# Jones

> District Court, M.D. Alabama · February 3, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11250334

## Case

- **Full name:** Frederick Dwight Jones v. Rolanda Calloway
- **Court:** District Court, M.D. Alabama
- **Decided:** February 3, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11250334

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding that plaintiff cannot hold supervisory officials liable for the actions of their subordinates under a theory of respondeat superior or vicarious liability under § 1983

## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
NORTHERN DIVISION

FREDERICK DWIGHT JONES, )
#157783, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) CASE NO. 2:23-CV-165-SMD
)
ROLANDA CALLOWAY, )
)
Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

I. INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff Frederick Dwight Jones, an inmate proceeding pro se, filed an amended
complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.1 Doc. 16. Although the amended complaint states
multiple claims against multiple defendants, all but one claim against one defendant have
been dismissed prior to entry of this Order. See Docs. 65, 66. The only remaining claim is
whether Defendant Rolanda Calloway, Warden of Kilby Correctional Facility during
some—but not all—of the events alleged in the amended complaint, violated Plaintiff’s
Fourteenth Amendment right to due process based on an alleged over-detention.2
Plaintiff has filed a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (Doc. 95), and Defendant

1 The amended complaint is the operative pleading in this action. See Dresdner Bank AG v. M/V Olympia
Voyager, 463 F.3d 1210, 1215 (11th Cir. 2006) (“An amended pleading supersedes the former pleading;
the original pleading is abandoned by the amendment, and is no longer a part of the pleader’s averments
against his adversary.”) (internal quotations and citation omitted).

2 As will be discussed further below, to the extent Plaintiff’s filings can be interpreted as attempting to state
any additional claims against Defendant Calloway, such claims are not properly before the Court and will
not be considered.
Calloway has filed a Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 104), to which Plaintiff has
filed numerous documents in response (see Docs. 106, 108–110). Upon careful

consideration, and for the reasons explained below, Plaintiff’s Motion for Judgment on the
Pleadings (Doc. 95) is DENIED, Defendant Calloway’s Motion for Summary Judgment
(Doc. 104) is GRANTED, and this case is DISMISSED with prejudice.
II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD3
Under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a reviewing court must grant
a motion for “summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine issue as to

any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “By its very terms, this standard provides that the mere existence of
some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly
supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue
of material fact.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247–48 (1986). “An issue

of fact is ‘genuine’ if the record as a whole could lead a reasonable trier of fact to find for
the nonmoving party.” Redwing Carriers, Inc. v. Saraland Apartments, 94 F.3d 1489, 1496
(11th Cir. 1996) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248). “An issue is ‘material’ if it might
affect the outcome of the case under the governing law.” Id.
The party seeking summary judgment “always bears the initial responsibility of

3 Given that both parties rely on evidence beyond the pleadings in this matter, the Court evaluates this case
under the Rule 56(c) standard for summary judgment rather than the Rule 12(c) standard for judgment on
the pleadings. See, e.g., Dean v. 1715 Northside Drive, Inc., 224 F. Supp. 3d 1302, 1308 n.1 (N.D. Ga.
2016) (“While the standard applied by the court is nearly identical under both a motion for summary
judgment and a motion for judgment on the pleadings, the court will consider matters outside of the
pleadings in ruling on the [parties’ motions] and thus should proceed under the Rule 56 framework.”).
informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of
‘the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together

with the affidavits, if any,’ which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of
material fact.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P.
56). The movant can meet this burden by presenting evidence showing there is no dispute
of material fact or by showing that the nonmoving party has failed to present evidence in
support of some element of his case on which he bears the ultimate burden of proof. Id. at
322–23.

Once the movant has satisfied this burden, the nonmoving party must “go beyond
the pleadings and by [his] own affidavits, or by the ‘depositions, answers to interrogatories,
and admissions on file,’ designate ‘specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for
trial.’” Id. at 324. In doing so, and to avoid summary judgment, the nonmovant “must do
more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.”

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). The
parties must support their assertions “that a fact cannot be or is genuinely disputed” by
“citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions, documents,
electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations[], admissions,
interrogatory answers, or other materials” or by “showing that the materials cited do not

establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot
produce admissible evidence to support the fact.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A)–(B).
If the nonmovant “fails to properly address another party’s assertion of fact as
required by Rule 56(c),” then the Court may “consider the fact undisputed for purposes of
the motion” and “grant summary judgment if the motion and supporting materials—
including the facts considered undisputed—show that the movant is entitled to it.” Fed. R.

Civ. P. 56(e)(2)–(3).
“In reviewing whether the nonmoving party has met its burden, the [C]ourt must
stop short of weighing the evidence and making credibility determinations of the truth of
the matter.” Tipton v. Bergrohr GMBH-Siegen, 965 F.2d 994, 998–99 (11th Cir. 1992)
(citation omitted). “Instead, the evidence of the non-movant is to be believed, and all
justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor.” Id. at 999 (citations and internal

quotations omitted). However, “mere conclusions and unsupported factual allegations are
legally insufficient to defeat a summary judgment motion.” Ellis v. England, 432 F.3d
1321, 1326 (11th Cir. 2005) (citation omitted). Furthermore, “[a] mere ‘scintilla’ of
evidence supporting the opposing party’s position will not suffice; there must be enough
of a showing that the jury could reasonably find for that party.” Walker v. Darby, 911 F.2d

1573, 1577 (11th Cir. 1990); see also Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249–50 (“If the evidence [on
which the nonmoving party relies] is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative,
summary judgment may be granted.”) (internal citations omitted).
III. RELEVANT FACTS4
Plaintiff served 30 years on a life sentence for an Alabama state robbery conviction

before receiving parole in 2004. Doc. 18 at 1; Doc. 17 at 4. In March of 2020, Plaintiff was

4 The “facts” set forth herein are merely for purposes of resolving summary judgment and may not be the
actual facts. See Cox v. Adm’r U.S. Steel & Carnegie, 17 F.3d 1386, 1400 (11th Cir.), opinion modified on
reh’g, 30 F.3d 1347 (11th Cir. 1994) (“[W]hat we state as ‘facts’ . . . for purposes of reviewing the rulings
on the summary judgment motion [] may not be the actual facts.”).
arrested in Indiana based on a violation of the terms of his Alabama state parole and
transported to Kilby Correctional Facility. Doc. 16 at 2. Plaintiff did not receive a hearing

on his alleged parole violation within 20 business days, in violation of Ala. Code § 15-22-
32(a).5 Id. Defendant Calloway arrived at Kilby on May 1, 2020, at which time she served
as Acting Facility Head. Doc. 72-1 at 1.
In May of 2020, Plaintiff “wrote and spoke with” Defendant Calloway about not
receiving a revocation hearing, but Defendant Calloway did not notify the Board of
Pardons and Paroles of Plaintiff’s detention. Doc. 16 at 2. However, Plaintiff’s daughter

“called the Board several times” in April of 2020; Plaintiff wrote multiple letters to the
Board in or around May of 2020; and “the Human Rights Agency and Southern Poverty
contacted the Board” about Plaintiff not receiving his hearing. Doc. 18 at 1–2; see also
Doc. 16 at 2. Although Ala. Code § 15-22-32(a) requires that a detained, alleged parole
violator be released back to parole supervision when no hearing occurs within the 20-day

timeframe, Plaintiff was not released. Id.
On August 27, 2020, Assistant Field Director Terry Anthony instructed Defendant
Calloway via email to release Plaintiff pursuant to Ala. Code § 15-22-32(a), and Plaintiff
was released on September 1, 2020. Doc. 16 at 2. Plaintiff’s revocation hearing was

5 Ala. Code § 15-22-32(a) states in relevant part: “Whenever there is reasonable cause to believe that a
prisoner who has been paroled has violated his or her parole, the Board of Pardons and Paroles, at its next
meeting, may declare the parolee to be delinquent, and time owed shall date from the delinquency. The
Department of Corrections, after receiving notice from the sheriff of the county jail where the parolee is
being held, shall promptly notify the board of the return of a parolee charged with violation of his or her
parole. The board, a single member of the board, a parole revocation hearing officer, or a designated parole
officer shall hold a parole court at the prison or at another place as it may determine within 20 business
days and consider the case of the parole violator . . . . If a hearing is not held within the specified 20 business
days, the parolee shall be released back to parole supervision.” Ala. Code § 15-22-32(a) (emphasis added).
subsequently held on September 16, 2020, in Decatur, Alabama, and it was recommended
that he be returned to prison for three years. Id. at 3.

IV. DISCUSSION
a. To the extent Plaintiff seeks monetary damages from Defendant Calloway in
her official capacity, Defendant Calloway is entitled to sovereign immunity.

Official capacity suits are “in all respects other than name, . . . treated as a suit
against the entity.” Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985). As such, a state
employee may not be sued in her official capacity unless the state has waived its Eleventh
Amendment immunity, see Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100
(1984), or Congress has abrogated the immunity, see Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida,
517 U.S. 44, 59 (1996). It is well-settled that Alabama has not waived its Eleventh
Amendment immunity in § 1983 cases, nor has Congress abrogated it. Holmes v. Hale, 701
F. App’x 751, 753 (11th Cir. 2017) (citing Carr v. City of Florence, Ala., 916 F.2d 1521,
1525 (11th Cir. 1990). Accordingly, to the extent Plaintiff seeks monetary damages from
Defendant Calloway in her official capacity as an employee of the Alabama Department
of Corrections, Defendant Calloway is entitled to sovereign immunity.6 See, e.g., Selensky

v. Alabama, 619 F. App’x 846, 849 (11th Cir. 2015); Harbert Int’l, Inc. v. James, 157 F.3d
1271, 1277–78 (11th Cir. 1998); Edwards v. Wallace Cmty. Coll., 49 F.3d 1517, 1524 (11th

6 Additionally, “neither a State nor its officials acting in their official capacities are ‘persons’ [subject to
suit] under § 1983.” Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989); see also Carr, 916 F.2d
at 1525 n.3 (“[S]tate officials acting in their official capacities are not ‘persons’ subject to liability under
42 U.S.C. § 1983.”).
Cir. 1995).
b. To the extent Plaintiff seeks monetary damages from Defendant Calloway in
her individual capacity, he has failed to establish a genuine issue of material
fact on a Fourteenth Amendment due process claim.

The Fourteenth Amendment provides that “[n]o State shall . . . deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” The Fourteenth Amendment
“applies when an individual alleges an ‘over-detention,’ or a continued detention after a
right to release.” Alcocer v. Mills, 906 F.3d 944, 953 (11th Cir. 2018); see also Ellard v.
Alabama Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, 824 F.2d 937, 943 (11th Cir. 1987) (holding that,
once a state chooses to confer a right such as parole, a prisoner’s interest in the right has
“real substance” and may be revoked only in compliance with the Fourteenth
Amendment).
“When an over-detention occurs and the Fourteenth Amendment governs the
analysis, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant acted with deliberate indifference

to [his] due-process rights.” Alcocer, 906 F.3d at 953. To establish deliberate indifference,
a plaintiff must demonstrate “that the defendant acted with ‘subjective recklessness as
used in the criminal law,’ . . . and to do so he must show that the defendant was actually,
subjectively aware that his own conduct caused a substantial risk of serious harm to the
plaintiff.” Wade v. McDade, 106 F.4th 1251, 1262 (11th Cir. 2024).7

Moreover, an actionable due process claim under § 1983 requires a plaintiff to

7 “[C]ivil law generally calls a person reckless who acts or (if the person has a duty to act) fails to act in the
face of an unjustifiably high risk of harm that is either known or so obvious that it should be known.” Wade,
106 F.4th at 1256 (11th Cir. 2024) (citing Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 836 (1994)). By contrast,
“criminal law . . . generally permits a finding of recklessness only when a person disregards a risk of harm
of which he is aware.” Id. (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 836–37).
demonstrate “an affirmative causal connection between the official’s acts or omissions
and the alleged constitutional deprivation.” Holt v. Glenn, 361 F. App’x 75, 77 (11th Cir.

2010) (per curiam) (quoting Zatler v. Wainwright, 802 F.2d 397, 401 (11th Cir. 1986)).
Applying this requirement to an over-detention claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate that
the defendant’s specific acts or omissions caused the alleged over-detention.
As an initial matter, Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that Defendant Calloway
acted with subjective recklessness as used in the criminal law; that is, that she was
subjectively aware that her own conduct caused a substantial risk of serious harm to

Plaintiff. Although Plaintiff avers that he told Defendant Calloway in May of 2020 that
he had not had a revocation hearing, he fails to make a sufficient showing that Defendant
Calloway was either (1) aware that she had any personal responsibility to notify the Parole
Board of Plaintiff’s detention; or (2) aware that Plaintiff was entitled to release based on
his failure to receive a hearing within 20 business days.

First, there is no evidence before the Court that Defendant Calloway, as Acting
Facility Head, was personally responsible for contacting the Board on behalf of Plaintiff.
See Doc. 72-1 at 1–2 (in which Defendant Calloway avers that “it was not my
responsibility to alert the Alabama Department of Pardons and Paroles of [Plaintiff’s]
arrest; nor was it my responsibility to schedule [Plaintiff] a hearing with the Board of

Pardons and Paroles”). Indeed, Plaintiff admits that he is uncertain as to who specifically
within the Alabama Department of Corrections was responsible for such notification. See
Docs. 99 at 2 (“Someone at Kilby facility was responsible for letting the parole know that
Plaintiff was there awaiting a revocation hearing.”); 109-1 at 2 (“[I]f not the warden,
someone working under her supervision had the duty of notifying the board.”).8
Second, even assuming it was in fact Defendant Calloway’s responsibility to contact

the Board, there is no evidence that she was subjectively aware of that fact or that she
knew Plaintiff was entitled to release as a result of not receiving a timely revocation
hearing. Plaintiff postulates that an individual in Defendant Calloway’s position should
have known that his rights were being violated, but he makes no showing that Defendant
Calloway subjectively possessed such knowledge. See Docs. 95 at 4 (“Plaintiff has shown
. . . that his over-detention was or should have been known by the defendant.”); 99 at 4

(“Even if this defendant argue that she didn’t know, this is a clearly established statutory,
constitutional right of which a reasonable person would have known.”); 99-1 at 2
(“[Defendant Calloway] knew or should have known that prisoners were being held at her
prison without being afford a revocation hearing.”); Doc. 108 at 4 (“The defendant clearly
state that it is not her responsibility or her staff to notify the parole board.[] Clearly this

defendant don’t know her duties or is lying to the Court.”). Notably, Plaintiff avers that
he did not learn about Ala. Code § 15-22-32(a) until after he spoke with Defendant
Calloway in May of 2020, see Doc. 89 at 2, so it is clear they did not discuss it during
their conversation. Thus, the evidence fails to demonstrate deliberate indifference by
Defendant Calloway.

8 The Court notes that Defendant Calloway cannot be held liable under § 1983 for the actions of her
employees under a theory of respondeat superior or vicarious liability. See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs.
Of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 691–95 (1978) (holding doctrine of respondeat superior inapplicable
to § 1983 actions); Belcher v. City of Foley, Ala., 30 F.3d 1390, 1396 (11th Cir. 1994) (holding that plaintiff
cannot hold supervisory officials liable for the actions of their subordinates under a theory of respondeat
superior or vicarious liability under § 1983).
Additionally, Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate the causation component of an
over-detention claim. Throughout the record9, Plaintiff repeatedly avers that the Board

knew he was detained beyond the permissible 20-day period but knowingly and willfully
failed to take any action:
• “Sometime in May 2020, Plaintiff wrote the Ala. Parole Board . . . and
informed them that he had not been afford a hearing within the 20
business days[.] Plaintiff also had his daughter . . . call the Parole Board
several times to inquire into why Plaintiff had not had a parole revocation
hearing. Because [Board members] were not allowed to come into Kilby
prison, they decided not to do anything about Plaintiff . . . being held
without a hearing.” Doc. 16 at 2.

• “The defendants will argue that due to the COVID-19 pandemic, the
Board was unaware of Plaintiff’s recapture[.] This argument don’t hold
water. Phone records will show that Plaintiff’s daughter . . . called the
Board several times in April of 2020, inquiring about why Plaintiff has
not had a hearing. Plaintiff also wrote the parole board several times
asking about his revocation hearing.” Doc. 18 at 1–2.

• “[T]he parole board was mad at Kilby because they were not allowed on
the premises. Myself and the other prisoners . . . were punished for
something that we had no control over or anything to do with.” Doc. 29
at 3.

• “The parole board was upset that the Warden at Kilby would not let them
on the premises to conduct hearings, so they decided not to do anything
and just let [me] sit in prison.[] The board could have held video hearings
or should have released me[.]” Doc. 32 at 4.

• “Ass. Attorney General J. Eric Anderson lied to Montgomery Circuit
Court, and Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals, stating that the Board
was unaware of my recapture for several weeks[.] On March 12, 2020,
Floyd County Jail . . . contacted the Alabama Parole Board[.] On March
27, 2020 I arrived at Kilby back gate, and the parole board was notified[.]
On September 27, 2020 the Board sent Kilby an e-mail, ordering my
immediate release. This is 6 months from when the Board had to have

9 When considering a motion for summary judgment, the Court “need consider only the cited materials, but
it may consider other materials in the record.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3) (emphasis added).
known that I was recaptured.” Doc. 49 at 9–10.

• “At all times the [parole board] defendants were fully aware of
Plaintiff[’]s whereabouts. The defendants made a conscience decision to
let Plaintiff sit inside of prison without affording him a hearing or
releasing him.[] This is not a mere case of negligence, these are
intentional acts, knowingly and willingly. For every day that they
couldn’t come on the premises of Kilby prison, they knew that Plaintiff .
. . had not been afford a hearing, as required by law.” Doc. 53 at 5.

• “Plaintiff will show that the [parole board] defendants knew Plaintiff was
at Kilby prison from March 27, 2020 until his release.[] On March 27,
2020 Plaintiff arrived at Kilby prison, and . . . [t]he prison and the
transportation agency had to call the Alabama parole board . . . in order
for Plaintiff to be accepted at Kilby prison. Again Plaintiff would aver
that the board was notified of Plaintiff[’]s arrival at the prison.[] Plaintiff
didn’t allege that Warden Calloway failed to notify the board until after
the defendants submitted to Montgomery Circuit Court in their motion to
dismiss that for several weeks they were unaware of Plaintiff[’]s
incarceration, which rightfully is a straight lie.” Doc. 55 at 7–8.

• “Warden Calloway was not the warden at that time. As far as Warden
Babers, Plaintiff would assume that she notified the Board or one of her
employees notified the board. [T]he wardens notification is not the only
trigger of a prompt revocation hearing. Actual knowledge of the parolee
incarceration surely triggers the time clock, and the executed of the
warrant also triggers the time clock, plus the parolee notice to the board
that he wishes to have a prompt hearing. All of these things happened and
because of them[,] the time clock was triggered.[] [T]he defendant nor
Plaintiff alleges that ‘no’ warden at Kilby Prison notified the board of
plaintiff’s return, only Warden Calloway, who was not the warden at that
time. Keep in mind that Plaintiff alleged Warden Calloway didn’t notify
the board because the defendants lied and submitted to Montgomery
Circuit Court that they were unaware of Plaintiff’s whereabouts for
several weeks.” Doc. 55 at 12.10

10 Plaintiff further asserts, throughout numerous unsworn documents, that he is certain the Board was
notified of his detention in March of 2020 and nevertheless knowingly and willfully violated his rights. See,
e.g., Docs. 28 at 4; 40 at 2; 56 at 11; 58 at 1; 59 at 2. However, “[u]nsworn statements may not be considered
by a district court in evaluating a motion for summary judgment.” See, e.g., Roy v. Ivy, 53 F.4th 1338, 1347
(11th Cir. 2022) (citing Carr v. Tatangelo, 338 F.3d 1259, 1273 n.26 (11th Cir. 2003), as amended (Sept.
29, 2003).
Plaintiff is adamant throughout his sworn filings that the Board had actual
knowledge of his detention as early as March of 2020; that the Board willfully failed to

either schedule a hearing or release him despite that knowledge; and, quite notably, that
he only brought Defendant Calloway into this action after the Board lied about that
knowledge. These averments directly contradict Plaintiff’s later unsworn and unsupported
assertion that he “would have been released had [Defendant Calloway] contacted the
parole board,” Doc. 76-1 at 3, and render it impossible for a reasonable factfinder to
conclude that Plaintiff’s over-detention was caused by Defendant Calloway’s failure to

notify.
Because the evidence fails to establish either deliberate indifference by Defendant
Calloway or that she affirmatively caused Plaintiff’s over-detention, Plaintiff has failed to
establish a genuine issue of material fact on his Fourteenth Amendment due process claim.
Accordingly, Defendant Calloway is entitled to summary judgment.

c. To the extent Plaintiff’s filings can be interpreted as attempting to state any
further claims against Defendant Calloway, such claims are not properly
before the Court.

After he filed his amended complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Plaintiff
acknowledged that, pursuant to Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), any claim
challenging the legality of his conviction or sentence is not cognizable in a § 1983 action.
See Doc. 29 at 1. Accordingly, Plaintiff made clear that is not seeking release from
imprisonment, but merely “compensation for holding Plaintiff for 5 additional months”
beyond the 20-day period. Id. at 2 (“A ruling in Plaintiff[’s] favor would only determine
how much money the defendants would have to pay for the illegal incarceration of five
months.”). He explicitly stated that this is “the only issue/claim” on which he wished to
proceed, and “all of the other claims can be dismissed without prejudice.” Id. at 3.

He reiterated this intention throughout his later filings. See Docs. 55 at 2 (“The
essential factual basis of this civil action is the claim that the defendants detained Plaintiff
5 months beyond the 20 business day period[.] Plaintiff willingly dismissed all of the other
claims[.]”); 59 at 2 (“Plaintiff never had a revocation hearing within the 20 business days
and was not released until five months after the 20 days had expired. This is the only claim
that has been properly exhausted for review by this Court.”); 94 at 4 (providing that the

only substantive issue before the Court is “[w]hether Warden Calloway violated Plaintiff’s
due process rights by not notifying the Alabama Parole Board in a timely manner”); 99-1
at 2 (acknowledging that Defendant Calloway “had no control over any event that
happened after Plaintiff was released”).
Accordingly, to the extent any of Plaintiff’s pleadings or subsequent filings appear

to challenge events that occurred after his release from Kilby on September 1, 2020—
including the validity and outcome of his subsequent revocation hearing as well as any
subsequent denials of parole—any such claims are not properly before the Court, are not
cognizable in a § 1983 action pursuant to Heck v. Humphrey, and will not be considered
here.

V. CONCLUSION
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, it is ORDERED that:
(1) Plaintiff’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (Doc. 95) is DENIED;
(2) Defendant Calloway’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 104) is
GRANTED;
(3) Judgment is ENTERED in favor of Defendant Calloway and against
Plaintiff; and
(4) This case is DISMISSED with prejudice.
Final Judgment will be entered separately.
DONE this 3rd day of February, 2026.

CHIEF U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11250334. Public record. Not legal advice.