# Landry

> District Court, M.D. Louisiana · February 6, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11252138

## Case

- **Full name:** Military-Veterans Advocacy, Inc., ET AL. v. Jeff Landry, in his official capacity as Governor of the State of Louisiana, ET AL.
- **Court:** District Court, M.D. Louisiana
- **Decided:** February 6, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11252138

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- finding that states may require commercial enterprises to disclose “purely factual and uncontroversial information about their services” so long as disclosures are reasonably related to a legitimate state interest and not unjustly or unduly burdensome

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

MILITARY-VETERANS ADVOCACY, CIVIL ACTION
INC., ET AL.
VERSUS
JEFF LANDRY, in his official NO. 24-00446-BAJ-RLB
capacity as Governor of the State of
Louisiana, ET AL.

ORDER
Before the Court is Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 61)
and remaining Defendant Liz Murrill’s Cross Motion for Summary Judgment
(Doc. 81) (collectively, “the Motions”). Both Motions are opposed. (Docs. 69, 72).
The Parties filed replies. (Docs. 73, 75). The Parties also submitted supplemental
briefing as ordered by the Court. (Docs. 93, 95). For reasons outlined below, the
Plaintiffs’ Motion is GRANTED and Defendant’s Motion is DENIED.
I. BACKGROUND
On June 3, 2024, the Louisiana State legislature passed Senate Bill 159, the
Preserving Lawful Utilization of Services for Veterans (PLUS) Act, (“the Act”). La.
Stat. Ann. § 29:296. The Act regulates “person[s] seeking to receive compensation for
advising, assisting, or consulting with any individual in connection with any veterans’
benefits matter.” Id. at §29:296 (C)(1). It does so by placing limits on the amount that
they may charge veterans for their services and mandates a disclosure that they must
provide both orally and in writing to prospective veteran-clients, among other
provisions. Id. at §§ 29:296 (C)(1), (E)(2).
Plaintiffs Military-Veterans Advocacy, Inc. (“MVA”), a 501(c)(3) charitable
organization, and the Law Office of John B Wells (“LOJBW”), a sole proprietorship,

filed suit against Defendants Jeff Landry, in his official capacity as Governor of
Louisiana, and Liz Murrill, in her official capacity as Attorney General of Louisiana,
to challenge the constitutionality of the Act. (Doc. 1).
Plaintiffs allege that this case is about some of the “most vulnerable and ill
patients in Louisiana, disabled veterans of the armed forces, the charitable
organization and law office that seeks to help them; and an unconstitutional and
ill-conceived law that will hamper or destroy Plaintiffs’ efforts in Louisiana leaving

some veterans sicker and poorer than their brother and sister veterans in other
States.” (Id. at ¶ 5).
Plaintiff LOJBW is a law practice that consists of a single attorney,
John B. Wells. (Id. at ¶ 6). Wells is a retired Navy Surface Warfare Commander who
practices in military and veteran law. (Id.). Wells is admitted to practice in all
military courts including the United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces

and the United States Supreme Court. (Id.). Wells is also admitted to practice before
the United States Department of Veterans Affairs (the “VA”). (Id. at ¶ 7). LOJBW
focuses its practice on veteran law and represents veterans in all stages of the veteran
system, including pro bono counseling and paid representation before the Board of
Veterans Appeals, the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims, and the Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit. (Id.).
Plaintiff MVA works to litigate, legislate, and educate veterans in their quest
for earned benefits. (Id. at ¶ 8). MVA attorneys routinely discuss VA issues and
provide recommendations to Congress. (Id.). MVA also files direct actions against the

Secretary under 38 U.S.C. § 502 and is a regular amicus curiae contributor at the
Federal Circuit and the Supreme Court of the United States. (Id.). In its educational
role, MVA provides social media outreach to veterans, conducts continuing legal
education on veteran law to attorneys, and promotes attorney participation in
veteran law. (Id.).
Plaintiffs filed the instant suit to challenge the Act, which Plaintiffs contend
will hamper or destroy their efforts in Louisiana to aid disabled veterans of the armed

forces. (Id. ¶ 5). The Act provides:
A. For the purposes of this Section, the following terms shall have the
following meanings:

(1) “Compensation” means any money, thing of value, or economic
benefit conferred on, or received by, any person in return for
services rendered, or to be rendered, by a person.

(2) “Person” means any natural person, corporation, trust,
partnership, incorporated or unincorporated association, or any
other legal entity.

(3) “Veterans’ benefits matter” means the preparation,
presentation, or prosecution of any claim affecting any person
who has filed or expressed an intent to file a claim for any benefit,
program, service, commodity, function, status, or entitlement to
which is determined to pertain to veterans, their dependents,
their survivors, or any other individual eligible for such benefits
under the laws and regulations administered by the United
States Department of Veterans Affairs or the Louisiana
Department of Veterans Affairs.
B. (1) No person shall receive compensation for referring any individual
to another person to advise or assist the individual with any veterans’
benefits matter.

(2) No person shall receive any compensation for any services
rendered in connection with any claim filed within the one-year
presumptive period of active-duty release.

(3) No person shall receive any compensation for any services
rendered in connection with any claim for pension benefits.

C. (1) A person seeking to receive compensation for advising, assisting,
or consulting with any individual in connection with any veterans’
benefits matter shall, before rendering any services, memorialize the
specific terms under which the amount to be paid will be determined in
a written agreement signed by both parties. Compensation must be
purely contingent upon an increase in benefits awarded, and if
successful, compensation shall not exceed five times the amount of the
monthly increase in benefits awarded based on the claim. Compensation
shall not exceed twelve thousand five hundred dollars or an amount
established by federal law, whichever is less. No initial or nonrefundable
fee shall be charged by a person advising, assisting, or consulting an
individual on a veterans’ benefit matter. No interest shall be charged on
any payment plans agreed to by the parties.

(2) A person seeking to receive compensation for advising,
assisting, or consulting with any individual with any veterans’
benefits matter shall not utilize a medical professional with whom
it has an employment or business relationship for a secondary
medical exam.

(3) In the event that a veteran claimant dies prior to a claim being
processed, any expected compensation shall be waived, and no
charge, fee, or debt shall be collected. Any payment plan for
services rendered shall be terminated immediately.

D. No person shall guarantee, either directly or by implication, a
successful outcome or that any individual is certain to receive specific
veterans’ benefits or that any individual is certain to receive a specific
level, percentage, or amount of veterans’ benefits.

E. (1) No person shall advise, assist, or consult for compensation with
any individual concerning any veterans’ benefits matter without clearly
providing at the outset of the business relationship the following
disclosure both orally and in writing:

“This business is not sponsored by, or affiliated with, the
United States Department of Veterans Affairs or the Louisiana
Department of Veterans Affairs, or any other federally chartered
veterans’ service organization. Other organizations including but
not limited to the Louisiana Department of Veterans Affairs, a
local veterans’ service organization, and other federally chartered
veterans’ service organizations may be able to provide you with
this service free of charge. Products or services offered by this
business are not necessarily endorsed by any of these
organizations. You may qualify for other veterans’ benefits
beyond the benefits for which you are receiving services here.”

(2) The written disclosure shall appear in at least twelve-point
font and shall appear in a readily noticeable and identifiable place
in the person’s agreement with the individual seeking services.
The disclosure shall direct the individual seeking services to the
nearest Veterans Service Office, with the appropriate address and
contact information for that office. The individual shall verbally
acknowledge understanding of the oral disclosure and sign the
document in which the written disclosure appears to represent
understanding of these provisions. The person offering services
shall retain a copy of the written disclosure while providing
veterans’ benefits services for compensation to the individual and
for at least one year after the date on which the service relations
terminate.

F. Businesses engaging in the preparation of an initial claim or appeal
of a disability rating for a fee shall not do any of the following:

(1) Utilize international call center or data centers for processing
veterans’ personal information.

(2) Gain direct access to any personal medical, financial, or
government benefits login, username, or password information.

G. A violation of the provisions of this Section shall constitute an unfair,
false, misleading, or deceptive act or practice in the conduct of trade or
commerce under the Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection
Law, R.S. 51:1401 et seq.
H. An entity assisting veterans with their initial disability claims as
prescribed within this Section shall, within one hundred twenty days of
the request, provide on an annualized basis of all of the following data
to the Department of Veterans Affairs:

(1) Aggregate number of serviced in the state.

(2) Number of claims approved, denied, and pending.

(3) Average claim return time.

(4) Number of clients who received a successful increase who have
a previously assigned “agent of record”.

(5) Data provided shall exclude any items of personal financial,
medical, or other data deemed confidential, business privileged,
or HIPAA protected information.

La. Rev. Stat. § 29:296.
Plaintiffs allege that the Act conflicts with federal law and thus violates the
Supremacy Clause. (Doc. 1 at ¶¶ 42–43). Plaintiffs further allege that the Act violates
the First Amendment by “coercing [Plaintiffs] to deliver the State’s message, via
mandated disclosure language, and pr[o]scribing heavy penalties for failure to do so.”
(Id. at ¶ 55). Plaintiffs allege that these coerced messages are intended to discourage
veterans from securing the services of an attorney. (Id. at ¶ 56). Plaintiffs allege that,
in effect, the Act attempts to convince veterans that using a less qualified and possibly
unaccredited organization would be desirable, even if this reduces the chance of
obtaining benefits. (Id.).
Plaintiffs also allege that the Act infringes on the Contracts clause because it
caps fees below what the contracting parties envision. (Doc. 1 at ¶¶ 62–68). Plaintiffs
contend that the Act will result in contract modifications or novation that will
fundamentally change the extent of the services Plaintiffs can offer, limiting
Plaintiffs’ ability to assist veterans. (Id.). Finally, Plaintiffs allege that the Act
violates the Louisiana Constitution because it infringes on the Louisiana Supreme

Court’s ability to regulate attorneys and set applicable fee caps. (Id. at ¶¶ 70–78).
II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Plaintiffs filed suit against the Governor and the Attorney General, asserting
the following causes of action: (1) federal preemption under the Supremacy Clause of
the United States Constitution (Count I); (2) abridgement of the Rights of Association,
Speech, and Petition in Violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the
United States Constitution (Count II); and (3) unconstitutional infringement of the

Contracts Clause (Count III). (Doc. 1).
The same day that Plaintiffs filed suit, Plaintiffs filed a Motion for Temporary
Restraining Order (“TRO”), asking the Court to enjoin enforcement of the Act while
the Court considered its constitutionality. (Doc. 2). The Court set the matter for
hearing. (Doc. 5).
In response, the Attorney General filed the Declaration of Michael Dupree,

Director of the Public Protection Division of the Attorney General’s Office. (Doc. 19-2).
The Declaration attests that the enforcement mechanism of the Act lies under his
responsibilities at the Attorney General’s Office, because the primary enforcement
mechanism of the Act is the Louisiana Unfair Trade Practices Act, which Dupree
enforces. (Id. at ¶¶ 6–9). Dupree further attested:
I hereby attest that I have no present intention to enforce Act 479 or the
Louisiana Unfair Trade Practices Act against the Plaintiffs in the
Complaint. Further, I do not plan to bring any enforcement actions to
enforce the provisions of Act 479 until the above-referenced litigation
regarding the validity of Act 479 is resolved. In the event that my office
determines to bring such any action against Plaintiffs, I will so advise,
in advance, counsel representing the Attorney General in the case
identified herein so that they can inform the Court as may be necessary
or appropriate.

(Id. at ¶ 11).

Based on the Attorney General’s commitment not to enforce the Act during the
pendency of this lawsuit, the Parties filed a Joint Motion to Continue the TRO.
(Doc. 19). The Court granted the Motion and continued the hearing on Plaintiffs’
Motion for TRO without date. (Doc. 28).
Thereafter, Defendants asked the Court to dismiss Plaintiffs’ claims for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). (Doc. 15; Doc.
36). The Court dismissed Plaintiffs’ claims as to Defendant Jeff Landry, in his official
capacity as Governor of Louisiana, due to a lack of subject matter jurisdiction. (Doc.
76 at 28-29). However, the Court denied the Attorney General’s Motion and found
that Plaintiffs had standing to bring their claims against her, in part, because “by its
plain meaning, the Act applies to Plaintiffs.” (Id. at 14). Plaintiffs and remaining
Defendant Liz Murrill, in her official capacity as Attorney General of Louisiana, now
both move for summary judgment, asserting that there are no genuine issues of
material fact and asking the Court to rule in their respective favors as a matter of
law. (Docs. 61 and 81).
III. LEGAL STANDARDS
A court may grant summary judgment only “if the movant shows that there is
no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as

a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A dispute regarding a material fact is “genuine”
if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict in favor of the
nonmoving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). When
ruling on motions for summary judgment, courts are required to view all inferences
drawn from the factual record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986); Coleman
v. Hous. Indep. School Dist., 113 F.3d 528, 533 (5th Cir. 1997).

To survive summary judgment, however, the nonmoving party must do more
than allege an issue of material fact: “Rule 56(e) . . . requires the nonmoving party to
go beyond the pleadings and by her own affidavits, or by the depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, designate specific facts showing that there is
a genuine issue for trial.” Auguster v. Vermilion Par. Sch. Bd., 249 F.3d 400, 402
(5th Cir. 2001) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986)). “Rule 56

does not impose upon the district court a duty to sift through the record in search of
evidence to support a party’s opposition to summary judgment.” Ragas v.
Tenn. Gas Pipeline Co., 136 F.3d 455, 458 (5th Cir. 1998) (citations and quotation
marks omitted). A party that fails to present competent evidence opposing a motion
for summary judgment risks dismissal on this basis alone. E.g., Broussard v.
Oryx Energy Co., 110 F. Supp. 2d 532, 536 (E.D. Tex. 2000) (“Plaintiff produced no
genuine issue of material fact to prevent the granting of Defendant’s Motion, and
therefore, the Court could grant Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment on this
basis alone.”).

IV. DISCUSSION
A. Whether the Act Violates the First Amendment Right to Free
Expression
At the outset, it is not clear from the pleadings whether Plaintiffs are lodging an
as-applied or facial challenge to the constitutionality of the Act under the First
Amendment. Plaintiffs allege that the Act “abridges Plaintiffs’ freedom of speech by
coercing them to deliver the State’s message, via mandated disclosure language. . .”,

which appears to challenge the statute’s application to Plaintiffs specifically. (Doc. 1
at ¶ 55).1 However, as-applied challenges typically “require[] the development of a
factual record for the court to consider.” Harris v. Mexican Specialty Foods, Inc., 564
F.3d 1301, 1308 (11th Cir. 2009). The scant factual record here, in addition to the
broad relief requested, lends toward interpreting Plaintiffs’ challenge as a facial one
as well. (Id. at 18) (“Plaintiffs request that this Court . . . declare SB 159

unconstitutional and void . . . [and] enjoin [Defendant] from any and all enforcement
of SB 159, as passed and codified”).
“In the commercial speech context, [t]o succeed in a typical facial attack,

1 The Court notes that Plaintiffs also seemingly allege a facial challenge to the constitutionality of
the Act based on vagueness and overbreadth, as well as a violation of their right to free association
under the First Amendment. (Doc. 1 at ¶¶ 57, 58, 60). However, Plaintiffs failed to sufficiently brief
these issues in both their instant Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 61) and Supplemental
Briefing (Doc. 95). Thus, the Court will not consider these claims.
[Plaintiffs] would have to establish that no set of circumstances exists under which
[the Act] would be valid, or that the statute lacks any plainly legitimate sweep ....”
Turtle Island Foods, S.P.C. v. Strain, 65 F.4th 211, 219 (5th Cir. 2023) (quoting

United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 472 (2010) (citations and internal quotation
marks omitted). Further, in a facial challenge, Plaintiffs bear this “heavy burden.” Id.
It is also well established that facial challenges are strongly disfavored, and that
courts should exercise the canon of constitutional avoidance and employ principles of
judicial restraint before finding a state law unconstitutional. Id. (citing Wash. State
Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442, 449–50 (2008); Voting for Am.,
Inc. v. Steen, 732 F.3d 382, 386 (5th Cir. 2013); Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281,

286 (2018)). With this in mind, and in part because Plaintiffs have made no
allegations “to establish that no set of circumstances exists under which [the Act]
would be valid” with respect tto the First Amendment, the Court construes Plaintiffs’
First Amendment challenge as applied only to them, rather than as a facial challenge.
Turtle Island Foods, 65 F.4th at 219.
1. Legal Standard

While the Constitution protects commercial speech, that protection is more
limited than for most other forms of speech. Express Oil Change, L.L.C. v.
Miss. Bd. Of Licensure for Pro. Eng’rs & Surveyors, 916 F.3d 483, 487 (5th Cir. 2019)
(citing Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978)). Further, “the
constitutionality of [a] required warning[] turns on both (1) whether the speech is
commercial and the (2) applicable level of scrutiny.” Free Speech Coal., Inc. v. Paxton,
95 F.4th 263, 279 (5th Cir. 2024), aff'd, 606 U.S. 461 (2025).
The Parties appear to agree that the disclaimer mandated by the Act

constitutes compelled commercial speech. (Doc. 93 at 4-5; Doc. 95 at 4). The Court,
relying on the Fifth Circuit’s analysis in Free Speech Coal., agrees. 95 F.4th at 280
(finding that government-required warnings outside of an advertisement context may
still constitute commercial speech). Regarding the applicable level of scrutiny,
Defendants contend that because this case relates to a mandatory disclosure, the less
stringent Zauderer test should be used to analyze its constitutionality. (Doc. 93 at 7).
See Zauderer v. Off. of Disciplinary Couns. of Supreme Ct. of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626 (1985)

(finding that states may require commercial enterprises to disclose “purely factual
and uncontroversial information about their services” so long as disclosures are
reasonably related to a legitimate state interest and not unjustly or unduly
burdensome). Defendants maintain, however, that the disclosure passes muster
under the more stringent Central Hudson test as well, which is an intermediate-
scrutiny analysis. (Doc. 93 at 7). See Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public

Service Comm’n of New York, 447 U.S. 557 (1980) (implementing four-factor test for
commercial speech limitations). Plaintiffs agree that one of these two tests applies,
but do not appear to advance either. (Doc. 95 at 5).
In deciding which standard applies to compelled disclosures, courts apply the
“relaxed” Zauderer scrutiny “where a state compels ‘commercial enterprises to
disclose purely factual and uncontroversial information about their services . . . .’. ”
Free Speech Coal. 95 F.4th at 281 (quoting Chamber of Comm. of U.S. v. U.S. Sec. &
Exch. Comm’n, 85 F.4th 760, 768 (5th Cir. 2023)). “A compelled statement is
‘uncontroversial’ for the purposes of Zauderer where the truth of the statement is not

subject to good-faith scientific or evidentiary dispute and where the statement is not
an integral part of a live, contentious political or moral debate.” Id. at 281-82. “That
standard does not mean that whenever the compelled speaker dislikes or disagrees
with the message he must convey, the statement is controversial . . . It means only
that there must be some widespread, good-faith dispute over the topic of the facts.”
Id.
Here, neither Party advances a factual record that assists the Court in deciding

whether the compelled language is controversial. In their pleadings, Plaintiffs allege
only that their objection to the disclosure language “as a leading veterans litigation
group . . . is enough to make the speech controversial.” (Doc. 95 at 5). The Court does
not entirely agree with that contention. However, the burden to rebut a plaintiffs’
challenge of controversy in the Zauderer context lies with Defendant here. See Free
Speech Coal., 95 F.4th at 282 (“We need not determine the outer limits of what

establishes “controversy” because [the state] has failed to rebut plaintiff’s challenges
in such a way that we are comfortably within its boundaries”). Defendant similarly
has offered next to no evidence regarding the lack of controversy of the disclosure
language, save for their own assurance it is not. (Doc. 81-1 at 28). In a vacuum of
factual support on this point, the Court cannot weigh in on whether the disclosure
language is controversial or not controversial.
There is, however, also serious doubt raised by Plaintiffs as to whether the
disclosure language is “purely factual” such that the Court can apply the relaxed
Zauderer standard, particularly when it is required by VA-authorized attorneys and

agents like Plaintiffs. Specifically, the Act’s mandatory disclosure would require
Plaintiffs, and other such authorized agents and attorneys, to tell prospective clients
that “[o]ther organizations including but not limited to . . . a local veterans’ service
organization, and other federally chartered veterans’ service organizations may be
able to provide you with this service free of charge.” La. Stat. Ann. § 29:296 (E)(1).
“In the context of litigation within the veterans court system,” Plaintiffs argue, this
is “patently false.” (Doc. 61-3 at 28). Plaintiffs point to case law that has “challenged

the ability of mere unlicensed laypersons, otherwise known as state or county
veterans service officers, to properly prosecute claims and appeals of veterans
benefits decisions.” (Doc. 61-3 at 30). See Fears v. Wilkie, 31 Vet. App. 309 (2019);
Comer v. Peake, 552 F.3d 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2009); Cook v. Marshall, 68 F.3d 447 (Fed.
Cir. 1995). Plaintiffs go on to note that “[f]ew if any organizations referenced in the
required disclaimer provide assistance within the litigation community [as Plaintiffs

do],” further undercutting the factual validity of the disclosure as applied to
Plaintiffs. Defendant does not attempt to rebut these contentions except by
reiterating conclusory statements. (Doc. 93 at 11). For the above reasons, the Court
does not find that the Zauderer standard can clearly be applied here.
“It is unsettled precisely which standard of scrutiny applies to compelled
commercial speech that is not subject to Zauderer scrutiny. On the one hand, Central
Hudson applied a form of intermediate scrutiny. On the other hand, Central Hudson
dealt only with restrictions on commercial speech, not compelled speech. Yet, NIFLA
suggests that compelled speech must survive, at minimum, intermediate scrutiny.”

Free Speech Coal., 95 F.4th at 283 (citing Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v.
Public Service Comm’n of New York, 447 U.S. 557 (1980); Nat'l Inst. of Fam. & Life
Advocs. v. Becerra, 585 U.S. 755, 773 (2018)). The Fifth Circuit ultimately applied the
Central Hudson test in Free Speech Coal., and this Court will do the same. Id.
2. Analysis
The test for when a government actor may regulate commercial speech set
forth in Central Hudson asks: “(1) whether the commercial speech at issue concerns

unlawful activity or is misleading; (2) whether the governmental interest is
substantial; (3) whether the challenged regulation directly advances the
government's asserted interest; and (4) whether the regulation is no more extensive
than necessary to further the government's interest.” Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at
566. “Each of these latter three inquiries”—whether (1) ‘the asserted governmental
interest is substantial,’ (2) the regulation ‘directly advances’ that interest, and (3) the

regulation ‘is not more extensive than is necessary to serve that interest’—must be
answered in the affirmative for the regulation to be found constitutional.” Express Oil
Change, L.L.C., 916 F.3d at 492 (citing Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S.
357, 367 (2002)). “The party seeking to uphold a restriction on commercial speech
carries the burden of justifying it.” Express Oil Change, L.L.C, 916 F.3d at 487 (citing
Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 71 n.20 (1983)). This “burden is a
‘heavy’ one,” and may not be “satisfied ‘by mere speculation or conjecture[.]’” Id.
The Court finds that Defendant has not carried her burden to meet at least

two, or perhaps three, of the four prongs of the Central Hudson test – to show that
the government’s interest is substantial, that the Act directly advances the
government’s asserted interest, or that the regulation is not more extensive than is
necessary to serve that interest. 447 U.S. at 566. Defendant offers only conclusory
allegations to support the Act’s compelled disclosure, asserting it “is clearly motivated
by the Legislature’s desire to regulate the provision of advising, assisting, or
consulting individuals concerning veterans’ benefits matters for compensation. . . The

disclosures are clearly aimed at informing the potential client, nothing more.” (Doc.
81-1 at 27). Defendant further avers that
there is little question (1) that the State’s interest in preventing deception in
connection to veteran’s benefits is substantial; (2) the disclosure advances the
State’s interest in a direct and material way by preventing fraud, overreaching,
and misleading veterans into believing that they have no other option and the
service provider has an “inside track” in obtaining benefits; (3) the disclaimer
serves as a reasonable means to prevent the dangers to veterans applying for
benefits and are narrowly tailored to achieve the State’s objective.

(Doc. 69 at 20). Despite having ample opportunity to do so, Defendant provides
no support in the factual record for these conclusions. There are no legislative
findings in the statutory text. See La. Stat. Ann. § 29:296. No legislative hearings
were identified or transcripts provided to support that the type of fraud alleged is a
widespread issue, that the Act is an efficient means to prevent fraud on veterans, or
that other means that may be less restrictive on free speech were not possible.2
Defendant argues in her opposition brief and instant Motion that the Act, and thus
the disclosure language, does not apply to Plaintiffs. (Doc. 69, 81). The Court found

that the Act does apply to Plaintiffs, though, and gave the Parties an opportunity to
supplement their arguments in light of that ruling. (Doc. 76, 86). However, despite
outlining the steps of the Central Hudson test in her supplemental briefing,
Defendant puzzlingly does not offer any of the required support to satisfy the test,
nor address how her argument changes in light of the court’s ruling that the Act does
in fact apply to Plaintiffs. (Doc. 93). Defendant reiterates only that “[t]he Government
has a substantial interest in protecting veterans and applicants for veterans

benefits.” (Id. at 9). Perhaps the Court can accept that this is a sufficiently substantial
interest for the government. However, Defendant offers no evidence to support the
effectiveness of the disclosure in achieving this interest, nor a finding that the
disclosure is not more extensive than is necessary to achieve this interest with regard
to the First Amendment. To the contrary, Plaintiffs, who comprise a veterans
advocacy nonprofit and an attorney who takes up benefits claims on behalf of

veterans, sometimes pro bono, argue that this mandatory disclosure would
discourage potential veteran-clients from engaging them for their services. (Doc. 1 at
¶¶ 5-8, 56).

2 Defendant submitted minutes from a Senate Committee meeting (Doc. 81-6) and copies of the
House and Senate Journals (Doc. 81-8, 81-9) that appear to merely report the passage of the bill and
provide no substantive remarks on the PLUS Act.
Importantly, the burden is on the government to support this restriction on
speech, and it cannot rest on ‘speculation or conjecture.’ Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S.
761, 770, (1993); see Ibanez v. Fla. Dep’t of Bus. & Prof. Reg., 512 U.S. 136, 146 (1994).

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 “mandates the entry of summary judgment, after
adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a
sufficient showing to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's
case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). Moreover, “[w]here the record taken as a whole
could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no
genuine issue for trial.” Matsushita Elec. Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475

U.S. 574, 587 (1986). Here, both Parties were provided ample opportunity to point to
facts that could develop this issue. Discovery has concluded and both Parties offered
statements of material facts. (Docs. 61-2, 81-2). Thus, the Court is left to conclude
that there are no further facts that could be developed even at trial that would lend
support to Defendant’s arguments. Without at least some evidence to support the
reasonableness of the Act’s required disclosure, the Court finds that the Act violates

Plaintiffs’ rights under the First Amendment and is therefore unconstitutional as
applied to Plaintiffs.
B. Whether the Act is Preempted by Federal Law
Article VI of the United States Constitution provides that “the laws of the
United States ... shall be the supreme law of the land.” U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2. In
preemption cases, courts must begin with the presumption that “the historic police
powers of the States [are] not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was
the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.” Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 565
(2009). However, this applies most stringently when “Congress has legislated in a

field which the States have traditionally occupied.” Id. It does not apply “when the
State regulates in an area where there has been a history of significant federal
presence.” United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89, 109 (2000). The Parties first disagree
whether a presumption against preemption applies. Defendant argues that
“enforcement of compensation for services related to military veterans benefits” is
such a “field” which has been traditionally governed by the states. (Doc. 69 at 14).
Plaintiffs counter that veterans’ benefits are “a uniquely federal program.” (Doc. 61-

3 at 24). The Court has no difficulty finding that federal benefits for veterans, and
regulating access to those, is clearly “an area where there has been a history of
significant federal presence.” Locke, 529 U.S. at 109. Thus, the presumption against
preemption does not apply here.
Next, “Article VI's Supremacy Clause may entail preemption of state law in
any of three ways: by express provision, by implication, or by a conflict between state

and federal law.” Louisiana Health Service & Indem. Co. v. Rapides Healthcare
System, 461 F.3d 529, 533 (5th Cir.2006) (citing Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy
Res. Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190, 203–04 (1983)). Accordingly,
“[t]here are three types of preemption: (1) express preemption, (2) field preemption,
and (3) conflict preemption.” Simmons v. Sabine River Authority Louisiana, 732 F.3d
469, 473 (5th Cir.2013) (citing Kurns v. R.R. Friction Prods. Corp., 565 U.S. 625, 630-
31 (2012)). In their complaint, Plaintiffs argue that only field preemption and conflict
preemption apply to the Act. (Doc. 61-3 at 23-29). The Court will address each in turn.
1. Conflict preemption

Conflict preemption exists when it is either (1) impossible to comply with both
state and federal law or (2) when “the challenged state law stands as an obstacle to
the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.”
Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 399 (2012).
Plaintiffs contend that the Act is conflict preempted, arguing that the Act’s fee
cap and other compensation limitations “conflict with the statutory scheme enacted
by Congress” at 38 U.S.C. § 5904(d) and 38 C.F.R. § 14.636(f). (Doc. 61-3 at 27).

Defendant disagrees, claiming that the Act merely “addresses a gap in federal law
concerning the provision of services to veterans”, and that no federal text “prohibits
states from imposing additional consumer protections.” (Doc. 69 at 15; Doc. 81-1 at
22). Defendant further avers that “[Plaintiffs] identify no instance in which
compliance with both state and federal law is impossible.” (Doc. 81-1 at 22). On this
last point at least, the Court must agree. 38 U.S.C. § 5904(a) authorizes agents and

attorneys “for the preparation, presentation, and prosecution of claims under laws
administered by the Secretary [of Veterans Affairs],” as well as sets standards of
conduct and limits on the amount of fees they may charge. The Act implements a
strict $12,500 cap on compensation “for advising, assisting, or consulting with any
individual in connection with any veterans’ benefits matter.” La. Stat. Ann. § 29:296
(C)(1). Plaintiffs have not shown that it would be literally impossible to comply with
both 38 U.S.C. § 5904 and the Act’s limits on compensation, despite certainly serious
frustrations.
However, as noted, courts have also found preemption “where ‘under the

circumstances of [a] particular case, [a state law] stands as an obstacle to the
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.’”
Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 373 (2000) (quoting Hines v.
Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)). “What is a sufficient obstacle is a matter of
judgment, to be informed by examining the federal statute as a whole and identifying
its purpose and intended effects....” Id. That is not a license to engage in a
“freewheeling judicial inquiry into whether a state statute is in tension with federal

objectives,” though, because “such an endeavor would undercut the principle that it
is Congress rather than the courts that preempts state law.” City of El Cenizo, Texas
v. Texas, 890 F.3d 164, 180 (5th Cir. 2018) (citing Chamber of Commerce of U.S. v.
Whiting, 563 U.S. 582, 607 (2011)).
Here, Plaintiffs claim that the Act, by limiting the fees they may charge for
their services, “will limit Plaintiffs’ ability to represent veterans, especially in

complicated cases” and that they “will be forced to decline [many complex cases]” and
take up other less complex cases “to make up financial shortfalls.” (Doc. 61-3 at 15).
They further argue that the Act “interferes with the primary mission of [MVA]” and
“limits the type and number of cases accepted by [Mr. Wells].” (Id.). Plaintiffs also
contend that the Act’s prohibition on receiving compensation for “any services
rendered in connection with any claim for pension benefits,” would severely limit
their work on behalf of veterans appealing denials of pension benefits. La. Stat. Ann.
§ 29:296 (B)(1). (Doc. 61-3 at 27). Defendants contend that these requirements do not
apply to Plaintiff and other VA-authorized agents, but the Court has already

dismissed this idea. (Doc. 76). The Act’s requirements do, by plain language
standards, apply to Plaintiffs. (Id.).
The Court thus finds that the Act, by placing significant restrictions on the
services offered by Plaintiffs and others similarly situated, sufficiently obstructs
“Congress’s intent that veterans have access to authorized, qualified private
representatives to assist them in pursuing claims for VA benefits.” Jewell v. Herke,
526 F. Supp. 3d 459, 465 (D. Minn. 2021).3 The Act is preempted by its conflict with

federal law.
2. Field preemption
“[S]tates are precluded from regulating conduct in a field that Congress, acting
within its proper authority, has determined must be regulated by its exclusive
governance.” Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 389 (2012) (citing Gade v.
National Solid Wastes Management Assn., 505 U.S. 88, 115 (1992)). “The intent to

displace state law altogether can be inferred from a framework of regulation ‘so
pervasive ... that Congress left no room for the States to supplement it’ or where there
is a ‘federal interest ... so dominant that the federal system will be assumed to
preclude enforcement of state laws on the same subject.’” Id. (quoting Rice v. Santa

3 While the cited case is only of persuasive authority and was heard on a different procedural
posture, the Court nonetheless finds its analysis regarding federal preemption of the regulation of
veterans’ benefits claims agents informative and applicable.
Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)). “Courts should hesitate to infer field
preemption unless ‘the nature of the regulated subject matter permits no other
conclusion’ or ‘Congress has unmistakably so ordained.’ When analyzing field

preemption, ‘the relevant field should be defined narrowly.’” U.S. v. Texas, 144 F.4th
632, 667 (5th Cir. 2025) (quoting DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 356 (1976); City of
El Cenizo v. Texas, 890 F.3d 164, 177 (5th Cir. 2018)).
In light of these cautious directives, the Court refrains from finding that the
field of regulating federal veterans’ benefits claims agent is preempted to such an
extent that an “intent to displace state law altogether can be inferred.” Arizona v.
United States, 567 U.S. at 389. However, it does appear that the federal government

has at least a dominant interest and a robust framework to regulate agents and
attorneys who may assist veterans in accessing benefits “under the laws and
regulations administered by the United States Department of Veterans Affairs.” La.
Stat. Ann. § 29:296 (A)(3). See 38 U.S.C. § 5904(a)(1) (enacting a scheme to recognize
attorneys and agents “for the preparation, presentation, and prosecution of claims
under laws administered by the Secretary [for Veterans’ Affairs].”). The Court also

finds instructive the Supreme Court’s ruling in Sperry v. State of Florida ex rel.
Florida Bar, 373 U.S. 379 (1963), that “[a] State may not enforce licensing
requirements which, though valid in the absence of a federal regulation, . . . impose
upon the performance of activity sanctioned by federal license additional conditions
not contemplated by Congress.” Id. at 385.
C. Whether the Act Violates the Contracts Clause
Because the Court has found the Act unconstitutional on the basis of federal
preemption and the First Amendment, it need not reach Plaintiffs’ remaining
constitutional claim regarding the Contracts Clause. U.S. Const. art. I, §10, cl. 1.

However, the Court finds Defendant’s argument persuasive on this point. (Doc. 81-1
at 22-23). Nothing in the text of the Act states or implies that the fee caps, or any
other provisions, will apply to existing contractual obligations. See La. Stat. Ann. §
29:296; Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. 213, 269 (1827).

V. CONCLUSION

The Court finds that the Act, as written, necessarily impedes the realization of
Congress's goal of ensuring that veterans have access to qualified representatives to
assist them in pursuing claims for VA benefits, in violation of the Supremacy Clause.
U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2. The Court also finds that the Act’s mandatory disclosure
provision, La. Stat. Ann. § 29:296 (E)(1), is unconstitutional as applied to Plaintiffs
because it compels speech in a manner that violates Plaintiffs’ right to free expression

under the First Amendment. Therefore, consistent with the reasoning in this opinion,
the Court grants summary judgment for the Plaintiffs.
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc.
61) is GRANTED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant’s Cross Motion for Summary
Judgment (Doc. 81) is DENIED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Preserving Lawful Utilization of
Services for Veterans (PLUS) Act, (“the Act”), now codified as La. Stat. Ann. § 29:296,
is unconstitutional and Defendants are enjoined from enforcing the Act as written.

Baton Rouge, Louisiana, this 6 day,of February, 2026

JUDGE BRIAN A. I
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11252138. Public record. Not legal advice.