Ky. Sept.
28, 2010); and Amini, 259 F.3d at 502
Nevertheless, factor four favors Defendant. At the
dismissal stage, Defendant did not show and made no argument
attempting to show that she would be prejudiced by the Court’s

equitably tolling Plaintiff’s deadline to initiate the EEO
process. (ECF No. 17 at 15.) Defendant argues now that she was
prejudiced by Plaintiff’s delay in two ways. First, Defendant
argues that her access to witnesses was hindered, because three
employee witnesses had left the USMS by January 2020, four months
after Plaintiff first sought EEO counseling in September 2019.
(ECF Nos. 75 at 11 & 83-2 at ¶ 60.) Plaintiff does not address
this argument.4 The two-year delay in initiating the EEO process
meant that Defendant had more difficulty accessing witnesses.
Second, Defendant cites witnesses’ memory loss caused by
the two-year delay. (ECF No. 75 at 11-12.) Defendant accurately
cites the deposition testimony of Jacob Green, Eddie Laster, and

Steve Moody that shows a failure of memory about certain events
and details. (ECF No. 75 at 11-12.) Green ascribed his difficulty
recalling events to the passage of time. (ECF No. 75-2 at 29).
Moody testified that the fact he was deposed after his June 2022
retirement affected his ability to recall key events.5 (ECF No.

4 Plaintiff incorrectly asserts that “the only prejudice the
Defendant can point to deals with witness recollection.” (ECF No. 83
at 11.)
5 Moody’s subsequent declaration, submitted by Plaintiff in her
response to Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, clarifies some,
75-7 at 5.) Laster, at his deposition, also implied that the
passage of time had hindered his ability to recall events. (ECF
No. 75-18 at 33-34.)

Memory naturally fades with time, and it is impossible to
say definitively whether a witness’s memory would be better
absent Plaintiff’s two-year delay. A witness’s faded memory
might also be due in part to the fact that the case had to
proceed through an administrative process before reaching this
Court. (ECF No. 1-2.) Plaintiff argues that these lapses in
memory occurred in response to questions that strategically favor
Defendant. (ECF No. 83 at 11-13). However, the Court must
consider the fact that three key witnesses attributed their lack
of memory to the passage of time, potentially prejudicing
Defendant and hindering the case, given Plaintiff’s two-year
delay in initiating the EEO process.

The heightened difficulty of accessing witnesses and the
fading memory of other witnesses prejudice Defendant.
4. There Are No Extenuating Circumstances
All of the factors weigh against equitable tolling in this
case. Plaintiff knew the procedures for initiating the EEO
process, she suspected or should have suspected she was
potentially being retaliated against when she was not selected

but not all, of the gaps Defendant cites in Moody’s memory during
his deposition. (ECF No. 83-1.)
for the Seattle Position, and Defendant would be prejudiced by
Plaintiff’s two-year delay in initiating the process. Even in
the absence of prejudice to Defendant, equitable tolling would

be inappropriate.
Because the Dixon factors are “not exhaustive, and equitable
tolling is decided on a case-by-case basis, this inquiry must
consider any additional, relevant factors.” Garrett, 2010 WL
3862994 at *12. The parties have cited no additional factors,
and the Court finds none relevant here.

V. Conclusion
Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED. After
full consideration of the record, the Court finds that all of
the Dixon factors weigh against equitably tolling Plaintiff’s
filing deadline. Because Plaintiff did not initiate the EEO
process within forty-five days after learning she had not been

hired for the Seattle Position, the retaliation and reprisal
claim is time-barred and dismissed WITH PREJUDICE.

So ordered this 11th day of February, 2026.

/s/ Samuel H. Mays, Jr.
SAMUEL H. MAYS, JR.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11256541. Public record. Not legal advice.