# Thornton

> District Court, N.D. Alabama · February 9, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11252942

## Case

- **Full name:** Tiffany Elaine Thornton v. Limestone County Board of Education, et al.
- **Court:** District Court, N.D. Alabama
- **Decided:** February 9, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11252942

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- describing “judicial proceedings” as “liberty-depriving” in the context of a fabricated-evidence claim

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
NORTHEASTERN DIVISION

TIFFANY ELAINE THORNTON, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) Case No. 5:25-cv-00205-HNJ
)
LIMESTONE COUNTY BOARD OF )
EDUCATION, et al., )
)
Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Defendants Limestone County Board of Education, Cade Baker, and Ashley
Carter filed a Partial Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff Tiffany Elaine Thornton’s Complaint.
(Doc. 4). Based upon review of the motion and associated filings, the court
DISMISSES Counts I, II, and IV of Thornton’s Complaint against all Defendants.
Count III against Defendants Baker and Carter will proceed.
MOTION TO DISMISS STANDARD
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8, governing pleadings, calls for a short and plain
statement of a claim, which, if established, entitles the pleader to relief. See Dees v.
Lamar, No. 2:20-cv-1326-LSC-GMB, 2020 WL 13750276, at *2 (N.D. Ala. Nov. 30,
2020) (noting Rule 8(a)(1) requires a plaintiff to “give the defendant fair notice of what
the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests”). Relatedly, Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure Rule 12(b)(6) permits a court to dismiss a complaint if it fails to state a claim
for which relief may be granted.
In Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), the Court revisited the applicable

standard governing Rule 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss. First, courts must take note of
the elements a plaintiff must plead to state the applicable claims at issue. Id. at 675.
After establishing the elements of the claim at issue, the court identifies all well-
pleaded, non-conclusory factual allegations in the complaint and assumes their veracity.

Id. at 679. Well-pleaded factual allegations do not encompass mere “labels and
conclusions,” legal conclusions, conclusory statements, or formulaic recitations and
threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action. Id. at 678 (citations omitted).
In evaluating the sufficiency of a plaintiff’s pleadings, the court may draw reasonable

inferences in the plaintiff’s favor. Aldana v. Del Monte Fresh Produce, N.A., Inc., 416 F.3d
1242, 1248 (11th Cir. 2005).
Third, a court assesses the complaint’s well-pleaded allegations to determine if
they state a plausible cause of action based upon the identified claim’s elements. Iqbal,

556 U.S. at 678. Plausibility ensues “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows
the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged,” and the analysis involves a context-specific task requiring a court

“to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id. at 678, 679 (citations
omitted). The plausibility standard does not equate to a “probability requirement,” yet
it requires more than a “mere possibility of misconduct” or factual statements that are
“merely consistent with a defendant’s liability.” Id. at 678, 679 (citations omitted).
BACKGROUND
On February 7, 2025, Plaintiff Tiffany Elaine Thornton filed the present suit

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging Defendants falsified her son’s school attendance
records and maliciously initiated truancy proceedings against her. (Doc. 1).
Specifically, Thornton alleges her child attended Creekside Primary School in
Limestone County, Alabama. (Id. at ¶ 8). Thornton’s child missed school “on multiple

occasions” due to a formal diagnosis of eosinophilic esophagitis (EoE).1 (Id. at ¶ 10).
Thornton reportedly “provided timely, valid excuses for all of her son’s absences” in
accordance with state law. (Id. at ¶ 11).
However, Defendants Baker and Carter allegedly falsified the child’s attendance

records to indicate Thornton violated state truancy laws. (Id. at ¶¶ 12-13). When
Thornton attempted “to clarify the situation by informing Baker that her son had no
unexcused absences because he had valid, timely excuses for each absence,” Baker
declared “Mrs. Thornton was not going to be allowed to keep her son out of school for

three or four days or longer just because she had a doctor’s excuse for all of the days in
question” and “her son would only be excused for two days regardless of the number
of days covered by the doctor’s excuse.” (Id. at ¶ 14). Similarly, Carter informed

Thornton “she (Carter) and Baker were going to allow only two days to be excused for

1 EoE involves “inflammation of the esophagus caused by an overabundance of certain white blood
cells.” The condition commonly produces symptoms of “heartburn, chest pain and difficulty
swallowing.” Cleveland Clinic, Eosinophilic Esophagitis,
https://my.clevelandclinic.org/health/diseases/14321-eosinophilic-esophagitis.
many of Mrs. Thornton’s son’s longer absences regardless of the length of time the
pediatrician thought her son should stay out of school and regardless of the length of

time covered by the pediatrician’s excuse.” (Id. at ¶ 15).
“Baker and Carter continued their practice of falsifying said attendance records
until such time as the records facially indicated that Thornton’s son had over seven
unexcused absences,” triggering the “appropriate school administrator[’s duty] to send

a criminal referral to the local district attorney’s office for prosecution.” (Id. at ¶ 16).
Based solely on the allegedly falsified records, Baker and Carter “sent, or caused to be
sent, a criminal referral to the Limestone County District Attorney (“DA”) for the
initiation of criminal truancy charges against Mrs. Thornton.” (Id.).

Upon service of a Juvenile Court Summons on February 22, 2023, Thornton
“was compelled by the threat of contempt of court” to attend mandatory court
hearings, submit to random drug testing, and attend parenting classes during the
pendency of the proceedings, causing her mental anguish and emotional distress. (Id.

at ¶¶ 18, 20). During the drug test she underwent, “Thornton was compelled to
completely disrobe in front of an employee of the contractor used by the Court for
administering drug tests.” (Id. at ¶ 19). Moreover, Thornton alleged the State stripped

away “her parental right to withdraw her son from Creekside and place him in another
school.” (Id. at ¶ 18). Furthermore, the court allegedly declined to “accept evidence
from Mrs. Thornton” regarding her belief the State fabricated evidence against her and
continued the criminal proceedings for several weeks to investigate whether Thornton
stood in contempt of court. (Id. at ¶¶ 21-22).

The court ultimately dismissed the charges against Thornton on August 17, 2023,
approximately six months after service of the initial Juvenile Court Summons. (Id. at ¶
22).
The Complaint comprises four counts: (I) denial of Thornton’s due process right

to a fair trial; (II) denial of Thornton’s substantive due process right to life, liberty, and
property; (III) malicious prosecution; and (IV) deliberate indifference by the Limestone
County Board of Education to Baker and Carter’s “widespread custom or pattern of
falsifying attendance records.” (Id. at ¶¶ 25-48).

Defendants filed a Partial Motion to Dismiss. (Doc. 4). First, they contend all
claims against the Board warranted dismissal because Thornton failed to allege the
Board engaged in a custom or policy depriving Thornton of her constitutional rights.
(Id. at 5-9). Relatedly, Defendants argue the Board stands immune from all potential

state law claims under Article I, Section 14 of the Alabama Constitution. (Id. at 9-11).
Next, they argue Count I fails to state a claim against any defendant because “[a] plaintiff
‘cannot have been deprived of a fair trial in the absence of a trial.’” (Id. at 12 (quoting

Mastroianni v. Deering, 835 F. Supp. 1577, 1584 (S.D. Ga. 1993))). Finally, Defendants
contend Count II fails to state a claim against any of the Defendants because “a Section
1983 claim for suppression of evidence may only be brought when the plaintiff’s
criminal case goes to trial, and the suppression of exculpatory evidence affects the
outcome.” (Id. at 13).

Thornton filed a response indicating she did not oppose the dismissal of Counts
II or IV. (Doc. 8 at 8-9). Regarding Count I, however, Thornton contends “a trial is
unnecessary . . . for a 1983 fair trial claim to lie,” citing decisions from multiple sister
circuits. (Id. at 1-8).

Defendants filed a reply. (Doc. 10). In addition to their previously raised
arguments concerning Count I, they maintain Count I merits dismissal because school
administrators do not constitute members of the prosecution team for purposes of a §
1983 fair trial claim based on allegedly fabricated evidence. (Id. at 5).

Due to the new legal argument raised in Defendants’ reply, Thornton filed a
Motion to Strike Portion of Defendants’ Reply and Permission to File Surreply. (Doc.
11). The court granted Thornton’s motion to file a surreply addressing Defendants’
new argument concerning school administrators and deemed Thornton’s

corresponding motion to strike as moot. (Doc. 16). Thornton filed a surreply on May
12, 2025. (Doc. 17).
ANALYSIS

I. PLAINTIFF DOES NOT DISPUTE THE DISMISSAL OF
DEFENDANT LIMESTONE COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION
OR COUNTS II AND IV AGAINST ALL DEFENDANTS.

Thornton “did not intend to allege and did not allege any state law claims against
the Board and did not intend to allege and did not allege any claim against the Board in
any of her other Counts.” (Id. at 9). In addition, Thornton consented to the dismissal
of Counts II and IV. (Doc. 8 at 8-9). Accordingly, the court DISMISSES Defendant

Limestone County Board of Education as well as Counts II and IV against the other
Defendants.
II. THE COMPLAINT FAILS TO STATE A VALID CLAIM FOR
DEPRIVATION OF THORNTON’S FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT LIBERTY INTERESTS BASED ON
FABRICATION OF EVIDENCE.

In Count I of the Complaint, Thornton alleges a violation of her due process
right to a fair trial. (Doc. 1 at ¶¶ 25-29). The Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process
Clause provides that no State shall “deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. The Due Process Clause
provides “two distinct guarantees: substantive due process and procedural due
process.” DeKalb Stone, Inc. v. Cnty. of DeKalb, 106 F.3d 956, 959 (11th Cir. 1997) (citing
Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 125 (1990)).
Thornton does not clearly delineate in her complaint whether she asserts her
claim as a substantive due process claim or a procedural due process claim. (Doc. 1 at

¶¶ 25-29). Therefore, the court will address both claims.
A. Thornton Has Not Advanced a Viable Substantive Due Process
Claim.

Generally, “substantive due process has two strands—one that protects against
deprivation of fundamental rights and one that protects against arbitrary legislation.”
Hillcrest Prop., LLP v. Pasco Cnty., 915 F.3d 1292, 1297 (11th Cir. 2019). Thornton’s due
process claim incites the deprivation of a fundamental right. In that vein, “[s]ubstantive
due process includes both the protections of most of the Bill of Rights, as incorporated

through the Fourteenth Amendment, and also the more general protection against
‘certain arbitrary, wrongful government actions regardless of the fairness of the
procedures used to implement them.’” DeKalb Stone, 106 F.3d at 959 (quoting Zinermon,
494 U.S. at 125).2

More pertinently, the Due Process Clause affords the right to a fair trial to
warrant deprivations of life, liberty, or property interests in a criminal court proceeding.
See In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955) (“A fair trial . . . is a basic requirement of
due process.”); see also Fappiano v. City of New York, 640 F. App’x 115, 118 (2d Cir. 2016)

(“A fair trial claim is a civil claim for violations of a criminal defendant’s Fourteenth
Amendment due process rights.”) (citing Ramchair v. Conway, 601 F.3d 66, 73 (2d Cir.
2010)). The Due Process Clause particularly precludes the State from deliberately
manufacturing false evidence to deprive an accused of a fair trial. See Napue v. Illinois,

360 U.S. 264, 269 (1959) (“[A] conviction obtained through use of false evidence,
known to be such by representatives of the State, must fall under the Fourteenth
Amendment. The same result obtains when the State, although not soliciting false

evidence, allows it to go uncorrected when it appears.” (citations omitted)); Schneider v.

2 As to the latter of the afore-cited substantive due process claims based upon arbitrary, wrongful
government actions, the “right to substantive due process . . . protects individuals from arbitrary
conduct by government officials that ‘shocks the conscience.’” King v. Pridmore, 961 F.3d 1135, 1143
(11th Cir. 2020).
Estelle, 552 F.2d 593, 595 (5th Cir. 1977) (“If the state through its law enforcement agents
suborns perjury for use at the trial, a constitutional due process claim would not be

defeated merely because the prosecuting attorney was not personally aware of this
prosecutorial activity.”); Riley v. City of Montgomery, 104 F.3d 1247, 1253 (11th Cir. 1997)
(“[The] planting of false evidence could constitute a violation of Plaintiff’s rights under
the Federal Constitution and, accordingly, could give rise to liability under Section

1983.” (citing, inter alia, Napue, 360 U.S. at 268-70, and Schneider, 552 F.2d at 595)).
Despite titling Count I “Denial of Due Process Right to Fair Trial,” (Id. at 7),
Thornton never proceeded to trial or received a conviction for the truancy charges: the
State dropped all charges against Thornton prior to trial.3 (Id. at ¶ 22). Nevertheless,

Thornton, relying on case law from several other circuits, asserts “a trial is unnecessary
in order for a § 1983 fair trial claim to lie.” (Doc. 8 at 2). She declares, however, “[i]t
does not appear that the Eleventh Circuit has addressed this issue head on.” (Id. at 7).
Defendants Baker and Carter argue Thornton may not invoke the Fourteenth

Amendment to allege deprivations of liberty accruing prior to trial. (Doc. 4 at 12 (“A
plaintiff ‘cannot have been deprived of a fair trial in the absence of a trial.’ Mastroianni
v. Deering, 835 F. Supp. 1577, 1584 (S.D. Ga. 1993). ‘The relevant injury in deprivation

of fair trial claims is the existence of a potentially unfair trial or verdict, not the mere

3 Napue, Schnieder, and Riley involved plaintiffs challenging their wrongful convictions on the basis of
fabricated evidence. Thus, these cases do not address whether an individual who never proceeds to
trial may nevertheless advance a Fourteenth Amendment Due Process claim where defendants’
fabrication resulted in pre-trial deprivations of liberty.
absence of a fair trial.’ Id.”)).4 To this end, Baker and Carter contend Thornton may
only seek redress pursuant to the Fourth Amendment for the alleged harms at issue.

(Doc. 10 at 3 (“If a plaintiff complains about the initiation of criminal proceedings, that
plaintiff may pursue a malicious prosecution claim.”)).
In Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266 (1994), the Supreme Court addressed the
viability of a substantive due process right to stand free from criminal prosecution

except upon probable cause. 510 U.S. at 268. In Albright, Illinois authorities issued an
arrest warrant charging Albright with the sale of a substance that resembled an illegal
drug. Id. The court later dismissed the action against Albright because the charge did
not state an offense under Illinois law. Id. at 269. Albright subsequently lodged a §

1983 claim alleging the arresting officer deprived him of his substantive due process
right to stand free from criminal prosecution except upon probable cause. Id.
In its decision, the Supreme Court rejected the Fourteenth Amendment’s
substantive due process doctrine as a foundation for a malicious prosecution claim vis-

4 The parties do not contest a due process claim could proceed if an individual stood trial on the
charges, regardless of the outcome of the trial. Eleventh Circuit precedent confirms this
understanding. In Weiland v. Palm Beach County Sheriff’s Office, 792 F.3d 1313, 1317 (11th Cir. 2015), the
State charged the eponymous claimant with “two counts of aggravated assault on a law enforcement
officer” and detained him for nearly two years awaiting trial based on a police-fabricated story. At
trial, Weiland received an acquittal. Id. He subsequently sued the arresting officers under § 1983,
alleging “he was detained improperly and prosecuted for charges based on evidence fabricated by the
deputies and lies contained in their police reports.” Id. at 1328. The Eleventh Circuit allowed
Weiland’s § 1983 action to stand despite his acquittal, as “the specific injury identified by Weiland—
i.e., unjust incarceration—is a deprivation of liberty redressable under the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.” Id. (citing Campbell v. Johnson, 586 F.3d 835, 840 (11th Cir. 2009)).
à-vis pre-trial conduct5: the Court reminded litigants “the accused is not ‘entitled to
judicial oversight or review of the decision to prosecute.’” Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S.

266, 274 (1994) (citations omitted). Rather, the Court identified the Fourth
Amendment as the source of constitutional rights for “deprivations of liberty that go hand
in hand with criminal prosecutions.” Id. (emphasis added) (citation omitted); see also id.
at 273 (“Where a particular Amendment ‘provides an explicit textual source of

constitutional protection’ against a particular sort of government behavior, ‘that
Amendment, not the more generalized notion of “substantive due process,” must be
the guide for analyzing these claims.’” (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395
(1989))).

The Eleventh Circuit has interpreted Albright to bar substantive due process
claims alleging a “violation of [the] right to be free from prosecution based upon false
evidence/charges.” Rehberg v. Paulk, 611 F.3d 828, 852 (11th Cir. 2010), aff’d, 566 U.S.
356 (2012); see also id. at 853 (“[U]nder the Fourteenth Amendment, there is no

substantive due process right to be free from malicious prosecution without probable
cause. A malicious prosecution claim arises under the Fourth Amendment, not
Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process.” (citing Albright, 510 U.S. at 274));

5 “[O]nce a trial has occurred, the Fourth Amendment drops out: A person challenging the sufficiency
of the evidence to support both a conviction and any ensuing incarceration does so under the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Manuel v. City of Joliet, 580 U.S. 357, 369 n.8 (2017).
Therefore, a litigant may maintain a claim based upon the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process
Clause if there ensues a wrongful conviction or imprisonment based upon fabricated evidence.
Tinney v. Shores, 77 F.3d 378, 381 (11th Cir. 1996) (“[A]n allegation of prosecution without
probable cause must . . . be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment . . . .”(citation

omitted)); Jordan v. Mosley, 298 F. App’x 803, 806 (11th Cir. 2008) (Malicious prosecution
“is an independent cause of action that potentially is cognizable under the Fourth
Amendment.”(citing Uboh v. Reno, 141 F.3d 1000, 1002–03 n.4 (11th Cir. 1998) (holding
if malicious prosecution or abuse of process is committed by state actors and results in

the arrest or other seizure of a defendant, the defendant’s only remedy is under the
Fourth Amendment), abrogated on other grounds by Williams v. Aguirre, 965 F.3d 1147 (11th
Cir. 2020))); Miller v. Dyer, No. 1:16-CV-04625-ELR, 2019 WL 11583477, at *4 n.5
(N.D. Ga. Mar. 14, 2019) (citing Rehberg, 611 F.3d at 853) (finding no substantive due

process violation when plaintiff alleged detective fabricated evidence); Fletcher v. Miller,
No. 16-62551-CIV, 2016 WL 10919967 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 8, 2016), report and
recommendation adopted, No. 16-62551-CIV, 2017 WL 7691749 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 13, 2017)
(citing Rehberg, 611 F.3d at 853) (dismissing plaintiff’s substantive due process claim

based on allegations sheriff’s deputy issued a false arrest report for failure to state a
claim upon which relief may be granted); accord Becker v. Kroll, 494 F.3d 904, 918-19 (10th
Cir. 2007) (“We think the unavoidable construction of Albright is that no § 1983 claim

will arise from filing criminal charges without probable cause under the substantive due
process protections of the Fourteenth Amendment.”).6

6 See also Watkins v. Officer Davlin Session, No. 19-60810-CIV-ALTMAN/Valle, 2021 WL 663762, at *10
(S.D. Fla. Feb. 19, 2021) (footnote omitted):
As delineated, pretrial deprivations of liberty based on fabricated evidence
certainly give rise to a Fourth Amendment claim. See Manuel v. City of Joliet, 580 U.S.

357 (2017). In Manuel, the State charged the plaintiff with unlawful possession of a
controlled substance and detained him prior to trial on the basis of a report deliberately
falsified by an evidence technician. Id. at 361. The plaintiff spent 48 days in pretrial
detention before the State sought dismissal of the charge. Id. at 362. The Court

sustained the viability of the plaintiff’s claim: “If the complaint is that a form of legal
process resulted in pretrial detention unsupported by probable cause, then the right
allegedly infringed lies in the Fourth Amendment.” Id. at 367; see also id. at 369 n.8
(“[O]nce a trial has occurred, the Fourth Amendment drops out: A person challenging

the sufficiency of the evidence to support both a conviction and any ensuing
incarceration does so under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”).
To be sure, the Supreme Court briefly addressed the viability of a due process

[I]n the Eleventh Circuit, a fabrication-of-evidence claim is really just a species of
malicious prosecution. Put differently, in this Circuit, the right a fabrication-of-
evidence claim vindicates is the right not to be prosecuted with fabricated evidence.
See, e.g., [Kingsland v. City of Miami, 382 F.3d 1220, 1234 (11th Cir. 2004), abrogated on other
grounds by Williams v. Aguirre, 965 F.3d 1147 (11th Cir. 2020)] (“Kingsland also asserts a
§ 1983 claim for malicious prosecution based on the defendants’ alleged fabrication of
evidence against her[.]”); Johnson v. Darnell, 781 F. App’x 961, 964 (11th Cir. 2019) (“As
to Johnson’s claim for malicious prosecution, he failed to allege facts that would
plausibly suggest Cruz or Pino-Diaz were the legal cause of the proceeding against
him. Specifically, as noted above, he failed to allege any facts concerning the substance
of the evidence or statements Cruz or Pino-Diaz fabricated.”); Williams v. Miami-Dade
Police Dep’t, 297 F. App’x 941, 947 (11th Cir. 2008) (“Williams’s malicious prosecution
claim against Baaske is based upon Baaske’s alleged act of fabricating evidence, which
resulted in the prosecutor being presented with false and misleading evidence.”).
claim based on fabricated evidence in assessing a statute of limitations issue vis-à-vis
such a claim. McDonough v. Smith, 588 U.S. 109, 115 (2019). McDonough involved a

plaintiff charged with forging absentee ballots for a primary election. Id. at 112. The
prosecution relied on allegedly false affidavits, coached witnesses, and a suspect DNA
analysis to support the charges. Id. at 113. The allegedly false evidence led to
McDonough’s arrest, arraignment, and release (with restrictions on his travel) pending

trial. Id. at 113. The prosecutor litigated McDonough’s case to trial twice, the first
ending in a mistrial and the second resulting in an acquittal on all charges. McDonough
subsequently sued the prosecutor under § 1983.
As applicable in this case, the Court neither affirmed nor disavowed the viability

of a due process claim based upon fabricated evidence:
Though McDonough’s complaint does not ground his fabricated-
evidence claim in a particular constitutional provision, the Second Circuit
treated his claim as arising under the Due Process Clause. [McDonough v.
Smith, 898 F.3d 259, 266 (2d Cir. 2018).] McDonough’s claim, this theory
goes, seeks to vindicate a “right not to be deprived of liberty as a result of
the fabrication of evidence by a government officer.” Ibid. (quoting Zahrey
v. Coffey, 221 F.3d 342, 349 (2d Cir. 2000)); see also, e.g., Napue v. Illinois, 360
U.S. 264, 269 (1959). We assume without deciding that the Second
Circuit’s articulations of the right at issue and its contours are sound,
having not granted certiorari to resolve those separate questions. See Heck
v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 480, n.2 (1994) (accepting the lower courts’
characterization of the relevant claims).

McDonough, 588 U.S. at 115 (cleaned up). The Court continued in a footnote:

In accepting the Court of Appeals’ treatment of McDonough’s
claim as one sounding in denial of due process, we express no view as to
what other constitutional provisions (if any) might provide safeguards
against the creation or use of fabricated evidence enforceable through a
42 U.S.C. § 1983 action. See Soldal v. Cook County, 506 U.S. 56, 70 (1992)
(“Certain wrongs affect more than a single right and, accordingly, can
implicate more than one of the Constitution’s commands”). Moreover,
because the Second Circuit understood McDonough’s due process claim
to allege a deprivation of liberty, we have no occasion to consider the
proper handling of a fabricated-evidence claim founded on an allegation
that the use of fabricated evidence was so egregious as to shock the
conscience, see, e.g., County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 849 (1998),
or caused harms exclusively to “interests other than the interest in
freedom from physical restraint,” Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 283
(1994) (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment); see also, e.g., W. Keeton,
D. Dobbs, R. Keeton, & D. Owen, Prosser and Keeton on Law of Torts
§ 119, p. 870 (5th ed. 1984) (Prosser & Keeton) (“[O]ne who is wrongfully
prosecuted may suffer both in reputation and by confinement”).
Accordingly, we do not address what the accrual rule would be for a claim
rooted in other types of harm independent of a liberty deprivation, as no
such claim is before us. See [McDonough, 898 F.3d at 266].

McDonough, 588 U.S. at 115 n.2 (cleaned up).7
While the McDonough decision allowed the fabrication of evidence claim to
proceed under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, the Court did so
without creating binding precedent such a claim appropriately articulated the right at
issue or soundly defined its contours. McDonough, 588 U.S. at 115; see also id. at 127
(Thomas, J., dissenting) (“[E]ven if the Second Circuit were correct that McDonough
asserts a violation of the Due Process Clause, it would be preferable for the Court to
determine the claim’s elements before deciding its statute of limitations.”).8

7 Notably, the Court opined, “Though McDonough was not incarcerated pending trial, he was subject
to restrictions on his ability to travel and other ‘restraints not shared by the public generally,’ Justices of
Boston Municipal Court v. Lydon, 466 U.S. 294, 301 (1984), and as the case comes to this Court, it is
undisputed that McDonough has pleaded a liberty deprivation. See [McDonough v. Smith, 898 F.3d 259,
266 (2d Cir. 2018)].” McDonough v. Smith, 588 U.S. 109, 117 n.4 (2019) (cleaned up).
8 In addition, unlike Thornton, McDonough stood trial twice. McDonough, 588 U.S. at 113. Therefore,
although the court did not indicate standing trial constituted an essential element of the plaintiff’s
Hence, applicable precedent does not establish the viability of a Fourteenth
Amendment substantive due process claim in the circumstances at bar.9 Accordingly,

Thornton’s Fourteenth Amendment claim warrants dismissal on this basis.10

claim, the facts of McDonough do not clearly establish a plaintiff may pursue a due process claim for
evidence fabrication when the plaintiff’s criminal case did not ultimately go to trial. (See Doc. 4 at 12).
9 Thornton cites Paylan v. Teitelbaum, 798 F. App’x 458 (11th Cir. 2020), for the proposition that “no
trial is needed for a § 1983 fabricated evidence claim.” (Doc. 17 at 5). First and foremost, the Paylan
decision constitutes an unpublished panel opinion that cannot override the clear precedent provided
in Rehberg: Litigants cannot maintain due process claims stemming from pretrial injuries predicated
upon fabricated evidence.

Furthermore, other than citing Riley v. City of Montgomery, 104 F.3d 1247, 1253 (11th Cir. 1997), for the
proposition that “fabricating incriminating evidence violates an accused’s constitutional rights,” 798
F. App’x at 465, the Paylan decision, in rejecting the claim for insufficient evidence, does not expressly
identify the constitutional provision underpinning the right. To be sure, Riley, a substantive due
process case, involved allegations of fabricated evidence resulting in incarceration post-trial, so
Thornton’s appeal to the Paylan decision arises from its Riley reference in circumstances devoid of a
trial or hearing vis-à-vis the Paylan plaintiff’s involuntary admission for drug abuse treatment.
However, the Paylan circumstances incite a Fourth Amendment unreasonable seizure claim just as
readily as a due process deprivation of liberty interests claim. Therefore, Paylan serves as poor
authority for Thornton’s entreaty.
10 To be sure, several circuits countenance such claims based upon the substantive due process
doctrine. See Harris v. Town of S. Pines, 110 F.4th 633, 646 (4th Cir. 2024) (contrasting a Fourth
Amendment claim where the alleged harm consists of “wrongful detention without probable cause”
with a Fourteenth Amendment fabrication of evidence claim where “the alleged harm is that the entire
panoply of rights afforded to criminal defendants was infected by the fabricated evidence, thus
wrongfully depriving the defendant of their liberty. For example, ‘[t]he setting of bail, which may
make the difference between freedom and confinement pending trial, and the prosecutor’s decision
to pursue charges rather than to dismiss the complaint without further action, may depend on the
prosecutor’s and magistrate’s assessments of the strength of the case, which in turn may be critically
influenced by fabricated evidence.’” (quoting Garnett v. Undercover Officer C0039, 838 F.3d 265, 277 (2d Cir.
2016))); Barnes v. City of New York, 68 F.4th 123, 129 (2d Cir. 2023) (“Moreover, to insist that a
deprivation of liberty requires custody or a conviction overlooks the fact that Barnes’s prosecution on
the drug sale charge is itself a deprivation of liberty. For fabricated-evidence claims based on due
process, we have previously recognized that a plaintiff’s ‘prosecution’ can be a ‘deprivation of liberty.’”
(citing Ashley v. City of New York, 992 F.3d 128, 139 (2d Cir. 2021) (describing “judicial proceedings”
as “liberty-depriving” in the context of a fabricated-evidence claim))); Awabdy v. City of Adelanto, 368
F.3d 1062, 1069 (9th Cir. 2004) (“We do not interpret Albright as establishing a rule that Fourth
Amendment violations are the only proper grounds for malicious prosecution claims under § 1983.”).

The putative “injuries might be cognizable as due process violations through a gap in constitutional
protection created by Albright’s limitation of § 1983 malicious prosecution claims to those based on
B. Thornton Does Not Allege a Viable Procedural Due Process Claim.
Alternatively, Thornton may have to sought to lodge a procedural due process

claim rather than a substantive due process claim. “In procedural due process claims,
the deprivation by state action of a constitutionally protected interest in ‘life, liberty, or
property’ is not in itself unconstitutional; what is unconstitutional is the deprivation of
such an interest without due process of law.” Zinermon, 494 U.S. at 125 (citation omitted).

In the Eleventh Circuit, “a § 1983 claim alleging a denial of procedural due process
requires proof of three elements: (1) a deprivation of a constitutionally-protected liberty
or property interest; (2) state action; and (3) constitutionally-inadequate process.”
Arrington v. Helms, 438 F.3d 1336, 1347 (11th Cir. 2006) (quoting Grayden v. Rhodes, 345

F.3d 1225, 1232 (11th Cir. 2003)).
1. Thorton Possesses a Constitutionally-Protected Liberty Interest.
Thornton contends Baker and Carter’s actions deprived her of liberty;
principally, the State compelled Thornton “to attend multiple court hearings, to

the Fourth Amendment.” Becker v. Kroll, 494 F.3d 904, 918 (10th Cir. 2007); see also Cole v. Carson, 802
F.3d 752, 773 (5th Cir. 2015) (“Where police intentionally fabricate evidence and successfully get
someone falsely charged with a felony as cover for their colleagues’ actions, and the Fourth
Amendment is unavailing, there may be a due process violation.”), cert. granted, judgment vacated sub nom.
Hunter v. Cole, 580 U.S. 994 (2016), and opinion reinstated in relevant part, 905 F.3d 334 (5th Cir. 2018),
overruled on other grounds by, Cole v. Carson, 935 F.3d 444 (5th Cir. 2019); cf. Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266,
291 (1994) (Souter, J., concurring in judgment) (“There may indeed be exceptional cases where some
quantum of harm occurs in the interim period after groundless criminal charges are filed but before
any Fourth Amendment seizure. Whether any such unusual case may reveal a substantial deprivation
of liberty, and so justify a court in resting compensation on a want of government power or a limitation
of it independent of the Fourth Amendment, are issues to be faced only when they arise. They do
not arise in this case and I accordingly concur in the judgment of the Court.”).
undergo an unannounced drug test at her own expense after her first hearing, to be
subject to random drug tests, to attend multiple parenting classes, and to ensure that

her son was not late or absent from school on any occasion during the pendency of the
criminal proceeding.” (Doc. 1 at ¶ 18). During the unannounced drug test, Thornton
“was compelled to completely disrobe in front of an employee of the contractor used
by the Court.” (Id. at ¶ 19). While Thornton faced pending truancy charges, “[s]he was

also stripped of her parental right to withdraw her son from Creekside and place him
in another school.” (Id. at ¶ 18). In addition, Thornton asserts the proceedings
subjected her to embarrassment, invasion of her privacy, and damage to her reputation.
(Id. at ¶ 20).

“A liberty interest can originate from the Constitution or from a state statute or
regulation.” Schaeffer by & through Schaeffer v. Fulton Cnty. Sch. Dist., No. 1:17-CV-04383-
JPB, 2020 WL 10485696, at *4 (N.D. Ga. Feb. 4, 2020) (citing Meachum v. Fano, 427
U.S. 215, 225-26 (1976)). “If a state creates a substantive liberty interest by statute, then

it must afford due process before taking that liberty interest.” Id. (citing Sandin v. Conner,
515 U.S. 472, 477-78 (1995)). Importantly, though, “[p]rocess is not an end in itself.
Its constitutional purpose is to protect a substantive interest to which the individual has

a legitimate claim for entitlement.” Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 250 (1983).
As recounted, Thornton alleges a deprivation of liberty due to the court requiring
her to attend hearings under threat of contempt. In Schaeffer, a factually similar case,
parents Mark and Jennifer’s minor child William “suffer[ed] from disabilities that
impact[ed] his school attendance and performance.” 2020 WL 10485696, at *1. Like
Thornton, the Schaeffers alleged the defendants “repeatedly marked William with

unexcused absences for absences that qualified as excused” due to William’s medical
needs. Id. Despite the parents’ multiple requests for assistance from the school,
“Defendants allegedly filed a false Child in Need of Services (‘CHINS’) Referral in
which they stated William had forty unexcused absences and court intervention was

necessary to assist with William’s educational support.” Id. Due to this referral, the
plaintiffs “were directed to appear in Fulton County Juvenile Court,” where the court
determined “they were already making extraordinary efforts to help William access
school.” Id.

Nevertheless, three days after the hearing, the defendants escalated the CHINS
referral to a CHINS petition; “Defendants alleged in the CHINS petition that William
was truant in need of juvenile court supervision.” Id. Pursuant to this petition,
“Plaintiffs were summoned to juvenile court again and required to defend against the

allegations in the Petition.” Id. After holding another hearing, the Juvenile Court
dismissed the petition against the Schaeffers. Id. Thereafter, the plaintiffs filed a
Complaint asserting, inter alia, a § 1983 claim for denial of procedural due process. Id.

The Schaeffers contend they possessed “a liberty interest to not be forced by
penalty of law into court to answer a false, illegal petition.” Id. at *4. The court held
those allegations did not evince a constitutionally-protected liberty interest. Id. at *6.
In so holding, the court analogized plaintiffs’ argument to a similar procedural claim in
Todorov v. DCH Healthcare Authority, 921 F.2d 1438 (11th Cir. 1991), where the Eleventh
Circuit found this “[was] precisely the type of argument the Supreme Court of the

United States rejected in Olim [461 U.S. 238] when it articulated that process is not an
end in itself.” Schaeffer, 2020 WL 10485696, at *5 (citing Todorov, 921 F.2d at 1463 n.39);
see also Todorov, 921 F.2d at 1463-64 (holding a neurologist seeking additional privileges
at a general hospital did not possess a due process interest in the procedures used to

grant or deny such privileges if “there is no protected interest in the privileges”);
Schaeffer, 2020 WL 10485696, at *5 (“[T]his argument fails because ‘an expectation of
receiving process is not, without more, a liberty interest protected by the Due Process
Clause.’” (citing Olim, 461 U.S. at 250 n.12)).

The same analysis applies to Thornton’s argument she held a constitutionally-
protected liberty interest in not “[being] compelled by the threat of contempt of court
to attend multiple court hearings.” (Doc. 1 at ¶ 18). Accordingly, a procedural due
process claim fails in this regard. See Alexander v. McKinney, 692 F.3d 553, 557 n.2 (7th

Cir. 2012) (“Nor does the burden of appearing in court and attending trial, in and of
itself, constitute a deprivation of liberty. . . . It would be anomalous to hold that
attending a trial deprives a criminal defendant of liberty without due process of law,

when the purpose of the trial is to effectuate due process.”).
Thornton also contends she suffered humiliation, embarrassment, and damage
to her reputation because she “was involuntarily put into circumstances where she was
viewed by all as a bad and/or irresponsible parent and/or a drug user and criminal.”
(Doc. 1 at ¶ 19). “The Supreme Court . . . has held that injury to reputation, by itself,
does not constitute the deprivation of a liberty or property interest protected under the

Fourteenth Amendment.” Behrens v. Regier, 422 F.3d 1255, 1259 (11th Cir. 2005) (citing
Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 701-02 (1976)). This doctrine, known as the “stigma-plus”
test, requires “the individual must be not only stigmatized but also stigmatized in
connection with . . . [a] government official’s conduct [that] deprived the plaintiff of a

previously recognized property or liberty interest in addition to damaging the plaintiff’s
reputation.” Rehberg, 611 F.3d at 852 (quoting Behrens, 422 F.3d at 1260); see also Cypress
Ins. Co. v. Clark, 144 F.3d 1435, 1436-37 (11th Cir. 1998) (“[A] plaintiff [must] show that
the government official’s conduct deprived the plaintiff of a previously recognized

property or liberty interest in addition to damaging the plaintiff’s reputation.”); Zak v.
City of Arab, No. 4:15-cv-00232-JEO, 2015 WL 4508010, at *6 (N.D. Ala. July 24, 2015)
(holding reputational damages due to defamatory comments “are not recoverable under
§ 1983 unless the ‘damages were incurred as a result of government action significantly

altering the plaintiff[s’] constitutionally recognized legal rights’” (alteration in original)
(quoting Cypress Ins. Co., 144 F.3d at 1438)); N.M. v. Buckner, No. 2:22-cv-442-RAH,
2023 WL 2876166, at *6-7 (M.D. Ala. Apr. 10, 2023) (finding plaintiffs sufficiently

satisfied the stigma-plus test by alleging their names were placed on a central child abuse
registry causing stigmatization and “distinct alterations” of their rights to family
integrity).
Thornton alleges Baker and Carter’s fabrication of evidence subjected her to
circumstances which harmed her reputation. Nevertheless, Thornton’s allegations of
humiliation and reputation damage cannot, alone, sustain her due process claim.

However, the court may consider such harms if Thornton demonstrates deprivation of
a separate, constitutionally-protected liberty or property interest in connection with this
alleged defamation.
Thornton contends the Juvenile Court required her to undergo a drug test,

during which she “was compelled to completely disrobe in front of an employee of the
contractor used by the Court for administering drug tests.” (Doc. 1 at ¶¶ 19, 18). Such
drug tests, formally termed urinalysis, involve collecting and testing urine samples, often
under direct observation to detect tampering. Conduct of such drug tests constitutes a

search under the Fourth Amendment. See Skinner v. Ry. Lab. Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602,
617 (1989) (“Nor can it be disputed that the process of collecting the sample to be
tested, which may in some cases involve visual or aural monitoring of the act of
urination, itself implicates privacy interests.”); see also Everett v. Napper, 833 F.2d 1507,

1511 (11th Cir. 1987) (“Since the fourth amendment was designed to protect personal
privacy and dignity, we agree that a urinalysis is a search.”); Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union
v. Von Raab, 816 F.2d 170, 175 (5th Cir. 1987), aff’d in part, vacated in part, 489 U.S. 656

(1989) (“In several ways, drug screening by urinalysis infringes the employee’s
reasonable expectation of privacy and thereby constitutes a search under the fourth
amendment. There are few activities in our society more personal or private than the
passing of urine. Most people describe it by euphemisms if they talk about it at all. It
is a function traditionally performed without public observation . . . .”).
While the Constitution does not recognize any absolute right to privacy, see Dobbs

v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization, 597 U.S. 215, 255 (2022), various “‘zones of
privacy’ . . . have been recognized as warranting protection[,] . . . includ[ing] the right
to be free from unreasonable search and seizure,” Carroll by Carroll v. Parks, 755 F.2d
1455, 1456-57 (11th Cir. 1985). This right, though, finds its constitutional basis in the

Fourth Amendment. See Skinner, 489 U.S. at 613-14 (“The [Fourth] Amendment
guarantees the privacy, dignity, and security of persons against certain arbitrary and
invasive acts by officers of the Government or those acting at their direction.” (citations
omitted)). “[W]here as here a claim is raised under the specific protections of the

Fourth Amendment, the claim should be pursued under that amendment and not the
more generalized protections of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.” Kilpatrick v. United States, 578 F. Supp. 2d 1339, 1348-49 (N.D. Fla. 2008)
(citing Tinney, 77 F.3d at 381); see also Albright, 510 U.S. at 281 (“‘Because the Fourth

Amendment provides an explicit textual source of constitutional protection against this
sort of . . . governmental conduct,’ we said, ‘that Amendment, not the more generalized
notion of “substantive due process,” must be the guide for analyzing these claims.’”

(quoting Graham, 490 U.S. at 395)).
Therefore, any claim for an alleged deprivation of Thornton’s liberty arising from
the drug screen’s privacy infringement must proceed under the Fourth Amendment.
Hence, this alleged harm cannot sustain her procedural due process claim. Cf. Strunin
v. Darnell, No. 108-CV-197-SPM-AK, 2009 WL 1956711, at *2 (N.D. Fla. July 2, 2009)
(dismissing plaintiff’s claims that a blanket strip search policy for each person booked

in the county jail violated his procedural due process rights); see also id. (“While the
Amended Complaint claims a violation of procedural due process under the Fourteenth
Amendment instead of the Fourth Amendment violation that was pleaded in the
original Complaint, the Supreme Court has made clear that the Fourth Amendment,

with its specific guarantees, is the appropriate source of rights against pretrial
deprivations of liberty. . . . [C]ourts have found that when an amendment specifically
addresses a right, it is that amendment, and not the vague Due Process provisions of
the Fourteenth Amendment, that is the proper source for a potential cause of action.”).

Notably, though, Thornton also alleged she underwent the test at her own
expense. The money she expended for the test likely represents a protected property
interest, which could sufficiently support the first prong of her procedural due process
claim because a person clearly has a property interest in their funds. See, e.g., Sniadach v.

Fam. Fin. Corp. of Bay View, 395 U.S. 337 (1969) (identifying wages as a protected
property interest when discussing the necessary procedures for wage garnishment
pursuant to the Due Process Clause).

Even if the fee Thornton paid for the drug test constituted an insufficient
constitutionally-protected interest, Thornton also alleged the court “stripped [her] of
her parental right to withdraw her son from Creekside and place him in another school.”
Parents generally possess fundamental rights regarding the care and upbringing of their
children. See, e.g., Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399, 401 (1923) (noting the “liberty”
protected by the Due Process Clause includes the right of parents to “establish a home

and bring up children” and “to control the education of their own”). Such rights
include deciding whether to enroll a child in public school. See Pierce v. Soc’y of the Sisters
of the Holy Names of Jesus & Mary, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925) (“The fundamental theory of
liberty upon which all governments in this Union repose excludes any general power of

the state to standardize its children by forcing them to accept instruction from public
teachers only.”); Blau v. Fort Thomas Pub. Sch. Dist., 401 F.3d 381, 395–96 (6th Cir. 2005)
(noting “parents may have a fundamental right to decide whether to send their child to a
public school”). Inasmuch as Thornton alleges the State prevented her from

withdrawing her son from public school and enrolling him in a private school or
alternate homeschooling plan, the Complaint states a cognizable liberty deprivation.11

11 Thornton also asserts the court required her “to ensure that her son was not late or absent from
school on any occasion during the pendency of the criminal proceeding.” This averment does not
identify an infringement of a constitutionally-protected liberty or property interest. Although parents
and guardians possess a right to “direct the upbringing and education of children under their control,”
Pierce v. Society of the Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus & Mary, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925), it does not
constitute an absolute right. “There is no doubt as to the power of a State, having a high responsibility
for education of its citizens, to impose reasonable regulations for the control and duration of basic
education.” Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 213-14 (1972) (holding courts must balance “a State’s
universal interest in education” with “fundamental rights and interest, such as . . . the traditional
interest of parents with respect to the religious upbringing of their children so long as they . . . ‘prepare
(them) for additional obligations’” (quoting Pierce, 268 U.S. at 535)).

While Alabama cannot require parents to send their children to public school, the state can require
parents to educate their children, either through public, private, or homeschooling, and can impose
reasonable requirements on parents who elect to educate their children in the public school system.
See Pierce, 268 U.S. at 534 (“No question is raised concerning the power of the state reasonably to
regulate all schools, to inspect, supervise and examine them, their teachers and pupils; to require that all
children of proper age attend some school, that teachers shall be of good moral character and patriotic
In summary, Thornton’s alleged deprivations include three constitutionally-
protected liberty and property interests potentially cognizable under the Fourteenth

Amendment: the restrictions placed on her ability to withdraw her son from the school,
the funds she relinquished to pay for a required drug test, and the harm her reputation
suffered.12
2. The Defendants Engaged in State Action.

The conduct Thornton asserts as the cause of her stated deprivations of liberty
and property constitutes state action. Defendants Baker and Carter, both public school
employees, represent state actors. (See Doc. 1 at ¶¶ 5-6 (“Defendant Baker is now and
was at all times material hereto the Principal of Creekside Primary School located in

Limestone County, Alabama. At all times and in all ways material hereto Baker was a
local county official acting under color of state law and a person subject to suit in his
personal capacity under § 1983. . . . Defendant Carter is now and was at all times

disposition, that certain studies plainly essential to good citizenship must be taught, and that nothing
be taught which is manifestly inimical to the public welfare.” (emphasis added)). Accordingly,
Alabama state law requires school attendance for children between the ages of 6 and 17, and it holds
parents accountable if they fail to regularly require the child to attend school. See Ala. Code §§ 16-28-
2.1, -3, -12. It also requires parents to explain, as soon as practical, “the cause of any absence of the
child under his control or charge which was without permission of the teacher”; “a failure to furnish
such explanation shall be admissible as evidence of such child being a truant with the consent and
connivance of the person in control or charge of said child . . . .” Ala. Code § 16-28-15. Therefore,
the school did not have to tolerate excessive school tardiness or absences without explanation, to the
extent such conduct occurred.
12 Again, while her reputational harms alone cannot support a claim, as discussed supra, a court may
consider these harms in combination with other alleged deprivations of liberty and property. See
Rehberg v. Paulk, 611 F.3d 828, 852 (11th Cir. 2010), aff’d, 566 U.S. 356 (2012) (“[T]he ‘stigma-plus’ test
. . . requires the plaintiff to show both a valid defamation claim (the stigma) and ‘the violation of some
more tangible interest’ (the plus).” (citing Cannon v. City of W. Palm Beach, 250 F.3d 1299, 1302 (11th
Cir. 2001))).
material hereto the Assistant Principal of Creekside Primary School located in
Limestone County, Alabama. At all times and in all ways material hereto Carter was a

local government official acting under color of state law and a person subject to suit in
her personal capacity under § 1983.”)).
Furthermore, Baker and Carter undertook student-attendance record-keeping
and sent a criminal referral to the local district attorney’s office for the initiation of

truancy charges against Thornton pursuant to state law. (See Doc. 1 at ¶ 16 (“When a
student has seven or more unexcused absences, state law requires the appropriate
school administrator to send a criminal referral to the local district attorney’s office for
prosecution. Defendants Baker and Carter were at all material times aware of said state

law and were ultimately responsible for Creekside’s compliance with said law.”); doc.
17 at 3 (“In the present case, the Defendants were responsible for gathering facts and
evidence (i.e., determining when Plaintiff’s child was absent and whether the absence
was excused), keeping records of those facts, making a formal report of those facts,

forwarding the report to prosecutors as required by law, and making themselves
available as prosecution witnesses. . . . Section 16-28-12, Code of Alabama 1975
specifically requires school officials to document absences and to report violations of

the State’s truancy laws to the district attorney.”)).
As alleged in Thornton’s Complaint, Baker and Carter performed critical
evidence-gathering and reporting responsibilities as required by Section 16-28-12 of the
Alabama Code. See Ala. Code § 16-28-12(c) (“Any parent, guardian, or other person
having control or custody of any child enrolled in public school who fails to require the
child to regularly attend the school . . . shall be reported by the principal to the superintendent

of education of the school system in which the suspected violation occurred. The
superintendent of education or his or her designee shall report suspected violations to the district attorney
within 10 days. Any principal or superintendent of education or his or her designee
intentionally failing to report a suspected violation shall be guilty of a Class C

misdemeanor.” (emphasis added)). As the statute indicates, school principals possess a
compulsory duty to report suspected truancy violations.
In addition, Thornton alleges Baker and Carter labelled her son’s absences as
unexcused even though Thornton presented them with valid doctor’s notes to account

for the absences. (See, e.g., doc. 1 at ¶ 15 (“Defendant Carter told Mrs. Thornton that
she (Carter) and Baker were going to allow only two days to be excused for many of
Mrs. Thornton’s son’s longer absences regardless of the length of time the pediatrician
thought her son should stay out of school and regardless of the length of time covered

by the pediatrician’s excuse.”), ¶ 25 (“Defendants Baker and Carter, acting individually
and in concert, deliberately and knowingly fabricated false evidence in the form of
‘doctored’ official attendance records kept and maintained on Mrs. Thornton’s son.”)).

Moreover, she asserts Baker and Carter forwarded the allegedly false information to
prosecutors to initiate the truancy proceedings, resulting in the alleged deprivations of
Thornton’s constitutionally-protected liberty and property interests. (Id. at ¶ 16 (“As a
direct result of said falsified attendance records Defendants Baker and Carter sent, or
caused to be sent, a criminal referral to the Limestone County District Attorney (‘DA’)
for the initiation of criminal truancy proceedings against Mrs. Thornton.”), ¶¶ 27-28

(“The false information sent to the DA by Baker and Carter was the only evidence
against Mrs. Thornton. . . . As a result of Baker and Carter’s deliberate provision of
fabricated, false attendance information to the DA, Mrs. Thornton suffered a
deprivation of her due process right to a fair trial and to her life, liberty, and property

interests . . . .”)).
Therefore, the afore-described conduct constitutes state action.13
3. Thornton Received Constitutionally-Adequate Process.
Nevertheless, Thornton cannot establish a due process violation because she

13 Baker and Carter do not explicitly contest whether they represent state actors. They do, however,
claim school administrators do not comprise members of a “prosecution team” for purposes of a §
1983 constitutional claim. (Doc. 10 at 5 (“Baker and Carter are not members of a prosecution team,
but rather they are school administrators. Thus, they are not proper defendants to this claim.”)).
Some courts cognizing a Fourteenth Amendment fabrication-of-evidence claim require an alleged
offender exercise authority as an investigating official or a member of a prosecution team. See, e.g.,
Fitzgerald v. State Ct. of Bibb Cnty., No. 5:24-CV-190 (CAR), 2024 WL 3881487, at *5 (M.D. Ga. Aug.
19, 2024); Garnett, 838 F.3d at 280. The elements of a procedural due process claim contain no such
requirement.

Moreover, Eleventh Circuit caselaw establishes Baker and Carter likely represent members of the
prosecution team. Circuit caselaw defines members of a “prosecution team” as “the prosecutor or
anyone over whom he has authority,” which includes “both investigative and prosecutorial
personnel.” Moon v. Head, 285 F.3d 1301, 1309 (11th Cir. 2002) (quoting United States v. Meros, 866 F.2d
1304, 1309 (11th Cir. 1989)). Other courts maintain officials serving in separate agencies may perform
investigative functions in direct furtherance of a prosecution. See, e.g., United States v. Pelullo, 399 F.3d
197, 216 (3d Cir. 2005), as amended (Mar. 8, 2005) (“Here, there is no question that certain [Department
of Labor] agents were integral members of the prosecution team.”); United States v. Bin Laden, 397 F.
Supp. 2d 465, 485 (S.D.N.Y. 2005), aff’d sub nom. In re Terrorist Bombings of U.S. Embassies in E. Afr., 552
F.3d 93 (2d Cir. 2008) (finding agents of Marshalls Service’s Witness Security Program served on
prosecution team where agents “installed and continuously operated . . . video-teleconference
equipment at the prosecutors’ request”).
received constitutionally-adequate process. “Nothing in [the Fourteenth] Amendment
protects against all deprivations of life, liberty, or property by the State.” Parratt v. Taylor,

451 U.S. 527, 537 (1981), overruled on other grounds by Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327
(1986). “The Fourteenth Amendment protects only against deprivations ‘without due
process of law.’” Id. (citing Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 145 (1979)). “Therefore,
to determine whether a constitutional violation has occurred, it is necessary to ask what

process the State provided, and whether it was constitutionally adequate.” Zinermon,
494 U.S. at 126.
“There can be no doubt that, at a minimum, the Due Process Clause requires
notice and the opportunity to be heard incident to the deprivation of life, liberty, or

property at the hands of the government.” Grayden, 345 F.3d at 1232. However, the
specific procedural protections due process requires in a particular case reflects “a
flexible concept that varies with the particular situation.” Zinermon, 494 U.S. at 127.
Thornton alleges Baker and Carter deprived her liberty and property interests via

their “deliberate provision of fabricated, false attendance information to the DA.”
(Doc. 1 at ¶ 28). Actually, the alleged deprivation of interests resulted from state court
rulings influenced by the Defendants’ alleged misconduct. That is, the deprivation of

Thornton’s interests occurred pursuant to the provision of process, i.e., the juvenile
court hearings. In such posture, there ensues no need to focus upon post-deprivation
remedies vis-à-vis a procedural due process claim: the deprivation of asserted interests
did not result from “random and unauthorized” conduct where “predeprivation
process was impracticable” and infeasible. Rittenhouse v. DeKalb Cnty., 764 F.2d 1451,
1454 (11th Cir. 1985) (citing Parratt, 451 U.S. at 541); see also Wright v. Newsome, 795 F.2d

964, 967 (11th Cir. 1986) (citing Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422 (1982))
(holding “post-deprivation remedies do not satisfy the due process requirement where
the deprivation of property is effected pursuant to established state procedure, rather
than through random, unauthorized action”); Augustine v. Doe, 740 F.2d 322, 329 (5th

Cir. 1984) (“Parratt applies only when the nature of the challenged conduct is such that
the provision of predeprivation procedural safeguards is impracticable or infeasible.”),
cited in Sheldon H. Nahmod, CIVIL RIGHTS & CIVIL LIBERTIES LITIGATION: THE LAW
OF SECTION 1983 § 3:53 (2025).

Therefore, in this case “it was the state statutes or procedures themselves that
effected a deprivation,” Rittenhouse, 764 F.2d at 1455, i.e., the actual pre-deprivation
procedures—the juvenile court proceedings—that occasioned Thornton’s deprivation.
See also Augustine, 740 F.2d at 327-28 (“Parratt posits a distinction between (1) the

random and unauthorized (and hence unpredictable) conduct of a state actor, and (2)
conduct that the state can contain and direct by instituting procedural safeguards. . . .
The availability of a postdeprivation tort remedy does not satisfy the requirements of

due process in such cases.” (citations omitted)).
Properly conceived, Thornton’s putative procedural due process claim inquires
“what process the State provided, and whether it was constitutionally adequate. This
inquiry would examine the procedural safeguards built into the statutory or
administrative procedure of effecting the deprivation . . . .” Zinermon, 494 U.S. at 126.
Setting aside whether the Defendants actually constitute proper litigants in a suit

challenging the due process adequacy of state court procedures, Thornton’s
“procedural due process interests . . . were adequately protected by . . . the procedures
offered to challenge” the truancy charges. Becker, 494 F.3d at 919. The Juvenile Court
provided Thornton multiple hearings, ultimately allowing Thornton to successfully

challenge her charges. Cf. Rehberg, 611 F.3d at 853 (“Rehberg does not allege Dougherty
County or the individual defendants denied him the constitutionally required
procedures necessary to challenge his indictments and arrest. Indeed, Rehberg’s
successful challenges to the three indictments show otherwise.”); Rittenhouse, 764 F.2d

at 1455 (“Similarly in Logan, the state procedures that were challenged were themselves
predeprivation procedures. Those procedures were tested against the requirements of
procedural due process, and were found to be deficient.”).14
Hence, this court may not “supply procedural requirements in addition to

already-established criminal procedure under the Constitution and state law.” Becker,
494 F.3d at 921. Therefore, as Thornton cannot demonstrate she has received
constitutionally-inadequate process, her procedural due process claim fails. See Mines v.
Barber, 610 F. App’x 838, 840 (11th Cir. 2015) (“As Mr. Mines cannot establish the lack

14 Typically, a procedural due process claim in this regard would assess the adequacy of predeprivation
procedures pursuant to the factors established in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). There
exists no need to apply those factors because Thornton has presented no challenge to the juvenile
court procedures.
of an adequate process to redress his harm, his claim fails as a matter of law.”).
Accordingly, Thornton’s allegations do not suffice to state a Fourteenth Amendment
claim.
CONCLUSION
In summary, the court DISMISSES Defendant Limestone County Board of
Education and counts H and IV because Thornton does not object to their dismissal.
Further, the court DISMISSES Count I because Thornton fails to state a valid claim
for deprivation of her Fourteenth Amendment right to due process. Accordingly, the

court ORDERS Defendants to file a responsive pleading to Count II of Plaintiff's
Complaint at or within fourteen (14) days of the entry of this opinion.
DONE and ORDERED this 9" day of February, 2026.

(,
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

33

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11252942. Public record. Not legal advice.