# Kary Jarvis v. City of Daytona Beach

> Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit · February 6, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11251908

## Case

- **Court:** Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
- **Decided:** February 6, 2026
- **Precedential status:** Unpublished
- **Opinion:** Opinion
- **Nature of suit:** NEW
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- stating that an order is appealable if it is either final or falls into a specific class of interlocutory orders made appealable by statute or jurispruden- tial exception
- stating that this Court “may, USCA11 Case: 24-13456 Document: 52-1 Date Filed: 02/06/2026 Page: 9 of 22 24-13456 Opinion of the Court 9 within [its] discretion, exercise jurisdiction over otherwise nonap- pealable orders under the pendent appellate jurisdiction doctrine”

## Opinion text

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NOT FOR PUBLICATION

In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 24-13456
Non-Argument Calendar
____________________

KARY JARVIS,
Plaintiff-Appellee-Cross Appellant,
versus

CITY OF DAYTONA BEACH,
a Florida Municipal Corporation,
Defendant-Cross Appellee,
MARVILLE TUCKER,
in his official capacity and also, individually,
JAMES MACKENZIE,
in his official capacity and also, individually,
Defendants-Appellants-Cross Appellees.
____________________
Appeals from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
D.C. Docket No. 6:23-cv-00508-JSS-RMN
____________________
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2 Opinion of the Court 24-13456

Before KIDD, ANDERSON, and WILSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Marville Tucker and James Mackenzie appeal the district
court’s denial of their motion for summary judgment on several
claims and Kary Jarvis cross-appeals the court’s denial of his motion
for summary judgment. We address each issue in turn. We write
only for the parties who are already familiar with the facts. For that
reason, we include only such facts as are necessary to understand
our opinion.
I. FACTS
Jarvis alleged the following relevant facts. Tucker and Mac-
kenzie, city police officers, conducted a traffic stop of Jarvis’s vehi-
cle while dispatched pursuant to an anonymous tip. After conclud-
ing the traffic stop and delivering Jarvis a written warning, the Of-
ficers asked Jarvis for consent to search his vehicle, which he de-
clined, but they attempted to search his vehicle anyway. During
the Officers’ search, Jarvis started driving the vehicle. Tucker and
Mackenzie attempted to stop Jarvis from driving away, causing
Tucker to hang from the moving vehicle, and ultimately causing
the car to veer off the road and crash into a tree. Jarvis was ar-
rested, his car was subject to an inventory search, and he was later
charged with aggravated battery on a law enforcement officer, ag-
gravated fleeing, resisting an officer with violence, destroy-
ing/tampering with physical evidence, possession of THC oil, pos-
session of narcotic paraphernalia, and carrying a concealed electric
weapon. A state court judge granted Jarvis’s motion to suppress
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24-13456 Opinion of the Court 3

the evidence obtained from the search and the state’s attorney gen-
eral officer terminated the criminal proceedings against Jarvis in his
favor.
Jarvis filed suit against Tucker, Mackenzie, and the City of
Daytona Beach, asserting a total of fifteen claims against the de-
fendants under both federal and state law. Specifically, he asserted
claims for false arrest under state and federal law; unlawful deten-
tion and search; municipal liability; state and federal invasion of pri-
vacy; excessive force; malicious prosecution under both state and
federal law; negligence; vicarious liability assault; and conversion.
All parties moved for summary judgment. The district court
granted the City’s motion, denied Jarvis’s motion, and granted in
part and denied in part the motion filed by Tucker and Mackenzie.
Tucker and Mackenzie appealed the district court’s order and Jarvis
filed a cross-appeal against both the Officers and the City.
II. JURISDICTION
This Court issued jurisdictional questions asking the parties
to address (1) whether this Court has jurisdiction over Tucker and
Mackenzie’s appeal from the district court’s October 19 summary
judgment order, and (2) whether this Court should exercise pen-
dent appellate jurisdiction over Jarvis’s cross-appeal. On the same
day that this Court issued its jurisdictional questions in this case,
Tucker and Mackenzie moved to dismiss Jarvis’s cross-appeal for
lack of jurisdiction. They argue that their interlocutory appeal
may proceed immediately prior to the entry of a final judgment
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4 Opinion of the Court 24-13456

because it concerns the district court’s denial of their immunity de-
fenses as to Counts 5, 12, and 15. They contend that this excep-
tion—allowing an interlocutory appeal for denials of qualified im-
munity—does not extend to Jarvis’s cross-appeal and that his ap-
peal is premature in the absence of a final judgment. Accordingly,
Tucker and Mackenzie ask this Court to dismiss Jarvis’s cross-ap-
peal for lack of jurisdiction. Jarvis responds to the motion to dis-
miss that this Court has jurisdiction over his cross-appeal “pursuant
to the doctrine of pendent appellate jurisdiction.” He argues that
the immunity issues raised in Tucker and Mackenzie’s appeal are
“sufficiently related to and intertwined with” his cross-appeal, such
that this Court has jurisdiction over the cross-appeal.
Appellate jurisdiction is generally limited to final decisions
of the district courts. 28 U.S.C. § 1291; see also CSX Transp., Inc. v.
City of Garden City, 235 F.3d 1325, 1327 (11th Cir. 2000) (stating that
an order is appealable if it is either final or falls into a specific class
of interlocutory orders made appealable by statute or jurispruden-
tial exception). “A final decision is typically one that ends the liti-
gation on the merits and leaves nothing for the court to do but ex-
ecute its judgment.” Acheron Cap., Ltd. v. Mukamal, 22 F.4th 979,
986 (11th Cir. 2022) (quotation marks omitted). An order that dis-
poses of fewer than all claims against all parties to an action is gen-
erally not final or immediately appealable. Supreme Fuels Trading
FZE v. Sargeant, 689 F.3d 1244, 1246 (11th Cir. 2012).
Under the collateral order doctrine, a non-final order may
be appealed if it (1) conclusively determines a disputed question,
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24-13456 Opinion of the Court 5

(2) resolves an important issue completely separate from the merits
of the action, and (3) would be effectively unreviewable on appeal
from a final judgment. Plaintiff A v. Schair, 744 F.3d 1247, 1252–53
(11th Cir. 2014). An order denying qualified immunity at the sum-
mary judgment stage is immediately appealable to the extent the
denial turns on an issue of law. Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299,
306–07, 311 (1996). An interlocutory appeal from the denial of
qualified immunity must raise legal issues such as “whether the le-
gal norms allegedly violated by the defendant were clearly estab-
lished at the time of the challenged actions.” English v. City of
Gainesville, 75 F.4th 1151, 1155 (11th Cir. 2023). When that issue is
appealed, the factual issue of what the conduct was “may be ad-
dressed by an appellate court because it is a part of the core quali-
fied immunity analysis.” Johnson v. Clifton, 74 F.3d 1087, 1091 (11th
Cir. 1996); see also English, 75 F.4th at 1156 (“When both core qual-
ified immunity issues are involved, we have jurisdiction . . . .”). The
issue of “whether the plaintiff has asserted a violation of a constitu-
tional right at all” is also a legal issue subject to interlocutory re-
view. Cottrell v. Caldwell, 85 F.3d 1480, 1485 (11th Cir. 1996).
However, if the only issues appealed are evidence suffi-
ciency issues, such as whether the district court erred in determin-
ing that there was an issue of fact for trial regarding the defendant’s
actions, then this Court lacks jurisdiction to review the denial of
immunity. English, 75 F.4th at 1155–56; Behrens, 516 U.S. at 312–13
(noting that an immediate appeal is not permitted if the issue “is
nothing more than whether the evidence could support a finding
that particular conduct occurred”). In other words, this Court does
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6 Opinion of the Court 24-13456

not have jurisdiction to entertain interlocutory appeals from the
denial of qualified immunity when the defendant’s argument is
merely, “I didn’t do it.” Bryant v. Jones, 575 F.3d 1281, 1294 n.19
(11th Cir. 2009). Nevertheless, where an appeal from an order
denying qualified immunity includes both factual and legal issues,
this Court has jurisdiction to consider it under the collateral order
doctrine. See English, 75 F.4th at 1155–56. For example, even when
a district court states that it based the denial of qualified immunity
on the existence of genuine issues of material fact, this Court has
jurisdiction when the issue on appeal is a purely legal question.
Moniz v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 145 F.3d 1278, 1281 (11th Cir. 1998).
Florida law provides that officers, employees, and agents of
the State generally may not be held personally liable for actions
within the scope of their employment, so long as they did not act
in bad faith or with a malicious purpose. Fla. Stat. § 768.28(9)(a).
Because Florida Statute § 768.28(9)(a) affords protection from both
liability and the suit itself, the denial of a motion for summary judg-
ment on that basis is immediately appealable under the collateral
order doctrine. Butler v. Gualtieri, 41 F.4th 1329, 1335–36 (11th Cir.
2022). Florida law appears to require that the issue of sovereign
immunity turns on a question of law for interlocutory review to be
appropriate, and this Court has reiterated that holding in Aguirre v.
Seminole County, 158 F.4th 1276, 1291 (11th Cir. 2025).
Here, as an initial matter, the district court has not entered
a final order ending the litigation on the merits because it denied
Tucker and Mackenzie’s motion for summary judgment on some
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24-13456 Opinion of the Court 7

counts, and those counts remain pending. However, Tucker and
Mackenzie have raised at least some issues of law related to the
district court’s denial of qualified and sovereign immunity that may
invoke this Court’s jurisdiction. As to Count 5 (unlawful search
and seizure), the Officers argue on appeal that there was no consti-
tutional violation, and that even if there was, it was not a violation
of a clearly established right. Thus, Tucker and Mackenzie have
raised a permissible legal issue for interlocutory review. See Cottrell,
85 F.3d at 1485; English, 75 F.4th at 1155.
Because Counts 12 (malicious prosecution) and 15 (conver-
sion) concern the Officers’ argument that they are entitled to Flor-
ida statutory sovereign immunity, the denial of that immunity
must turn on a legal issue to be immediately appealable. Aguirre,
158 F.4th at 1291. This Court may review Tucker and Mackenzie’s
appeal as to Count 12 because the Officers argued that their prob-
able cause to arrest Jarvis entitled them, as a matter of law, to sov-
ereign immunity as to his state-law malicious prosecution claim.
The district court disagreed with this argument, which establishes
a legal issue sufficient to allow immediate review on appeal. How-
ever, Tucker and Mackenzie have not raised a legal issue as to
Count 15 because they essentially argue on appeal that they should
have been granted sovereign immunity because Jarvis failed to es-
tablish the necessary elements of his conversion claim. That argu-
ment is an evidence sufficiency claim that, on its own, does not
present a legal issue that this Court can review.
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8 Opinion of the Court 24-13456

Therefore, we have jurisdiction of the Officers’ appeal of the
district court’s denial of immunity for the Officers on Count 5 (un-
lawful search and seizure) and Count 12 (state law malicious pros-
ecution). However, we do not have jurisdiction of the Officers’
appeal of the district court’s denial of immunity for the Officers on
Count 15 (state law conversion).
Our pendant appellate jurisdiction on Jarvis’s cross-appeal is
determined separately with respect to each issue cross-appealed
and turns on whether the district court’s otherwise unreviewable
order with respect to such an issue is “inextricably intertwined”
with an issue properly before this Court, or if review of the unre-
viewable decision is necessary to ensure meaningful appellate re-
view of the appealable one. Jones v. Fransen, 857 F.3d 843, 850 (11th
Cir. 2017). “Matters may be sufficiently intertwined where they
implicate the same facts and the same law.” Smith v. LePage, 834
F.3d 1285, 1292 (11th Cir. 2016) (quotation marks and alteration
omitted). The “critical inquiry” in determining whether this Court
has pendent appellate jurisdiction “is whether the appealable issue
can be resolved without reaching the merits of the nonappealable
issues.” In re MDL-1824 Tri-State Water Rts. Litig., 644 F.3d 1160,
1179 (11th Cir. 2011). “[T]he Supreme Court has signaled that pen-
dent appellate jurisdiction should be present only under rare cir-
cumstances.” King v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 562 F.3d 1374, 1379 (11th
Cir. 2009). This Court has discretion whether to exercise pendent
appellate jurisdiction. See Summit Med. Assocs., P.C. v. Pryor, 180
F.3d 1326, 1335 (11th Cir. 1999) (stating that this Court “may,
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24-13456 Opinion of the Court 9

within [its] discretion, exercise jurisdiction over otherwise nonap-
pealable orders under the pendent appellate jurisdiction doctrine”).
In determining whether to exercise its discretionary pendent appel-
late jurisdiction, this Court should consider judicial economy inter-
ests. Hond. Aircraft Registry, Ltd. v. Gov’t of Hond., 129 F.3d 543, 545
(11th Cir. 1997).
The jurisdictional exception permitting interlocutory ap-
peals from orders denying qualified immunity does not necessarily
encompass a cross-appeal from an order partially granting and par-
tially denying qualified immunity. Hudson v. Hall, 231 F.3d 1289,
1293–94 (11th Cir. 2000). In Hudson, a case with a similar proce-
dural posture, the court allowed the plaintiff’s cross-appeal to pro-
ceed. There, the district court had granted qualified immunity to
the defendant on the initial stop and for the search of the plaintiff’s
car because the plaintiff had consented to the search. Id. at 1293.
But the court denied qualified immunity for the defendant’s search
of the plaintiffs themselves, finding that at the summary judgment
stage and accepting the plaintiffs’ version of the facts, the defendant
lacked consent for the search. Id. And, the court continued, even
assuming the plaintiffs consented, the defendant exceeded that con-
sent. Id. On appeal, the defendant challenged denial of qualified
immunity on the search of person claim while the plaintiffs cross-
appealed the initial stop and search of car decisions. We held that
the plaintiffs’ claim were inextricably intertwined with the defend-
ant’s:
In deciding Officer Hall’s appeal, we must consider
whether Officer Hall’s search of Plaintiffs’ persons
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10 Opinion of the Court 24-13456

clearly was unlawful given the totality of the circum-
stances. See United States v. Garcia, 890 F.2d 355, 358
(11th Cir. 1989). In examining the totality of the cir-
cumstances—and especially because Officer Hall says
that Plaintiffs freely and voluntarily consented to
searches of their persons—we must take into account
whether Officer Hall’s initial stop and search of Plain-
tiffs’ car clearly were unlawful. See, e.g., United States
v. Valdez, 931 F.2d 1448, 1452 (11th Cir. 1991) (finding
that consent to search was tainted by unlawful traffic
stop and, therefore, was not free and voluntary);
United States v. Miller, 821 F.2d 546, 549–50 (11th Cir.
1987) (same). In other words, to decide whether every
reasonable officer in Officer Hall’s position would
have known that Plaintiffs had not consented volun-
tarily to a search of their persons, we must consider,
among other things, whether Plaintiffs’ consent (if
any) was tainted by an illegal traffic stop and, more
important, whether every reasonable officer would
have been aware of such taint.

Id. at 1294 n.4.
Here, the Officers have only two claims of which we have
interlocutory jurisdiction: the denial of immunity for the unlawful
search and seizure and for malicious prosecution under state law.
By contrast, Jarvis purports to challenge the district court order
that denied every claim made in his motion for summary judgment
outright to Jarvis. It is clear that Jarvis’s challenge to the district
court’s denial of his motion for summary judgment on his unlawful
search and seizure claim (Count 5) is inextricably intertwined with
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24-13456 Opinion of the Court 11

the Officers’ appeal of the district court’s order denying the Offic-
ers’ summary judgment on that same Count 5 claim alleging an
unlawful search and seizure. However, we do not believe that any
other of Jarvis’s claims should be entertained pursuant to the pen-
dant appellate jurisdiction doctrine. Unlike the plaintiff in Hudson,
Jarvis’s other issues on appeal do not challenge a decision that im-
pacts the outcome of either of the two issues that the Officers have
properly brought before us. Therefore, we exercise our discretion
to entertain pendant appellate jurisdiction only to Jarvis’s appeal so
far as it pertains to the unlawful search and seizure claim.
III. DISCUSSION
A. The Officers Claim that the District Court Erred in Denying Their Mo-
tion for Summary Judgment on Jarvis’s Count 5, Alleging that the Officers
Violated his Fourth Amendment Rights by Prolonging the Traffic Stop and
Engaging in an Unlawful Search and Seizure
We have recently concisely explained the rationale and re-
quirements for qualified immunity:
Lawsuits levied against public officials in their per-
sonal capacity impose costs both on the defendant of-
ficials and on society as a whole, including litigation
expenses, diversion of official energy from pressing
public issues, deterrence of able citizens from accept-
ing public office, and dampening of officials’ ardor in
performing their duties. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S.
800, 814, 102 S. Ct. 2727, 2736 (1982). The defense of
qualified immunity “is the public servant’s (and soci-
ety’s) strong shield against these dangerous costs.”
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12 Opinion of the Court 24-13456

Foy v. Holston, 94 F.3d 1528, 1532 (11th Cir. 1996). It
protects government officials performing discretion-
ary functions from civil litigation and liability if their
conduct does not violate clearly established constitu-
tional or statutory rights of which a reasonable per-
son would have known. Id. (citing Harlow, 457 U.S. at
817–19, 102 S. Ct. at 2738). It accomplishes this pro-
tection by granting officials “immunity from suit,”
meaning “an entitlement not to stand trial or face the
other burdens of litigation.” Mitchell [v. Forsyth], 472
U.S. [511] at 526, 105 S. Ct. [2806] at 2815 [1985].

Each official who asserts qualified immunity is enti-
tled to “an independent qualified-immunity analysis
as it relates to his or her actions and omissions.” Alco-
cer v. Mills, 906 F.3d 944, 951 (11th Cir. 2018). The offi-
cial “must first prove that he was acting within his dis-
cretionary authority” when he performed the acts of
which the plaintiff complains. Bowen v. Warden, 826
F.3d 1312, 1319 (11th Cir. 2016) (internal quotation
marks omitted). Once this is established, “the burden
shifts to the plaintiff to show that the defendant is not
entitled to qualified immunity.” Holloman ex rel. Hollo-
man v. Harland, 370 F.3d 1252, 1264 (11th Cir. 2004)
(citing Cottone v. Jenne, 326 F.3d 1352, 1358 (11th Cir.
2003)). The plaintiff must establish that “(1) the de-
fendant violated a constitutional right, and (2) this
right was clearly established at the time of the alleged
violation.” Id. Judges may decide which of the two
prongs of this analysis to address first in light of the
circumstances in the case at hand. Pearson v. Callahan,
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555 U.S. 223, 236, 129 S. Ct. 808, 818, 172 L.Ed.2d 565
(2009).

To be clearly established, the contours of a right must
be sufficiently clear such that every reasonable officer
would have understood his conduct to violate that
right. Fuqua v. Turner, 996 F.3d 1140, 1150 (11th Cir.
2021) (citing Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741, 131
S. Ct. 2074, 2083 (2011)). A plaintiff may show this
through: “(1) case law with indistinguishable facts
clearly establishing the constitutional right; (2) a
broad statement of principle within the Constitution,
statute, or case law that clearly establishes a constitu-
tional right; or (3) conduct so egregious that a consti-
tutional right was clearly violated, even in the total
absence of case law.” Lewis v. City of W. Palm Beach,
561 F.3d 1288, 1291–92 (11th Cir. 2009) (citations
omitted). The law must not be defined at a high level
of generality, but rather be particularized to the facts
of the case. Fuqua, 996 F.3d at 1150.

When an officer moves for summary judgment on the
basis of qualified immunity, “[t]he court shall grant
summary judgment if the movant shows that there is
no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the mo-
vant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.
R. Civ. P. 56(a). Even though, at this posture, the facts
are construed in the light most favorable to the plain-
tiff, Jones v. Cannon, 174 F.3d 1271, 1281 (11th Cir.
1999), the evidence may create a fact question about
whether the officer engaged in violative conduct, id.
at 1290. “[A] genuine fact issue as to what conduct the
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14 Opinion of the Court 24-13456

defendant engaged in would preclude a grant of sum-
mary judgment based upon qualified immunity.” Rich
v. Dollar, 841 F.2d 1558, 1565 (11th Cir. 1988).

Aguirre v. Seminole Cnty., 158 F.4th 1276, 1296–97 (11th Cir. 2025).
The Fourth Amendment protects “[t]he right of the people
to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. The
Supreme Court has explained that “[t]emporary detention of indi-
viduals during the stop of an automobile by the police, even if only
for a brief period and for a limited purpose, constitutes a ‘seizure’
of ‘persons’ within the meaning of this provision.” Whren v. United
States, 517 U.S. 806, 809–10, 116 S. Ct. 1769, 1772 (1996). For such
a stop to comply with the Fourth Amendment, an officer must
have reasonable suspicion, and a driver’s violation of a traffic rule
can constitute reasonable suspicion for a traffic stop. Heien v. North
Carolina, 574 U.S. 54, 60, 135 S. Ct. 530, 536 (2014). But “a police
stop exceeding the time needed to handle the matter for which the
stop was made violates the Constitution’s shield against unreason-
able seizures.” Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348, 350, 135 S.
Ct. 1609, 1612 (2015).
However, such an extension is permissible if it was sup-
ported by reasonable suspicion of other criminal activity. United
States v. Perkins, 348 F.3d 965, 970 (11th Cir. 2003). “While ‘reason-
able suspicion’ is a less demanding standard than probable cause
and requires a showing considerably less than preponderance of
the evidence, the Fourth Amendment requires at least a minimal
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24-13456 Opinion of the Court 15

level of objective justification.” Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119,
123, 120 S. Ct. 673, 675–76 (2000) (quoting United States v. Sokolow,
490 U.S. 1, 7, 109 S. Ct. 1581, 1585 (1989)). When making a deter-
mination of “reasonable suspicion,” we must “look at the ‘totality
of the circumstances’ of each case to see whether the detaining of-
ficer has a ‘particularized and objective basis’ for suspecting legal
wrongdoing.” United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273, 122 S. Ct.
744, 750 (2002) (quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417–
18, 101 S. Ct. 690, 695 (1981)). “[A]n ‘inchoate and unparticularized
suspicion’ or ‘hunch’ of criminal activity” is not enough to satisfy
the minimum level of objectivity required. Wardlow, 528 U.S. at
124, 120 S. Ct. at 676 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27, 88 S. Ct.
1868, 1883 (1968)).
The Officers argue that there was neither a constitutional
violation nor a clearly established right, so they were entitled to
qualified immunity. In his cross-appeal, see infra note 1, Jarvis ar-
gues that the district court erred when it found that there were is-
sues of material fact that precluded summary judgment for him on
this issue.
The district court found that a reasonable jury could, view-
ing the facts most favorably to Jarvis and from the viewpoint of an
objective officer, find that a reasonable officer would know that his
authority to seize Jarvis ended when he confirmed the validity of
Jarvis’s driver’s license and registration, confirmed that Jarvis did
not have any outstanding warrants, and handed back his docu-
ments with a printed warning citation. The court next found that
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based on the totality of the circumstances, for qualified immunity
purposes, objectively reasonable officers would not believe they
had reasonable suspicion to detain Jarvis further after the traffic
stop. Specifically, the court rejected the Officers’ argument that
they had reasonable suspicion of Jarvis’s connection to drug activ-
ity at the apartment complex sufficient to prolong the traffic stop.
The court rejected the Officers’ reliance on the anonymous tip be-
cause they did not independently corroborate it and because the
basis of the tipster’s knowledge and the veracity of the information
was unknown. And the court found that a genuine issue of mate-
rial fact existed about whether Officer Tucker saw Jarvis make fur-
tive movements as well as whether Jarvis was avoiding eye contact
and target glancing. And these factors plus other information
gleaned during the stop, the court found, provided genuine issues
of material fact about whether the Officers had articulable reason-
able suspicion. Next, the court noted that the Supreme Court has
established that absent reasonable suspicion, police officers cannot
prolong a stop based on a traffic infraction to investigate unrelated
crimes. The Court has also rejected the use of anonymous tip to
establish reasonable suspicion to justify a Terry investigatory stop.
Thus, resolving all the disputed factual issues in favor of Jarvis—as
the court must do in analyzing the Officers’ motion for summary
judgment—the right to be free from seizure in the way the Officers
allegedly seized Jarvis was clearly established, and so the court de-
nied them qualified immunity
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24-13456 Opinion of the Court 17

We agree with the district court that whether the Officers
had reasonable suspicion of another crime based on the totality of
the circumstances is an issue for the jury.
As the district court explained, the Officers’ wholesale reli-
ance on the tip is misplaced. Although the tip did identify a car
similar to Jarvis’s at a nearby apartment complex, the tip was anon-
ymous and merely related that the car was in the parking lot sur-
rounded by people. Moreover, an anonymous tip, “standing alone,
would not warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that [a
stop] was appropriate.” Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 329 (1990)
(quotation marks omitted). For an anonymous tip to reasonably
support an officer’s suspicion of criminal activity, it must be accom-
panied by sufficient indicia of the tip’s reliability. Florida v. J.L., 529
U.S. 266, 270, 120 S. Ct. 1375, 1378 (2000). A detailed, contempo-
raneous report of suspicious activity to a 911 emergency dispatcher
carries with it sufficient indicia of reliability when the details and
location of the described events turn out to be correct. Navarette v.
California, 572 U.S. 393, 400, 134 S. Ct. 1683, 1689–90 (2014).
Here, the caller reported that a black or blue Mitsubishi was
in the parking lot with a crowd around it and there was a white
man in his forties wearing a red tank top, black basketball shorts,
white shoes, and carrying a backpack, walking around the vehicle.
The dispatcher was the one who characterized the incident as pos-
sibly involving drugs. But Jarvis, according to the dashcam, was
wearing a green t-shirt and khaki shorts, so he did not match the
description. The Officers did not report there was a concern about
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18 Opinion of the Court 24-13456

drug activity in the area and did not independently investigate the
tip. They did not observe Jarvis engage in any narcotics activity
beforehand that would provide credibility to the tip. Between the
disconnect in the physical description and the caller’s lack of per-
sonal knowledge about what was occurring, the tip alone did not
provide enough for the Officers to extend the search.
The Officers also point to other circumstances to support
their continued detention. Specifically, they point to: Officer
Tucker’s observation of Jarvis’s furtive movements as he ap-
proached the vehicle; Officer Mackenzie’s observation of a knife on
the console; Jarvis’s avoiding eye contact and target glancing; and
Jarvis’s report that he had been recently arrested for drug activity
and been incarcerated twice for selling drugs, totaling nineteen
years.
Examining each point, we agree with the district court that
several facts are disputed such that genuine issues of material fact
exist. For instance, Officer Tucker’s alleged observation of furtive
movements is undermined by the heavy tinting of Jarvis’s window
and Officer Mackenzie’s testimony that he did not observe any
such movements. Additionally, Officer Tucker saw the move-
ments before the stop began, undermining their importance to the
prolongation of the stop. Also, video of the stop does not support
the Officers’ argument that Jarvis was avoiding eye contact, and the
video shows he was cooperative. But the knife on the console, Jar-
vis’s admission of serious drug activity in the past, and Jarvis’s con-
firmation that he had just left the apartment do tend to support the
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24-13456 Opinion of the Court 19

Officers’ actions. In sum, because resolution of the reasonable sus-
picion issue will be influenced by the jury’s resolution of the genu-
ine issues of material fact, the issue is appropriate for the jury.
Turning to the issue of whether the alleged violation was
clearly established, the Officers argue that the cases the district
court relied upon are distinguishable. First, they argue that the is-
sue in Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348, 135 S. Ct. 1609 (2015),
was not if the officers were justified in extending the stop based on
their reasonable suspicion that other criminal activity was afoot.
But Rodriguez held that a traffic stop cannot be prolonged absent
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. Citing precedent, it ex-
plained that once the tasks related to the traffic infraction have
been completed, the officer’s authority to hold the subject of the
stop ends. Id. at 354, 135 S. Ct. at 1614. And the district court relied
on Florida v. J.L. to show that reasonable officers would know that
an anonymous tip lacking sufficient indicia of reliability cannot be
used to justify a Terry stop. Taking all of the facts in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff, as we must in the summary judgment
context, the Officers did not have reasonable suspicion of other
criminal activity. Therefore, there was clearly established law that
they could not prolong the traffic stop, and we affirm the district
court’s finding that qualified immunity for the Officers is not war-
ranted at this stage.
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20 Opinion of the Court 24-13456

Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment denying
the Officers qualified immunity on Jarvis’s Count 5. 1
B. The Officers Claim that the District Court Erred in Denying Their Mo-
tion for Summary Judgment on Jarvis’s Count 12 Alleging a State-Law
Malicious Prosecution Claim

The Officers argue that the district court erred when it de-
nied them immunity for Jarvis’s state-law malicious prosecution
claim.
Under Florida law, to prevail in a malicious prosecution ac-
tion,
a plaintiff must establish that: (1) an original criminal
or civil judicial proceeding against the present plain-
tiff was commenced or continued; (2) the present de-
fendant was the legal cause of the original proceeding
against the present plaintiff as the defendant in the
original proceeding; (3) the termination of the origi-
nal proceeding constituted a bona fide termination of
that proceeding in favor of the present plaintiff;
(4) there was an absence of probable cause for the

1 As noted above, we do have pendant appellate jurisdiction of Jarvis’s cross-

appeal challenge to the district court’s denial of his motion for summary judg-
ment on his Count 5 claim (unlawful search and seizure). The discussion
above indicates that there are genuine issues of material fact relating to
whether the Officers had reasonable suspicion to prolong the traffic stop.
Therefore, the district court properly denied Jarvis’s motion for summary
judgment on his Count 5 claim, and we also affirm the district court’s judg-
ment in that regard.
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24-13456 Opinion of the Court 21

original proceeding; (5) there was malice on the part
of the present defendant; and (6) the plaintiff suffered
damage as a result of the original proceeding.

Alamo Rent-A-Car, Inc. v. Mancusi, 632 So. 2d 1352, 1355 (Fla. 1994)
(citing Burns v. GCC Beverages, Inc., 502 So. 2d 1217 (Fla. 1986), and
Adams v. Whitfield, 290 So. 2d 49 (Fla. 1974)). In context of mali-
cious prosecution, Florida courts have held that the lack of proba-
ble cause can be used to infer to malice. Gallucci v. Milavic, 100 So.
2d 375, 378 (Fla. 1958).
The district court denied official immunity to the Officers
because they failed to demonstrate that they had probable cause
for all of the crimes for which they arrested Jarvis. But as the Su-
preme Court noted, state-law malicious prosecution claims require
a finding of probable cause for each charge. Chiaverini v. City of
Napoleon, 602 U.S. 556, 563–64, 144 S. Ct. 1745, 1751 (2024). 2 And

2 Although our research has not uncovered a Florida case following the gen-

eral rule—that a state-law malicious prosecution claim requires a finding of
the absence of probable cause for each charge—the district court so held and
the Officers’ brief on appeal does not challenge this holding. Accordingly, the
Officers have abandoned any such challenge. See Greenbriar, Ltd. v. City of Ala-
baster, 881 F.2d 1570, 1573 n.6 (11th Cir. 1989) (holding that issues not raised
on appeal are deemed waived).
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22 Opinion of the Court 24-13456

that failure to show probable cause means that malice can be in-
ferred. Gallucci, 100 So. 2d at 378. 3 Thus, the district court did not
err in denying the Officers immunity for this claim.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment denying
the Officers immunity on Jarvis’s Count 12.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the district court
is AFFIRMED.

3 And the genuine issues of fact with respect to whether the Officers lied about

seeing furtive movements and suspicious eye contact is potential evidence of
actual malice.

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11251908. Public record. Not legal advice.