# Opinion

> District Court, W.D. Oklahoma · February 9, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11252971

## Case

- **Full name:** Integrated Alarm Systems LLC v. Tyco Safety Products Canada Ltd
- **Court:** District Court, W.D. Oklahoma
- **Decided:** February 9, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11252971

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- applying the economic loss rule to a claim of negligently performed services
- applying the economic loss rule to a claim that a power purchase agreement was negligently distributed

## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA

INTEGRATED ALARM SYSTEMS )
LLC, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) Case No. CIV-25-00283-JD
)
)
TYCO SAFETY PRODUCTS )
CANADA LTD, )
)
Defendant. )

ORDER

Before the Court is Defendant Tyco Safety Products Canada Ltd.’s (“Defendant”)
Motion to Dismiss and Memorandum in Support. [Doc. Nos. 9, 10]. Plaintiff Integrated
Alarm Systems LLC (“Plaintiff”) filed a Response. [Doc. No. 13]. Defendant filed a
Reply. [Doc. No. 16].
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff installs burglar and fire alarm systems and their component parts. [Doc.
No. 1 ¶ 11]. Defendant designs, manufactures, and distributes component parts of burglar
and fire alarm systems, including the PG9936 Wireless Smoke and Heat Detector. [Id.
¶ 12]. Anixter, Inc. resells component parts of burglar and fire alarm systems, including
the PG9936 Wireless Smoke and Heat Detector. [Id. ¶ 13]. Plaintiff purchased the
products at issue in this case from Anixter. [Id. ¶ 14]. Defendant designed, manufactured,
and distributed the products at issue. [Id.].
Beginning in May 2022, Plaintiff’s customers advised Plaintiff that the PG9936
Wireless Smoke and Heat Detectors that Plaintiff installed in their homes were
erroneously transmitting smoke/heat signals to their home alarm systems, thereby

activating their fire alarm siren and initiating a fire alert to their remote monitoring
company. [Id. ¶ 15]. Plaintiff advised Defendant and Anixter of the false alarms its
customers were experiencing, and representatives of Defendant, Anixter, and Plaintiff
visited customers’ homes to investigate the cause of the false alarms. [Id. ¶ 21].
Defendant and Anixter told Plaintiff that the PG9936 Wireless Smoke and Heat Detectors

they sold Plaintiff were seventh generation and that they designed the seventh-generation
devices to comply with changes to the UL standards set to go in effect in 2024. [Id. ¶ 22].
They further told Plaintiff that the seventh-generation devices had a defective component
in the sensor, which caused the devices to erroneously transmit a smoke/heat signal to
their home alarm systems. [Id. ¶¶ 23, 24].

Representatives of Anixter and Defendant told Plaintiff that they were aware of
the defect and would compensate Plaintiff for the defective devices, as well as the costs
associated with performing service calls to address the defective devices. [Id. ¶ 25]. They
also told Plaintiff that they would place the sixth-generation devices back in production
and provide them to Plaintiff for installation in their customers’ homes. [Id.]. Plaintiff

states that Defendant has not provided replacement devices for most of the defective
devices that Plaintiff has placed in customers’ homes and that Defendant has not
compensated Plaintiff for its efforts to address the defective devices. [Id. ¶¶ 28, 29].
Plaintiff initiated this case, asserting causes of action against Defendant for
negligence, breach of warranty, res ipsa loquitor, interference with a business
relationship, false representation, special damages, and exemplary damages. [Id. ¶¶ 32–

81].
Prior to this case, Plaintiff had a case in the Western District of Oklahoma against
Defendant and Anixter. [Doc. No. 10 at 7].1 On March 6, 2024, Plaintiff filed a
stipulation of dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(1)(A)(ii), dismissing
its claims without prejudice. [Id. at 8]. On March 5, 2025, Plaintiff filed the Complaint in

this case. [Doc. No. 1].
Defendant moves the Court to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6).
[Doc. Nos. 9, 10]. Defendant argues that (1) Plaintiff’s claims are time-barred; (2)
Plaintiff cannot state a claim for res ipsa loquitur because it is not an independent cause
of action and the defective detectors were not exclusively in Defendant’s control; (3)

Plaintiff fails to state a claim for interference with a business relationship because
Plaintiff does not allege facts that demonstrate Defendant acted with malicious intent; (4)
Plaintiff does not state a claim for false representation because Plaintiff fails to meet the
requirements for pleading a fraud claim in accordance with Rule 9(b) and Plaintiff does
not plead detrimental reliance; (5) the economic loss rule bars Plaintiff’s negligence

claim; and (6) Plaintiff fails to state a claim for breach of implied warranty because

1 The Court uses page numbering from the CM/ECF stamp at the top of the filing
on the district court docket.
Plaintiff is not the ultimate consumer. [Doc. No. 10 at 11–25]. The Court addresses each
of these arguments below.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint must contain
“enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff
pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678

(2009). Although a complaint does not need detailed factual assertions, a pleading that
offers only “labels and conclusions” or “pleads facts that are merely consistent with a
defendant’s liability” will not suffice. Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
The burden is on the plaintiff to plead factual allegations that “raise a right to relief above
the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.

In evaluating a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Court accepts all well-pled factual
allegations as true and views the allegations in the light most favorable to the nonmoving
party. Peterson v. Grisham, 594 F.3d 723, 727 (10th Cir. 2010). Conclusory statements,
however, are not entitled to the assumption of truth, and courts are free to disregard them.
Khalik v. United Air Lines, 671 F.3d 1188, 1191 (10th Cir. 2012).

III. ANALYSIS
A. Plaintiff’s claims are not time-barred.
The Court begins with Defendant’s argument that Plaintiff’s claims are time-
barred. Defendant asserts that Plaintiff’s “new” causes of action—causes of action
asserted here that Plaintiff did not assert in the prior case—are time-barred. [Doc. No. 10
at 11–13]. The basis for Defendant’s argument is that the scheduling order in the prior
case set the deadline to amend pleadings as December 5, 2023, and that Plaintiff’s claims

here somehow qualify as amended pleadings in the prior case. [Id. at 11]. Thus,
Defendant argues Plaintiff must have good cause for failing to timely amend. [Id. at 11–
12]. The Court must agree with Plaintiff that Defendant “failed to cite any authority
which states a previously dismissed cause of action—dismissed via a joint stipulation—
can impact what occurs in a refiled cause of action.” [Doc. No. 13 at 10]. Accordingly,

the Court finds Defendant’s position that Plaintiff’s claims are time-barred untenable.
Instead, as argued by Plaintiff, the Court looks to the Oklahoma savings statute to
determine whether Plaintiff’s re-filed case is timely. [See id. at 10–12]. The savings
statute provides:
If any action is commenced within due time, and a judgment thereon for the
plaintiff is reversed, or if the plaintiff fail in such action otherwise than
upon the merits, the plaintiff, or, if he should die, and the cause of action
survive, his representatives may commence a new action within one (1)
year after the reversal or failure although the time limit for commencing the
action shall have expired before the new action is filed.

12 Okla. Stat. § 100. “[W]here an action is timely commenced and dismissed without
prejudice upon plaintiff’s motion prior to trial on the merits but after the statute of
limitations has run, plaintiff may commence a new action within a year after such
dismissal.” Powers v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co., 1964 OK 116, ¶ 2, 392 P.2d 744, 746
(discussing a predecessor statute). When determining whether the new action is
sufficiently related to the prior action in order to receive the benefit of the savings statute,
Oklahoma applies the transactional approach: “Oklahoma jurisprudence uses the
transactional approach for its definition of a ‘cause of action.’ The operative event that
underlies a party’s claim delineates the parameters of his cause of action. This conceptual

approach ensures that litigants will be able to assert different theories of liability without
violating the purposes of the statute of limitations.” Chandler v. Denton, 1987 OK 38,
¶ 12, 741 P.2d 855, 862–63.
In its Reply, Defendant does not dispute the application of the savings statute, nor
does it assert Plaintiff’s causes of action do not rely on the same operative events as its

prior causes of action. [See Doc. No. 16]. In fact, Defendant states that Plaintiff’s
Complaint is based on the “same operative set of facts” as its previous complaint. [Doc.
No. 10 at 8 (“While the Refiled Complaint is based upon the same operative set of facts
as the original Complaint and repleads the same negligence and breach of warranty
causes of action, there are a few notable differences from the original Complaint.”)].

Accordingly, the Court concludes that the savings statute applies and that Plaintiff’s
claims were timely filed.
B. Res ipsa loquitur is not an independent cause of action under
Oklahoma law.

The Court next turns to Defendant’s arguments regarding Plaintiff’s res ipsa
loquitur claim. Defendant first argues that Oklahoma law does not recognize res ipsa
loquitur as an independent cause of action. [Doc. No. 10 at 13–14]. The Court agrees.
In Plaintiff’s Complaint, it asserts both causes of action of negligence [Doc. No. 1
¶¶ 32–34] and res ipsa loquitur [id. ¶¶ 45–47]. However, under Oklahoma law which
applies in this diversity case, res ipsa loquitur is an “evidentiary rule . . . to aid the
plaintiff in making out a prima facie case of negligence in circumstances when direct
proof of why the harm happened is beyond the power or knowledge of the plaintiff.”

Smith v. Hines, 2011 OK 51, ¶ 21, 261 P.3d 1129, 1136; see also Curtis v. Crop Prod.
Servs., Inc., No. CIV-13-986-R, 2014 WL 12730325, at *6 (W.D. Okla. Sept. 29, 2014)
(“Res ipsa loquitor is not a theory of recovery, but rather it is an evidentiary doctrine that
permits the jury to infer the existence of negligence.”). Accordingly, Plaintiff cannot
assert an independent cause of action for res ipsa loquitur as it is a theory under which it

can pursue its negligence claim. The Court dismisses Plaintiff’s independent claim for res
ipsa loquitur.
C. Plaintiff states a claim for interference with a business relationship.
The Court next addresses Defendant’s argument that Plaintiff fails to state a claim
for interference with a business relationship. Defendant argues that Plaintiff has not

plausibly alleged facts that demonstrate Defendant acted with malice. [Doc. No. 10 at 16–
17].
The elements of an interference with business relationship claim are (1) Defendant
interfered with a business or contractual right; (2) the interference was malicious and
wrongful and was neither justified, privileged nor excusable; and (3) the interference

proximately caused damage. Mac Adjustment, Inc. v. Prop. Loss Rsch. Bureau, 1979 OK
41, ¶ 5, 595 P.2d 427, 428. “The element of malice, for malicious interference, is defined
as an unreasonable and wrongful act done intentionally, without just cause or excuse.”
Tuffy’s, Inc. v. City of Okla. City, 2009 OK 4, ¶ 14, 212 P.3d 1158, 1165.2 Defendant
asserts that in order to show malice, Plaintiff must plead facts demonstrating “the purpose
of the tortfeasor’s act, and their motive must include a desire to interfere and disrupt the

others’ prospective economic business advantage.” [Doc. No. 10 at 16 (emphasis
omitted) (quoting Loven v. Church Mut. Ins. Co., 2019 OK 68, ¶ 21, 452 P.3d 418, 426)].
The Court notes, however, that is not the exclusive way in which to establish the
interference was malicious or wrongful. A plaintiff may satisfy this element by showing
that “the tortfeasor ‘acted with the intentional purpose to interfere or in bad faith’ or the

‘interference was done with an improper, wrongful, or malicious motive.’” Brown v.
Dynamic Gaming Sols., LLC, No. CIV-22-917-D, 2023 WL 1788540, at *3 (W.D. Okla.
Feb. 6, 2023) (quoting Loven, 2019 OK 68, ¶ 22, 452 P.3d at 426)].
Defendant argues that Plaintiff fails to plead facts demonstrating malice because
Plaintiff has not pled that Defendant intentionally manufactured, distributed, and sold a

defective device for the purpose of interfering with Plaintiff’s business relationships.
[Doc. No. 10 at 16 (“Integrated’s interference claim fails in the absence of any basis or
explicit allegation that Tyco acted with malicious intent to harm Integrated’s business

2 The Court notes that Plaintiff labeled its claim as “interference with a business
relationship.” [Doc. No. 1 ¶¶ 48–55]. Plaintiff characterizes Defendant’s interference as
intentional and wrongful. [Id. ¶ 50]. The Oklahoma Supreme Court has stated that “[t]he
terms ‘malicious interference,’ ‘intentional interference,’ and ‘tortious interference’ with
contract or business relations have been used interchangeably in Oklahoma
jurisprudence, and do not designate distinct torts . . . .” Tuffy’s, 2009 OK 4, ¶ 15, 212
P.3d at 1165. Thus, to the extent caselaw refers to “malicious interference,” it is
applicable to Plaintiff’s claim as Plaintiff casts the claim as one for intentional
interference with a business relationship.
relationships with its customers by designing, manufacturing, distributing and selling the
defective Detectors.”) (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted)]. Plaintiff,
however, states that the act of interference it pleads is not Defendant’s design,

manufacture, and distribution of the defective device but is instead the act of failing to
publicly state the seventh-generation device was defective:
The purpose for Tyco’s improper conduct was to avoid liability for the
defect. The result of Tyco’s conduct was to place Plaintiff in the position of
being privately told by Tyco that the Smoke Detectors were defective only
for Tyco to then state publicly they were not. The purpose of Tyco’s
conduct was a disruption in the business relationship Plaintiff had with the
homebuilders and homeowners where the defective Smoke Detectors were
installed. Tyco’s act of telling the public that the Smoke Detectors were
defect-free caused Plaintiff’s customers to be given the false impression
that Plaintiff was to blame for the Smoke Detectors malfunctioning.

[Doc. No. 13 at 21–22; see also Doc. No. 1 ¶ 50]. Defendant does not respond to this
argument in its Reply. [See Doc. No. 16 at 2].
Drawing all inferences in favor of Plaintiff, the Court concludes, at this pleading
stage, Plaintiff’s allegation regarding Defendant’s public denial that the product was
defective satisfies the requirement that Defendant acted maliciously or wrongfully
because Defendant sought to evade responsibility and wrongfully placed the
responsibility for the defective product upon Plaintiff. The Court concludes that these
facts, taken as true, satisfy that Defendant “acted with the intentional purpose to interfere
or in bad faith or the interference was done with an improper, wrongful, or malicious
motive.” Dynamic Gaming Sols., LLC, 2023 WL 1788540, at *3 (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted). Accordingly, the Court concludes Plaintiff has adequately
pled an interference with business relationship claim.
Defendant also argues that, if the Court concludes that Plaintiff has adequately
pled an interference with business relationship claim, the economic loss doctrine should
preclude this claim. [Doc. No. 10 at 17]. The Court addresses this argument below in

connection with its analysis of the economic loss rule relating to Plaintiff’s negligence
claim.
D. Plaintiff fails to plead its false representation claim with particularity.
Defendant next argues that the Court should dismiss Plaintiff’s false representation
claim because Plaintiff fails to plead fraud with the specificity required by Rule 9(b) and

that, as pled, Plaintiff has not stated facts that demonstrate detrimental reliance. [Doc. No.
10 at 17–20 (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b)].
Rule 9(b) states that “[i]n alleging fraud or mistake, a party must state with
particularity the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake. Malice, intent, knowledge,
and other conditions of a person’s mind may be alleged generally.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b).

Federal caselaw has interpreted this rule as requiring a plaintiff to “set forth the time,
place and contents of the false representation, the identity of the party making the false
statements and the consequences thereof.” Koch v. Koch Indus., Inc., 203 F.3d 1202,
1236 (10th Cir. 2000) (quoting In re Edmonds, 924 F.2d 176, 180 (10th Cir. 1991))].
Plaintiff’s allegations of fraud do not meet this requirement. As the basis for its

false representation claim, Plaintiff pleads two misrepresentations. First, Plaintiff states
that “Defendant made material representations to Plaintiff and the public claiming the
PG9936 Wireless Smoke and Heat Detectors were defect-free.” [Doc. No. 13 at 22
(quoting Doc. No. 1 ¶ 56)]. Second, Plaintiff states that “Defendant now denies admitting
to Plaintiff that the PG9936 Wireless Smoke and Heat Detectors are defective presenting
another misrepresentation made by Defendant.” [Id. (quoting Doc. No. 1 ¶ 58)]. Plaintiff
identifies the contents of the misrepresentations but does not state the time or place of the

misrepresentations, the party making the misrepresentations, or the consequences of the
misrepresentations. See Koch, 203 F.3d at 1236.
The Court agrees with Defendant that, as pled, Plaintiff does not state how it
detrimentally relied upon the alleged misrepresentations. [See Doc. No. 10 at 19].
Plaintiff merely states that “Plaintiff, and other members of the public, acted in reliance

upon Defendant’s representation that the PG9936 Wireless Smoke and Heat Detectors
were defect-free”, and that “Plaintiff acted in reliance upon the representations made by
Defendant that it would compensate Plaintiff for its efforts to deal with the defective
PG9936 Wireless Smoke and Heat Detectors.” [Doc. No. 1 ¶¶ 61, 62]. These allegations
do not meet the heightened pleading requirement of Rule 9(b) because they do not

demonstrate the consequences of Defendant’s alleged fraudulent misrepresentation. The
Court, accordingly, grants Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s false representation
claim.
E. Plaintiff states a claim for breach of implied warranty.
The Court next turns to Plaintiff’s breach of warranty claim. Defendant argues the

Court should dismiss this claim because Defendant lacks privity with Plaintiff. [Doc. No.
10 at 22–25]. Plaintiff asserts a claim for breach of implied warranty under Oklahoma
law, thus arguing that Defendant breached a warranty implied in the contract of sale of
the defective devices. [See Doc. No. 13 at 28]. However, because Plaintiff did not
purchase the devices directly from Defendant, Plaintiff lacks privity of contract with
Defendant. [See Doc. No. 10 at 23]. Defendant argues that Oklahoma law only allows the
ultimate consumer to bring implied warranty claims against the manufacturer and has not

extended that result to anyone in the vertical chain of distribution. [Id.]. Because
Oklahoma law on this point is limited, the Court must examine the precise language of
the relevant cases.
The Oklahoma Supreme Court first addressed the issue in Old Albany Estates, Ltd.
v. Highland Carpet Mills, Inc., 1979 OK 144, 604 P.2d 849. The plaintiff was an ultimate

consumer who purchased a defective product through a third-party, who in turn
purchased the product directly from the manufacturer. Id. ¶ 2, 604 P.2d at 850. The
plaintiff sued the manufacturer for breach of implied warranties under the Uniform
Commercial Code. Id. ¶ 4, 604 P.2d at 850–51. Determining that the Uniform
Commercial Code was silent on vertical privity regarding implied warranties, the court

held that “a manufacturer may be held liable for breach of implied warranty of
merchantability or fitness for particular purpose under the Uniform Commercial Code
without regard to privity of contract between the manufacturer and the ultimate buyer.”
Id. ¶ 12, 604 P.2d at 852. Accordingly, the Court concluded that the “[p]laintiff, being in
the chain of distribution, may maintain a direct action against defendant to recover the

benefit of his bargain . . . .” Id. Based upon its plain language, the Court does not
interpret the court’s holding in the limited way urged by Defendant. The Court interprets
the holding as not requiring vertical privity between any plaintiff in the chain of
distribution and the manufacturer in order to assert claims of implied warranties.
Although the court referred to the plaintiff as “the ultimate buyer,” the court did not limit
its holding to the ultimate consumer of the defective product. See id. Instead, the court
determined vertical privity between parties was not a requirement for an implied warranty

claim. See id.
The Oklahoma Supreme Court’s decision in Elden v. Simmons supports the
Court’s interpretation that vertical privity is not a requirement for a breach of implied
warranty claim asserted by anyone in the chain of distribution. 1981 OK 81, 631 P.2d
739. In that case, the Court again considered whether an ultimate consumer could bring a

breach of implied warranty claim against the manufacturer. Id. ¶ 9, 631 P.2d at 742.
Based upon Old Albany Estates, the court concluded that the plaintiff could bring such a
cause of action, stating that “under the rationale of Old Albany Estates . . . the plaintiffs,
as ultimate purchasers, may maintain a breach of warranty action against the
manufacturer of the bricks, Acme Brick Company, even though no privity of contract

exists between the plaintiffs and Acme Brick, as Acme is a manufacturer in the chain of
distribution.” Id. In support of its holding, the court stated as follows:
In reaching our holdings today, we note that the requirement of
vertical privity as a prerequisite to suit on an implied or express
warranty, both under the Uniform Commercial Code and outside the
Code, is, given today’s market structure, an antiquated notion. A
manufactured product placed in the chain of distribution may literally pass
through dozens of hands before it reaches the ultimate consumer. When the
product is found to be defective, it makes little sense to allow the ultimate
consumer redress against his immediate vendors only. If such were the
case, the consumer’s immediate vendor, if he were to have the full benefit
of his bargain, would have to, in turn, sue his immediate vendor, who
would, in turn, have to sue his vendor, and so on up the chain, until the
party ultimately responsible for placing a defective product in the market is
reached. It defies common sense to require such an endless chain of
litigation in order to hold the party at fault responsible. For this reason,
this Court, in Old Albany Estates v. Highland Carpet Mills . . .
eliminated the requirement of vertical privity, thus allowing ultimate
consumers to bring direct breach of warranty actions against manufacturers
of products which are allegedly defective.

Id. ¶ 10, 631 P.2d at 742 (emphasis added). The court referenced “the ultimate consumer”
because the plaintiff in that case was, in fact, the ultimate consumer. See id. But the
court’s reasoning does not support limiting its holding to ultimate consumers because that
would give rise to exactly the scenario the court criticizes as “def[ying] common
sense”—Plaintiff would have to initiate “an endless chain of litigation” to hold Defendant
responsible. Id.; see also Patty Precision Prods. Co. v. Brown & Sharpe Mfg. Co., 846
F.2d 1247, 1254 (10th Cir. 1988) (“In our view, the broad-sweeping language used by the
Supreme Court of Oklahoma in Old Albany Estates v. Highland Carpet Mills . . .
reiterated and enlarged upon in Elden v. Simmons . . . rejected the majority view that a
‘vertical’ non-privity plaintiff, i.e., one who buys within the distributive chain but who
does not buy directly from the defendant, cannot maintain an action for breach of implied
warranty.”); Patty Precision v. Brown & Sharpe Mfg. Co., 742 F.2d 1260, 1263 (10th Cir.
1984) (“The parties are in agreement that Old Albany abolished the vertical privity
requirement for implied warranties.”).
For these reasons, the Court concludes that Oklahoma caselaw does not require

vertical privity for Plaintiff to assert a claim of breach of an implied warranty against
Defendant. Accordingly, the Court denies Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss on this claim.
F. The economic loss doctrine precludes Plaintiff’s negligence claim.
Defendant next argues that the economic loss rule bars Plaintiff’s negligence
claim. [Doc. No. 10 at 20–22]. “The economic loss rule is a court-created doctrine that

bars recovery under manufacturer’s product liability for purely economic injury to the
product itself.” Mills v. J-M Mfg. Co., 2025 OK 23, ¶ 15, 567 P.3d 385, 389 (citing
Waggoner v. Town & Country Mobile Homes, Inc., 1990 OK 139, ¶ 22, 808 P.2d 649,
653). Defendant asserts that this rule bars Plaintiff’s negligence claim because Plaintiff
“explicitly and exclusively seeks recovery for losses that are purely ‘economic’ in

nature.” [Doc. No. 10 at 20]. Plaintiff counters that the economic loss rule does not apply
to negligence claims and is instead restricted to product liability claims. [Doc. No. 13 at
24].
Plaintiff correctly states that Oklahoma courts have applied the economic loss rule
in products liability cases. See Mills, 2025 OK 23, ¶ 15, 567 P.3d at 389. The Oklahoma

Supreme Court recently stated in Mills that they declined to extend the rule “beyond the
context of products liability” like other jurisdictions have done. Id. ¶ 15 n.5, 567 P.3d at
389 n.5. In support of that statement, the court cited two cases, each applying the
economic loss rule to negligence claims but not in the context of a negligence claim
based upon a defective product. See id. (citing Springfield Hydroelectric Co. v. Copp, 172

Vt. 311, 315, 779 A.2d 67, 71 (2001) (applying the economic loss rule to a claim that a
power purchase agreement was negligently distributed); Ramerth v. Hart, 133 Idaho 194,
197, 983 P.2d 848, 851 (1999) (applying the economic loss rule to a claim of negligently
performed services)).
However, Oklahoma federal district courts have applied the economic loss rule to
negligence claims that have “substantially the same sort of issue as is presented in a
products liability suit.” Okla. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Toshiba Int’l Corp., No. CIV-14-0759-

HE, 2016 WL 3659941, at *6 (W.D. Okla. July 1, 2016) (applying the economic loss rule
to a negligence claim where “the dispute [was] centered on damage to a product and
whether that damage is covered by a warranty”); see also United Golf, LLC v. Westlake
Chem. Corp., No. 05-CV-0495-CVE-PJC, 2006 WL 2807342, at *3 (N.D. Okla. Aug. 15,
2006) (“The reasoning of Waggoner applies to the full range of unintentional torts,

precluding negligence or products liability claims when the UCC provides a
comprehensive remedy for plaintiff's economic injury.”) (citing Waggoner, 1990 OK
139, ¶¶ 20–21, 808 P.2d at 653).
The court’s reasoning in Waggoner supports the federal district courts’ application
of the economic loss rule to negligence claims based upon defective products. The

Oklahoma Supreme Court’s reasoning on barring product liability claims seeking to
recover only economic loss is as follows:
This Court has long held that manufacturers’ products liability should be
distinguished from contractual liability. While the UCC does envision
allowing recovery for personal injury and for property damage arising out
of defectively manufactured articles, such recovery arises out of contractual
relationships, express or implied. This contractual relationship, the sales
contract, is also the basis for the recovery of a buyer’s economic losses. In
contrast, the economic expectations of parties have not traditionally been
protected by the law concerning unintentional torts. These expectations
have been safeguarded by commercial law principles.

Waggoner, 1990 OK 139, ¶¶ 19–20, 808 P.2d at 653 (citation modified). This rationale
applies to negligence claims seeking economic damages based upon defective products.
As discussed above, Plaintiff has a remedy for its economic losses in the form of a breach
of implied warranty claim against Defendant.3
Plaintiff, however, argues that, even if the Court finds the economic loss rule

applies to its negligence claim, it seeks more than economic damages. [Doc. No. 13 at
28]. Plaintiff asserts that the economic loss rule does not prevent Plaintiff from
recovering “the losses suffered by Plaintiff for more than a thousand service calls to
address the defective Smoke Detectors, loss of profits, loss of reputation, loss of business
value and exemplary damages.” [Id.]. The Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals has defined

“economic loss” as “damages other than physical harm to persons or property.” Proe v.
Diamond Homes, 2025 OK CIV APP 18, ¶ 40, 574 P.3d 1, 15.4 Plaintiff has not alleged
property damage (other than damage to the defective products themselves) or personal
injury. [See Doc. No. 1 ¶ 82]. Accordingly, the type of damages claimed by Plaintiff falls
within the economic loss rule.

For the above reasons, the Court grants Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s
negligence claim.

3 The court’s reasoning in Waggoner is not, however, equally applicable to
Plaintiff’s interference with a business relationship claim. Waggoner addresses that
economic losses are not available in products liability claims because contract claims are
available to protect the economic expectations of the parties. 1990 OK 139, ¶¶ 19–20,
808 P.2d at 653. As Plaintiff’s interference with business relationship claim is an
intentional tort, requiring a showing of malice, Defendant has not cited a rationale, or
supporting caselaw, for applying the economic loss rule to this claim. [See Doc. No. 10 at
17]. Consequently, the Court allows the interference claim to proceed.

4 The court also noted that “any property damage for which tort recovery can be
had must be damage to property other than the property which is the subject of the
contract.” Proe, 2025 OK CIV APP 18, ¶ 40, 574 P.3d at 15.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons described above, the Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN
PART Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss. [Doc. Nos. 9, 10]. The Court GRANTS the
Motion as it pertains to Plaintiff’s res ipsa loquitur, negligence, and false representation
claims. The Court DENIES the Motion as it relates to other claims.
IT IS SO ORDERED this 9th day of February 2026.
ei W. DISHMAN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

> While it harbors doubts about Plaintiff’s ability to plead a false representation
claim under the alleged facts, because the defect resulting in dismissal is a pleading
deficiency, the Court dismisses Plaintiff's false representation claim without prejudice.
The Court does not, however, consider the defects in Plaintiffs res ipsa loquitur and
negligence claims to be curable and thus dismisses those claims with prejudice.
In its Response, Plaintiff requests leave to amend to cure any pleading deficiency.
[Doc. No. 13 at 7, 24, 31]. But Plaintiff cannot seek leave to amend its Complaint in its
response brief. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 7(b)(1) (“A request for a court order must be made by
motion.”); LCvR7.1(c) (“A response to a motion may not also include a motion . . . made
by the responding party.”); LCvR15.1 (explaining that a party moving to amend a
pleading must attach the proposed pleading as an exhibit to the motion); see also Albers
v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs of Jefferson Cnty., 771 F.3d 697, 706 (10th Cir. 2014) (“We
have recognized the importance of Fed. R. Civ. P. 7(b) and have held that normally a
court need not grant leave to amend when a party fails to file a formal motion.” (quoting
Calderon v. Kan. Dep’t of Soc. & Rehab. Servs., 181 F.3d 1180, 1186 (10th Cir. 1999))).
18

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11252971. Public record. Not legal advice.