# Freeman

> District Court, S.D. Illinois · February 4, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11251137

## Case

- **Full name:** Earl Freeman v. Thomas Lillard, Warden
- **Court:** District Court, S.D. Illinois
- **Decided:** February 4, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EARL FREEMAN, )
)
Petitioner, )
)
vs. ) Civil No. 3:24-cv-02227-GCS
)
THOMAS LILLARD, Warden, )
)
Respondent. )

MEMORANDUM & ORDER

SISON, Magistrate Judge:

Pending before the Court is Petitioner Freeman’s motion for reconsideration of the
denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2241 habeas corpus petition premised on “new” information this
Court did not have at the time of the decision. (Doc. 19). Specifically, Petitioner argues
that on April 2, 2025, the Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) updated his time credits pursuant to
the First Step Act of 2018 (“FSA”) to December 21, 2018, and therefore 935-days of
disallowed program days should be reinstated. (Doc. 19). Respondent opposes the
motion arguing that Petitioner has still not demonstrated that he successfully participated
in any evidence-based recidivism reduction (“EBRR”) programing or productive
activities (“PAs”) during that period as required by the FSA to award him the additional
credit. The Court agrees with Respondent that this “new” information does not warrant

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a reconsideration of the Court’s previous Memorandum and Order denying and
dismissing Petitioner’s 28 U.S.C. § 2241 Petition. See (Doc. 17).

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not explicitly contemplate
motions to reconsider. Nevertheless, the Seventh Circuit has approved of district courts
construing motions pursuant to the standards set forth in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
59(e) or 60(b) if it appears that a party is requesting relief available under those Rules. See
United States v. Deutsch, 981 F.2d 299, 300 (7th Cir. 1992). A motion under Rule 59(e) must
be filed “no later than 28 days after the entry of judgment/order to be timely. This time

limit is unyielding.” Banks v. Chicago Bd. of Educ., 750 F.3d 663, 666 (7th Cir.
2014) (citations omitted). The Court cannot extend the 28-day deadline imposed by Rule
59(e). Id. (citing FED. R. CIV. PROC. 6(b)(2); Justice v. Town of Cicero, Ill., 682 F.3d 662, 664-
665 (7th Cir. 2012)). When a motion to reconsider is filed more than 28 days after the entry
of judgment/order, the Court is to treat the motion as filed under Rule 60(b). Id.

Petitioner filed the motion for reconsideration on July 8, 2025, almost two months
after the entry of the Court’s Order dated May 9, 2025. See FED. R. CIV. PROC. 59(e). Thus,
the Court must treat the motion for reconsideration as one filed pursuant to Rule 60(b).
Under Rule 60(b), a Court may vacate a final judgment for mistake, inadvertence,
surprise, or excusable neglect; fraud or misconduct of the opposing party; a judgment

that is void or discharged; newly discovered evidence; or “any other reason that justifies
relief.” FED. R. CIV. PROC. 60(b)(1)-(6). Despite the catchall provision of allowing a court

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to grant relief for “any other reason,” Rule 60(b) is still an “extraordinary remedy and is
granted only in exceptional circumstances.” Wickens v. Shell Oil Co., 620 F.3d 747, 759 (7th

Cir. 2010) (quoting Dickerson v. Board of Educ. of Ford Heights, Ill., 32 F.3d 1114, 1116 (7th
Cir. 1994)).
Here, Petitioner has not shown a legal or factual mistake made by the Court , nor
has he demonstrated any other reason to justify relief. See Kemp v. United States, 596 U.S.
528, 533-534 (2022). The Court again finds that Freeman has not established that he is
entitled to an award of FSA time credit starting on December 21, 2018. To be entitled to

FSA time credit, Petitioner had to successfully participate in EBRR programming or PAs
following either his sentencing on May 10, 2012, or December 21, 2018, until the date he
was released to federal detainer, at time which he entered the exclusive custody of the
federal authorities. See 18 U.S.C. § 3632(d)(4)(A). Petitioner has not demonstrated in his
motion for reconsideration that he successfully participated in any EBRR programming

or PAs during the period of December 21, 2018, through July 14, 2021, to justify an award
of additional FSA time credit. His argument for reconsideration focuses on when he
should have started earning FSA time credit instead of pointing to evidence that he
successfully participated in any EBRR programming or PAs from December 21, 2018.
Accordingly, Petitioner has not shown that the BOP failed to properly calculate and apply

his FSA time credits. Consequently, his motion for reconsideration is denied.

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CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the Court DENIES Petitioner's motion for
reconsideration. (Doc. 19).
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: February 4, 2026. Digitally signed by
. Judge Sison
Aint ©. Dd Date: 2026.02.04
13:10:08 -06'00'
GILBERT C. SISON
United States Magistrate Judge

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11251137. Public record. Not legal advice.
