# Owens

> District Court, C.D. Illinois · February 2, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11249815

## Case

- **Full name:** James Owens v. Latoya Hughes, et al.
- **Court:** District Court, C.D. Illinois
- **Decided:** February 2, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
SPRINGFIELD DIVISION

JAMES OWENS, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) 3:25-cv-03161-MMM
)
LATOYA HUGHES, et al. )
)
Defendants. )

ORDER
Plaintiff, proceeding pro se and presently incarcerated at Pinckneyville
Correctional Center seeks to proceed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to challenge various
aspects of the proposed terms of his state court mandatory supervised release. Several
matters are before the Court and will be addressed in turn.
A. Merit Review
The court must “screen” Plaintiff’s complaint, and through such process identify
and dismiss any legally insufficient claim, or the entire action if warranted. 28 U.S.C. §
1915A. A claim is legally insufficient if it “(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a
claim upon which relief may be granted; or (2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant
who is immune from such relief.” Id.
The court accepts the factual allegations as true, liberally construing them in the
plaintiff’s favor. Turley v. Rednour, 729 F.3d 645, 649 (7th Cir. 2013). Conclusory
statements and labels are insufficient—the facts alleged must “state a claim for relief
that is plausible on its face.” Alexander v. United States, 721 F.3d 418, 422 (7th Cir. 2013)
(citation omitted).
Allegations

Plaintiff names as Defendants IDOC Director Latoya Hughes, the Illinois
Prisoner Review Board, the Chair and several Members of the Prisoner Review Board,
Illinois Parole Chief Jason Garnett, Deputy Illinois Parole Chief Dion Dixon, John Does,
and Alyssa Williams.
Plaintiff is 66 years old. In 1979, in California, Plaintiff sexually abused a six-

year-old girl he was left alone with at the house of an acquaintance. He alleges he “had
been curious about engaging in sexual intercourse with a young girl.” He was arrested,
charged, found guilty, and sentenced to five years’ imprisonment. After serving that
time he was diverted to a mandatory treatment facility where he received treatment
over the next forty-two months. Plaintiff there admitted to “fondling” four other girls in

the past, when he had been left alone with them. Plaintiff moved to Illinois in 1983, met
his “life partner” Brenda, and they had a son in 1985. In about 1999 Plaintiff sexually
assaulted his son’s friend Brittany repeatedly over a period of 7 or 8 months. Plaintiff
pled guilty to a criminal charge based on those actions and was sentenced to 30 years in
prison. He is nearing the end of that sentence.

He now seeks to challenge the constitutionality of the Illinois Prisoner Review
Board’s Order setting the terms of his Mandatory Supervised Relief. Plaintiff argues
that for various reasons that Order is constitutionally infirm.
Analysis
Plaintiff’s claims are barred under Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), and the
precedent developed therefrom. Heck prohibits a prisoner from obtaining relief in a

§ 1983 suit where a judgment in [his] favor “would necessarily imply the invalidity of
his conviction or sentence.” Heck, 512 U.S. at 487. This is so, unless “the conviction or
sentence is reversed, expunged, invalidated, or impugned by the grant of a writ of
habeas corpus.” Id. at 489.
The Heck-bar applies to terms of mandatory supervised release because “[f]or

parolees, the ... ‘conditions’ of parole are the confinement.” Williams v. Wisconsin, 336
F.3d 576, 579 (7th Cir. 2003); Ortega v. Ford, No. 23-1784, 2024 WL 1634072, at *3 (7th Cir.
Apr. 16, 2024), cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 437 (2024).
Here, there is no indication that Plaintiff has attempted to invalidate this aspect
of his sentence through collateral attack in one full round of state court review followed

by petitioning a federal court for federal habeas relief. Those are the steps Plaintiff must
take to try to invalidate the terms of his sentence, rather than this civil suit under § 1983.
If successful in invalidating his sentence, and if he could plausibly allege that he was
somehow injured, it is possible that perhaps he could then pursue a suit like this one.
B. Motion to Request Counsel

Plaintiff requests that the Court appoint counsel on his behalf. Doc. 5.
The Seventh Circuit has summarized the legal standard for Plaintiff’s request as
follows:
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1), a federal court “may request an attorney to
represent any person unable to afford counsel.” The statute is “entirely
permissive.” Pruitt v. Mote, 503 F.3d 647, 654 (7th Cir. 2007) (en banc). Civil
litigants have no constitutional or statutory right to court-appointed
counsel, and § 1915(e)(1) “does not authorize the federal courts to make
coercive appointments of counsel.” Id. at 653 (quoting Mallard v. U.S. Dist.
Court for S. Dist. of Iowa, 490 U.S. 296, 310, 109 S.Ct. 1814, 104 L.Ed.2d 318
(1989)). Rather, the statute “codifies the court’s discretionary authority to
recruit a lawyer to represent an indigent civil litigant pro bono publico.” Id.

“Almost everyone would benefit from having a lawyer, but there are too
many indigent litigants and too few lawyers willing and able to volunteer
for these cases.” Olson v. Morgan, 750 F.3d 708, 711 (7th Cir. 2014). “District
courts are thus placed in the unenviable position of identifying, among a
sea of people lacking counsel, those who need counsel the most.” Id.

Accordingly, we have recently explained that “the decision whether to
recruit a lawyer for a particular plaintiff is made against the twofold
backdrop of a high volume of indigent, pro se litigants (particularly
incarcerated individuals) and a small pool, by comparison, of attorneys
willing and able to take those cases on pro bono.” Watts v. Kidman, 42 F.4th
755, 763 (7th Cir. 2022). Based on these and other practical considerations,
we have held that district judges should engage in a two-step inquiry when
faced with a request for pro bono counsel under § 1915(e)(1), asking first
“(1) has the indigent plaintiff made a reasonable attempt to obtain counsel
or been effectively precluded from doing so; and if so, (2) given the
difficulty of the case, does the plaintiff appear competent to litigate it
himself?” Pruitt, 503 F.3d at 654.

The first step needs no elaboration. Step two “can be complex” and involves
a pragmatic judgment about the difficulty of the case and the plaintiff’s
ability to present it to the court on his own. Watts, 42 F.4th at 760. “The
inquiries are necessarily intertwined; the difficulty of the case is considered
against the plaintiff’s litigation capabilities, and those capabilities are
examined in light of the challenges specific to the case at hand.” Pruitt, 503
F.3d at 655. A judge will normally consider “the plaintiff’s literacy,
communication skills, educational level, and litigation experience” along
with any evidence in the record “bearing on the plaintiff’s intellectual
capacity and psychological history.” Id. But these are merely factors that are
ordinarily relevant. No one factor is “necessary or conclusive.” Id. at 655
n.9. Indeed, “[t]here are no fixed requirements for determining a plaintiff’s
competence to litigate his own case.” Id. at 655. Ultimately, the “inquiry into
the plaintiff’s capacity to handle his own case is a practical one, made in
light of whatever relevant evidence is available on the question.” Id.

Finally, “the decision whether to recruit pro bono counsel is left to the
district court’s discretion.” Id. at 654. Our job is to ensure that this discretion
is exercised in accordance with appropriate legal principles. The “question
on appellate review is not whether we would have recruited a volunteer
lawyer in the circumstances, but whether the district court applied the
correct legal standard and reached a reasonable decision based on facts
supported by the record.” Id. at 658.

Jones v. Anderson, 116 F.4th 669, 675-76 (7th Cir. 2024). In determining the second step, the
Court may view the case through the lens of certain factors that the Seventh Circuit has
enumerated.
Though this inquiry must be case-and plaintiff-specific, we have identified
circumstances that tend to diminish a prisoner-plaintiff’s ability to litigate
pro se, such as when: (1) the case reaches later stages of litigation, (2) the
plaintiff is transferred to another facility and loses access to relevant
witnesses or evidence, (3) the claim depends on the state of mind of the
defendant, and (4) expert testimony is necessary to prove the claim.

Owens v. Wexford Health Sources, et al., No. 22-2882, 2024 WL 5242367, at *3 (7th Cir. Dec.
30, 2024), citing James v. Eli, 889 F.3d 320, 327-28 (7th Cir. 2018).
Here, first, Plaintiff has not shown a reasonable attempt to obtain counsel on his
own, nor has he shown he cannot do so. He indicates he was at a time held in segregation,
but he is now at a different prison and has been in regular written communication with
the Courts. Plaintiff must attempt to find an attorney by writing to several attorneys,
specific to this lawsuit, and if unsuccessful may renew his motion, attaching copies of his
request letters sent along with any responses received.
As to the second inquiry, Plaintiff’s claims are not factually difficult; he alleges his
rights were violated under his sentence. However, working out exactly who did what at
what time in relation to decisions that were made may be difficult to prove because
Plaintiff does not have personal knowledge of some of those facts, and has moved prisons

several times. This factor somewhat favors a search for counsel on Plaintiff’s behalf.
Written discovery would produce to Plaintiff the relevant conviction and sentence
records related to his claims, though, making the factual difficulty overall a wash.
Plaintiff’s claims are not particularly legally difficult, though all federal litigation
is difficult to a degree. Plaintiff’s pleadings are clear and legible. They are coherent. And
Plaintiff has extensive federal litigation experience, which weighs against appointing

counsel. Plaintiff’s education level is not before the Court, but once again he appears well
able to communicate. There is no information before the Court that indicates Plaintiff is
mentally impaired to the extent that he cannot represent himself.
Most importantly, it appears this case is without legal merit as brought, and so
recruitment of counsel would be a poor use of Court resources in this case.

Here, looking at Plaintiff’s abilities compared with the many other unrepresented
litigants who ask for help finding a free lawyer, considering all the factors, and in an
exercise of its discretion, the Court finds Plaintiff can adequately continue representing
himself.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED:

1. Plaintiff's Motion for Appointment of Counsel [5] is DENIED.
2. Plaintiff's Motion for Expedited Hearing [6] is DENIED.
3. Plaintiff's motions for status [7], [8] are DENIED as MOOT.
4. Pursuant to its merit review of the Complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A,
the Court finds that Plaintiff's claims are not cognizable as they must be pursued as
collateral attacks to his sentence rather than under § 1983. As such, Plaintiff's
allegations do not state a claim. This action is dismissed with prejudice. Plaintiff
must first proceed in state court and federal habeas if he wants to challenge the terms
of his sentence. Judgment to enter for Defendants. A future court may find this
dismissal counts under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).
Entered this 2nd day of February, 2026.
s/Michael M. Mihm
MICHAEL M. MIHM
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11249815. Public record. Not legal advice.