# RIBARDO

> District Court, D. New Jersey · January 26, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11252536

## Case

- **Full name:** Timothy R. v. Frank Bisignano, Commissioner of Social Security
- **Court:** District Court, D. New Jersey
- **Decided:** January 26, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11252536

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- explaining that, to qualify for disability insurance benefits, a claimant’s “inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity” caused by an impairment “must last, or must be expected to last, for at least 12 months”
- stating that substantial evidence exists only “in relationship to all the other evidence in the record”

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

TIMOTHY R.,1

Plaintiff,
Case No. 1:24-cv-1148
v. Magistrate Judge Norah McCann King

FRANK BISIGNANO,2
Commissioner of Social Security,

Defendant.

OPINION AND ORDER

This matter comes before the Court pursuant to Section 205(g) of the Social Security Act,
as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), regarding the application of Plaintiff Timothy R. for Disability
Insurance Benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 401 et seq. Plaintiff
appeals from the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security denying that application.
After careful consideration of the entire record, including the entire administrative record, the
Court decides this matter pursuant to Rule 78(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. For the
reasons that follow, the Court affirms the Commissioner’s decision.
I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On January 14, 2020, Plaintiff filed an application for benefits, alleging that he has been
disabled since December 28, 2019. R. 135, 149, 278–79. The application was denied initially and

1 The Committee on Court Administration and Case Management of the Judicial Conference of
the United States has recommended that, due to significant privacy concerns in social security
cases, federal courts should refer to plaintiffs in such cases by only their first names and last
initials. See also D.N.J. Standing Order 2021-10.
2 Frank Bisignano, the current Commissioner of Social Security, is substituted as Defendant in
his official capacity. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d).

1
upon reconsideration. R. 150–55, 162–64. Plaintiff sought a de novo hearing before an
administrative law judge (“ALJ”). R. 165–66. ALJ Karen Shelton held a hearing on August 1,
2022, at which Plaintiff, who was represented by counsel, testified, as did a vocational expert. R.
82–121. In a decision dated October 24, 2022, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff was not disabled

within the meaning of the Social Security Act from December 28, 2019, Plaintiff’s alleged
disability onset date, through the date of that decision. R. 24–37. That decision became the final
decision of the Commissioner of Social Security when the Appeals Council declined review on
January 12, 2024. R. 1–6. Plaintiff timely filed this appeal pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). ECF
No. 1. On February 10, 2025, Plaintiff consented to disposition of the matter by a United States
Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and Rule 73 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. ECF No. 14.3 On February 11, 2025, the case was reassigned to the undersigned. ECF
No. 15. The matter is ripe for disposition.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
A. Standard of Review

In reviewing applications for Social Security disability benefits, this Court has the
authority to conduct a plenary review of legal issues decided by the ALJ. Knepp v. Apfel, 204
F.3d 78, 83 (3d Cir. 2000). In contrast, the Court reviews the ALJ’s factual findings to
determine if they are supported by substantial evidence. Sykes v. Apfel, 228 F.3d 259, 262 (3d
Cir. 2000); see also 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The United States Supreme Court has explained this
standard as follows:
Under the substantial-evidence standard, a court looks to an existing administrative
record and asks whether it contains sufficien[t] evidence to support the agency’s

3The Commissioner has provided general consent to Magistrate Judge jurisdiction in cases
seeking review of the Commissioner’s decision. See Standing Order In re: Social Security Pilot
Project (D.N.J. Apr. 2, 2018).
2
factual determinations. And whatever the meaning of substantial in other contexts,
the threshold for such evidentiary sufficiency is not high. Substantial evidence, this
Court has said, is more than a mere scintilla. It means – and means only – such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion.

Biestek v. Berryhill, 587 U.S. 97, 102–03 (2019) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted);
see also Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 565 (1988) (citation and internal quotations
omitted); Bailey v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 354 F. App’x 613, 616 (3d Cir. 2009) (citations and
quotations omitted); K.K. ex rel. K.S. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 17-2309, 2018 WL 1509091,
at *4 (D.N.J. Mar. 27, 2018).
The substantial evidence standard is a deferential standard, and the ALJ’s decision cannot
be set aside merely because the Court “acting de novo might have reached a different
conclusion.” Hunter Douglas, Inc. v. NLRB, 804 F.2d 808, 812 (3d Cir. 1986); see, e.g., Fargnoli
v. Massanari, 247 F.3d 34, 38 (3d Cir. 2001) (“Where the ALJ’s findings of fact are supported
by substantial evidence, we are bound by those findings, even if we would have decided the
factual inquiry differently.”) (citing Hartranft v. Apfel, 181 F.3d 358, 360 (3d Cir. 1999)); K.K.,
2018 WL 1509091, at *4 (“‘[T]he district court ... is [not] empowered to weigh the evidence or
substitute its conclusions for those of the fact-finder.’”) (quoting Williams v. Sullivan, 970 F.2d
1178, 1182 (3d Cir. 1992)).
Nevertheless, the Third Circuit cautions that this standard of review is not “a talismanic
or self-executing formula for adjudication.” Kent v. Schweiker, 710 F.2d 110, 114 (3d Cir. 1983)
(“The search for substantial evidence is thus a qualitative exercise without which our review of
social security disability cases ceases to be merely deferential and becomes instead a sham.”);
see Coleman v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 15-6484, 2016 WL 4212102, at *3 (D.N.J. Aug. 9,
2016). The Court has a duty to “review the evidence in its totality” and “take into account
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whatever in the record fairly detracts from its weight.” K.K., 2018 WL 1509091, at *4 (quoting
Schonewolf v. Callahan, 972 F. Supp. 277, 284 (D.N.J. 1997) (citations and quotations omitted));
see Cotter v. Harris, 642 F.2d 700, 706 (3d Cir. 1981) (stating that substantial evidence exists
only “in relationship to all the other evidence in the record”). Evidence is not substantial if “it is

overwhelmed by other evidence,” “really constitutes not evidence but mere conclusion,” or
“ignores, or fails to resolve, a conflict created by countervailing evidence.” Wallace v. Sec’y of
Health & Human Servs., 722 F.2d 1150, 1153 (3d Cir. 1983) (citing Kent, 710 F.2d at 114); see
K.K., 2018 WL 1509091, at *4. The ALJ decision thus must be set aside if it “did not take into
account the entire record or failed to resolve an evidentiary conflict.” Schonewolf, 972 F. Supp.
at 284-85 (citing Gober v. Matthews, 574 F.2d 772, 776 (3d Cir. 1978)).
Although an ALJ is not required “to use particular language or adhere to a particular
format in conducting [the] analysis,” the decision must contain “sufficient development of the
record and explanation of findings to permit meaningful review.” Jones v. Barnhart, 364 F.3d
501, 505 (3d Cir. 2004) (citing Burnett v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 220 F.3d 112, 119 (3d Cir.

2000)); see K.K., 2018 WL 1509091, at *4. The Court “need[s] from the ALJ not only an
expression of the evidence s/he considered which supports the result, but also some indication of
the evidence which was rejected.” Cotter, 642 F.2d at 705-06; see Burnett, 220 F.3d at 121
(“Although the ALJ may weigh the credibility of the evidence, [s/]he must give some indication
of the evidence which [s/]he rejects and [the] reason(s) for discounting such evidence.”) (citing
Plummer v. Apfel, 186 F.3d 422, 429 (3d. Cir. 1999)). “[T]he ALJ is not required to supply a
comprehensive explanation for the rejection of evidence; in most cases, a sentence or short
paragraph would probably suffice.” Cotter v. Harris, 650 F.2d 481, 482 (3d Cir. 1981). Absent

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such articulation, the Court “cannot tell if significant probative evidence was not credited or
simply ignored.” Id. at 705. As the Third Circuit explains:
Unless the [ALJ] has analyzed all evidence and has sufficiently explained the
weight [s/]he has given to obviously probative exhibits, to say that [the] decision is
supported by substantial evidence approaches an abdication of the court’s duty to
scrutinize the record as a whole to determine whether the conclusions reached are
rational.

Gober, 574 F.2d at 776; see Schonewolf, 972 F. Supp. at 284-85.
Following review of the entire record on appeal from a denial of benefits, the Court can
enter “a judgment affirming, modifying, or reversing the decision of the [Commissioner], with or
without remanding the cause for a rehearing.” 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Remand is appropriate if the
record is incomplete or if the ALJ’s decision lacks adequate reasoning or contains illogical or
contradictory findings. See Burnett, 220 F.3d at 119-20; Podedworny v. Harris, 745 F.2d 210,
221-22 (3d Cir. 1984). Remand is also appropriate if the ALJ’s findings are not the product of a
complete review which “explicitly weigh[s] all relevant, probative and available evidence” in the
record. Adorno v. Shalala, 40 F.3d 43, 48 (3d Cir. 1994) (internal quotation marks omitted); see
A.B. on Behalf of Y.F. v. Colvin, 166 F. Supp.3d 512, 518 (D.N.J. 2016).
B. Sequential Evaluation Process
The Social Security Act establishes a five-step sequential evaluation process for
determining whether a plaintiff is disabled within the meaning of the statute. 20 C.F.R. §
404.1520(a)(4). “The claimant bears the burden of proof at steps one through four, and the
Commissioner bears the burden of proof at step five.” Smith v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 631 F.3d
632, 634 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing Poulos v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 474 F.3d 88, 92 (3d Cir. 2007)).

5
At step one, the ALJ determines whether the plaintiff is currently engaged in substantial
gainful activity. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(b). If so, then the inquiry ends because the plaintiff is not
disabled.
At step two, the ALJ decides whether the plaintiff has a “severe impairment” or

combination of impairments that “significantly limits [the plaintiff’s] physical or mental ability
to do basic work activities[.]” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(c). If the plaintiff does not have a severe
impairment or combination of impairments, then the inquiry ends because the plaintiff is not
disabled. Otherwise, the ALJ proceeds to step three.
At step three, the ALJ decides whether the plaintiff’s impairment or combination of
impairments “meets” or “medically equals” the severity of an impairment in the Listing of
Impairments (“Listing”) found at 20 C.F.R. § 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. 20 C.F.R. §
404.1520(d). If so, then the plaintiff is presumed to be disabled if the impairment or combination
of impairments has lasted or is expected to last for a continuous period of at least 12 months. Id.
at § 404.1509. Otherwise, the ALJ proceeds to step four.

At step four, the ALJ must determine the plaintiff’s residual functional capacity (“RFC”)
and determine whether the plaintiff can perform past relevant work. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(e), (f).
If the plaintiff can perform past relevant work, then the inquiry ends because the plaintiff is not
disabled. Otherwise, the ALJ proceeds to the final step.
At step five, the ALJ must decide whether the plaintiff, considering the plaintiff’s RFC,
age, education, and work experience, can perform other jobs that exist in significant numbers in
the national economy. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(g). If the ALJ determines that the plaintiff can do
so, then the plaintiff is not disabled. Otherwise, the plaintiff is presumed to be disabled if the

6
impairment or combination of impairments has lasted or is expected to last for a continuous
period of at least twelve months.
III. ALJ DECISION AND APPELLATE ISSUES
Plaintiff was 37 years old on December 28, 2019, his alleged disability onset date. R. 35.

He met the insured status requirements of the Social Security Act through December 31, 2024.
Id. At step one, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity
between his alleged disability onset date and the date of the decision. Id.
At step two, the ALJ found that Plaintiff suffered from the following severe impairments:
degenerative disc disease, carpal tunnel syndrome, obesity, bipolar disorder, and post-traumatic
stress disorder (“PTSD”). Id. The ALJ further found that Plaintiff’s visual disturbance, chronic
liver disease, and diabetes mellitus were not severe impairments. R. 26–27. The ALJ also found
that there was no objective or clinical evidence to support the existence of knee and shoulder
pain, hypermobility syndrome, and fibromyalgia. R. 27.
At step three, the ALJ found that Plaintiff did not suffer an impairment or combination of

impairments that met or medically equaled the severity of any Listing. R. 28–30.
At step four, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had the RFC to perform light work subject to
various additional limitations. R. 31–35. The ALJ also found that this RFC did not permit the
performance of Plaintiff’s past relevant work as a hotel clerk and game attendant. R. 35.
At step five and relying on the testimony of the vocational expert, the ALJ found that a
significant number of jobs—e.g., jobs as a linen grader, a photocopy operator, and a collator
operator—existed in the national economy and could be performed by Plaintiff with this RFC. R.
36–37. The ALJ therefore concluded that Plaintiff was not disabled within the meaning of the
Social Security Act from December 28, 2019, his alleged disability onset date, through the date

7
of the decision. R. 37.
Plaintiff disagrees with the ALJ’s findings at step four and asks that the decision of the
Commissioner be reversed and remanded with directions for the granting of benefits or,
alternatively, for further proceedings. Plaintiff’s Memorandum of Law, ECF No. 6; Plaintiff’s

Reply Brief, ECF No. 13. The Commissioner takes the position that his decision should be
affirmed in its entirety because the ALJ’s decision correctly applied the governing legal
standards, reflected consideration of the entire record, and was supported by sufficient
explanation and substantial evidence. Defendant’s Brief Pursuant to Local Civil Rule 9.1, ECF
No. 12.
IV. SUMMARY OF RELEVANT MEDICAL EVIDENCE
A. Lawrence G. Mintzer, Ph.D.
On April 3, 2020, Lawrence G. Mintzer, Ph.D., conducted a mental examination of
Plaintiff. R. 427–31. Plaintiff reported that he drives only infrequently and that his mother had
driven him to the appointment. R. 427. He lives with his parents and with one of his three

children. Id. As a child, he was in constant fear of his father. R. 428. Most of Plaintiff’s
employment was in fast foods (including management), window working, and private security.
R. 429. He last worked as a slot technician and stopped working in December 2019 because “I
had a ton of physical issues.” R. 427–28. He also has problems with depression and has difficulty
leaving the house for fear that someone will hurt him. R. 427. However, he was not undergoing
any mental health treatment. Id. Dr. Mintzer noted Plaintiff’s reported activities of daily living:
Mr. R[.] doesn’t do any of the cleaning at his home because “I’m going to hurt
myself doing it.” He doesn’t do any of the cooking because “It’s not my kitchen.”
Mr. R[.] does only a very small amount of the grocery shopping because “Being on
my feet too long hurts.” Mr. R[.] said that he usually gets along well with people
“even though I don’t like people. I’m afraid of people. Everyone has betrayed me.”
Mr. R[.] is not involved in any group activities. He doesn’t get together with any
8
friends. Mr. R[.] sometimes sees his brother and he also sees his nephew. Mr. R[.]
takes care of paying his own bills. He keeps up with his grooming and hygiene. On
a typical day it takes him two hours after he gets up to not be in severe pain. He
watches TV. He noted, “I don’t do much.”

Id. Plaintiff’s medical history included vision problems (from cornea transplants); herniated disc;
three bulging discs; two pinched nerves in his neck; bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome; two
herniated discs and two pinched nerves in his lower back; hypermobility syndrome throughout
his body; diabetes; low testosterone; fatty liver; and high triglycerides. Id. Plaintiff reported one
psychiatric hospitalization, at age 16 or 17, for depression following the deaths of his uncle and
grandmother. Id. Upon mental status examination, Dr. Mintzer observed the following:
Mr. R[.] was oriented to person, place, and time. He was casually dressed and
adequately groomed. He is of average height and he is somewhat overweight. At
times he grimaced and shifted in his seated position, appearing to be in some
physical pain. Mr. R[.]’s speech was within normal limits. Mr. R[.] seemed
somewhat depressed. His affect was mildly constricted. Mr. R[.] has never
experienced either auditory or visual hallucinations.

Mr. R[.]’s thought processes were goal-directed, and his speech was coherent.
There were no indications of any delusional thoughts, but Mr. R[.] mentioned that
he just lost two of his children because he left his ex-girlfriend. He said that his
former girlfriend “had my daughter claim that I molested her.” There were no
indications of any suicidal thoughts. Mr. R[.] has never made a suicide attempt.
There were no indications of any homicidal thoughts. Mr. R[.] does experience
ideas of reference, believing that other people are talking about him, laughing at
him, and/or staring at him. Mr. R[.] has a fear of leaving his house. He said that
he is claustrophobic.

Mr. R[.]’s abstract thinking is good. His fund of general knowledge is fairly good.
His capacity to perform simple calculations is fair. Mr. R[.]’s concentration was
fairly good; for instance, he performed serial sevens somewhat slowly, getting one
of the first six numbers incorrect. He was able to correctly spell the word “world”
both forwards and backwards. Mr. R[.]’s intelligence is estimated to be in the
average range.

Mr. R[.]’s remote memory is good. His recent memory is fair; for example, he was
able to recall two out of three items after one minute and again after five minutes.
He was unable to recall what he had eaten for dinner on the evening prior to my
meeting with him. Mr. R[.]’s immediate retention and recall are fair; for example,
he was able to repeat six digits forward and four digits in reverse. Mr. R[.]’s
9
impulse control is good; for instance, he does not have any problems with his
temper. Mr. R[.]’s social judgment is poor; for instance, he said that if he found an
envelope on the street that was sealed, addressed, and had a new stamp, he
“wouldn’t touch it." Mr. R[.]’s insight is good. He seems to be a reliable informant.

R. 429. Dr. Mintzer diagnosed major depressive disorder, recurrent, severe, and PTSD. Id.
According to Dr. Mintzer, Plaintiff “has an illness that is expected to last for the next 12 months.
Mr. R[.]’s limitations are caused by a combination of physical health problems and
psychological problems. Overall, Mr. R[.]’s limitations are moderate to severe in degree.” Id.
Plaintiff’s prognosis “appears to be guarded.” R. 430.
B. State Agency Mental Consultants
Consultant Steven Reed4 conducted an initial review of Plaintiff’s medical record on
behalf of the state agency on April 13, 2020. R. 34 (reflecting consultant’s credentials), 122–34.
According to Consultant Reed, the record documented the severe medically determinable
impairments of depressive, bipolar and related disorders, as well as trauma and stressor-related
disorders. R. 127. In conducting the psychiatric review technique and considering the paragraph
B criteria of Listings 12.04 (addressing depressive, bipolar and related disorders) and 12.15
(trauma and stressor-related disorders), Consultant Reed opined that Plaintiff was moderately
limited in two of the broad areas of functioning (abilities to interact with others and to
concentrate, persist, or maintain pace) and was mildly limited in the remaining two areas of
functioning (abilities to understand, remember, or apply information and to adapt or manage
oneself). R. 128. In assessing Plaintiff’s mental RFC, Consultant Reed found, inter alia, that
Plaintiff was moderately limited in his ability to perform activities within a schedule, maintain
regular attendance, and be punctual within customary tolerances and to complete a normal

4 The ALJ refers to this consultant as “Steven Reed, Ph.D.,” R. 34, but the credentials of this state
agency consultant are not immediately apparent in the record.
10
workday or week without interruptions from psychologically based symptoms and to perform at
a consistent pace without unreasonable rest periods. R. 131. Under the heading “MRFC—
Additional Explanation,” Consultant Reed further explained his opinion as follows:
-No IP psych Tx MER; CL reported one psych hospitalization during adolescence;

-ADLs: Notwithstanding limitations associated with his reported physical
impairments, CL is able to manage daily affairs.

However, on his AOL form (also 3P AOL form), and then at recent psych CEMSE,
CL provided a convincing description of suffering psychologically, and
chronically. He described having ongoing difficulty with attention, concentration,
memory, and task completion; pervasive sad mood/anhedonia, low motivation,
despairing outlook and a sense of self-loathing; also, he reported a pattern of social
withdrawal and avoidance. He noted that “now that I have Medicaid I will be
seeking some mental help.”

At CEMSE, he was AOx3, with coherent, goal-directed TP; no s/s psychosis or
mania; affect was mildly constricted; he performed adequately on cognitive
screening portion of MSE; consistent with his self-description on the AOL form,
he described numerous Sx of depression and a pattern of social avoidance. Per CE,
Ox = MOD, recurrent, severe; and PTSD.

CL’s MFC is Moderately Impaired. In a work-like setting with a predictable routine
and relatively light interpersonal demands, he would be able to carry out tasks with
adequate CPP, relate adequately, and adapt to routine changes.

R. 132.
Consultant Pamela Foley5 reviewed Plaintiff’s medical record upon reconsideration for
the state agency on June 26, 2020. R. 136–48. She agreed with Consultant Reed that the record
documented the severe psychological impairments of depressive, bipolar and related disorders
and trauma and stressor-related disorders with mild and moderate paragraph B findings. R. 141.
Consultant Foley further agreed that Plaintiff was moderately limited in, inter alia, his abilities to
perform activities within a schedule, maintain regular attendance, and be punctual within

5 The ALJ refers to this consultant as “Pamela Foley, Ph.D.,” R. 34, but the credentials of this
state agency consultant are not immediately apparent in the record.
11
customary tolerances and to complete a normal workday or week without interruptions from
psychologically based symptoms and to perform at a consistent pace without unreasonable rest
periods. R. 144. Under the heading “MRFC—Additional Explanation,” Consultant Foley opined
as follows:

RECON:
The claimant is a 38 year old man who is requesting reconsideration of a DIB
denied at the initial level on 4/14/2020 with no mental allegation but a moderate
MRFC. Original evidence supports the initial finding. Clmt does not allege
worsening and still has no direct mental allegation. There is no new evidence at the
recon level.

Prior rating is affirmed as written.

R. 145.
V. DISCUSSION
A. RFC Determination
The ALJ determined that Plaintiff had the RFC to perform a limited range of light work:
After careful consideration of the entire record, the undersigned finds that the
claimant has the residual functional capacity to perform light work as defined in 20
CFR 404.1567(b) except he can only stand/walk for 4 hours and sit for 6 hours in
an 8-hour workday; can only occasionally climb ramps and stairs, but never climb
ladders, ropes or scaffolds; can only occasionally balance, stoop, kneel, crouch or
crawl; and can frequently handle and finger. Additionally, the claimant is able to
understand, remember, and carry out simple, routine and repetitive tasks in a routine
work environment with few changes; can make simple work decisions; can perform
work that is goal oriented rather than strict quota oriented; can work for 2 hours
before needing a standard 15 minute break; and can have occasional contact with
supervisors, coworkers and the public, that is brief and superficial in nature.

R. 31. Plaintiff argues that, for several reasons, substantial evidence does not support this
determination. Plaintiff’s Memorandum of Law, ECF No. 6, pp. 7–19; Plaintiff’s Reply Brief,
ECF No. 13, pp. 1–4. Plaintiff’s arguments are not well taken.
A claimant’s RFC is the most that the claimant can do despite his limitations. 20 C.F.R. §
404.1545(a)(1). At the administrative hearing stage, it is the ALJ who is charged with
12
determining the claimant’s RFC. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(e), 404.1546(c); see also Chandler
v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 667 F.3d 356, 361 (3d Cir. 2011) (“The ALJ—not treating or examining
physicians or State agency consultants—must make the ultimate disability and RFC
determinations.”) (citations omitted). When determining a claimant’s RFC, the ALJ has a duty to

consider all the evidence. Plummer v. Apfel, 186 F.3d 422, 429 (3d Cir. 1999). However, the ALJ
need include only “credibly established” limitations. Rutherford v. Barnhart, 399 F.3d 546, 554
(3d Cir. 2005); see also Zirnsak v. Colvin, 777 F.3d 607, 615 (3d Cir. 2014) (stating that the ALJ
has discretion to choose whether to include “a limitation [that] is supported by medical evidence,
but is opposed by other evidence in the record” but “[t]his discretion is not unfettered—the ALJ
cannot reject evidence of a limitation for an unsupported reason” and stating that “the ALJ also
has the discretion to include a limitation that is not supported by any medical evidence if the ALJ
finds the impairment otherwise credible”).
In finding that Plaintiff had the RFC for a limited range of light work, the ALJ detailed
years of record evidence regarding Plaintiff’s mental impairments,6 including, inter alia,

Plaintiff’s hearing testimony that he panics and had been recently hospitalized for six days and
had participated in intensive individual therapy, that he struggles to sleep and feels tired and
fatigued, which makes him feel stuck, angry, frustrated, ashamed, and worthless; that he spends
most of day watching “YouTube stuff,” playing video games, or listening to music although he
attempts to complete a task every day and tries to walk a few times a week for exercise and that
he goes grocery shopping monthly; Plaintiff ‘s history of mental illness with a voluntary
hospitalization in 2001; that Plaintiff sought mental health treatment in January 2021, endorsing

6 Plaintiff’s RFC challenges focus on Plaintiff’s mental impairments and the Court’s discussion
will do the same.
13
“some severe PTSD problems,” citing panic attacks 3-4 times per week, lasting 5-10 minutes at a
time when dealing with “official” things, but stating that these improve when his mother takes
care of these things and when he isolates; his endorsement of severe anxiety, flashbacks,
episodes of depersonalization, hypervigilance, apathy, anhedonia, anergy and avolition, and

constant depression; evidence that, although Plaintiff had started medication and that his primary
care provider had taken over Plaintiff’s mental health treatment, there was no evidence that he
had continued with mental health treatment; Plantiff’s December 2021 report that Vistaril had
resulted in a great reduction of anxiety; Plaintiff’s June 2022 admission to a psychiatric facility
for suicidal ideation with a plan, and Plaintiff’s report that he was taking prescribed medication
and was experiencing increased depression due to life stressors, including unemployment, loss of
custody of his two children due to child abuse allegations, physical impairments, and lack of
finances; evidence that, during that hospitalization, Plaintiff was minimally compliant with
treatment, isolating himself throughout the day, not participating in group therapy, but taking
psychotropic medications; Plaintiff’s report that this hospitalization was “peaceful,” because he

needed a break from life’s responsibilities, sleep, and time to think; Plaintiff’s request, after a
few days, for discharge because he felt okay and denied suicidal ideations; evidence that,
subsequently, Plaintiff participated in an acute partial care program for PTSD with major
depressive disorder; evidence that, by August 2022, treatment was reduced to an outpatient level
of care; and evidence that Plaintiff’s care was thereafter routine and conservative, consisting
mainly of medications as prescribed by his primary care provider. R. 32–35. The ALJ went on to
explain the RFC determination as follows:
Based on a thorough review of all the evidence and subjective reports, the
undersigned finds that the claimant retains the residual functional capacity to
perform light work except he can only stand/walk for 4 hours and sit for 6 hours in
an 8-hour workday; can only occasionally climb ramps and stairs, but never climb
14
ladders, ropes or scaffolds; can only occasionally balance, stoop, kneel, crouch or
crawl; and can frequently handle and finger. Additionally, the claimant is able to
understand, remember, and carry out simple, routine and repetitive tasks in a routine
work environment with few changes; can make simple work decisions; can perform
work that is goal oriented rather than strict quota oriented; can work for 2 hours
before needing a standard 15 minute break; and can have occasional contact with
supervisors, coworkers and the public, that is brief and superficial in nature. This
residual functional capacity assessment takes into account all of the claimant’s
legitimate conditions and resulting limitations imposed on the claimant and looks
at the evidence in the light most favorable to the claimant. The claimant has a lot
of complaints, but there is little objective evidence to support those complaints.

R. 35. In the view of this Court, this record contains substantial evidence to support the ALJ’s
RFC determination. See Zirnsak, 777 F.3d at 615; Rutherford, 399 F.3d at 554. Plaintiff
nevertheless challenges the ALJ’s RFC determination. Plaintiff’s Memorandum of Law, ECF No.
6, pp. 7–19; Plaintiff’s Reply Brief, ECF No. 13, pp. 1–14.
Plaintiff first argues that the ALJ “critically ignored the Plaintiff’s depression or anxiety
diagnoses providing no meaningful discussion of these impairments or their impact upon the
Plaintiff’s ability to perform work functions in the decision[.]” Plaintiff’s Memorandum of Law,
ECF No. 6, p. 10 (noting further that Plaintiff’s “depression resulted in suicidal thoughts with a
plan that resulted in a week-long inpatient hospitalization followed by an intensive outpatient
partial day program”).
Plaintiff’s argument is not well taken. As an initial matter, “[a] diagnosis alone . . . does
not demonstrate disability.” Foley v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 349 F. App’x 805, 808 (3d Cir. 2009)
(citing Petition of Sullivan, 904 F.2d 826, 845 (3d Cir. 1990)); see also Phillips v. Barnhart, 91
F. App’x 775, 780 (3d Cir. 2004) (“[The claimant’s] argument incorrectly focuses on the
diagnosis of an impairment rather than the functional limitations that result from that
impairment. A diagnosis of impairment, by itself, does not establish entitlement to benefits under
the Act”). Moreover, Plaintiff simply points to these diagnoses and his mental health treatment
15
without explaining how these facts support his allegation of reversible error in the ALJ’s
decision. Plaintiff’s Memorandum of Law, ECF No. 6, p. 10;7 see also Padgett v. Comm’r of Soc.
Sec., No. CV 16-9441, 2018 WL 1399307, at *2 (D.N.J. Mar. 20, 2018) (“[B]ecause Plaintiff has
articulated no analysis of the evidence, the Court does not understand what argument Plaintiff

has made here. Plaintiff has done no more than throw down a few pieces of an unknown jigsaw
puzzle and left it to the Court to put them together. The Court does not assemble arguments for a
party from fragments.”). Notably, and as detailed above, the ALJ expressly considered Plaintiff’s
inpatient hospitalization and his subsequent intensive outpatient treatment. R. 32. Plaintiff’s
argument, therefore, apparently boils down to nothing more than a disagreement with the ALJ’s
decision, which the Court has already explained is supported by substantial evidence. See
Perkins v. Barnhart, 79 F. App’x 512, 514–15 (3d Cir. 2003) (“Perkins’s argument here amounts
to no more than a disagreement with the ALJ’s decision, which is soundly supported by
substantial evidence.”). To the extent that Plaintiff invites the Court to reweigh the evidence, the
Court declines to do so. See Chandler, 667 F.3d at 359 (“Courts are not permitted to reweigh the

evidence or impose their own factual determinations [under the substantial evidence standard].”);
cf. Hatton v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 131 F. App’x 877, 880 (3d Cir. 2005) (“When
‘presented with the not uncommon situation of conflicting medical evidence . . . [t]he trier of
fact has the duty to resolve that conflict.’”) (quoting Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 399
(1971)).
Plaintiff next contends that the RFC determination is flawed because “it fails to
contemplate the Plaintiff’s established limitations performing work activity on a regular and

7 Plaintiff also advances another argument related to this evidence, which the Court addresses
later in this decision.
16
continuing basis.” Plaintiff’s Memorandum of Law, ECF No. 6, p. 10. In advancing this
argument, Plaintiff first points to the ALJ’s consideration of the opinions of the state agency
reviewing psychologists. Id. at 10–11 (citing R. 34–35, 131, 144). In crafting Plaintiff’s RFC, the
ALJ specifically considered, inter alia, these opinions:

In the initial determination, Steven Reed, Ph.D. opined that the claimant’s mental
impairments result in mild limitations in understanding, remembering or applying
information and adapting or managing oneself and moderate limitations in
interacting with others and concentrating, persisting or maintaining pace (Exhibit
1A, page 5). In the reconsideration determination, Pamela Foley, Ph.D. affirmed
Dr. Reed’s opinion (Exhibit 3A, page 6). The undersigned only finds these opinions
somewhat persuasive, as the claimant’s recent voluntary hospitalization and
subsequent treatment supports a finding that he is slightly more limited, as detailed
above.

R. 34–35 (emphasis added). According to Plaintiff, the ALJ’s RFC does not reflect the state
agency limitations in his ability to maintain sustained work activity, nor did the ALJ address how
these limitations would impede his ability to work on a regular and continuing basis. Plaintiff’s
Memorandum of Law, ECF No. 6, pp. 10–11 (citing R. 131, 144, and pointing to state agency
findings that Plaintiff is “at least moderately limited in several key areas of mental function,
including the abilities to perform activities within a schedule, maintain regular attendance, and
be punctual within customary tolerances, to complete a normal workday and workweek without
interruptions from psychologically based symptoms and to perform at a consistent pace without
an unreasonable number and length of rest periods, among others”); see also Plaintiff’s Reply
Brief, ECF No. 13, p. 1. Plaintiff contends that, although the ALJ characterized him as more
limited than did the state agency consultants, the RFC contains no restrictions—such as absences
from work and time off task—to accommodate even the state agency consultants’ opinions of
moderate limitations. Id. The RFC is therefore incomplete and, because the ALJ accorded partial
17
weight to the state agency opinions and found Plaintiff even further restricted than did those
consultants, the RFC is beyond this Court’s review. Id.
The Court is not persuaded that this issue requires remand. As an initial matter, the
moderate limitations that Plaintiff highlights appear in the worksheet portion of the state agency

opinions, which is not the operative portion of those opinions, i.e., not the opinion regarding the
RFC. Smith v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 631 F.3d 632, 636 (3d Cir. 2010) (“‘Section I is merely a
worksheet to aid in deciding the presence and degree of functional limitations and the adequacy
of documentation and does not constitute the RFC assessment.’”) (emphasis in the original)
(quoting POMS DI 24510.060, available at
https://secure.ssa.gov/apps10/porns.nsf/lnx/0424510060); R. 130–31 (“The questions below help
determine the individual’s ability to perform sustained work activities. However, the actual
mental residual functional capacity assessment is recorded in the narrative discussion(s), which
describes how the evidence supports each conclusion. This discussion(s) is documented in the
explanatory text boxes following each category of limitation (i.e., understanding and memory,

sustained concentration and persistence, social interaction and adaptation). Any other assessment
information deemed appropriate may be recorded in the MRFC - Additional Explanation text
box.”) (emphasis added), 78 (same); cf. Wise v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 626 F. App’x 357, 360 (3d
Cir. 2015) (“But we have said that ALJs are not required to give any weight to these fill-in-the-
blank and checklist portions of RFC assessments and that their focus instead should be on the
narrative portions of the assessments where the medical experts expound on their opinions.”)
(citations omitted). The ALJ therefore had no obligation to reconcile any alleged inconsistency
between the actual MRFC in the narrative section (which appeared under the heading “MRFC –
Additional Explanation”) and the moderate limitations contained in the worksheet. Id.

18
Moreover, in finding Plaintiff moderately limited in his abilities to perform activities
within a schedule, maintain regular attendance, and be punctual within customary tolerances and
to complete a normal workday and workweek without interruptions from psychologically based
symptom and to perform at a consistent pace without an unreasonable number and length of rest

periods, Consultants Reed and Foley expressly referenced their narrative discussions under the
heading, “MRFC – Additional Explanation.” R. 131, 144 (referring to “see below” when asked
to explain in narrative form the limitations and/or capacities in sustained concentration and
persistence). In that narrative explanation, as detailed above, the state agency reviewing
consultants found that Plaintiff was “[m]oderately impaired” but “[i]n a work-like setting with a
predictable routine and relatively light interpersonal demands, he would be able to carry out
tasks with adequate CPP [concentration, persistence, and maintaining pace], relate adequately,
and adapt to routine changes.” R. 132, 144 (noting that Plaintiff has a moderate mental RFC and
affirming prior rating as written). Stated differently, Consultants Reed and Foley detailed and
explained in the narrative discussion the parameters of Plaintiff’s mental functional limitations.

See id. The ALJ accommodated these limitations by restricting Plaintiff to understanding,
remembering, and carrying out simple, routine and repetitive tasks in a routine work
environment with few changes; making simple work decisions; and working for 2 hours before
needing a standard 15 minute break. R. 31; cf. Hess v. Comm’r Soc. Sec., 931 F.3d 198, 210 (3d
Cir. 2019) (“A limitation to ‘simple tasks’ is fundamentally the same as a limitation ‘to jobs
requiring understanding, remembering, and carrying out only simple instructions and making
only simple work-related decisions[.]’”) (citations omitted); Menkes v. Astrue, 262 F. App’x 410,
412–13 (3d Cir. 2008) (“The term ‘simple routine tasks,’ in the context of the disability
proceedings, generally refers to the non-exertional or mental aspects of work. For example,

19
performing a ‘simple routine task’ typically involves low stress level work that does not require
maintaining sustained concentration.”).
Plaintiff further contends that the RFC does not reflect the ALJ’s finding that Plaintiff
was even “more limited” than was found by the state agency psychological consultants, thus

preventing subsequent reviewers, such as this Court, from understanding Plaintiff’s limitations.
Plaintiff’s Memorandum of Law, ECF No. 6, p. 11; Plaintiff’s Reply Brief, ECF No. 13, p. 2.
This Court disagrees. The RFC limited Plaintiff to, inter alia, work that is goal oriented rather
than imposing strict quotas and limited Plaintiff to contact with supervisors, coworkers, and the
public that is only occasional, brief, and superficial in nature. R. 31. These RFC limitations are
more restrictive than those in the state agency mental RFC, which concluded that Plaintiff could
“carry out tasks with adequate CPP” and could “relate adequately” to others. R. 132, 145.8
Plaintiff goes on to insist that his week-long inpatient hospitalization in June 2022 and his
participation “in an intensive out-patient program, which met five days per week from 8:30am to
2:30p.m.” “[u]ndoubtedly” “interfered with the Plaintiff’s ability to perform work functions on a

regular and continuing basis.” Plaintiff’s Memorandum of Law, ECF No. 6, pp. 11–12 (citing R.
709); see also Plaintiff’s Reply Brief, ECF No. 13, pp. 1–2. Plaintiff contends that the ALJ’s
failure to properly consider this treatment, by failing to include absences and off-task limitations
in the RFC, is not harmless because the vocational expert testified that absence from work up to

8 To the extent that Plaintiff suggests that the ALJ’s paragraph B findings at step three were
inconsistent with the RFC, warranting remand, Plaintiff’s Reply Brief, ECF No. 13, p. 2, that
argument is unavailing. The Court has already explained that the RFC appropriately
accommodated all credibly established limitations flowing from Plaintiff’s mental impairments.
Moreover, “no incantations are required at steps four and five simply because a particular finding
has been made at steps two and three. Those portions of the disability analysis serve distinct
purposes and may be expressed in different ways” and, therefore, “the findings at steps two and
three will not necessarily translate to the language used at steps four and five.” Hess, 931 F.3d at
209.
20
two days per month and/or being off task 15% or more of the work day would preclude
competitive employment. Id. This argument is not well taken.
As previously explained, the ALJ expressly considered this evidence when crafting the
RFC; Plaintiff’s insistence that this medical treatment requires greater RFC limitations boils

down to simply a disagreement with the ALJ—who has the duty to craft the RFC—and whose
decision the Court has already explained is supported by substantial evidence. See Chandler, 667
F.3d at 361; Perkins, 79 F. App’x at 514–15; Markoch, 2020 WL 7586953, at *4–5. The Court
therefore again declines Plaintiff’s invitation to re-weigh the evidence or to impose his—or this
Court’s—own factual determination. See Chandler, 667 F.3d at 359; Zirnsak, 777 F.3d at 611. In
any event, Plaintiff has not shown that his week-long hospitalization and outpatient treatment
lasted for a period of twelve months. See Plaintiff’s Memorandum of Law, ECF No. 6; Plaintiff’s
Reply Brief, ECF No. 13; R. 709; Barnhardt v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 214–15, 225 (2002)
(explaining that, to qualify for disability insurance benefits, a claimant’s “inability to engage in

any substantial gainful activity” caused by an impairment “must last, or must be expected to last,
for at least 12 months”) (cleaned up). Moreover, as Plaintiff emphasizes, his outpatient program
met consistently at a scheduled time. Plaintiff’s Memorandum of Law, ECF No. 6, p. 11;
Plaintiff’s Reply Brief, ECF No. 13, p. 2. Plaintiff offers no explanation why he would be unable
to work outside those regular, specified times. See Scott R. v. Kijakazi, 643 F. Supp. 3d 483,
493–94 (D.N.J. 2022) (noting that the claimant’s treatment was not “frequent, lengthy, or
disruptive” and that “Plaintiff’s doctor’s appointments were scheduled and he was able to
maintain a work schedule despite them”); Santiago Hernandez v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. CV
19-18528 (KM), 2020 WL 5229373, at *7 (D.N.J. Sept. 2, 2020) (“Moreover, [the claimant’s]
partial hospitalization obligations were not sporadic and unpredictable; to the contrary, they were

21
clearly scheduled with discrete beginning and end times.”) (remanding on other grounds); cf.
Kangas v. Bowen, 823 F.2d 775, 776–77 (3d Cir. 1987) (remanding where the ALJ failed to
consider the claimant’s need of regular and continuous treatment consisting of eight
hospitalizations, several of which required seven-to-ten days of in-patient treatment followed by

one-to-two-week at-home recovery period, over a period of sixteen months).
Plaintiff also suggests that the ALJ violated the Agency’s Program Operations Manual
Systems (“POMS”) when the ALJ—after finding Plaintiff “more limited” than he was found by
the state agency psychologists—purportedly failed to include limitations in the RFC that were
more restrictive than were those consultants’ findings. Plaintiff’s Memorandum of Law, ECF No.
6, p. 12. Plaintiff’s arguments are not well taken. As explained above, the ALJ did include
greater restrictions than those found by the state agency consultants, including restrictions to
goal-oriented work rather than to work requiring strict quotas and to only occasional, brief, and
superficial contact with others. R. 31, 132, 145. Moreover, POMS “lack the force of law and
create no judicially-enforceable rights.” Bordes v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 235 F. App’x 853, 859

(3d Cir. 2007); see also Edelman v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 83 F.3d 68, 71 n.2 (3d Cir. 1996)
(same) (citing Schweiker v. Hansen, 450 U.S. 785, 789 (1981)).
Plaintiff next contends that the RFC limitation to occasional, brief, and superficial contact
with supervisors, coworkers, and the public is “inconsistent with basic mental demands required
to perform all work.” Plaintiff’s Memorandum of Law, ECF No. 6, p. 13 (citing SSR 85-15); see
also Plaintiff’s Reply Brief, ECF No. 13, p. 3. Plaintiff specifically argues that “[t]he ability to
interact with coworkers and supervisors on an ‘occasional’ basis necessarily means that the
Plaintiff is only able to interact appropriately with coworkers and supervisors for up to one-third
of the workday” and, “[i]nversely, for two-thirds of an 8-hour workday the Plaintiff cannot

22
interact appropriately with coworkers or supervisor.” Plaintiff’s Memorandum of Law, ECF No.
6, p. 13 (citing SSR 83-10). According to Plaintiff, an ability to interact appropriately with others
for only one-third of the workday does not constitute a “sustained basis” of eight hours per day,
five days a week, or any equivalent work schedule. Id. (citing SSR 96-8p, 96-9p). Plaintiff’s

argument is not well taken. This Court has previously considered and rejected a similar
argument, finding that “‘courts routinely find that an individual can perform unskilled work in
the national economy, despite a limitation to only occasional interaction with coworkers,
supervisors, and the public.’” Rebecca L. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 617 F. Supp. 3d 256, 273
(D.N.J. 2022) (quoting Torres v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. CV 14-6178, 2015 WL 8328346, at
*7 (D.N.J. Dec. 8, 2015) (collecting cases)); see also Vargas v. Saul, No. 1:19-CV-1858, 2020
WL 2468401, at *7–8 (M.D. Pa. May 13, 2020) (noting that “courts have frequently sustained
decisions like the ALJ’s determination in this case, which found that a claimant could perform
SVP level 2 jobs when the ALJ limited that claimant to occasional interactions with coworkers
or supervisors”) (collecting cases); R. 36 (noting that the three jobs identified by the vocational

expert that Plaintiff could perform were all unskilled, SVP level 2 jobs). Accordingly, Plaintiff
has not persuaded this Court that remand is required on this basis.9
Plaintiff further argues that the RFC is deficient because it fails to define the terms “brief
and superficial” when limiting Plaintiff to only occasional contact with coworkers, supervisors,
and the public. Plaintiff’s Memorandum of Law, ECF No. 6, p. 14. According to Plaintiff, these
terms are unclear and their use by the ALJ therefore undermines the vocational expert’s
testimony regarding the availability of jobs that Plaintiff could perform with the ALJ’s RFC. Id.

9 To the extent that Plaintiff argues that an inability to appropriately interact with others violates
the POMs, Plaintiff’s Memorandum of Law, ECF No. 6, pp. 13–14, that argument is unavailing
for the reasons already discussed.
23
This Court again disagrees. Plaintiff’s counsel did not object to or otherwise ask the ALJ to
clarify these terms at the hearing; in fact, Plaintiff’s counsel expressly agreed that the ALJ had
“clarified everything.” R. 115–16 (reflecting the ALJ’s hypothetical and the vocational expert’s
testimony regarding available jobs with the RFC found by the ALJ), 119–20 (reflecting the

ALJ’s invitation to counsel to pose “other alternative hypotheticals you wanted to ask or other
questions you wanted to ask the VE [vocational expert]?” and counsel’s response, “I think you
clarified everything”); see also Carolyn C. v. Kijakazi, No. 1:20-CV-3544, 2021 WL 4932785, at
*15 (D.N.J. Oct. 22, 2021) (“[A] failure to challenge a vocational expert’s testimony at the
hearing waives Plaintiff’s right to later object to that testimony.”); Tonti v. Saul, No. CV 20-92,
2021 WL 518178, at *3 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 11, 2021) (“Here, [the plaintiff] neither objected to the
VE’s testimony at the hearing nor obtained any agreement from the ALJ either prior to the
hearing to hold the proceedings open for post-hearing submissions. Consequently, she waived
the right to object to that testimony.”). Notably, Plaintiff has not identified—nor can the Court
locate—any evidence in the hearing transcript demonstrating that the vocational expert (or

counsel) was confused as to the meaning of the ALJ’s terms “brief and superficial.” See
generally R. 114–21. Plaintiff therefore has not established that remand is warranted on this
basis.
In short, for all these reasons, the Court concludes that the ALJ’s findings regarding
Plaintiff’s RFC are consistent with the record evidence and enjoy substantial support in the
record.

24
B. Opinion Evidence
Plaintiff also argues that the ALJ “improperly rejected” Dr. Mintzer’s opinion. Plaintiff’s
Memorandum of Law, ECF No. 6, pp. 17–19; Plaintiff’s Reply Brief, ECF No. 13, pp. 3–4. This
Court disagrees.

An ALJ must evaluate all record evidence in making a disability determination. Plummer,
186 F.3d at 433; Cotter, 642 F.2d at 704. The ALJ’s decision must include “a clear and
satisfactory explication of the basis on which it rests” sufficient to enable a reviewing court “to
perform its statutory function of judicial review.” Cotter, 642 F.2d at 704–05. Specifically, the
ALJ must discuss the evidence that supports the decision, the evidence that the ALJ rejected, and
explain why the ALJ accepted some evidence but rejected other evidence. Id. at 705–06; Diaz v.
Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 577 F.3d 500, 505–06 (3d Cir. 2009); Fargnoli v. Massanari, 247 F.3d 34,
42 (3d Cir. 2001) (“Although we do not expect the ALJ to make reference to every relevant
treatment note in a case . . . we do expect the ALJ, as the factfinder, to consider and evaluate the
medical evidence in the record consistent with his responsibilities under the regulations and case

law.”). Without this explanation, “the reviewing court cannot tell if significant probative
evidence was not credited or simply ignored.” Cotter, 642 F.2d at 705; see also Burnett, 220
F.3d at 121 (citing Cotter, 642 F.2d at 705).
For claims filed after March 27, 2017,10 the regulations eliminated the hierarchy of
medical source opinions that gave preference to treating sources. Compare 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527
with 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(a) (providing, inter alia, that the Commissioner will no longer “defer
or give any specific evidentiary weight, including controlling weight, to any medical opinion(s)
or prior administrative medical finding(s), including those from [the claimant’s] medical

10 As previously noted, Plaintiff’s claim was filed on January 14, 2020.
25
sources”). Instead, the Commissioner will consider the following factors when considering all
medical opinions: (1) supportability; (2) consistency; (3) relationship with the claimant,
including the length of the treating examination, the frequency of examinations, and the purpose
of the treatment relationship; (4) the medical source’s specialization; and (5) other factors,

including, but not limited to, “evidence showing a medical source has familiarity with the other
evidence in the claim or an understanding of our disability program’s policies and evidentiary
requirements.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(c).
The applicable regulation emphasizes that “the most important factors [that the ALJ and
Commissioner] consider when [] evaluat[ing] the persuasiveness of medical opinions and prior
administrative medical findings are supportability (paragraph (c)(1) of this section) and
consistency (paragraph (c)(2) of this section).” Id. at § 404.1520c(a). As to the supportability
factor, the regulation provides that “[t]he more relevant the objective medical evidence and
supporting explanations presented by a medical source are to support his or her medical
opinion(s) or prior administrative medical finding(s), the more persuasive the medical opinions

or prior administrative medical finding(s) will be.” Id. at § 404.1520c(c)(1). As to the
consistency factor, the regulation provides that “[t]he more consistent a medical opinion(s) or
prior administrative medical finding(s) is with the evidence from other medical sources and
nonmedical sources in the claim, the more persuasive the medical opinion(s) or prior
administrative medical finding(s) will be.” Id. at § 404.1520c(c)(2).
The applicable regulation further requires the ALJ to articulate her “consideration of
medical opinions and prior administrative medical findings” and articulate in the “determination
or decision how persuasive [she] find[s] all of the medical opinions and all of the prior
administrative medical findings in [the claimant’s] case record.” Id. at § 404.1520c(b). As

26
previously noted, “[s]upportability and consistency are the most important factors. . . . ALJs need
not explain their determinations regarding the other factors, but they must discuss supportability
and consistency.” Gongon v. Kijakazi, 676 F. Supp. 3d 383, 394 (E.D. Pa. 2023) (citations
omitted); see also Stamm v. Kijakazi, 577 F. Supp. 3d 358, 370 (M.D. Pa. 2021) (“Generally, the

ALJ may, but is not required to, explain his or her consideration of the other factors, but if there
are two equally persuasive medical opinions about the same issue that are not exactly the same,
then the ALJ must explain how he or she considered the other factors.”). Finally, an ALJ “need
not reiterate the magic words ‘support’ and ‘consistent’ for each doctor” in order to satisfy the
articulation requirements for the supportability and consistency factors, providing that the judge
“weave[s] supportability and consistency throughout her analysis of which doctors were
persuasive.” Zaborowski v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 115 F.4th 637, 639 (3d Cir. 2024).
At step four of the sequential evaluation, the ALJ found Dr. Mintzer’s opinion
unpersuasive, reasoning as follows:
In connection with his application, the claimant underwent a mental status
examination with Lawrence Mintzer, Ph.D. in April 2020 (Exhibit 4F). At that time,
he complained of chronic depression with difficulty leaving his home due to
paranoia that someone is going to hurt him (Id. at 1). However, he reported that he
is not able to work due to physical symptoms (Id. at 2). In fact, he acknowledged
that he was not participating in any mental health treatment and last saw a
psychiatrist when he was in his 20s (Id.). Upon examination, his concentration was
fairly good, as he performed serial 7s somewhat slowly and made one mistake, but
was able to correctly spell “world” both forwards and backwards (Id. at 3). His
memory was also good, as he was able to recall 2/3 items after one and five minutes
though was unable to recall what he had eaten for dinner the night before (Id.). He
was able to repeat 6 digits forward and 4 in reverse (Id.). Given his examination,
Dr. Mintzer opinioned [sic] that the claimant suffers from moderate to severe
limitations due to a combination of physical health problems and psychological
problems (Id.). The undersigned does not find Dr. Mintzer’s opinion persuasive, as
he contemplated the claimant’s physical impairments, which he did not evaluate,
and failed to provide a specific opinion regarding the claimant’s residual functional
capacity.

27
R. 34. In challenging the ALJ’s consideration in this regard, Plaintiff argues that Dr. Mintzer
properly considered the effect of Plaintiff’s physical impairments on his mental state. Plaintiff’s
Memorandum of Law, ECF No. 6, p. 18. Plaintiff also argues in reply that the ALJ failed to
adhere to the requirements of 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c because the ALJ did not discuss the

consistency or supportability of Dr. Mintzer’s opinion. Plaintiff’s Reply Brief, ECF No. 13, pp.
3–4.
The Court is not persuaded that this issue requires remand. Even assuming, for present
purposes only, that the ALJ erred in finding that Dr. Mintzer had improperly considered
Plaintiff’s physical impairments and erred in failing to expressly discuss the consistency and
supportability of Dr. Mintzer’s findings, Plaintiff has not explained how such errors amount to
anything more than harmless. See Plaintiff’s Memorandum of Law, ECF No. 6, p. 18; Plaintiff’s
Reply Brief, ECF No. 13, pp. 3–4. The ALJ correctly found that Dr. Mintzer had offered no
opinions as to Plaintiff’s functional limitations. R. 34; see also R. 427–31. Notably, Plaintiff has
not identified any specific functional limitation offered by Dr. Mintzer, let alone any additional

limitation that should have been included in the RFC or that would otherwise require remand.
See Plaintiff’s Memorandum of Law, ECF No. 6, p. 18; Plaintiff’s Reply Brief, ECF No. 13, pp.
3–4. Based on this record, Plaintiff has not persuaded this Court that the ALJ’s consideration of
Dr. Mintzer’s findings amount to anything more than harmless error. See Shinseki v. Sanders,
556 U.S. 396, 409–10 (2009) (“[T]he burden of showing that an error is harmful normally falls
upon the party attacking the agency’s determination. . . . [T]he party seeking reversal normally
must explain why the erroneous ruling caused harm.”).
Plaintiff also argues that, where the ALJ rejected Dr. Mintzer’s findings because that
examiner did not provide a specific functional opinion, the ALJ had an affirmative duty to

28
contact Dr. Mintzer and request that information. Plaintiff’s Memorandum of Law, ECF No. 6, p.
18 (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1519p(b)). This Court disagrees. The regulation on which Plaintiff
relies provides that “[i]f the [consultative examiner’s] report is inadequate or incomplete, we will
contact the medical source who performed the consultative examination, give an explanation of

our evidentiary needs, and ask that the medical source furnish the missing information or prepare
a revised report.” Id. at § 404.1519p(b). However, “the ALJ only need recontact the medical
source when the evidence received from the medical source is inadequate to determine whether
or not the claimant is disabled, not because the ALJ finds the doctor’s opinion inconsistent with
the claimant’s medical records.” Gladden o/b/o Hyman-Self v. Berryhill, 2018 WL 1123763, at
*6 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 28, 2018) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Kelly v. Colvin, C.A. No.
09-759-RGA-SRF, 2013 WL 5273814, at *16 (D. Del. Sept. 18, 2013)). Notably, “[t]here is no
obligation to recontact a medical source when the ALJ finds that the record as a whole provides
an adequate basis to determine whether the claimant is disabled.” Id. As detailed above, the ALJ
considered years of objective medical evidence as well as the opinions of reviewing state agency

psychologists and implicitly determined that the record as a whole provided information
sufficient to reach a conclusion. R. 24–37. Under the circumstances presented in this case,
Plaintiff has not persuaded the Court that the ALJ was required to recontact Dr. Mintzer.
In short, for all these reasons, any errors in the ALJ’s consideration of Dr. Mintzer’s
report will not serve as a basis for remand.
C. Plaintiff’s and Third Party’s Statements
Plaintiff also challenges the ALJ’s consideration of his subjective complaints. Plaintiff’s
Memorandum of Law, ECF No. 6, pp. 19–22; Plaintiff’s Reply Brief, ECF No. 13, pp. 4–6. For
the reasons that follow, Plaintiff’s arguments are not well taken.

29
“Subjective allegations of pain or other symptoms cannot alone establish a disability.”
Miller v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 719 F. App’x 130, 134 (3d Cir. 2017) (citing 20 C.F.R. §
416.929(a)). Instead, objective medical evidence must corroborate a claimant’s subjective
complaints. Prokopick v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 272 F. App’x 196, 199 (3d Cir. 2008) (citing 20

C.F.R. § 404.1529(a)). Specifically, an ALJ must follow a two-step process in evaluating a
claimant’s subjective complaints. SSR 16-3p, 2017 WL 5180304 (Oct. 25, 2017). First, the ALJ
“must consider whether there is an underlying medically determinable physical or mental
impairment(s) that could reasonably be expected to produce an individual’s symptoms, such as
pain.” Id. “Second, once an underlying physical or mental impairment(s) that could reasonably
be expected to produce an individual’s symptoms is established, [the ALJ] evaluate[s] the
intensity and persistence of those symptoms to determine the extent to which the symptoms limit
an individual’s ability to perform work-related activities[.]” Id.; see also Hartranft v. Apfel, 181
F.3d 358, 362 (3d Cir. 1999) (“[Evaluation of the intensity and persistence of the pain or
symptom and the extent to which it affects the ability to work] obviously requires the ALJ to

determine the extent to which a claimant is accurately stating the degree of pain or the extent to
which he or she is disabled by it.”) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)). In conducting this
evaluation, an ALJ must consider the objective medical evidence as well as other evidence
relevant to a claimant’s subjective symptoms. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(3) (listing the following
factors to consider: daily activities; the location, duration, frequency, and intensity of pain or
other symptoms; precipitating and aggravating factors; the type, dosage, effectiveness, and side
effects of any medication you take or have taken to alleviate pain or other symptoms; treatment,
other than medication, currently received or have received for relief of pain or other symptoms;
any measures currently used or have used to relieve pain or other symptoms; and other factors

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concerning your functional limitations and restrictions due to pain or other symptoms). Finally,
an “ALJ has wide discretion to weigh the claimant’s subjective complaints, Van Horn v.
Schweiker, 717 F.2d 871, 873 (3d Cir. 1983), and may discount them where they are unsupported
by other relevant objective evidence.” Miller, 719 F. App’x at 134 (citing 20 C.F.R. §

416.929(c)); see also Izzo v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 186 F. App’x 280, 286 (3d Cir. 2006) (“[A]
reviewing court typically defers to an ALJ’s credibility determination so long as there is a
sufficient basis for the ALJ’s decision to discredit a witness.”).
Here, the ALJ followed this two-step evaluation process. The ALJ specifically considered
Plaintiff’s subjective complaints. R. 31–35. The ALJ found that Plaintiff’s medically
determinable impairments could reasonably be expected to cause symptoms, but that Plaintiff’s
statements “concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of these symptoms are not
entirely consistent with the medical evidence and other evidence in the record for the reasons
explained in this decision.” R. 32. As previously discussed, the ALJ detailed years of medical
evidence and record testimony to support her findings. R. 32–35. The ALJ further explained her

consideration of Plaintiff’s subjective statements:
Upon consideration of the evidence of record, the undersigned finds that the
claimant’s medically determinable impairments could reasonably be expected to
produce some symptoms. However, having considered the entire evidence of record
and the criteria of SSR 16-3p and 20 CFR 404.1529, the undersigned finds that the
claimant’s statements that [he] is unable to work are not supported and are not
consistent in light of the discrepancies between the claimant’s assertions,
testimony, and medical record. The record shows that the treatment the claimant
has received has been routine and conservative, consisting mainly of the use of
medications. Moreover, up until recently, his mental illness was managed with
medications as prescribed by his primary care provider. Following his June 2022
voluntary hospitalization, he participated in an acute partial care program for a short
period before he was stepped down to outpatient treatment. Therefore, the evidence
fails to substantiate the claimant’s allegations of debilitating limitations.
Accordingly, [] the undersigned finds that the claimant’s testimony and allegations
are not fully consistent with the evidence of record.

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R. 35; see also id. (“The claimant has a lot of complaints, but there is little objective evidence to
support those complaints.”). In the view of this Court, this record provides substantial support for
the ALJ’s decision to discount Plaintiff’s subjective statements as inconsistent with the record
evidence. See Van Horn, 717 F.2d at 873; Miller, 719 F. App’x at 134; Izzo, 186 F. App’x at

286.
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to properly consider his subjective statements of
disabling mental limitations because the ALJ “minimized the impact of those impairments upon
the Plaintiff’s RFC by characterizing the record in such a way as to downplay the severity of the
symptoms.” Plaintiff’s Memorandum of Law, ECF No. 6, pp. 20–21 (complaining that Plaintiff
underwent an in-patient hospitalization that the ALJ “downplay[ed]” as voluntary) (citations
omitted); see also Plaintiff’s Reply Brief, ECF No. 13, pp. 4–5 (same). The Court is not
persuaded that this issue requires remand. In considering Plaintiff’s June 2022 inpatient
hospitalization, the ALJ expressly noted the circumstances surrounding that hospitalization,
including Plaintiff’s suicidal ideation as well as his statement that he needed a break from

responsibilities:
By December [2021], he indicated that the use of Vistaril resulted in a great
reduction of anxiety (Id. at 27). Despite this, in June 2022, he was admitted to a
psychiatric facility (Exhibit 10F) after expressing suicidal ideation with a plan
(Exhibit 12F, page 24). At that time, he indicated that he was merely taking
psychotropic medications as prescribed by his primary care provider and was
experiencing increased depression due to life stressors, including unemployment,
loss of custody of his two children due to child abuse allegations, physical
impairments and lack of finances (Id.). As an inpatient, he was minimally
compl[iant] with treatment, as he isolated himself throughout the day in his room,
did not participate in group therapy and merely took psychotropic medications (Id.
at 146). He indicated that he found his stay “peaceful,” as he needed a break from
life’s responsibilities (Id.), sleep and time to think (Id. at 168). After a few days, he
requested discharge, as he felt okay and denied suicidal ideations (Id. at 146).
Subsequently, he participated in an acute partial care program for post-traumatic
stress disorder with major depressive disorder (Exhibits 10F & 16F). By August,
he was stepped down to an outpatient level of care (Exhibit 10F).
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R. 34. Reading the ALJ’s opinion as a whole, this Court is not persuaded that the ALJ
improperly “downplay[ed]” Plaintiff’s subjective complaints. In any event, to the extent that
Plaintiff points to his inpatient hospitalization and intensive outpatient program, the Court has
already explained that the ALJ considered that evidence when crafting the RFC determination,
and that the ALJ’s RFC determination is supported by substantial evidence. The Court concludes
that the ALJ sufficiently explained her reasoning in assessing Plaintiff’s subjective complaints,
and the ALJ’s findings in this regard are supported by substantial evidence in the record and are
therefore entitled to this Court’s deference. See SSR 16-3p; Miller, 719 F. App’x at 134; cf.
Malloy v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 306 F. App’x. 761, 765 (3d Cir. 2009) (“Credibility

determinations as to a claimant’s testimony regarding pain and other subjective complaints are
for the ALJ to make.”) (citing Van Horn v. Schweiker, 717 F.2d 871, 873 (3d Cir. 1983)).
Plaintiff also complains that the ALJ improperly discounted the third party statement of
his mother. Plaintiff’s Memorandum of Law, ECF No. 6, pp. 21–22; Plaintiff’s Reply Brief, ECF
No. 13, pp. 5–6. The ALJ expressly addressed this statement as follows:
A statement was also provided by the claimant’s mother in a third-party function
report (Exhibit 3E). This statement is not persuasive, as it is a lay opinion based
upon casual observation, rather than objective medical examination and testing.
Further, it is potentially influenced by loyalties of family. It certainly does not
outweigh the accumulated medical evidence regarding the extent to which the
claimant’s impairments limit his functional abilities. Ultimately, this statement is
not persuasive for the same reasons set forth above in finding the claimant’s
allegations to be less than wholly consistent with the evidence of record.

R. 32. Plaintiff contends that the ALJ erred when discounting his mother’s statement simply
because she was a layperson and not a medical professional and because she may be biased.
Plaintiff’s Memorandum of Law, ECF No. 6, pp. 21–22; Plaintiff’s Reply Brief, ECF No. 13, pp.
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5–6. According to Plaintiff, the ALJ’s error in this regard “violates SSR 16-3p and constitutes
further harmful error.” Plaintiff’s Memorandum of Law, ECF No. 6, p. 22.
Even assuming, for the sake of argument, that the ALJ erred in assessing this third party
statement, Plaintiff has not explained how any such error harmed him. See Plaintiff’s

Memorandum of Law, ECF No. 6, pp. 21–22; Plaintiff’s Reply Brief, ECF No. 13, pp. 5–6.
Plaintiff does not identify any particular portion of that statement or functional limitation based
on that statement that the ALJ’s RFC failed to accommodate or that required any different or
additional RFC limitation. See id. Based on this record, the ALJ’s error in this regard, if any, is
harmless and does not require remand. See Shinseki, 556 U.S. at 409–10; Brown v. Astrue, 649
F.3d 193, 195 (3d Cir. 2011) (“An error is ‘harmless’ when, despite the technical correctness of
an appellant’s legal contention, there is also ‘no set of facts’ upon which the appellant could
recover.”) (citation omitted); Rutherford v. Barnhart, 399 F.3d 546, 553 (3d. Cir. 2005) (finding
that “a remand is not required here because it would not affect the outcome of the case”). In

short, the ALJ’s assessment of his mother’s third party statement will not serve as a basis for
remand of this action. Id.
VI. CONCLUSION
For all these reasons, the Court AFFIRMS the Commissioner’s decision.
The Court will issue a separate Order issuing final judgment pursuant to Sentence 4 of 42
U.S.C. § 405(g).
IT IS SO ORDERED.

Date: January 26, 2026 s/Norah McCann King
NORAH McCANN KING
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11252536. Public record. Not legal advice.