# In Re: S.H.A., Appeal of: K.L.A.

> Superior Court of Pennsylvania · February 11, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11254517

## Case

- **Court:** Superior Court of Pennsylvania
- **Decided:** February 11, 2026
- **Precedential status:** Unpublished
- **Opinion:** Opinion by Kunselman
- **Judges:** Kunselman
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11254517

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- recognizing that “where a child is too young to express a preference, it would be appropriate for the GAL to represent the child’s best and legal interests simultaneously.” (citation omitted)

## Opinion text

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

IN RE: S.H.A., A MINOR : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
APPEAL OF: K.L.A., MOTHER :
:
:
:
:
: No. 1942 EDA 2025

Appeal from the Decree Entered July 8, 2025
In the Court of Common Pleas of Lehigh County Orphans' Court at No(s):
A2025-0007

IN RE: S.H.A., A MINOR : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
APPEAL OF: A.T.A., FATHER :
:
:
:
:
: No. 1997 EDA 2025

Appeal from the Decree Entered July 8, 2025
In the Court of Common Pleas of Lehigh County Orphans' Court at No(s):
A2025-0007

BEFORE: KUNSELMAN, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and BENDER, P.J.E.

MEMORANDUM BY KUNSELMAN, J.: FILED FEBRUARY 11, 2026

In these matters, K.L.A. (Mother) and A.T.A. (Father) appeal from the

decrees that terminated their parental rights to their now over two-year-old

son, S.H.A. (the Child or Child), pursuant to the Adoption Act. See 23

Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), (a)(2), (a)(5), (a)(8), and (b). Because each parent’s

appeal raises substantially the same issues and involves the same facts and
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circumstances, we address the parents’ appeals together in one decision.

After review, we affirm.

We discern the following factual and procedural history from the

orphans’ court’s opinion. In October 2023, while Mother was pregnant with

the Child, Mother and Father traveled from Lehigh County to Philadelphia to

buy illegal drugs. On the way, Mother went into labor and had an emergency

c-section in Philadelphia.

At his birth, the Child and Mother tested positive for several illicit

substances. Mother told medical staff she had been using two to three bags

of heroin daily, which was a reduction due to her concern that the drugs would

impact the Child. Mother was fearful that if she went through withdrawal while

pregnant, the Child would suffer. Within a few days after his birth, it became

obvious that the Child was drug-impacted. He was placed in the NICU. While

the Child was hospitalized, Mother and Father visited him only a handful of

times, with the last visit being on October 24, 2023. Conversely, a foster

family began visiting the Child daily. The Child was discharged into the foster

family’s care in November 2023, five and a half weeks after he was born, and

he has remained there ever since.

The Child was adjudicated dependent. Mother’s court-ordered

recommendations included: submitting urinalysis to show sobriety as

recommended by the Lehigh County Office of Children and Youth Services (the

Agency); completing a drug and alcohol evaluation and any treatment

recommended; and obtaining and maintaining legal income and stable

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housing. Father’s court-ordered recommendations included: submitting

urinalysis to show sobriety as recommended by the Agency; obtaining and

maintaining legal income and stable housing; and notifying the Agency of any

changes in his address or contact information.

Over the next fourteen months, Mother and Father failed to comply with

their court-ordered recommendations and did not maintain contact with the

Agency or the Child. On February 7, 2025, the Agency filed petitions to

involuntarily terminate Mother’s and Father’s parental rights. The orphans’

court held a termination hearing on April 23, 2025. 1 Two Agency caseworkers,

____________________________________________

1 The Child was represented by counsel at the termination hearing who also

served as the Child’s guardian ad litem (GAL) in the dependency proceedings.

Our Supreme Court has mandated that appellate courts sua sponte “verify
that the orphans’ court indicated that the attorney [in a dual role of GAL and
legal counsel] could represent the child’s best interests and legal interests
without conflict.” In re Adoption of K.M.G., 240 A.3d 1218, 1236 (Pa.
2020); see also 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2313(a). Counsel representing a child’s legal
interests must advocate for the child’s preferred outcome even if counsel does
not agree with it, whereas the GAL representing a child’s best interests must
express what the GAL “believes is best for the child’s care, protection, safety,
and wholesome physical and mental development regardless of whether the
child agrees.” In re T.S., 192 A.3d 1080, 1082 n.2 (Pa. 2018) (citation
omitted).

Here, the record does not contain clear findings by the trial court regarding
whether a conflict existed between the Child’s legal and best interests.
However, the Child was a little over a year and a half old at the time of the
termination hearing, and there is record evidence that he was still learning to
speak and had a limited vocabulary. See N.T., 4/23/25, at 68, 75, 77, 81;
Recommendations – Permanency Review, 3/19/24, 9/12/24, 2/25/25 (noting
that the Child was too young to express his views). Given the Child’s young
age and his stage of development, it would have been impossible to ascertain
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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a foster care adoption case manager, and Mother testified. On July 8, 2025,

the orphans’ court involuntarily terminated Mother’s and Father’s parental

rights to the Child.

Mother and Father timely filed these appeals. We will address Mother’s

appeal first. Mother presents the following two issues 2 for our review:
____________________________________________

his preferred outcome. Thus, there could not have been a conflict between
the Child’s interests, and dual representation was appropriate. See T.S., 192
A.3d at 1088 (recognizing that “where a child is too young to express a
preference, it would be appropriate for the GAL to represent the child’s best
and legal interests simultaneously.” (citation omitted)).

Nevertheless, we remind the orphans’ court and all counsel that the orphans’
court is required to determine whether counsel can represent the dual
interests of a child before appointing an individual to serve as GAL/counsel
for the child. See K.M.G., supra. The orphans’ court is not permitted to
delegate this responsibility to counsel. See Matter of Adoption of A. C. M.,
333 A.3d 704, 708-09 (Pa. Super. 2025). As a best practice, when a child is
too young to express a preference, the orphans’ court should indicate this in
the order appointing the GAL as the child’s legal counsel for the termination
proceeding.

2 Mother’s Appellate Rule 1925(b) statement raises approximately six issues,

none of which directly match the issues she lists in her brief. See Mother’s
Concise Statement of Matters Complained of on Appeal. Two of her issues
broadly challenge the termination by stating that it was not supported by
sufficient evidence and that the Agency had not met its burden of proof. See
id. Although her next three issues do not specifically cite which statutory
subsections she is challenging, we surmise from the language used that they
refer to Section 2511(a)(2), (5), and (8). See id. Mother’s sixth issue cites
Section 2511(a)(8) and (b). See id. However, none of Mother’s issues
specifically cite Section 2511(a)(1) or use the language from that subsection.
See id.

We remind and caution Mother and her counsel that, pursuant to Appellate
Rule 1925(b), issues “not included in the Statement and/or not raised in
accordance with the provisions of this paragraph (b)(4) are waived.” Pa.R.A.P.
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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1. Did the trial court err as a matter of law and/or abuse its
discretion in finding that the Lehigh County Office of
Children and Youth Services met the requirements of 23
Pa.C.S.A. §2511(a)(1), (a)(2), (a)(5) and (a)(8) by clear
and convincing evidence?

2. Did the trial court err as a matter of law and/or abuse its
discretion in finding that the Lehigh County Office of
Children and Youth Services sustained their burden of
proof by clear and convincing evidence that the
termination of biological parent’s’ parental rights to [the
Child] best met the needs and welfare of the Child as
required by 23 Pa.C.S.A. §2511(b)?

Mother’s Brief at 4 (cleaned up) (numbering added) (excess capitalization and

suggested answers omitted).

We begin with our well-settled standard of review:

The standard of review in termination of parental rights
cases requires appellate courts to accept the findings of fact
and credibility determinations of the trial court if they are
supported by the record. If the factual findings are
supported, appellate courts review to determine if the trial
court made an error of law or abused its discretion. A
decision may be reversed for an abuse of discretion only
upon demonstration of manifest unreasonableness,
partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. The trial court’s
decision, however, should not be reversed merely because
the record would support a different result. We have
previously emphasized our deference to trial courts that
often have first-hand observations of the parties spanning
multiple hearings.

In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013) (citations and quotation marks

omitted).
____________________________________________

1925(b)(4)(vii). Nevertheless, because a challenge to (a)(1) is derivative of
the broader issues included in her concise statement, our appellate review
was not impeded. Thus, we decline to find waiver in this instance.

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Our Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that in termination cases,

deference to the trial court is particularly crucial. In re Adoption of L.A.K.,

265 A.3d 580, 597 (Pa. 2021); see also Interest of S.K.L.R., 256 A.3d 1108,

1124 (Pa. 2021) (“When a trial court makes a ‘close call’ in a fact-intensive

case involving . . . the termination of parental rights, the appellate court

should review the record for an abuse of discretion and for whether evidence

supports that trial court’s conclusions; the appellate court should not search

the record for contrary conclusions or substitute its judgment for that of the

trial court.”). The abuse-of-discretion standard in termination cases “is a

highly deferential standard and, to the extent that the record supports the

court’s decision, we must affirm even though evidence exists that would also

support a contrary determination.” In re P.Z., 113 A.3d 840, 849 (Pa. Super.

2015) (citation omitted); see also T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 267. Furthermore, the

“trial court is free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence presented, and

is likewise free to make all credibility determinations and resolve conflicts in

the evidence.” In re M.G., 855 A.2d 68, 73-74 (Pa. Super. 2004) (citation

omitted).

Clear and convincing evidence is evidence that is so “clear, direct,

weighty and convincing as to enable the trier of fact to come to a clear

conviction, without hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.” In re

C.S., 761 A.2d 1197, 1201 (Pa. Super. 2000) (en banc) (quoting Matter of

Adoption of Charles E.D.M., II, 708 A.2d 88, 91 (Pa. 1998)).

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Termination of parental rights is governed by Section 2511 of the

Adoption Act, which requires a bifurcated analysis.

Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The party
seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing
evidence that the parent’s conduct satisfies the statutory
grounds for termination delineated in Section 2511(a). Only
if the court determines that the parent’s conduct warrants
termination of his or her parental rights does the court
engage in the second part of the analysis pursuant to
Section 2511(b): determination of the needs and welfare of
the child . . . .

In re C.M.K., 203 A.3d 258, 261-62 (Pa. Super. 2019) (citation omitted);

see also Interest of M.E., 283 A.3d 820, 830 (Pa. Super. 2022).

Instantly, the orphans’ court terminated Mother’s rights under Section

2511(a)(1), (a)(2), (a)(5), (a)(8), and (b). As we may affirm under any of

the subsections of Section 2511(a), we review the court’s decision as to

Section 2511(a)(1). That subsection provides:

(a) General rule.--The rights of a parent in regard to a
child may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the
following grounds:

(1) The parent by conduct continuing for a period of at
least six months immediately preceding the filing of the
petition either has evidenced a settled purpose of
relinquishing parental claim to a child or has refused or
failed to perform parental duties.

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1).

Here, the termination petitions were filed on February 7, 2025; thus,

the statutory timeframe to examine Mother’s actions began on August 7,

2024. Our Supreme Court has reinforced “the view that the six-month period

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immediately preceding the filing of the petition is the most critical period to

evaluate for affirmative conduct or its absence . . . .” In re Adoption of

C.M., 255 A.3d 343, 367 (Pa. 2021) (citation omitted) (some emphasis in

original). “The trial court must examine the individual circumstances of each

case and consider all of the explanations of the parent to decide if the

evidence, under the totality of the circumstances, requires involuntary

termination.” In re I.J., 972 A.2d 5, 10 (Pa. Super. 2009) (citing In re

B.,N.M., 856 A.2d 847, 855 (Pa. Super. 2004), appeal denied, 872 A.2d 1200

(Pa. 2005)).

Regarding parental duties, we have explained that:

There is no simple or easy definition of parental duties.
Parental duty is best understood in relation to the needs of
a child. A child needs love, protection, guidance, and
support. These needs, physical and emotional, cannot be
met by a merely passive interest in the development of the
child. Thus, . . . the parental obligation is a positive duty
which requires affirmative performance.

B.,N.M., 856 A.2d at 855 (citation omitted).

Furthermore,

Parental duty requires that the parent act affirmatively with
good faith interest and effort, and not yield to every
problem, in order to maintain the parent-child relationship
to the best of his or her ability, even in difficult
circumstances. A parent must utilize all available resources
to preserve the parental relationship, and must exercise
reasonable firmness in resisting obstacles placed in the path
of maintaining the parent-child relationship. Parental rights
are not preserved by waiting for a more suitable or
convenient time to perform one’s parental responsibilities
while others provide the child with [the child’s] physical and
emotional needs.

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Id. (internal citations omitted).

Once a settled purpose of relinquishing parental rights or a failure to

perform parental duties is established, “the court must engage in three lines

of inquiry: (1) the parent’s explanation for [the parent’s] conduct; (2) the

post-abandonment contact between [the] parent and [the] child; and (3)

consideration of the effect of termination of parental rights on the child

pursuant to Section 2511(b).” In re Z.S.W., 946 A.2d 726, 730 (Pa. Super.

2008) (citing Charles E.D.M., II, 708 A.2d at 92).

Here, the orphans’ court determined that the Agency had proven the

statutory grounds for terminating Mother’s parental rights under Section

2511(a)(1). The court explained:

Addiction played the predominant role in guiding both
parents’ behavior for the first 17 months of Child’s life. He
was adjudicated dependent following a hearing held
November 7, 2023, which they did not attend. They did not
attend any of the dependency hearings pertaining to Child
or try to comply with [any] of the court-ordered services the
Juvenile Division set forth to help Mother and Father reunify
with Child. After their last visit with Child on October 24,
2023, at the NICU in Philadelphia, they did not visit Child at
all. They did not contact [the Agency] to find out how Child
was doing, except that on March 25, 2024, Mother reached
out to [. . .] the original [Agency] caseworker in the matter,
and provided updated contact information for herself and
Father. [The original caseworker passed that information to
the new caseworker, who immediately reached back out to
Mother. Mother provided updated contact information for
herself and Father. The caseworker attempted to engage
Mother in services, but after the caseworker let Mother know
what was expected of her and that Mother could visit with
the Child, Mother did not respond.] [. . .] Neither parent
responded to subsequent attempts [the caseworker] made
to contact the parents, whether by phone, mail, or text.

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On or about September 3, 2024, the Juvenile Division
granted the Agency’s petition for a finding of aggravated
circumstances based on the parents’ failure to maintain
contact with Child for a period of six months. On March 5,
2025, nearly a year after her last contact with the Agency,
Mother contacted the Agency for the second time since Child
went into the Agency’s care. She provided her current
contact information at the recovery house and requested
visits with Child. [The caseworker] then reached out to
Father using new contact information Mother had provided
to ask if he would like visits as well.

[The caseworker] scheduled visits for Mother and for
Father to occur on March 19, 2025. Child was 17 months
old at the time and it would be the first time either parent
had seen him since October 24, 2023. Mother attended the
visit, but Father failed to confirm the visit as required and
was unable to attend. Notably, Child clung to his foster
father at the start of the visit. During the visit, Mother was
appropriate with Child and spoke to him throughout the
visit. He reacted to Mother the same way he does to
complete strangers: Rather than playfully initiating, as he
does when he is with people whom he knows and with whom
he is comfortable, he kept to himself or responded to
Mother’s initiation of play.

Another visit was scheduled for Father for April [15],
2025, but it had to be cancelled because Child was sick. As
of the date of the termination hearing, Mother had two
supervised hour-long visits with Child. Father had not seen
Child at all.

The [orphans’ court] recognizes that Mother has recently
made progress, but the Agency’s petition to terminate
Mother’s and Father’s parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.
§2511(a)(1), (2), (5), and (8) is nevertheless well-founded
and should be granted. Child has been continuously in
placement since November 7, 2023. From October 24,
2023, (the parents’ last visit with Child at the Temple
University Hospital) until approximately two months before
the termination hearing, neither parent showed any interest
in performing parental duties or taking the steps necessary
to provide Child with the essential parental care, control, or

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subsistence he needs for his physical and mental wellbeing.
(See 23 Pa.C.S. §2511(a)(1) and (2).) In addition, they
exhibited an apparent “settled purpose of relinquishing
parental claim to [their] child” for a period in excess of six
months by their failure to have any involvement with Child
or with the Agency regarding Child. (23 Pa.C.S
§2511(a)(1).)[FN 5]

FN 5 Neither parent contacted the Agency for nearly a
year, between Mother’s March 25, 2024, phone
contact and her March 5, 2025, phone contact. Father
apparently never tried to reach the Agency. Mother
testified that she tried to reach [the caseworker] in
January of 2025 while her inpatient counselor was
with her but that she was unsuccessful. The only
contact from Child’s parents that [the caseworker]
described was a phone call in January [2025] that was
actually from a case manager at Pyramid’s inpatient
center at Langhorne. The individual called [the
caseworker] to notify her that each of the parents had
been in the hospital for more than a month due to an
overdose. (Mother indicated during her testimony
that there never was an overdose; rather, the parents
were detoxing as previously described.) The case
manager further conveyed that Father’s mother had
received a letter giving Father notice of a permanency
review hearing scheduled in February and she was
requesting a continuance of the hearing. However,
the [orphans’ court] notes that neither parent
responded to attempts the Agency made by phone
call, text, email, or regular mail to contact Mother
and/or Father regarding Child after Child was placed
in the Agency’s care on November 7, 2023.

Orphans’ Court Opinion (O.C.O.), 7/8/25, at 4-6 (some footnotes omitted).

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On appeal, relevant to (a)(1),3 Mother argues that because she did not

have physical custody of the Child since removal and was limited to only

supervised contact with the Child, “she did not truly have the opportunity after

adjudication to provide ongoing, consistent parental care” to the Child.

Mother’s Brief at 13. Therefore, she did not fail or refuse to provide ongoing,

consistent parental care to the Child. See id. She also “had certainly not

evidenced any settled purpose of relinquishing her rights” to the Child. Id.

Mother also claims that this Court must consider all her circumstances which

were largely beyond her control. See id. at 14. According to Mother, her

efforts to remain in contact with the Child were never made easier by the

Agency. Id. Thus, Mother reiterates that she did not evidence a settled

purpose to relinquish her parental rights to the Child, nor did she intentionally

fail to parent him. Id. She claims she could not parent the Child because the

dependency court removed him from her care and placed him into foster care.

Id.

____________________________________________

3 In her brief, although Mother utilizes some of the language from Section
2511(a)(1), she fails to clearly delineate which parts of her argument relate
to (a)(1). Thus, we would have cause to find Mother’s first issue waived due
to lack of proper development. See, e.g., In re M.Z.T.M.W., 163 A.3d 462,
465 (Pa. Super. 2017) (“It is well-settled that this Court will not review a claim
unless it is developed in the argument section of an appellant’s brief, and
supported by citations to relevant authority.” (citation omitted)).
Nevertheless, we decline to do so, and instead only address Mother’s
arguments that relate to a Section 2511(a)(1) analysis.

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Our review of the record supports the orphans’ court’s decision and

belies Mother’s arguments. In the six-month statutory period (August 2024

to February 2025), Mother never contacted the Agency about her reunification

goals or the Child. See N.T., 4/23/25, at 41, 43, 45, 48. Mother never visited

with the Child during that period. See id. at 45. Mother did not attend the

Child’s adjudication hearing or any permanency review hearings. See id. at

13, 32, 37, 43, 120. The permanency review orders entered in this case found

that Mother had no compliance with the permanency plan and had made no

progress toward alleviating the circumstances which necessitated the original

placement. See Recommendations – Permanency Review, 3/19/24, 9/12/24,

2/25/25. In fact, aggravated circumstances were granted for both parents in

September 2024 because they had no contact with the Child for six months.

See N.T. at 43.

Additionally, Mother did not comply with any of her court-ordered

recommendations. She did not submit urine screens. Id. at 33, 38, 44, 48.

She did not complete a drug and alcohol evaluation or follow through with its

recommendations. Id. at 33, 38, 44-45. The Agency could not confirm if

Mother had stable housing or income or refer her to services because Mother

had no contact with the Agency. See id. at 35, 41, 45, 48.

Essentially, Mother did absolutely nothing during the six-month period.

She did not visit or have any contact with the Child, and she never even

reached out to the Agency to ask about him. Although Mother testified at the

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termination hearing that she went into detox in December 2024 followed by

inpatient and outpatient treatment, Mother did not reach out to the Agency

again until March 5, 2025. See id. at 49, 101-03. The caseworker was

unaware that Mother had entered a detox facility, had completed inpatient

treatment, or was in a recovery house until Mother contacted the Agency in

March. See id. at 55-57. Therefore, at the February 2025 permanency review

hearing, Mother’s progress was unknown because she had not contacted the

Agency. See id. at 57.

Further, Section 2511(b) makes clear that, with “respect to any petition

filed pursuant to subsection (a)(1), (6), or (8), the court shall not consider

any efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions described therein which

are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the filing of the petition.”

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b). Thus, Mother’s contact with the Agency on March 5,

2025, the first time the Agency had heard from her since March 25, 2024,

cannot be considered because it occurred after the termination petition was

filed on February 7, 2025. See id.; N.T. at 48-49. Additionally, the Agency

did not learn about any of Mother’s treatment until she finally reached out in

March 2025, after the termination petition had already been filed. Related to

post-abandonment contact, Mother’s two subsequent visits with the Child after

she contacted the Agency in March 2025 also cannot be considered, because

they occurred post-termination petition. See 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b).

Moreover, Mother admitted at the termination hearing that she could not have

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the Child with her where she was currently residing, and she had only secured

a job the week before the hearing. See N.T. at 106-07, 26.

Like the orphans’ court, we acknowledge that Mother has made some

recent progress with receiving treatment and beginning to visit the Child.

However, that does not negate the extended period that the Child was in

placement before the termination petition was filed (from November 2023 to

February 2025), during which Mother only contacted the Agency once (in

March 2024) and never had contact with the Child. Further, we acknowledge

that Mother testified that she attempted to contact the caseworker with her

counselor in January 2025 and did not receive a response. See id. at 122-

24. However, the orphans’ court noted that neither parent responded to the

Agency’s attempts by phone call, text, email, or regular mail to contact them

regarding the Child. O.C.O. at 6 n.5. We reiterate that the orphans’ court

was free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence presented, and to make

credibility determinations and resolve conflicts in the evidence. See M.G.,

supra.

Lastly, Mother testified at the termination hearing that she felt she

needed to stay away from the Child until she was clean and sober. See N.T.

at 100, 120, 134-35. Although we commend Mother for the effort she has

made in becoming sober, we reiterate that “the parental obligation is a

positive duty which requires affirmative performance.” B.,N.M., 856 A.2d at

855 (citation omitted). “Parental rights are not preserved by waiting for a

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more suitable or convenient time to perform one’s parental responsibilities

while others provide the child with [the child’s] physical and emotional needs.”

Id. (citation omitted). As the orphans’ court cogently explained, during “this

17-month period in which his parents were mostly or completely absent, a

foster family stepped in to fulfill the parental role that was otherwise missing

for this little boy.” O.C.O. at 7. Under the totality of the circumstances,

Mother’s explanation for her conduct does not excuse her complete absence

from the Child’s life until after the termination petition was filed.

Thus, there was competent evidence to support the orphans’ court’s

conclusion that Mother evidenced a settled purpose of relinquishing her

parental claim to the Child or refused or failed to perform parental duties for

the six-month statutory period. See Interest of A.M., 256 A.3d 1263, 1270–

71 (Pa. Super. 2021) (noting that “where a child is in foster care, a parent has

the affirmative duty to work towards the return of the child by cooperating

with the Agency to obtain the rehabilitative services necessary for her to be

capable of performing her parental duties and responsibilities.” (citation

omitted)). We discern no error of law or abuse of discretion with the orphans’

court’s decision under Section 2511(a)(1).

Mother’s second issue challenges the orphans’ court’s findings under

Section 2511(b), the second part of the bifurcated analysis in termination of

parental rights cases. Section 2511(b) provides:

(b) Other considerations.--The court in terminating the
rights of a parent shall give primary consideration to the

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developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare
of the child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated
solely on the basis of environmental factors such as
inadequate housing, furnishings, income, clothing and
medical care if found to be beyond the control of the parent.

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b).

The “determination of the child’s particular developmental, physical, and

emotional needs and welfare must be made on a case-by-case basis,” but

“courts should consider the matter from the child’s perspective, placing [the

child’s] developmental, physical, and emotional needs and welfare above

concerns for the parent.” In the Interest of K.T., 296 A.3d 1085, 1105 (Pa.

2023) (citations omitted); see also C.M.K., 203 A.3d at 261-62 (the focus of

Section 2511(a) is the conduct of the parent, whereas the focus of Section

2511(b) is the best interests of the child) (citation omitted).

“The plain language of Section 2511(b) clearly mandates that, in

assessing the petition to terminate parental rights, the ‘primary consideration’

must be the child’s ‘developmental, physical and emotional needs and

welfare.’” K.T., 296 A.3d at 1105. It is well-established that the child’s

“emotional needs” and “welfare” include “intangibles such as love, comfort,

security, and stability.” Id. at 1106 (citing T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 267). Our

Supreme Court also requires courts to consider, not only whether the children

have a bond with their biological parent, but also whether the children are in

a pre-adoptive foster home and whether they have a bond with their foster

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parents. Id. (citing T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 268; In re D.C.D., 105 A.3d 662, 677

(Pa. 2014)).

Here, the orphans’ court concluded that terminating Mother’s parental

rights best served the Child’s needs and welfare. The court explained:

Child has been in the home of Kinship Parents since
November 8, 2023, and has been outside of the parents’
care since his birth. Mother and Father had just four or five
visits with Child during the first month of his life. Recent
attempts to establish visitation confirmed that Mother is
essentially a stranger to Child and that he has no bond with
her. He did not have a name for Mother, but he calls his
foster parents “Mommy” and “Daddy.” In light of Child’s
very young age and Father’s failure to see the [C]hild at all
since October of 2023, it is hard for [the orphans’ court] to
imagine that Child has any bond with Father, either.

In contrast, Child had regular ongoing contact with the
foster family before he was placed with them, and he has
lived with them continuously since placement. By all
accounts, he is well-adjusted and happy, closely bonded to
all members of the family, and really is a family member in
the foster family. All of his day-to-day needs, medical
needs, and developmental needs are consistently met by his
foster family. They advocated for him to receive physical
therapy (PT) when they noticed that his neck and core
muscles appeared weak. They ensured he attended PT from
January to July of 2024, and they followed through with the
recommended exercises until he completed all
recommended therapy. They promote frequent sibling visits
between Child and his brother S., who is in the legal custody
of S.’s great aunt and uncle. [4] Child’s foster parents
consistently meet all of his physical, medical, and emotional
needs. He is spontaneously affectionate with them,

____________________________________________

4 Here, the trial court noted Mother and Father have another son together, the

Child’s older brother, S. See N.T. at 21-22, 40. The brother does not reside
with either Mother or Father and was not involved in this appeal. See id. at
40, 67-68, 116-17.

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whereas he is guarded with others, including with his
biological Mother.

Child needs and deserves stability, security, consistency,
nurturance, and permanency. Each of these needs is ably
met by his foster parents, with the exception of
permanency. They want to give him permanency, as well,
and plan to adopt him if parental rights are terminated. We
therefore find it best serves Child’s needs and welfare to
terminate both parents’ rights so that legal effect can be
given to the relationship that already exists in fact between
them.

O.C.O. at 8-9.

On appeal, Mother argues that separating the Child from her does not

serve his needs. See Mother’s Brief at 16. She claims that Section 2511(b)

“specifically notes that factors ‘beyond the control of the parent’ may not be

the sole basis for terminating parental rights.” Id. Mother asserts that many

of the barriers to her having custody of the Child were beyond her control,

such as housing and substance abuse disorder which is a documented health

condition. Id.

Mother’s argument misapprehends the relevant law and is belied by the

record. Specifically, a full reading of Section 2511(b) reveals that the “rights

of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the basis of environmental factors

such as inadequate housing, furnishings, income, clothing and medical care if

found to be beyond the control of the parent.” 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b).

Contrary to Mother’s argument, this section applies specifically to

“environmental factors” that a court finds to be beyond the control of the

parent. See id. However, the orphans’ court did not terminate Mother’s rights

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based solely on factors such as inadequate housing, furnishings, income,

clothing, or medical care, nor did the court find any of those factors to be

beyond Mother’s control. Instead, her decision to be absent from the Child’s

life until after the termination petition was filed, and to have nearly no contact

with the Agency during the Child’s placement, was within her control. We do

not minimize the impact substance abuse can have on a parent, but courts

“must keep the ticking clock of childhood ever in mind. Children are young

for a scant number of years, and we have an obligation to see to their healthy

development quickly.” K.T., 296 A.3d at 1108 (citing T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 269)

(emphasis omitted). Mother’s argument is unavailing.

Further, Mother makes no cogent argument that she has any type of

bond with the Child. Mother visited with the Child four times in October 2023

while he was in the hospital after being born. See N.T. at 15. Her next visit

with the Child did not occur until March 2025, after the termination petition

was filed. See id. at 49-50. By that time, the Child was seventeen-months

old and had not seen Mother since he was less than a month old. He did not

recognize Mother nor call her “mom.” See id. at 60-61. The Child did not

initiate interactions with Mother and initially clung to his foster father and the

supervisor. See id. at 78. Thus, there was no evidence of any bond between

Mother and the Child. See In re Adoption of C.P.D., 324 A.3d 11, 27 (Pa.

Super. 2024) (“In cases where there is no evidence of any bond between the

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parent and child, it is reasonable to infer that no bond exists.” (citation

omitted)).

Conversely, the Child’s foster family began visiting him while he was still

in the hospital, and he has lived with them since he was released. See N.T.

at 16, 28, 51, 73. The Child is now extremely bonded with his foster parents

and foster siblings. See id. at 51-53, 74-76, 80. The Child’s foster family

takes care of all his needs and are an adoptive resource for him. See id. at

52-53, 76-77, 87. The Child refers to his foster parents as “mommy” and

“daddy.” See id. at 68, 77. The Child also has consistent visits with his older

sibling. See id. at 40, 44, 67. The Agency caseworker testified that the Child

needed permanency, and it was her opinion that parental rights should be

terminated. See id. at 68-69. Similarly, the case manager recommended

that the Child stay with his foster family. See id. at 80. Thus, the record

supports the orphans’ court’s decision. We discern no error of law or abuse

of discretion in the orphans’ court’s termination of Mother’s parental rights

under Section 2511(b).

We now address Father’s appeal. Father presents the following two

issues5 for our review:

____________________________________________

5 Father’s Appellate Rule 1925(b) statement is identical to Mother’s statement.

Thus, our concerns with Mother’s statement, as discussed in Footnote 2, apply
equally to Father’s statement, which also does not specifically address Section
2511(a)(1). As with Mother, we remind and caution Father and his counsel
that issues “not included in the Statement and/or not raised in accordance
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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1. Did the trial court err as a matter of law and/or abuse its
discretion in finding that the Lehigh County Office of
Children and Youth Services met the requirements of 23
Pa.C.S.A. §2511(a)(1), (a)(2), (a)(5) and (a)(8) by clear
and convincing evidence?

2. Did the trial court err as a matter of law and/or abuse its
discretion in finding that the Lehigh County Office of
Children and Youth Services sustained its burden of proof
by clear and convincing evidence that the termination of
biological parent’s parental rights to [the Child] best met
the needs and welfare of the Child as required by 23
Pa.C.S.A. §2511(b)?

Father’s Brief at 4 (cleaned up) (numbering added) (excess capitalization and

suggested answers omitted).

Instantly, the orphans’ court terminated Father’s rights under Section

2511(a)(1), (a)(2), (a)(5), (a)(8), and (b). Again, we may affirm under any

subsection of Section 2511(a). Thus, we begin with our analysis of Section

2511(a)(1), incorporating our standard of review as described above.

On appeal, Father argues that the mere presence of substance abuse

issues does not establish grounds for termination. See Father’s Brief at 10. 6

____________________________________________

with the provisions of this paragraph (b)(4) are waived.” Pa.R.A.P.
1925(b)(4)(vii). However, as with Mother, we decline to find waiver because
Father’s challenge to (a)(1) is derivative of the two broad issues included in
his concise statement, so our appellate review was not impeded.
6 We note that Father does not specifically analyze the separate elements of

any of the Section 2511(a) subsections, including (a)(1), and instead, simply
makes general assertions in his argument section. In fact, Father does not
even cite the language of any of the Section 2511(a) subsections in his
argument beyond a broad assertion that he had not evidenced a settled
purpose of relinquishing his rights to the Child. Thus, we would have cause
to find Father’s first issue waived due to lack of proper development. See,
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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Father claims he sought treatment to get his substance abuse issues under

control. Id. According to Father, this Court must recognize that the medical

emergency in December 2024, where both parents were hospitalized from

their drug use, was a turning point for him, and he realized that he did not

want the Child to grow up without Father and Mother. Id. Father asserts that

the orphans’ court failed to examine and acknowledge his justifications and

failed to acknowledge his efforts at receiving substance abuse treatment. Id.

Father also claims that he and Mother did not fail or refuse to care for the

Child, they just lacked the wherewithal to do so at the time. Id. at 11. Lastly,

Father asserts that he has not evidenced any settled purpose of relinquishing

his rights to the Child. Id.

Father’s argument fails to appreciate the standard of review we must

apply in termination cases and is belied by the record.

Our review of the record supports the orphans’ court’s decision. We

again note that the relevant six-month statutory period under Section

2511(a)(1) was from August 2024 to February 2025. During that timeframe,

Father, like Mother, had no contact with the Agency or the Child. Specifically,

throughout the life of the case before the termination petition was filed, Father

____________________________________________

e.g., M.Z.T.M.W., 163 A.3d at 465 (“It is well-settled that this Court will not
review a claim unless it is developed in the argument section of an appellant’s
brief, and supported by citations to relevant authority.” (citation omitted)).
Nevertheless, we decline to do so, because our appellate review was not
impeded.

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never contacted the Agency about his reunification goals or to ask about the

Child, even though the Agency attempted to reach him. See N.T. at 35-36,

42, 46. Father never visited with the Child during that period; his last visit

was in October 2023 while the Child was in the hospital. See id. at 36, 42,

45, 47-48, 64. Father did not attend the Child’s adjudication hearing or any

permanency review hearings. See id. at 13, 32, 37, 43. The permanency

review orders entered in this case found that Father had no compliance with

the permanency plan and had made no progress toward alleviating the

circumstances which necessitated the original placement. See

Recommendations – Permanency Review, 3/19/24, 9/12/24, 2/25/25. In fact,

as noted above, aggravated circumstances were granted for both parents in

September 2024 because they had no contact with the Child for six months.

See N.T. at 43.

Additionally, Father did not comply with any of his court-ordered

recommendations. The only time Father submitted a urine screen was at the

beginning of this case before the relevant six-month period, and it was

insufficient, so it did not qualify as a drug screen. See id. at 22. Otherwise,

Father did not submit urine screens. See id. at 9, 35, 41, 46, 48. Father

never contacted the Agency to notify them of any changes in his address or

contact information. See id. at 35-36, 42, 46. Because Father had no contact

with the Agency, it could not confirm his housing or income. See id. at 36,

42, 48.

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Essentially, Father did absolutely nothing during the six-month period.

He did not visit or have any other contact with the Child, and he never even

reached out to the Agency to ask about the Child. In fact, it was Mother, not

Father, who reached out to the Agency in March 2025, after the termination

petition was filed, which was the first time the Agency had heard from Mother

since March 2024. See id. at 48-49. The Agency then reached out to Father.

See id. at 50. Father had the opportunity to visit with the Child in March

2025, but he did not communicate with the Agency in time to confirm the visit.

See id. at 82-84. Father was then scheduled to have a visit in April 2025, but

the Child was sick, so the visit was canceled. See id. at 50-51. Thus, as of

the termination hearing in April 2025, Father had not visited the Child since

October 2023. See id. at 64-66. He had a visit scheduled for the Wednesday

after the hearing, but as that was after the termination petition was filed, it

cannot be considered. See id. at 66; 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b).

Relevant to (a)(1), Father had no post-abandonment contact with the

Child. Moreover, Father did not testify at the termination hearing, and, thus,

he did not provide any explanation for his conduct. See Z.S.W., supra. The

Agency caseworker testified that she was aware that Father had been

employed for about a month and a half, and that Father had been in treatment

for about a week as of the termination hearing. See N.T. at 63-64. However,

again, these efforts were post-termination petition and cannot be considered.

As for Father’s other treatment, the caseworker testified that she was aware

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Father had gone through rehabilitation but did not know the details of his

treatment. See id. Father did not reach out to the Agency at any point during

the relevant six-month period to provide information about his treatment.

Thus, under the totality of the circumstances, competent evidence

supported the orphans’ court’s conclusion that Father evidenced a settled

purpose of relinquishing his parental claim to the Child or refused or failed to

perform parental duties for the six-month statutory period. See A.M., 256

A.3d at 1270–71 (noting that “where a child is in foster care, a parent has the

affirmative duty to work towards the return of the child by cooperating with

the Agency to obtain the rehabilitative services necessary for [him] to be

capable of performing [his] parental duties and responsibilities.” (citation

omitted)); B.,N.M., 856 A.2d at 855 (noting that “the parental obligation is a

positive duty which requires affirmative performance” and parental “rights are

not preserved by waiting for a more suitable or convenient time to perform

one’s parental responsibilities while others provide the child with [the child’s]

physical and emotional needs.” (citations omitted)). We discern no error of

law or abuse of discretion with the orphans’ court’s decision under Section

2511(a)(1).

We turn next to Section 2511(b), and we incorporate our standard of

review under this section as discussed above. Here, as explained above, the

orphans’ court concluded that terminating Father’s parental rights would best

serve the Child’s needs and welfare.

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On appeal, Father argues that he loves the Child. Father’s Brief at 12.

He asserts that many of the barriers he encountered when trying to reunify

with the Child were undermined by substance abuse problems. Id. Father

claims that he never abandoned the Child and continued to be fiercely devoted

to him. Id. According to Father, the emotional toll termination will take on

the Child should not be underestimated. See id.

Father’s argument again fails to appreciate the standard of review we

must apply in termination cases and is belied by the record.

As noted above, Section 2511(b) focuses on the child, not on the parent.

See C.M.K., supra. Thus, Father’s arguments that he loves the Child, never

abandoned him, and continued to be fiercely devoted to him are unavailing

under a Section 2511(b) analysis. As with Mother, we do not minimize the

impact substance abuse can have on a parent, but courts “must keep the

ticking clock of childhood ever in mind. Children are young for a scant number

of years, and we have an obligation to see to their healthy development

quickly.” K.T., 296 A.3d at 1108 (citing T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 269) (emphasis

omitted). Father’s argument yields no relief.

Further, Father makes no cogent argument that he has any type of bond

with the Child, nor could he convincingly make that argument. Father visited

with the Child four times in October 2023 while the Child was in the hospital.

See N.T. at 15. As of the termination hearing in April 2025, Father had not

yet visited the Child again. By that time, the Child was over eighteen-months

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old and had not seen Father since he was less than a month old. Thus, there

was no evidence of any bond between Father and the Child. See C.P.D., 324

A.3d at 27 (“In cases where there is no evidence of any bond between the

parent and child, it is reasonable to infer that no bond exists.” (citation

omitted)).

We incorporate our above discussion of the Child’s foster family. The

Child’s foster family began visiting him when he was still in the hospital, and

he has lived with them since he was released. See N.T. at 16, 28, 51, 73.

The Child is now extremely bonded with his foster parents and siblings. See

id. at 51-53, 74-76, 80. The Child’s foster family takes care of all his needs

and are an adoptive resource for him. See id. at 52-53, 76-77, 87. The Child

refers to his foster parents as “mommy” and “daddy.” See id. at 68, 77. The

Child also has consistent visits with his older sibling. See id. at 40, 44, 67.

The Agency caseworker testified that the Child needed permanency, and it

was her opinion that parental rights should be terminated. See id. at 68-69.

Similarly, the case manager recommended that the Child stay with his foster

family. See id. at 80. Thus, the record supports the orphans’ court’s decision.

We discern no error of law or abuse of discretion in the orphans’ court’s

termination of Father’s parental rights under Section 2511(b).

In sum, we hold that the orphans’ court did not abuse its discretion or

commit an error of law in terminating Mother’s and Father’s parental rights

pursuant to Section 2511 of the Adoption Act.

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Decrees affirmed.

Date: 2/11/2026

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11254517. Public record. Not legal advice.