# Sainiak

> District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania · February 3, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11252203

## Case

- **Full name:** Garrett Raymond Sainiak v. Security Lt. Newberry, et al.
- **Court:** District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania
- **Decided:** February 3, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11252203

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- stating that “[tlhe PLRA requires only ‘proper exhaustion,’ meaning exhaustion of those administrative remedies that are ‘available’ (quoting Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 93 (2006)
- finding no constitutional violation where inmate was required to lift his genitals, spread his buttocks, and then place his hands on his head and sweep his mouth with his fingers
- holding that prison officials rendered plaintiffs administrative remedies unavailable when they failed to timely respond to his grievance and ignored his follow-up 14 requests for a decision
- holding that it is constitutional to conduct a full strip search of an inmate in general population, “regardless of the reason for detention or the existence of reasonable suspicion that the individual is concealing something’

## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
GARRETT RAYMOND SAINIAK, Civil No. 3:24-cv-538
Plaintiff (Judge Mariani)
v. .
SECURITY LT. NEWBERRY, et al.,
Defendants
MEMORANDUM
Plaintiff Garrett Sainiak (“Sainiak”), an inmate housed, at all relevant times, at the
State Correctional Institution, Frackville, Pennsylvania (“SCl-Frackville”), commenced this
civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Doc. 1). The remaining Defendants are
Lieutenant Newberry, Lieutenant Rainer, Lieutenant Maul, Correctional Officer Storm,
Correctional Officer Forte, Correctional Officer Kimmel, and Sergeant Walter.
Presently before the Court is Defendants’ motion for summary judgment pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. (Doc. 38). The motion is ripe for resolution. For the
reasons set forth below, the Court will grant the motion.

I. Statement of Undisputed Facts‘
A. Facts Related to Placement in the Dry Cell
On September 13, 2022, Sainiak was transferred from SCl-Benner to SCI-Frackville.
(Doc. 51 J 1). During his deposition, Sainiak testified that, while at SCl-Benner and
preparing for transport, he was told that a drug sniffing dog “hit on” him, indicating the
possible presence of contraband. (Id. 73). Sainiak “acknowledge[d] and complied with the
Officers’ directions.” (/d. {| 4).
Upon arrival at SCl-Frackville, Sainiak was subjected to a body cavity search and

was passed through a body scanner by corrections officers. (/d. 5). Sainiak was informed
that he was being placed in a dry cell because he was suspected of having contraband on
his person due to the results of the body scan. (Id. { 2).

1 Local Rule 56.1 requires that a motion for summary judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 56 be supported “by a separate, short, and concise statement of the material facts, in numbered
paragraphs, as to which the moving party contends there is no genuine issue to be tried.” M.D. Pa. LOCAL
OF Court 56.1. A party opposing a motion for summary judgment must file a separate statement of
material facts, responding to the numbered paragraphs set forth in the moving party's statement and
identifying genuine issues to be tried. /d. Unless otherwise noted, the factual background herein derives
from Defendants’ Rule 56.1 statement of material facts. (Doc. 51). Although Sainiak filed a brief (Docs. 55,
57) in opposition to Defendants’ motion, he failed to file a response to Defendants’ statement of material
facts. Therefore, as authorized by Local Rule 56.1, the Court will admit as uncontroverted the statement of
facts submitted by Defendants. See M.D. Pa. LOCAL RULE OF CouRT 56.1 (“All material facts set forth in the
statement required to be served by the moving party will be deemed to be admitted unless controverted by
the statement recjuired to be served by the opposing party.”); see also Rau v. Allstate Fire & Cas. Ins. Co.,
793 F. App’x 84, 87 (3d Cir. 2019) (upholding this Court's decision to strike non-movant’s non-responsive
counterstatement of facts under Local Rule 56.1); Weitzner v. Sanofi Pasteur Inc., 909 F.3d 604, 613 (3d
Cir. 2018) (finding that “the District Court is in the best position to determine the extent of a party's
noncompliance with Local Rule 56.1, as well as the appropriate sanction for such noncompliance’); see
also Doc. 40 § 3; Doc. 43 J 3; Doc. 45 ] 3; Doc. 48 J 3; Doc. 54 J 3 (advising Sainiak that failure to file a
responsive statement of material facts would result in the facts set forth in Defendants’ statement of
material facts being deemed admitted).

Sainiak was placed in a dry cell for monitoring and was provided a paper smock to

wear. (/d. 6). The purpose of the dry cell was to monitor Sainiak’s bodily waste to
determine if he would pass any contraband. (/d. 7). Sainiak remained in the dry cell from
September 13, 2022 to September 16, 2022. (/d. $8). At the conclusion of the monitoring
period, contraband was not discovered. (/d. {| 9).
In his complaint, Sainiak alleged that while in the dry cell, he was not allowed to
clean himself or the cell, he had inadequate toilet paper and inadequate food and water, he

was exposed to pepper spray and was subjected to constant illumination. (/d. 11; Doc. 1,
at 7-9, 12).
Upon release from the dry cell, Sainiak was transferred to the Restrictive Housing
Unit (“RHU"). (Doc. 51 ¥ 10).
Defendants maintain that Sainiak has not produced medical records or other
evidence demonstrating any physical injury. (/d. 12).
B. Facts Regarding Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
The Pennsylvania Department of Corrections (the “DOC” or the “Department’) has a
formal policy and procedures manual for inmates, which must be followed by inmates who
file grievances while incarcerated at state correctional institutions operated by the
Department. (/d. 13). The purpose of a grievance is to allow an inmate to bring concerns
and complaints to the attention of prison officials. (/d.). The grievance procedures are set

forth in the Department’s Administrative Directive 804 ("DC-ADM 804’), titled Inmate
Grievance System. (/d.).
Pursuant to DC-ADM 804, the DOC has the following three-tiered grievance system
which serves as an inmate’s administrative remedy: (1) an initial review by a Grievance
Officer; (2) appeal to the Facility Manager or designee; and (3) appeal to the Secretary's
Office of Inmate Grievance and Appeals (“SOIGA’) for final review. (Id. J 14).
A grievance must be submitted in writing, using the grievance form available on all
housing units or blocks, within 15 working days after the events noted in the grievance. (Id.
q 15). A grievance must include the following: a statement of facts relevant to the claim
including the date and approximate time and location of the event(s) giving rise to the
grievance; the identity of any individuals who were directly involved in the event(s); any
claims the inmate wishes to make concerning violations of DOC directives, regulations,
court orders, or other law; and any compensation or legal relief desired. (/d. 16).
Upon receipt on the inmate's grievance, the Facility Grievance Coordinator assigns
each grievance (even a rejected grievance) a tracking number and enters it into the
Automated Inmate Grievance Tracking System. (/d. J 17).
The inmate then receives an initial review response. (See id. J 18). Ifthe inmate is
dissatisfied with the initial response, he or she may appeal that decision to the Facility
Manager. (/d.). The Facility Manager then provides a written response to the grievance.
(/d. | 19). The Facility Manager may uphold the response, uphold the inmate, dismiss the

grievance (either as untimely or on the merits), or uphold in part and deny in part. (/d.). The
Facility Manager may also remand the initial review response for further investigation or
consideration. (/d.).
If an inmate is not satisfied with the decision of the Facility Manager, he or she may
submit an appeal to SOIGA. (/d. § 20). Only issues raised in both the original grievance
and the appeal to the Facility Manager may be appealed to this level. (/d.). SOIGA reviews
the original grievance, the initial review response, the appeal to the Facility Manager. the
Facility Manager's response, and the appeal to final review. (/d. □ 21). SOIGA may uphold
the response, uphold the inmate, dismiss, or uphold in part and deny in part. (/d. J 22).
Alternatively, the Chief Grievance Officer may remand the grievance to the facility for further
investigation or reconsideration or may refer the appeal to a different bureau. (/d.).
Defendants assert that Sainiak filed grievance number 999897, pertaining to the
claims raised in this matter. (/d. ] 23). Defendants maintain that grievance number 999897

was not appropriately exhausted to final review. (/d.).
Il. Legal Standard
Through summary adjudication, the court may dispose of those claims that do not
present a “genuine dispute as to any material fact.” Feb. R Civ.P. 56(a). “As to materiality,

... [o]nly disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing
law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,
477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).

The party moving for summary judgment bears the burden of showing the absence
of a genuine issue as to any material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106
S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). Once such a showing has been made, the non-moving
party must offer specific facts contradicting those averred by the movant to establish a
genuine issue of material fact. Lujan v. Nat'l Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871, 888 (1990).
Therefore, the non-moving party may not oppose summary judgment simply on the basis of
the pleadings, or on conclusory statements that a factual issue exists. Anderson, 477 U.S.
at 248. “A party asserting that a fact cannot be or is genuinely disputed must support the
assertion by citing to particular parts of materials in the record...or showing that the
materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an
adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact.” Feb. R. Civ. P.
56(c)(1)(A)-(B). In evaluating whether summary judgment should be granted, “[t]ne court
need consider only the cited materials, but it may consider other materials in the record.”
FED. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3). “Inferences should be drawn in the light most favorable to the non-
moving party, and where the non-moving party's evidence contradicts the movant’s, then
the non-movant’s must be taken as true.” Big Apple BMW, Inc. v. BMW of N. Am., Inc., 974
F.2d 1358, 1363 (3d Cir.1992), cert. denied 507 U.S. 912 (1993).
However, “facts must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party
only if there is a ‘genuine’ dispute as to those facts.” Scoff v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380, 127

S. Ct. 1769, 1776, 167 L. Ed. 2d 686 (2007). If a party has carried its burden under the

summary judgment rule,
its opponent must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical
doubt as to the material facts. Where the record taken as a whole could not
lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no genuine
issue for trial. The mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between
the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for
summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of
material fact. When opposing parties tell two different stories, one of which is
blatantly contradicted by the record, so that no reasonable jury could believe
it, a court should not adopt that version of the facts for purposes of ruling on a
motion for summary judgment.
Id. (internal quotations, citations, and alterations omitted).
lll. Discussion
Defendants seek summary judgment on the following grounds: (1) Sainiak failed to
establish an Eighth Amendment violation; (2) Sainiak failed to establish a Fourth
Amendment violation; (3) Sainiak’s Fourteenth Amendment claim is barred by the more-
specific-provision rule; (4) Sainiak failed to establish a First Amendment violation; (5)
Sainiak failed to establish a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress; (6) Sainiak’s
state law claims are barred by sovereign immunity; and (7) Sainiak failed to properly
exhaust his administrative remedies. (Doc. 52). The Court begins its analysis with the
threshold question of whether Sainiak has exhausted his administrative remedies.

A. Exhaustion of Administrative Review2
Defendants contend that Sainiak failed to properly exhaust any grievances against
them in the prison’s administrative review process prior to proceeding to federal court.
(Doc. 52, at 21-24).
The Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (“PLRA”), 42 U.S.C. § 1997e ef seq.,
requires prisoners to exhaust available administrative remedies before suing prison officials
for alleged constitutional violations. See id. § 1997e(a); Ross v. Blake, 578 U.S. 632, 639,
642 (2016) (explaining that only “available” remedies must be exhausted). The PLRA
“exhaustion requirement applies to all inmate suits about prison life, whether they involve
general circumstances or particular episodes, and whether they allege excessive force or

some other wrong.” Porter v. Nussile, 534 U.S. 516, 532 (2002). It has been made clear
that the exhaustion requirement is mandatory. See Williams v. Beard, 482 F.3d 637, 639
(3d Cir. 2007); see also Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 741 (2001) (holding that the
exhaustion requirement of the PLRA applies to grievance procedures “regardless of the
relief offered through administrative procedures”); Nyhuis v. Reno, 204 F.3d 65, 67 (3d Cir.
2000) (same). “[I]t is beyond the power of [any] court...to excuse compliance with the

2 Because Defendants raised the issue of exhaustion of administrative remedies, the Court
issued an Order notifying the parties that it would consider exhaustion in its role as factfinder in accordance
with Paladino v. Newsome, 885 F.3d 203 (3d Cir. 2018) and Small v. Camden Cnty., 728 F.3d 265 (3d Cir.
2013), and afforded the parties the opportunity to supplement the record with any additional evidence
relevant to exhaustion of administrative remedies. (Doc. 58).

exhaustion requirement.” Nyhuis, 204 F.3d at 73 (quoting Beeson v. Fishkill Corr. Facility,
28 F. Supp.2d 884, 894-95 (S.D.N.Y. 1998)).
To exhaust administrative remedies an inmate must comply with all applicable
grievance procedures and rules. Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 231 (3d Cir. 2004). The
PLRA requires not only technical exhaustion of the administrative remedies, but also
substantial compliance with procedural requirements. Spruill, 372 F.3d at 227-32; see also
Nyhuis, 204 F.3d at 77-78. A procedural default by the prisoner, either through late or
improper filings, bars the prisoner from bringing a claim in federal court unless equitable
considerations warrant review of the claim. Spruill, 372 F.3d at 227-32; see also Camp v.
Brennan, 219 F.3d 279 (3d Cir. 2000). A procedural default may be excused, however, if
the prisoner can show that the administrative remedies were unavailable to him. See
Rinaldi v. United States, 904 F.3d 257, 266 (3d Cir. 2018) (stating that “[tlhe PLRA requires
only ‘proper exhaustion,’ meaning exhaustion of those administrative remedies that are
‘available’ (quoting Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 93 (2006)). “An administrative remedy
is unavailable when it “operates as a simple dead endj,]...is so opaque that it becomes,
practically speaking, incapable of use, or when prison administrators thwart inmates from
taking advantage of a grievance process through machination, misrepresentation, or
intimidation.” Downey v. Pa. Dep't of Corr., 968 F.3d 299, 305 (3d Cir. 2020) (quoting
Shifflett v. Korszniak, 934 F.3d 356, 365 (3d Cir. 2019)).

As stated, the DOC employs a three-step grievance process that must be completed
to properly exhaust administrative remedies in most cases. See Booth v. Churner, 206 F.3d
289, 292 n.2 (3d Cir. 2002); Commonwealth of Pa., Dep’t of Corr., Inmate Grievance Sys.,
Policy No. DC-ADM 804 (“DC-ADM 804”). If informal resolution attempts do not resolve the
problem, the first step is to file a written grievance (using form DC-804, Part 1) with the
Facility Grievance Coordinator within 15 working days after “the event upon which the claim
is based.” DC-ADM 804 § 1(A)(3)-(5). An adverse decision by the Grievance Coordinator

may be appealed to the Facility Manager within 15 working days of the initial-review

response or rejection. /d. § 2(A)(1). Finally, the decision of the Facility Manager may be
appealed to “Final Review’ with the Secretary's Office of Inmate Grievances and Appeals,
and again must be submitted within 15 working days of the date of the Facility Manager's
decision. Id. § 2(B)(1).
The DOC has specific requirements for grievances submitted by inmates. Those
requirements include, among other things, that the grievance “be legible [and]
understandable”; “include a statement of the facts relevant to the claim” as well as “the date,
approximate time, and location of the event(s) that gave rise to the grievance”; that the
prisoner “identify individuals directly involved in the event(s)”; and that the grievance include
“the specific relief sought,” including “compensation or other legal relief normally available
from a court.” Id. § 1(A)(11).

10

Defendants assert that Sainiak filed one relevant grievance—number 999897. (Doc.
52, at 21-24: Doc. 51 J 23; Doc. 51-5). On September 23, 2022, Sainiak filed grievance
999897 with respect to his placement in the dry cell from September 13, 2022 to September
16, 2022. (Doc. 51-5, at 8-11).
On October 19, 2022, the grievance officer issued an initial review response and
denied the grievance. (/d. at 12). The grievance officer found as follows:
| have reviewed your grievance and all matters pertinent to your claim. On
9/13/2022, you were transferred to SCI Frackville from SCI Huntingdon.s
Upon your transfer, an air scan of your person was completed via a drug
detection canine, and during this process the canine alerted to the presence
of drugs contained on or in your person. Once received at SCI Frackville, a
body scan was completed that also detected the presence of a foreign object
inside your body. You were then, within DOC Policy 6.3.1 Section 47, placed
in a dry cell under observation. As part of this policy, you were also placed in
a Secure Cuff Mitt restraint and ankle shackles. During this process,
[mledical staff were present and conducted an examination of the restraints to
ensure they were not too restrictive to cut off circulation or cause bodily
distress. In addition, while placed in a dry cell status, you were offered an
opportunity to exercise/use the bathroom every two hours along with the
ability to use the bathroom upon request to staff. As such, your grievance
and any relief sought is denied.
(Id.).
Sainiak appealed the first-level denial to the Facility Manager. (Id. at 13). On
November 29, 2022, the Facility Manager upheld the initial response that denied the
grievance, and reasoned as follows:

3 The Court notes that other evidence of record reveals that Sainiak arrived at SCI-Frackville
from SCl-Benner, and not from SCl-Huntingdon. (See Doc. 51-2, at 3). This discrepancy is immaterial to
the resolution of the issues before the Court.
11

| have reviewed your appeal and initial review response by UM
Wegrzynowicz, while reviewing relevant records. | write at this time to advise
you that | concur with his initial review response, as he addressed all
concerns at the initial level. At my level, you provide nothing further to
warrant a different response.
Based upon what is reference above, the Facility Manager upholds the initial
review response. As a result, all relief sought is denied.
(Id. at 14).
On December 8, 2022, Sainiak filed an appeal to SOIGA. (/d. at 4, 15-23). On
February 2, 2023, SOIGA remanded the matter to the institution for further review, finding
that the institution did not address all of Sainiak’s allegations. (/d. at 5-7).
On rernand, the institution again denied the grievance. (See id. at 3). Therefore, on
March 20, 2023, Sainiak filed his second appeal to SOIGA. (/d. at 3). On May 11, 2023,
SOIGA dismissed the appeal on procedural grounds “due to a failure to comply with the
provisions of the DC-ADM 804” noting that “[a]n appeal to final review is not permitted when
[Sainiak] fail[ed] to comply with submissions procedures” and Sainiak “[has] not provided
[SOIGA] with required and/or legible documentation for review.” (Id. at 2). More
specifically, SOIGA found that Sainiak “failed to provide a copy of the facility's remanded

response. Additionally, in [his] appeal, [he] failed to provide reason(s) for appealing the
facility's remanded response.” (/d.). Therefore, SOIGA dismissed the grievance appeal.
(Id.).
This grievance history confirms that Sainiak failed to properly exhaust grievance
number 999897. DC-ADM 804 makes it clear that an inmate appealing a grievance to final
12

review must provide SOIGA with all required documentation relevant to the appeal and that
his failure to do so may result in the dismissal of the appeal. As stated, the DOC’s
grievance policy consists of three steps. The final step involves an appeal to the SOIGA
within 15 working days of the Facility Manager's Appeal Response. A proper appeal to final
review must include: “(1) a legible copy of the Initial Grievance; (2) a copy of the initial
review response/rejection and/or remanded initial review response/rejection; (3) a legible
copy of the Inmate Appeal to the Facility Manager; (4) a copy of the Facility
Manager/designee’s decision and/or remanded Facility Manager/designee's decision; (5) a
written appeal to the SOIGA...” DC-ADM 804 § 2(B)(1)(j). “[FJailure to provide any of the
documentation noted above may result in the appeal being dismissed.” Id. § 2(B)(1)(j)(6).
The evidence confirms that Sainiak failed to comply with these requirements. A prisoner's
failure to comply with the procedural and substantive requirements of the DOC’s grievance
policy, as set forth in DC-ADM 804, results in procedural default, thereby precluding an
action in federal court. See Woodford, 548 U.S. at 84, 90-91; Spruill, 372 F.3d at 227-32.
By failing to give SOIGA the required! documentation for his grievance appeal,
Sainiak has not followed the applicable procedures outlined in DC-ADDM 804, which “supply
the yardstick for measuring procedural default.” Spruill, 372 F.3d ai 231. An inmate's
failure to suomit the required documents to SOIGA results in the inmate failing to exhaust
administrative remedies. See, e.g., Mack v. Klopotoski, 540 F. App’x 108, 113 (3d Cir.
2013) (affirming dismissal for inmate's failure to properly exhaust because inmate had falec!

13

to include photocopies of his appeals to the Facility Manager and rejecting substantial
compliance argument that inmate filed handwritten copies since DC-ADM 804 specifically
required photocopies).
As the remaining Defendants have provided evidence to support their failure to
exhaust defense, the burden shifts to Sainiak to produce evidence that the DOC grievance
remedies were not available to him. Sainiak has failed to meet this burden.
Sainiak has not provided any basis to excuse his procedural default of grievance
number 999897. Instead, Sainiak simply argues that he exhausted his administrative
remedies by filing a final appeal to SOIGA and receiving its decision on May 11, 2023.
(Doc. 57, at 11-15). Sainiak’s argument misses the mark. Sainiak has not presented any
evidence that he complied with the requirements of Section 2 of DC-ADM 804 regarding
appeals to Final Review. It is thus undisputed that Sainiak failed to comply with the
requirements of DC-ADM 804 for filing a proper appeal to final review.
Under certain circumstances, administrative remedies may not be effectively
available to an inmate, preventing a timely pursuit of the prison grievance process. See,
e.g., Camp, 219 F.3d at 281; Shifflett, 934 F.3d at 359 (“a prisoner exhausts his
administrative remedies as soon as the prison fails to respond to a properly submitted
grievance in a timely fashion”); Robinson v. Superintendent Rockview SCI, 831 F.3d 148,
154 (3d Cir. 2016) (holding that prison officials rendered plaintiffs administrative remedies
unavailable when they failed to timely respond to his grievance and ignored his follow-up

14

requests for a decision). The record does not support a finding that the administrative
process was unavailable to Sainiak, nor does Sainiak set forth any argument that the
grievance process was unavailable to him or that Defendants obstructed his access to the
prison grievance system. (See Doc. 57). To the contrary, the record establishes that
Sainiak had full and ready access to the administrative remedy process.
In sum, grievance number 999897 was not properly exhausted. Sainiak has not
provided any basis to excuse his failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Under Rule 56,
Sainiak was required to establish the existence of a genuine dispute of material fact. See
Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 324. He has failed to do so. Consequently, the Court concludes
that Sainiak has not properly exhausted the claims in this action, and Defendants are
entitled to an entry of summary judgment in their favor. See Spruill, 372 F.3d at 222, 230.
Even had Sainiak properly exhausted, Defendants are also entitled to summary
judgment on the merits of the claims, as set forth below.
B. Eighth Amendment Claim
The Eighth Amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment imposes
constitutional limitations on a prisoner's conditions of confinement. See Graham v. Connor,
490 U.S. 386 (1989): Rhodes v. Chaprnan, 452 U.S. 337 (1981). “[A] prison official violates
the Eighth Amendment only when two requirements are met.” Gilblom v. Gillipsie, 425 □ □
App’x 165, 168 (3d Cir. 2011) (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994)).

15

First, the plaintiff must allege a deprivation that is “objectively, sufficiently serious.”
Gilblom, 435 F. App’x at 168 (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834). The objective component
is narrowly defined: only “extreme deprivations” suffice to make out an Eighth Amendment
claim. Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9 (1992). A prisoner must show that the condition,
either alone or in combination with other conditions, deprived him of “the minimal civilized

measure Of life’s necessities,” or at least a “single, identifiable human need.” Wilson v.
Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 304 (1991) (citing Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347). These needs include
“food, clothing, shelter, sanitation, medical care and personal safety.” Griffin v. Vaughn, 112
F.3d 703, 709 (3d Cir. 1997). “[A] totality of the circumstances test must be applied to
determine whether the conditions of confinement constitute cruel and unusual punishment.”
Tillery v. Owens, 907 F.2d 418, 427 (3d Cir. 1990).
Second, the plaintiff must show that the prison official “subjectively acted with a
sufficiently culpable state of mind, i.e., deliberate indifference.” Tillman v. Lebanon County
Corr. Facility, 221 F.3d 410, 418 (3d Cir. 2000). Serious hardship to the prisoner is required
to satisfy the Eighth Amendment's objective component. Wilson, 501 U.S. at 298.
Sainiak maintains that Defendants violated his Eighth Amendment rights by placing
him in the dry cell, and he challenges the various conditions and deprivations he allegedly
suffered during his confinement therein. (Doc. 1, at 12). Sainiak asserts that his Eighth
Amendment rights were violated when he was forced to spend time in the dry cell in a paper
gown, having his private parts exposed, in restraints, without adequate toilet paper, without

16

the ability to clean himself or the cell, without adequate food and water, and while being
exposed to pepper spray, and being under constant lighting. (/d. at 7-9, 12).
As the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit have explained,
when considering whether conditions of confinement violated the Eighth Amendment, “the
Constitution does not mandate comfortable prisons.” Thomas v. Tice, 948 F.3d 133, 139
(3d Cir. 2020) (quoting Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 349). “To the extent that such conditions are
restrictive and even harsh, they are part of the penalty that criminal offenders pay for their
offenses against society.” Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347. Courts consider “the length of
confinement, the amount of time prisoners must spend in their cells each day, the
opportunities for activities outside the cells, and the repair and functioning of basic physical
facilities such as plumbing, ventilation, and showers.” Tillery, 907 F.2d at 427. With respect
to a dry cell, the Third Circuit has explained:
A ‘dry cell’ is a cell that lacks water—all standing water has been drained from
the toilet, the room's water supply has been shut off, and the sink and toilet
have been capped to prevent inmate access. An inmate may be placed in a
dry cell when prison staff have observed the inmate attempt to ingest an item
of contraband or they learn that the inmate is attempting to introduce
contraband into the prison. Dry cells are used to closely observe the inmate
until natural processes allow for the ingested contraband to be retrieved. To
this end, dry cells lack all linens and moveable items other than a mattress,
inmates’ clothes are exchanged for a simple smock, and their movements are
carefully controlled to prevent them from concealing or disposing of any
retrievable contraband.
Thomas, 948 F.3d at 137.

17

While “administrative confinement in a dry cell is unpleasant and often unsanitary, so
long as the conditions of that confinement are not foul or inhuman, and are supported by
some penological justification, they will not violate the Eighth Amendment.” Thomas, 948
F.3d at 138-39 (citing Young v. Quinlan, 960 F.2d 351, 364-65 (3d Cir. 1992)); see also
Gilblom, 435 F. App’x at 169 (explaining that “[mJaintaining institutional security and
preserving internal order and discipline are essential goals that may require limitation or
retraction of the retained constitutional rights of both convicted prisoners and pretrial
detainees” and holding that “the need to ensure that contraband would not be brought into
the prison certainly justified [the plaintiff's] placement in a dry cell”) (citing Bell v. Wolfish,
441 U.S. 520, 546 (1979).
The Court recognizes that the “duration and conditions of...confinement cannot be
ignored in deciding whether such confinement meets constitutional standards|;]” however,
[t]he touchstone is the health of the inmate.” Young, 960 F.2d at 364.
Sainiak sets forth specific deprivations he allegedly suffered during his confinement
in the dry cell for approximately three days after he was suspected of ingesting contraband.
(Doc. 1, at 7-9, 12). As stated, Sainiak asserts that he was not able to clean himself or the
cell, he was provided inadequate toilet paper, food, and water, his paper gown ripped on
one occasion and his private parts were exposed before he was provided a new gown, his
restraints were too tight, and he was exposed to pepper spray and constant light. (/d.).

18

Upon consideration of the record, the Court finds that the conditions of which Sainiak
complains, while certainly unpleasant, do not rise to the level of an Eighth Amendment
violation. There is no evidence that Defendants knew of and disregarded a substantial risk
of harm caused by the conditions Sainiak asserts. The Third Circuit has noted that the
temporary denial of soap or toilet paper does not violate the Eighth Amendment. See
Brooks v. Bledsoe, 682 F. App’x 164, 170 (3d Cir. 2017) (prisoner denied sheets, blankets,
and toilet paper); Freeman v. Miller, 615 F. App’x 72, 77 (3d Cir. 2015) (prisoner denied

soap for 7 days). Further, while Sainiak complains of inadequate food and water, the denial
of a meal on one occasion does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation. See
Lindsey v. O’Connor, 327 F. App’x 319, 321 (3d Cir. 2009) (prisoner denied one meal).
Moreover, the record is replete with evidence that Sainiak was regularly offered food and
water, which he refused to accept on some occasions. (Doc. 51-2, at 5-100). In addition,
the constant lighting does not violate the Eighth Amendment because Sainiak does not
indicate that he suffered any medical issue due to the three-day period of constant
illumination. See Stewart v. Beard, 417 F. App’x 117, 118 (3d Cir. 2011) (24-hour
illumination in the RHU). While Sainiak asserts that his restraints caused numbness in his
hands, the undisputed evidence reflects that he received medical attention for this condition
and staff exercised his hands every day that he was in the dry cell, assessed his restraints
and adjusted them as needed. (Doc. 51-2, at 5-6, 19-20, 25-100). Whether examined

19

separately or collectively, the evidence does not support a finding that the conditions of
Sainiak’s confinement in the dry cell amounted to a constitutional violation.
With respect to the duration of confinement in the dry cell, the record reflects that
Sainiak was in the dry cell from September 13, 2022 to September 16, 2022. (Doc. 51-2, at
4,10). Sainiak does not challenge the duration of his time in the dry cell. (See Doc. 1).
The Court will nonetheless address the duration of Sainiak’s confinement in the dry cell.
In Thomas v. Tice, a prisoner was placed in a dry cell after a guard in the visitation

room saw the prisoner ingest what the guard suspected may have been contraband.
Thomas, 948 F.3d at 139. After four days of his confinement, the prisoner's stool was
examined and an x-ray was taken of the prisoner's abdominal cavity, which both showed no
evidence of contraband. /d. at 137. Nevertheless, the prison decided to continue the
prisoner's confinement in the dry cell for five more days. /d. The prisoner-plaintiff asserted
two Eighth Amendment challenges to his confinement in a dry cell: (1) specific deprivations
he allegedly suffered during his confinement; and (2) the duration of that confinement. /d. at
139. Specifically, the prisoner argued that he should have been released from the dry cell
when the guard's initial suspicion that the prisoner ingested contraband was dispelled when

an x-ray revealed that his abdominal cavity was clean. /d. at 140.
Initially, the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
granted summary judgment, finding that the prisoner’s conditions of confinement claim
failed because the prisoner did not produce evidence to provide a sufficient basis upon

20

which a reasonable jury could conclude that the individual defendants had knowledge of the
prisoner's conditions of confinement. Id. at 139. However, on appeal, the Third Circuit
found that summary judgment was inappropriate on the duration of the prisoner's
confinement issue. /d. at 140. The Court reiterated “that when administrative confinement
in a dry cell is not foul or inhuman, and serves a legitimate penological interest, it will not
violate the Eighth Amendment.” Id. However, the Third Circuit found that there was a
disputed issue of material fact as to whether there was a penological justification to continue
the prisoner's administrative confinement in the dry cell after the x-ray revealed that his
abdominal cavity was empty. /d. Therefore, the Third Circuit reversed, in part, the order
granting summary judgment on the issue of the prisoner's duration of confinement issue. /d.
Here, the undisputed evidence reflects that a drug sniffing dog alerted prison officials
to the presence of contraband on Sainiak. Once Sainiak arrived at SCl-Frackville on
September 13, 2022, he underwent an initial body scan at 18:30:00 hours and a body cavity
search at 18:47:00. (Doc. 1, at 6; Doc. 51-2, at 3-5). The scan “produced images of
unknown objects or stool inside the inmate[']s abdominal area.” (Doc. 51-2, at 3). On
September 13, 2022 at 19:02:00 hours, Sainiak emptied his bowels and no contraband was
found. (Doc. 51-2, at 5). On September 13, 2022 at 19:10:00 hours, Sainiak underwent
another scan. (Doc. 51-2, at 5). The second scan “appear[ed] to show some of the objects/
stool gone but the possibility of a left over object or possibly left over stool in the same
area.” (Doc. 51-2, at 3) (sic). Sainiak was then placed back in the dry cell. (/d.). On

21

September 13, 2022 at 19:25:00 hours, Sainiak underwent another scan, which appeared to
show something in his abdominal area. (Doc. 51-2, at 3, 5). On September 14, 2022 at
21:00:00 hours, another body scan was conducted.* (Doc. 51-2, at 5, 53-54, 59). On
September 15, 2022 at 13:00:00 hours, Sainiak emptied his bowels and no contraband was
found. (Doc. 51-2, at 6). On September 16, 2022 at 7:00:00, Sainiak underwent an x-ray in
the medical department, which did not show anything inside Sainiak. (/d.; Doc. 1, at 8). On
September 16, 2022, at 16:29:00 hours Sainiak emptied his bowels a third time.5 (Doc. 51-
2, at 6). On September 16, 2022, around 16:53 hours, Sainiak was a placed through a body
scanner and “[t]he scan was clear.” (Doc. 51-2, at 99). Sainiak was then released from the
dry cell on September 16, 2022. (Doc. 51-2, at 6).
There is no evidence that Sainiak went through a body scanner after the results were
clear. Sainiak was a placed through his final body scan on September 16, 2022 around
16:53 hours, which revealed no contraband within his person. (Doc. 51-2, at 99).
Afterward, staff terminated Sainiak’s confinement in the dry cell. (Doc. 51-2, at 6).
Defendants have established a legitimate penological justification for confining
Sainiak in a dry cell and evidence in the record confirms that Defendants terminated that
confinement once it was established that Sainiak’s scan and x-ray were clear. Sainiak does

54,59) 4 The record does not appear to contain the results of this body scan. (See Doc. 51-2, at 5, 53-

5 At his deposition, Sainiak testified that he was told he must remain in the cell “until [he]
defecate|s] three times.” (Doc. 51-3, at 16, Deposition of Garrett Sainiak, Notes of Transcript 15:22-23).
22

not proffer evidence to establish that Defendants continued his confinement in violation of
the Eighth Amendment. Therefore, Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on the
duration of confinement issue.
C. Fourth Amendment Claim
Sainiak asserts a Fourth Amendment claim arising from the body cavity search and
the body scans. (Doc. 1, at 12). He claims that he endured “unreasonable searches” by
being forced to undergo a body cavity search and go through the body scans. (/d.).
The Fourth Amendment protects “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their
persons. ..against unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. Inmates
do not have a Fourth Amendment right to be free of strip searches under all circumstances.
See Bell, 441 U.S. 520. Although strip searches constitute a “significant intrusion on an
individual's privacy,” United States v. Whitted, 541 F.3d 480, 486 (3d Cir. 2008), where
prison officials conduct such searches in a reasonable manner to maintain security and to
prevent the introduction of contraband or weapons in the facility, strip searches do not
violate the Fourth Amendment. See Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders of Cnty. of
Burlington, 621 F.3d 296, 309-11 (3d Cir. 2010), affirmed, 566 U.S. 318 (2012).
When determining the reasonableness of a strip search, courts must balance “the
need for the particular search against the invasion of personal rights that the search entails”
and consider “the scope of the particular intrusion, the manner in which it is conducted, the
justification for initiating it, and the place in which it is conducted.” Bel, 441 U.S. at 558-59

23

(holding that the prison’s policy of strip and visual body cavity searches, requiring inmates to
stand naked, lift their genitals and bend over and spread their buttocks for visual inspection,
did not violate an inmate’s Fourth Amendment rights); see also Brown v. Blaine, 185 F.
App’x 166, 169-70 (3d Cir. 2006) (finding no constitutional violation where inmate was
required to lift his genitals, spread his buttocks, and then place his hands on his head and

sweep his mouth with his fingers).
The Supreme Court also held that it is constitutional to conduct a full strip search of

an individual detained in the general population of a jail, regardless of the reason for
detention or the existence of reasonable suspicion that the individual is concealing
something. Florence, 566 U.S. at 328 (explaining that “correctional officials must be
permitted to devise reasonable search policies to detect and deter the possession of
contraband in their facilities”); see also Small v. Wetzel, 528 F. App'x 202, 207 (3d Cir.
2013) (holding that it is constitutional to conduct a full strip search of an inmate in general
population, “regardless of the reason for detention or the existence of reasonable suspicion
that the individual is concealing something’) (citing Florence, 566 U.S. 318).
Moreover, there is no violation of an inmate's constitutional rights by conducting the
strip search, including a visual body cavity search, in front of other inmates. See /lles v.
Beard, No. 1:12-cv-964, 2013 WL 2285565, at *5 (M.D. Pa. May 23, 2013); Eby v. Karnes,
No. 1:19-cv-2069, 2020 WL 1550634 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 1, 2020) (where the search was
performed in front of other inmates and included a visual cavity search).

24

Sainiak has failed to set forth any facts or present any evidence demonstrating that
the body cavity search and body scans were unreasonable. As outlined above, the
undisputed record reveals that a drug sniffing dog alerted prison officials to the presence of
contraband on Sainiak. Therefore, when Sainiak arrived at SCl-Frackville on September
13, 2022, he underwent a body cavity search and was placed through a body scanner.
(Doc. 1, at 6; Doc. 51-2, at 3-5). He underwent more body scans and an x-ray of his
abdominal area. Once the body scan was clear and the x-ray showed no signs of anything
inside Sainiak, he was released from the dry cell and the searches ceased. (Doc. 51-2, at
3-5, 8, 99).
With respect to his Fourth Amendment unreasonable search claim, Sainiak failed to
provide specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. It is undisputed that the
drug sniffing dog alerted prison officials to the presence of contraband on Sainiak, and that
the first two body scans showed something inside Sainiak’s person. Sainiak failed to
establish that there was no legitimate penological justification for the searches or that the
searches took on an unreasonable scope and manner. Therefore, the Court will grant
Defendants’ motion with respect to the Fourth Amendment claim.
D. Fourteenth Amendment Ciaim
Sainiak asserts 2 Fourteenth Amendment due procesis claim arising out of his
placement in the dry cell. (Doc. 1, at 12). The conduct Sainiak alleges in support of his
Fourteenth Amendment claim is based on the same conduct he alleges in support of his

25

Eighth Amendment claim. (/d.). Sainiak does not indicate if he is asserting a Fourteenth
Amendment procedural due process claim or a substantive due process claim. (See id.,
stating that Sainiak is alleging “the violation of [his] due process rights”). The Court
interprets Sainiak’s complaint as raising a Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process
claim concerning his placement in the dry cell. To the extent that Sainiak is attempting to
assert a substantive due process claim regarding his placement in the dry cell, such a claim
is barred by the more-specific-provision rule.
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution contains both procedural and substantive protections. See U.S. Const. amend.
XIV, § 1. The substantive component of the Due Process Clause safeguards against
certain deprivations of individuals’ “life, liberty, and property” by state actors “regardless of
the fairness of the procedures used to implement them.” L.R. v. Sch. Dist. Of Phila., 836
F.3d 235, 241 (3d Cir. 2016) (quoting Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125
(1992)). A substantive due process claim, however, cannot be maintained when the alleged
constitutional violation is “covered by a specific constitutional provision, such as the Fourth

or Eighth Amendment.” Porter v. Pa. Dep't of Corr., 974 F.3d 431, 447 (3d Cir. 2020)
(quoting United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 272 n.7 (1997)). In such situations, the
claim must be analyzed under the rubric of the more specific constitutional provision rather
than substantive due process, see id., as substantive due process is an “unchartered area”
with “scarce and open-ended” guideposts, Collins, 503 U.S. at 125. The “more-specific-

26

provision rule” will often apply when the challenged conduct underlying the substantive due

process claim is the same conduct that implicates a more explicit constitutional provision.
See Porter, 974 F.3d at 448.
Insofar as Sainiak is asserting a substantive due process claim for his placement in
the dry cell, that claim is barred by the more-specific-provision rule. The Court will grant
summary judgment to Defendants with respect to Sainiak’s Fourteenth Amendment
substantive due process claim.
E. First Amendment Claim
Sainiak also sets forth a First Amendment retaliation claim. (Doc. 1, at 6, 12).
Sainiak asserts that Defendant Newberry retaliated against him for being a drug dealer. (/d.
at 6; see also Doc. 57, at 9). He asserts that Defendant Newberry retaliated by placing him
in the dry cell. (/d.).
To state a retaliation claim under the First Amendment, a plaintiff bears the burden of
Satisfying three elements. First, a plaintiff must prove that he was engaged in
constitutionally protected activity. See Rauser v. Horn, 241 F.3d 330, 333 (3d Cir. 2001).
Second, a plaintiff must demonstrate that he “suffered some ‘adverse action’ at the hands of
prison officials.” Id. (quoting Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 225 (3d Cir. 2000)). This
requirement is satisfied by showing adverse action “sufficient ‘to deter a person of ordinary
firmness’ from exercising his First Amendment rights.” /d. (quoting Suppon v. Dadonna,
2013 F.3d 228, 235 (3d Cir. 2000)). Third, a prisoner must prove that “his constitutionally

27

protected conduct was ‘a substantial or motivating factor’ in the decision to discipline him."
Rauser, 241 F.3d at 333-34 (quoting Mount Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle,
429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977)).
The mere fact that an adverse action occurs after either a complaint or grievance is
filed is relevant, but not dispositive, for the purpose of establishing a causal link between the
two events. See Lape v. Pennsylvania, 157 F. App’x 491, 498 (3d Cir. 2005). Only when
the facts of a particular case are “unusually suggestive” of a retaliatory motive will temporal
proximity, on its own, support an inference of causation. See Krouse v. Am. Sterilizer Co.,
126 F.3d 494, 503 (3d Cir. 1997). The Third Circuit has noted that an inmate can satisfy
this burden “with evidence of either (1) an unusually suggestive temporal proximity between
the protected activity and the allegedly retaliatory action or (2) a pattern of antagonism
coupled with timing that suggests a causal link.” Watson v. Rozum, 834 F.3d 417, 422 (3c
Cir. 2002).
If a prisoner establishes a prima facie case of retaliation, the burden shifts to prison
officials to show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that “they would have made the

same decision absent the protected conduct for reasons reasonably related to a legitimate
penological interest.” Rauser, 241 F.3d at 334. “This is often referred to as the ‘same
decision defense.” Watson, 834 F.3d at 422. If the prison officials cari make this showing, it
defeats the retaliation claim. See Carter v. McGrady, 292 F.3d 152, 159 (3d Cir. 2002).

28

In the instant case, there is no evidence that Sainiak engaged in constitutionally
protected activity. Sainiak avers as follows: “Security Lt. Newberry told me that | was being
placed in a dry-cell. When | asked why, he told me he knows I’m a drug dealer and have
drugs.” (Doc. 1, at 6). While Sainiak believes the Defendant Newberry’s action was
retaliatory, he does not set forth a legal claim of retaliation. As stated, Sainiak asserts that
Defendant Newberry retaliated against him because he was a drug dealer. However, it is
implausible that Sainiak’s alleged criminal activity, which he asserts triggered the retaliation,
was a constitutionally protected activity. See, e.g., Timmons v. Issac, No. 1:20-cv-2035,
2023 WL 348992, at *7 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 20, 2023), appeal dismissed, No. 23-1344, 2023 WL
5521065 (3d Cir. Apr. 25, 2023) (explaining that “[c]ommitting homicide is not protected by
the First Amendment.”). Sainiak failed to present any evidence that Defendant Newberry’s
action was taken due to Sainiak’s participation in a constitutionally protected activity.
Sainiak has thus failed to meet the first prong of a retaliation claim.
In any event, nothing in the record suggests that Defendant Newberry took action
solely based upon his alleged belief that Sainiak was a drug dealer. Accordingly, the Court
will grant summary judgment to Defendant Newberry with respec:t to the retaliation claim.
F. State Law Clain
Sainiak asserts that Defendants intentionally inflicted emotional distress upon him.
(Doc. 1, at 12). He appears to assert that his placement in the dry cell, the inability to clean
himself or the cell, the loss of feelings in his hands, being escotteci through the srison with a

29

ripped smock, the exposure to pepper spray, and the exposure to constant illumination,
caused him emotional distress. (See generally Doc. 1).
To maintain a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress under Pennsylvania
law, a plaintiff must demonstrate “(1) extreme or outrageous conduct [that] (2) intentionally
or recklessly causes (3) severe emotional distress to another.” Manley v. Fitzgerald, 997
A.2d 1235, 1241 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2010) (citing Carson v. City of Phila., 574 A.2d 1184,
1187 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1990)). Nothing in the record, however, establishes that Defendants
acted intentionally or recklessly to cause Sainiak severe emotional distress. (See Doc. 51-
2).
Moreover, in Pennsylvania, sovereign immunity applies to intentional torts committed
by Commonwealth defendants acting in their individual capacities. See Sears v. Mooney,
No. 1:17-cv-50, 2019 WL 6726839, at *47 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 11, 2019) (citation omitted).
Sovereign immunity “applies to Commonwealth employees in both their official and
individual capacities, so long as the employees are ‘acting within the scope of their duties.”
Larsen v. State Emps’ Ret. Sys., 553 F. Supp. 2d 403, 420 (M.D. Pa. 2008). As a general
matter, subject only to ten specific statutory exceptions not applicable here, this sovereicn
immunity bars state law tort claims like the one alleged here, since Commonwealth

30

employees are immune from liability for either negligence or intentional torts.6 McGrath v.
Johnson, 67 F.Supp.2d 499, 511 (E.D. Pa. 1999), aff'd, 35 F. App’x 357 (3d Cir. 2002).
Here, the evidence of record demonstrates that Defendants were acting within the scope of
their employment. Accordingly, they are entitled to sovereign immunity as well. Thus, the
Court will grant Defendants’ motion for summary judgment with respect to Sainiak’s claim
for intentional infliction of emotional distress.
IV. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the Court will grant Defendants’ Rule 56 motion and enter
judgment in their favor. (Doc. 38). A separate Order shall issue.

a Ct1ty Te
7 ca.
Robert D. Mariani
United States District Judge
Dated: February 4 , 2026

6 The ten categories for which sovereign imnnunity will not apply are: (1) vehicles in the
possession or control of a Commonwealth party; (2) acts of health care employees of Commonwealth
agency medical facilities or institutions; (3) the care, custody, or control of personal property; (4) a
dangerous condition of Commonwealth agency real estate and sidewalks; (5) dangerous conditions of
highways created by potholes or sinkholes; (6) the care, custody, or control of animals; (7) liquor store
sales; (8) National Guard activities; (9) toxoids and vaccines; and (10) sexual abuse. See 42 Pa. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 8522(b).
31

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11252203. Public record. Not legal advice.