# Ladd

> District Court, S.D. Illinois · February 3, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11250471

## Case

- **Full name:** Perice Ladd v. Sean M. Featherstun, Julie A. Kozuszek, Paige Clark-Strawn
- **Court:** District Court, S.D. Illinois
- **Decided:** February 3, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

PERICE LADD, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
vs. )
)
SEAN M. FEATHERSTUN, ) Case No. 25-cv-1876-DWD
JULIE A. KOZUSZEK, )
PAIGE CLARK-STRAWN, )
)
Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

DUGAN, District Judge:
Plaintiff Perice Ladd, a former inmate of the Illinois Department of Corrections,
brings this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged deprivations of his
constitutional rights. (Doc. 1). The Court concluded that his initial complaint failed to
state a claim, and Plaintiff has filed a timely amended complaint (Doc. 8). Plaintiff faults
defendants for allegedly relying on incorrect information during his underlying criminal
proceedings to secure a higher sentence. Plaintiff has applied to proceed in forma pauperis.
(Doc. 2). Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915, an indigent party may commence a federal court action
without paying required costs and fees upon submission of an affidavit asserting the
inability to pay such fees or give security therefore and stating, the nature of the action,
defense or appeal and the affiant’s belief that he is entitled to redress. 28 U.S.C. §
1915(a)(1). Under § 1915(e)(2), the Court is also required to consider if a party has
presented plausible claims for relief before granting pauper status. The Court may
dismiss a case or deny a party’s IFP application if the action is clearly frivolous or
malicious, fails to state a claim, or seeks monetary damages from a defendant who is

immune. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). At this juncture, the factual allegations of the pro se
complaint are to be liberally construed. Rodriguez v. Plymouth Ambulance Serv., 577 F.3d
816, 821 (7th Cir. 2009).
The Amended Complaint
Plaintiff faults Defendants Featherstun and Kozuszek for improperly treating one
of his prior criminal proceedings as a conviction during the sentencing phase of recent

criminal proceedings. (Doc. 8 at 4). Specifically, he claims that he completed probation
for case 2006-CF-169, and the case should have been dismissed entirely upon completion
of probation and payment of fines. Despite this agreement, Featherstun and Kozuszek
allegedly knowingly presented information about the previous offense to enhance
Plaintiff’s sentence in case 2018-CF-460. He alleges that the presentation of the predicate

conviction was the sole basis to give him a 30-year sentence. (Doc. 8 at 4).
Plaintiff faults his defense attorney, Defendant Paige Clark-Strawn, for knowing
that the conviction should not be considered a predicate but failing to take action to
correct his sentence. (Doc. 8 at 5). He alleges that on July 23, 2025, the sentencing court
“corrected [his] sentence, removed the habitual criminal enhancement, and resentenced

[him].” (Doc. 8 at 5). He claims that under the new sentence, he was eligible for
immediate release and actually overserved his sentence. He alleges that the Defendants
fabricated evidence against him in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, they
conspired against him, and Defendant Clark-Strawn deprived him of a liberty interest by
failing to intervene on his behalf. He seeks monetary compensation.

A review of the publicly available criminal docket sheet for Plaintiff’s case in
Jefferson County Court indicates that in July of 2025 his sentence was reduced from 30
years to 15 years. See State v. Ladd, Case No. 18-CF-0460 (Jefferson County Court).1 Case
No. 18-CF-0460 is set for a hearing on February 4, 2026. Id. The Illinois Department of
Corrections inmate locator tool indicates that Plaintiff was released on parole on July 25,
2025, but it does not indicate a parole discharge date.2

Discussion
Plaintiff’s amended complaint is subject to dismissal for the reasons previously
explained in relation to his original complaint. Specifically, he is still attempting to bring
allegations against the defendants for actions taken directly within the ordinary course
of criminal proceedings. Prosecutors Featherstun and Kozuszek have absolute immunity

for acts they took during criminal proceedings. Such immunity applies to actions within
the scope of prosecutorial duties, Bianchi v. McQueen, 818 F.3d 309, 318 (7th Cir. 2016)
(immunity applied to the extent a plaintiff allege that prosecutors made false statements
at trial), and can apply even if a prosecutor acts with malice or in an unreasonable fashion,
Smith v. Power, 346 F.3d 740, 742 (7th Cir. 2003). Plaintiff faults Featherstun and Kozuszek

1 Accessible via Judici.com,
https://www.judici.com/courts/cases/case_dispositions.jsp?court=IL041025J&ocl=IL041025J,2018CF460,IL041025
JL2018CF460D1, last accessed January 20, 2026.
2 IDOC Inmate Locator Tool, https://idoc.illinois.gov/offender/inmatesearch.html, last accessed February 3, 2026.
for representations during the sentencing phase of his case but this is undisputably a core
prosecutorial function, so they are protected by absolute immunity.

Second, as to Defendant Clark-Strawn, she cannot be held liable under § 1983.
“A public defender does not act under color of state law when performing a lawyer's
traditional functions as counsel to a defendant in a criminal proceeding.” Polk County v.
Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 325 (1981). Likewise, private defense attorneys also are not “state
actors” amenable to suit under § 1983. Id. Clark-Strawn is not considered a state actor
for purposes of her involvement with the sentencing phase of the case, so she is immune.

Third, Plaintiff alleges that the defendants conspired against him, but the assertion
is utterly threadbare. Plaintiff has no allegation that plausibly suggests the defendants
communicated about his predicate offense and reached an agreement to violate his rights.
See e.g., Gills v. Hamilton, 2026 WL 113265 (7th Cir. Jan. 15, 2026) (finding that an inmate
failed to state a conspiracy claim against defendants because he did not establish an

underlying constitutional violation and had nothing more than speculation to support
his assumption that the defendants agreed to cause him harm). Furthermore, because
Plaintiff’s primary due process claims are being dismissed for failure to state a claim,
Plaintiff cannot maintain a freestanding conspiracy claim. See Archer v. Chisholm, 870 F.3d
603, 620 (7th Cir. 2017) (a plaintiff cannot maintain a freestanding conspiracy claim under

§ 1983 if the other substantive § 1983 claims fail).
Having reviewed Plaintiff’s allegations twice, the Court finds that it is not
necessary to afford further opportunities to amend because the facts Plaintiff describes
could not support a viable theory of relief against the named defendants. See e.g.
Zimmerman v. Bornick, 25 F.4th 491, 494 (7th Cir. 2022) (amendment would be futile if
plaintiff already had multiple chances to cure deficiencies); Always Towing & Recovery,

Inc. v. City of Milwaukee, 2 F.4th 695, 707 (7th Cir. 2021) (courts may deny leave to amend
if an amendment would be futile); McCree v. Grissom, 657 F.3d 623, 624 (7th Cir. 2011)
(leave to amend shall be granted where justice so requires, but leave to amend need not
be given if an amendment to the complaint would be futile). As such, this case is now
dismissed for failure to state a claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e).
Disposition

Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint (Doc. 8) is DISMISSED with prejudice for failure
to state a claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed In Forma
Pauperis (Doc. 2), and his Motion for Status (Doc. 6) are DENIED as moot because this
case is being dismissed for failure to state a claim. The Clerk of Court shall enter
judgment and CLOSE this case.

IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: February 3, 2026 /s/ David W. Dugan
______________________________
DAVID W. DUGAN
United States District Judge

If Plaintiff wishes to appeal this Order, he must file a notice of appeal with this Court
within thirty days of the entry of judgment. FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(1)(A). If Plaintiff chooses
to appeal, he will be liable for the $605.00 filing fee irrespective of the outcome of the
appeal. See FED. R. APP. P. 3(e); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2); Ammons v. Gerlinger, 547 F.3d 724,
725-56 (7th Cir. 2008). A proper and timely motion filed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 59(e) may toll the 30-day appeal deadline. FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(4). A Rule 59(e)
motion must be filed no later than 28 days after the entry of judgment, and this 28-day
deadline cannot be extended.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11250471. Public record. Not legal advice.