# Stinde

> District Court, S.D. Illinois · February 2, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11249705

## Case

- **Full name:** Raymond Stinde v. Tyson Brown, Heather Hood, Jeff Marnarti, Derek Brandt, David Evelsizer, Mary Zimmer, Donald Lindenberg, Frank Lawrence, Angela Crain, Mohammed Siddiqui, and Anthony Wills
- **Court:** District Court, S.D. Illinois
- **Decided:** February 2, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

RAYMOND STINDE, #R34993, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
vs. ) Case No. 3:21-cv-01108-SMY
)
TYSON BROWN, HEATHER HOOD, )
JEFF MARNARTI, DEREK BRANDT, )
DAVID EVELSIZER, MARY ZIMMER, )
DONALD LINDENBERG, )
FRANK LAWRENCE, ANGELA CRAIN, )
MOHAMMED SIDDIQUI, )
and ANTHONY WILLS,1 )
)
Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

YANDLE, Chief District Judge:
This matter is now before the Court for consideration of two motions for summary
judgment for failure to exhaust administrative remedies filed by Defendant Mohammed Siddiqui
(Doc. 105) and Defendants Angela Crain, Heather Hood, David Evelsizer, Frank Lawrence, and
Donald Lindenberg (Doc. 107). For the following reasons, Defendants Evelsizer, Lawrence,
Lindenberg, Crain, and Siddiqui’s motions will be GRANTED, and Defendant Hood’s motion
will be DENIED.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Raymond Stinde is an inmate in the custody of the Illinois Department of
Corrections (IDOC) and filed this lawsuit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 while he was incarcerated
at Menard Correctional Center. He asserts Eighth Amendment claims against the defendants for

1 The Clerk’s Office will be DIRECTED to UPDATE the docket sheet to reflect the correct spelling of each
defendant’s name as reflected in the case caption and listed in their Answers, see Docs. 63, 64, 75, and 87.
their alleged deliberate indifference to his unconstitutional living conditions and chronic joint pain
for two months beginning on July 11, 2019.2
Plaintiff makes the following allegations in the Second Amended Complaint: Plaintiff
transferred from Pinckneyville Correctional Center to Menard Correctional Center following an

altercation with another inmate on July 11, 2019. He was punished with two months in
segregation.
Plaintiff was housed in a dirty segregation cell equipped with a rusty bedframe and urine-
stained mattress without bedding or a mattress protector. He was given no hygiene supplies and
no access to cold water. He also had no access to his personal belongings for several weeks.
Defendants Brown, Marnarti, Brandt, Hood, Evelsizer, Lindenberg, and Lawrence failed to
provide bedding and hygiene items when he asked.
Plaintiff was also denied medication for joint pain associated with lupus after requesting it
daily beginning on July 11, 2019. Although Nurse Practitioner Mary Zimmer increased his
prescription pain medication to 800 mg of Ibuprofen on August 1, 2019, Defendants Zimmer,

Crain, and Siddiqui failed to provide it from July 11, 2019 until October 11, 2019. Id.
The Second Amended Complaint (Doc. 44) survived preliminary screening under
28 U.S.C. § 1915A on the following claims (see Doc. 45):
Count 1: Eighth Amendment claim against Brown, Marnarti, Brandt, Hood,
Evelsizer, Lindenberg, and Lawrence for subjecting Plaintiff to
unconstitutional living conditions in segregation for two months beginning
July 11, 2019.

Count 2: Eighth Amendment claim against Zimmer, Crain, and Siddiqui for
exhibiting deliberate indifference to Plaintiff’s chronic joint pain associated
with lupus beginning July 11, 2019.

2 Plaintiff filed a Complaint (Doc. 1) on September 7, 2021, a First Amended Complaint (Doc. 38) on June 28, 2023,
and a Second Amended Complaint (Doc. 44) on August 30, 2023. The Second Amended Complaint now controls.
See Docs. 44-45.
Id. In their Answers to the Second Amended Complaint, see Docs. 63, 64, 75, and 87, all
defendants raised an affirmative defense based on Plaintiff’s alleged failure to exhaust his available
administrative remedies before bringing this lawsuit. Defendants Brown, Marnarti, Brandt, and
Zimmer later withdrew the affirmative defense, see Docs. 86 and 94, while Defendants Siddiqui,

Hood, Evelsizer, Lindenberg, Lawrence, and Crain moved for summary judgment, see Docs. 105
and 107.
MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Defendants Hood, Evelsizer, Lawrence, and Lindenberg seek summary judgment on
Count 1, see Doc. 107, and Defendants Siddiqui and Crain seek summary judgment on Count 2,
see Docs. 105 and 107. Defendants point out that Plaintiff knew how to use the grievance process
and did so regularly. Defendant Siddiqui concedes that Plaintiff properly exhausted one grievance
for each claim (Doc. 106, ¶¶ 12, 14), and the other defendants do not dispute that he completed
each step of the grievance process for those two grievances. They argue however that Plaintiff’s
grievance about the inadequate living conditions in Count 1 focused on misconduct of lower-level

staff for issues that were addressed by the time he wrote the grievance, and his grievance
addressing inadequate pain management for his lupus in Count 2 did not properly identify the
defendants or describe misconduct by them.
Plaintiff argues his grievances provide timely and sufficient notice of both claims against
all defendants based on his general description of them, his description of their misconduct, or
their supervisory roles opposes summary judgment. (Docs. 110 and 111).
FACTS
The following material facts are taken from pleadings, affidavits, depositions, admissions,
and answers to interrogatories and are considered undisputed for purposes of the pending motions:
Plaintiff filed two grievances that are dipositive of the pending summary judgment
motions:3 Grievance #32-9-19 and Grievance #162-10-19. (Docs. 107-1, ¶ 14; Docs. 110, 111)
Grievance #32-9-19 addresses the unconstitutional conditions of confinement at issue in Count 1.
(Doc. 107-1, ¶ 12, pp. 170-75). Grievance #162-10-19 addresses the denial of pain medication for

joint pain associated with lupus at issue in Count 2. (Doc. 107-1, pp. 133-44). Both grievances
are summarized below.
Grievance 1: #32-9-19 (Count 1)
In Grievance #32-9-19 dated August 26, 2019, Plaintiff complains about his conditions of
confinement in a dirty segregation cell beginning July 11, 2019. (Doc. 107-1, pp. 170-75). He
states he requested and was denied a bedroll, hygiene bag, and cold water, even after Officers
Brandt, Brown, Marnarti, and Held promised to provide these items to him. Id. at 173-75. Plaintiff
reportedly submitted a written request for grievance forms and money vouchers to Counselor Hood
in mid-July 2019, and she indicated that both were available on the gallery. On July 15, 2019,
Plaintiff responded by saying that his daily requests for these forms were ignored, and he asked

for Hood’s help addressing the conditions in his cell, the denial of a bedroll, and the lack of hygiene
supplies. Id. Hood agreed to inform a lieutenant about the issues, but Plaintiff never heard from
Hood again. Id.
Plaintiff received some personal property, including soap, toothpaste, and deodorant, from
Pinckneyville on July 27, 2019. Id. He showered for the first time at Menard on July 28, 2019
(Plaintiff declined a shower because he had no hygiene items, clothing, or towels on July 18 and/or

3 For the first time, in his Amended Motion for Summary Judgment, Defendant Siddiqui identifies a third grievance
complaining of inadequate medical care that Siddiqui claims Plaintiff did not pursue beyond the first level of the
grievance process: Grievance #154-12-19 (Doc. 106, ¶¶ 11, 13; Doc. 106-1, p. 1). Siddiqui did not identify or discuss
this grievance in the original summary judgment motion or seek leave to expand the scope of the summary judgment
motion when he amended it pursuant to court order. No other parties address it. Moreover, because this grievance has
no bearing on the outcome of the pending motions, the Court will not discuss it in any detail.
19, 2019). Id. He was then seen by a nurse practitioner for treatment of a rash that he developed
from his exposure to these conditions. Id. See also Doc. 106, ¶ 14.
Plaintiff sent a letter to the “Sergeant of North 2 (Lindberg), Major (John Doe), and
Warden”4 to report the unconstitutional living conditions on July 31, 2019. (Doc. 107-1, p. 174).

Plaintiff indicates that this letter to Lindenberg, Evelsizer, and Lawrence served to “mak[e] them
aware of [his] problems within this grievance.” Id. He states that he did not hear back from them.
Id. On August 2, 2019, Officer Held promised to give him a bedroll and hygiene supplies while
making rounds, and Lieutenant Snell provided a bedroll on August 4, 2019. Id. Plaintiff concludes
the grievance with a request for implementation of new policies for obtaining grievance forms and
money vouchers, a new bed, bedding, shower access, plumbing repairs, and hygiene supplies. Id.
Plaintiff’s grievance was marked received on September 20, 2019. (Doc. 107-1, pp. 171-
72). Grievance Officer Jeff Mulholland denied it on September 24, 2019, based on a review of
Counselor Hood’s investigation into the alleged misconduct of subordinate staff members (Brandt,
Brown, Marnarti, and Held) and report finding no complaints from Plaintiff about cell conditions,

hygiene items, or plumbing. Id. Chief Administrative Officer Lawrence concurred with this
decision on September 24, 2019. Id. Plaintiff appealed to the ARB on October 1, 2019. Id. The
ARB denied the appeal three days later noting the grievance was appropriately addressed by the
facility administration. Id. at 170. Debbie Knauer signed the denial for the ARB on October 4,
2019, and Acting IDOC Director Rob Jeffreys concurred the same day. Id.

4 In the Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiff identifies these individuals more specifically as Sergeant Lindenberg,
Major Evelsizer, and Warden Lawrence. See Doc. 44; Doc. 107-1, p. 174.
Grievance 2: #162-10-19 (Count 2)
In Grievance #162-10-19 dated October 14, 2019, Plaintiff complains about inadequate
medical care for his lupus and related pain. (Doc. 107-1, pp. 133-44). He states he informed
Menard’s medical staff about his lupus, joint pain, and treatment with pain medication during

intake on July 11, 2019. Id. at 136. On July 19, 2019, Plaintiff submitted a sick call slip to report
that he was still waiting to receive ibuprofen or Motrin (high dosage) and was then seen by “LPN
Ms. T.” the same day. He rated his pain as a “9” on a scale from “1 to 10” where “10” was the
worst pain. He also complained about not being seen by a doctor since arriving at the prison. Id.
He included two exhibits with his grievance: (1) Outpatient Offender Progress Notes documenting
his diagnosis of lupus and treatment with Motrin (600 mg) from July 11, 2019; and (2) Outpatient
Progress Notes confirming his diagnosis with lupus and medication adjustment to Ibuprofen (800
mg) and Plaquenil from July 19, 2019. Id. at 140.
Plaintiff also states in the grievance that he was scheduled to see a nurse practitioner on
July 25, 2019, but his appointment was rescheduled for July 30, 2019. Id. at 137. Before that

appointment, Plaintiff submitted another nurse sick call slip to report ongoing pain associated with
lupus. Id. He explains that medical staff denied him treatment after he refused to sign payment
paperwork when he was not actually required to pay for treatment of his chronic condition Id.
Plaintiff explains that on August 1, 2019, he saw a nurse who prescribed him Motrin (800
mg), id. at 137, and he supported this with an Offender Outpatient Progress Report signed by Mary
Zimmer on August 1, 2019. Id. at 142. Plaintiff did not actually receive this medicine, even after
directing 5 sick call slips to healthcare and asking nurses making rounds for his pain medication
on a daily basis. The nurses reassured him there was nothing more to do because the medicine
was already ordered. Id. at 137.
Plaintiff asserts he did not receive any pain medication until early October 2019, when
Nurse Reba gave him Ibuprofen (200 mg). Id. She also re-referred him to the nurse practitioner,
who again prescribed Ibuprofen (800 mg) on October 11, 2019. Plaintiff finally received it on
October 15, 2019. Id. In his grievance filed one day earlier, Plaintiff requested the following

relief: “the proper pain medication” to reduce his pain and suffering caused by his inadequate
healthcare in the “North 2 Health Care Unit” and “the names of nurse that delivered medication to
cells in the month of August & September so the nurses could be identified regarding the claim
herein.” Id. at 136-37.
Counselor Hood received Grievance #162-10-19 on October 17, 2019 and responded to it
on February 25, 2020. Id. at 136. The response referenced an attached Memorandum signed by
Dr. Siddiqui (facility medical director) and RN Angela Crain (HCUA) on February 19, 2020. Id.
at 144. Siddiqui and Crain noted that Plaintiff was prescribed 90 tablets of Ibuprofen (600 mg) at
Pinckneyville on June 20, 2019, and stated the pills should have been in his personal property
when he transferred to Menard on July 11, 2019. Id. Plaintiff’s medication records designated

them as “Keep On Person.” Id. According to the memo, Plaintiff was obligated to submit his own
refill requests, and he became eligible to do so on July 14, 2019. The prison’s pharmacy received
no refill requests from him in July, August, or September 2019. Id. He was given a new order for
ibuprofen (800 mg) on October 11, 2019 and received 30 tablets on October 15, 2019. Id.
Defendants Siddiqui and Crain explained that Plaintiff was responsible for requesting medication
refills 7 days before his supply ended and utilizing nurse sick call protocol. Id.
Menard’s grievance office received this Memorandum response on March 18, 2020, and
Grievance Officer Jeff Mulholland recommended that Plaintiff’s grievance be found moot on
March 20, 2020. Id. at 133-34. The Chief Administrative Officer concurred on March 24, 2020.
Id. Plaintiff signed his appeal on March 27, 2020. Id. at 134. Travis Bayler denied the appeal on
behalf of the ARB on April 15, 2020, and Acting IDOC Director Rob Jeffreys concurred with the
ARB’s decision. Id. at 133. They noted Plaintiff “has access to medical care. Treatment is at the
discretion of IDOC Physicians. Offender may submit a sick call for any issues that arise . . . [and]

a written request for medication within seven days prior to supply ending.” Id.
LEGAL STANDARDS
Summary judgment is proper if the pleadings, affidavits, depositions, admissions, and
answers to interrogatories show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the movant
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c). If a defendant meets his or her
burden of showing that there is an absence of evidence to support the plaintiff’s claim, Plaintiff
must demonstrate by affidavit, depositions, admissions, and answers to interrogatories that there
is a genuine issue of material fact for trial. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986).
Any doubt about the existence of a genuine issue must be resolved in favor of the nonmoving
party, i.e., the prisoner. Lawrence v. Kenosha Cty., 391 F.3d 837, 841 (7th Cir. 2004). The district

court’s role on summary judgment is generally not to weigh evidence or judge witness credibility.
When presented with a motion for summary judgment on the issue of exhaustion, the
district court’s approach to factual disputes is different. In Pavey v. Conley, 544 F.3d 739, 742
(7th Cir. 2008), the Seventh Circuit instructed district courts to conduct an evidentiary hearing to
resolve contested issues of fact concerning exhaustion. More recently, in Perttu v. Richards, 605
U.S. 460, 464 (2025), the Supreme Court partially overruled Pavey when it held that exhaustion
disputes must be reserved for a jury if the contested facts on exhaustion are intertwined with facts
on the merits of a claim. Thus, the district court must consider whether intertwinement between
factual disputes about exhaustion and the merits warrant a jury trial.5
If no material facts are disputed, no hearing is required. See Jackson v. Esser, 105 F.4th
948, 957 (7th Cir. 2024) (citing Smallwood v. Williams, 59 F.4th 306, 318 (7th Cir. 2023)); Doss

v. Gilkey, 649 F. Supp. 2d 905, 912 (S.D. Ill. 2009) (no hearing required where there are “no
disputed facts regarding exhaustion, only legal questions”). Because there are no genuine issues
of material fact in dispute, no Pavey hearing is necessary to resolve the pending motions.
Under the PLRA, a prisoner may not bring a lawsuit concerning prison conditions unless
and until he has exhausted all available administrative remedies. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a); Pavey,
544 F.3d 739, 740 (7th Cir. 2008). “The exhaustion requirement is an affirmative defense, which
the defendants bear the burden of proving.” Pavey v. Conley, 663 F.3d 899, 903 (7th Cir. 2011).
For a prisoner to properly exhaust his administrative remedies, the prisoner must “file complaints
and appeals in the place, and at the time, the prison’s administrative rules require.” Pozo v.
McCaughtry, 286 F.3d 1022, 1025 (7th Cir. 2002). “[A] prisoner who does not properly take each

step within the administrative process has failed to exhaust state remedies.” Id. at 1024.
Exhaustion must occur before the suit is filed. Ford v. Johnson, 362 F.3d 395, 398 (7th Cir. 2004).
The Illinois Administrative Code sets forth the grievance process that applies to an inmate
in the custody of the Illinois Department of Corrections. 20 ILL. ADMIN. CODE § 504.800, et seq.
(2017). The regulations require the inmate to file his grievance with his counselor or Grievance

5 The Supreme Court decided Perttu less than two weeks after all summary judgment briefing on exhaustion was
complete, so the Court requested supplemental briefing to address the impact of Perttu on this matter. (Doc. 115).
After reviewing Defendants’ Supplemental Briefs (Docs. 116, 118) and Plaintiff’s Responses (Docs. 120, 121), the
Court finds no intertwinement between the merits of the claims and the facts underlying exhaustion. This case involves
two Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claims arising from allegedly unconstitutional living conditions and
inadequate medical care. It involves no argument that Defendants’ misconduct interfered with Plaintiff’s exhaustion
of those claims. The facts surrounding exhaustion are also undisputed. This case is thus distinguishable from Perttu,
which included a First Amendment retaliation claim against a defendant who allegedly interfered with Plaintiff’s
ability to exhaust his administrative remedies for that claim.
Officer6 within 60 days of the incident, occurrence, or problem giving rise to the grievance. 20 ILL.
ADMIN. CODE § 504.810(a). If the complaint is not resolved through the counselor, the grievance
must be submitted to a Grievance Officer, who reports his or her findings and recommendations
in writing to the Chief Administrative Officer (CAO) within 2 months after receipt of the

grievance, whenever feasible. 20 ILL. ADMIN. CODE § 504.830(e). The CAO then provides the
inmate with a written decision on the grievance. Id.
If the inmate is not satisfied with the CAO’s response, he files an appeal with the IDOC
Director through the ARB. 20 ILL. ADMIN. CODE § 504.850(a). The ARB must receive the appeal
within 30 days of the date of the CAO’s decision. Id. The inmate must attach copies of the
Grievance Officer’s report and CAO’s decision to his appeal. Id. The ARB then considers the
matter and submits a written report of its findings and recommendations to the Director, who
makes a final determination within 6 months after receipt of the matter, when reasonably feasible
under the circumstances. 20 ILL. ADMIN. CODE § 504.850(d), (e).
If he faces an emergency, an inmate can use an alternative procedure to file an emergency

grievance. 20 ILL. ADMIN. CODE § 504.840. He may check the emergency grievance box on the
form and submit it directly to the CAO. Id. If deemed an emergency due to a substantial risk of
imminent personal injury or other serious or irreparable harm, the grievance is expedited for
processing. Id. If the CAO determines that a grievance does not describe an emergency, the
grievance is denied as a non-emergency, and the offender is notified, in writing, that he may
resubmit the grievance in accordance with the standard grievance procedure. 20 ILL. ADMIN. CODE
§ 504.840(c) (effective April 1, 2017).

6 Grievances about disciplinary matters should be addressed directly to the Grievance Officer, and all other grievances
should be sent to the counselor first. Id.
DISCUSSION
There is no dispute that Grievance #32-9-19 (dated August 26, 2019) and Grievance #162-
10-19 (dated October 14, 2019) were properly filed at each level of the grievance process
(Counselor, Grievance Officer, CAO, and ARB) “in the place, and at the time, the prison’s

administrative rules require.” See Pozo, 286 F.3d at 1025; Doc. 106, ¶¶ 12, 14; Doc. 107. At issue
is whether the grievances adequately apprised the prison of Plaintiff’s complaints with respect to
each defendant.
The Illinois Administrative Code requires a grievance to set forth factual details about each
aspect of the offender’s complaint. 20 ILL. ADMIN. CODE § 504.810(c). This includes a description
of what happened, when it happened, where it occurred, and who is the subject or otherwise
involved in the complaint. Id. The offender must include the name of each individual involved,
if available, or as much descriptive information as possible for each individual involved, if a name
is not available. Id.
Count 1: Grievance #32-9-19

Hood
Grievance #32-9-19 clearly identifies Counselor Hood by name, date, and description.
According to this grievance, Plaintiff first contacted Hood on July 15, 2019 and asked her for
grievance forms to address his complaints about unconstitutional living conditions that other staff
members had not addressed since his arrival on July 11, 2019. The same day, Plaintiff also
requested Hood’s help addressing the ongoing denial of a bedroll, hygiene supplies, and plumbing
issues. (See Doc. 42, ¶ 36). Plaintiff indicates that Hood agreed to report the issues to a lieutenant,
but he never heard from her about these issues again. Grievance #32-9-19 adequately describes
Hood’s involvement in the ongoing unconstitutional living conditions addressed in Count 1.
Therefore, Hood’s request for summary judgment will be denied.
Evelsizer, Lindenberg, and Lawrence
Grievance #32-9-19 identifies Lindenberg, Evelsizer, and Lawrence generically as the

“Sargent or North 2 (Lindberg),” the “Major (John Doe),” and the “Warden.” The parties do not
argue these generic references are insufficient to identify them in connection with this grievance.
See Doc. 107-1, p. 174; 20 ILL. ADMIN. CODE § 504.810(c). Rather, they take issue with the single
passing reference to them in an otherwise lengthy grievance complaining about other staff
members.
These defendants are mentioned only once in connection with a letter dated July 31, 2019
that was aimed at “making them aware of my problems within this grievance.” Plaintiff does not
describe the contents of this letter in his grievance. The grievance does not describe any
misconduct by Evelsizer, Lawrence, and Lindenberg prior to or after the letter, and there is no
indication in the record Plaintiff handed these defendants the letter or sent it to them some other

way. He does not indicate whether they received it, when they received it, or how they responded.
Plaintiff’s vague reference in the grievance to these three defendants in connection with a
letter dated July 31, 20197 is insufficient to satisfy § 504.810(c) or PLRA’s exhaustion
requirement. Accordingly, Defendants Lindenberg, Evelsizer, and Lawrence are entitled to
summary judgment on the issue of exhaustion, and their motion will be granted.

7 Moreover, the letter post-dates resolution of some issues. The date on the letter is four days after Plaintiff admits
receiving hygiene supplies on July 27, 2019 and four days before he admits receiving a bedroll on August 4, 2019.
Count 2: Grievance #162-10-19
Dr. Siddiqui (Facility Medical Director)
Dr. Siddiqui acknowledges that Plaintiff proceeded through each step of the grievance
process for Grievance #162-10-19 filed in connection with Count 2, but argues that neither he nor

any conduct attributable to him is referenced therein. (Doc. 106, ¶ 12). A grievant is not required
to know the name of the prison employee he is targeting in the grievance. See Roberts v. Neal,
745 F.3d 232, 235-36 (7th Cir. 2014). When known, he should include “the name of each person
who is the subject of or who is otherwise involved in the complaint,” or, alternatively, when not
known, he should include “as much descriptive information about the individual as possible.” Id.
(quoting § 504.810(b)).
Grievance #162-10-19 does not name Siddiqui, identify him generically as the “facility
medical director,” or describe any misconduct by him. Plaintiff’s passing reference to having seen
no doctor does not sufficiently describe this defendant who merely reviewed and responded to his
grievance dated October 2019 in a memo issued in February 2020. Plaintiff’s omission of all

descriptive information about this individual or his role in this matter is a fatal defect.
Consequently, Dr. Siddiqui’s motion for summary judgment will be granted.
Nurse Crain (Health Care Unit Administrator)
When determining whether a general reference is sufficient to encompass a specific person,
the Court is mindful of the PLRA’s requirement that a grievance “alert the prison to the nature of
the wrong for which redress is sought” and afford prison officials the opportunity to respond. See
Westefer v. Snyder, 422 F.3d 570, 580 (7th Cir. 2005) (citing Strong v. David, 297 F.3d 646, 650
(7th Cir. 2002)). See also Pavey, 663 F.3d at 905-06. The inmate must provide enough information
to fulfill a grievance’s function of giving prison officials a fair opportunity to address an inmate’s
complaints, not provide a particular official with personal notice that he may be sued. Maddox v.
Love, 655 F.3d 709, 722 (7th Cir. 2011); Johnson v. Johnson, 385 F.3d 503, 522 (5th Cir. 2004).
Grievance #162-10-19, refers to Nurse Reba, Mary Zimmer, “Nurse Practitioner,” “LPN
Ms. T.,” and other “nurses that delivered medication to cells in the month of August & September.”

(Doc. 107-1, pp. 136-37). Plaintiff fails to name Angela Crain specifically, generally, or
generically. He offers no description by physical appearance, job title, job description, or
otherwise. She is not implicated in any miscalculation of his pain, pain medication, or pain
treatment. Plaintiff simply made no effort to identify Nurse Crain as the individual or part of any
group of medical staff who denied him prescription pain medication between July and October
2019. All other facts suggest that her involvement was limited to the issuance of a memo
summarizing Plaintiff’s past care and issued four months after the events giving rise to Count 2
concluded. For these reasons, Crain’s motion for summary judgment on Count 2 will be granted.
DISPOSITION
The Amended Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Mohammed Siddiqui (Doc. 105) is

GRANTED, and the Amended Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Defendants Angela Crain,
Heather Hood, David Evelsizer, Frank Lawrence, and Donald Lindenberg (Doc. 107) is
GRANTED in part as to Defendants Angela Crain, David Evelsizer, Frank Lawrence, and Donald
Lindenberg and DENIED in part as to Defendant Heather Hood.
COUNT 1 is DISMISSED against Defendants Evelsizer, Lawrence, and Lindenberg, and
COUNT 2 is DISMISSED against Defendants Crain and Siddiqui, both based on Plaintiff’s
failure to exhaust his administrative remedies. Because no other claims remain pending against
them, Defendants Evelsizer, Lawrence, Lindenberg, Crain, and Siddiqui are DISMISSED from
this action with judgment to enter at the close of this case.
All other defendants withdrew or waived the affirmative defense based on Plaintiff’s
failure to exhaust his administrative remedies.
Now that the issue of exhaustion is resolved, the following claims will proceed to the
merits: COUNT 1 against Defendants Brown, Hood, Marnarti, and Brandt and COUNT 2

against Defendant Zimmer. In addition, Defendant Anthony Wills remains named in an official
capacity for purposes of carrying out any injunctive relief ordered in this case.
The Court will enter a separate Scheduling and Discovery Order lifting the stay on
discovery and providing further instructions and deadlines for litigation of the remaining claims.
The Clerk’s Office is DIRECTED to UPDATE the docket sheet in CM/ECF to reflect
the correct spelling of each defendant’s name as reflected in the above case caption and
Footnote 1 and TERMINATE Defendants Evelsizer, Lawrence, Lindenberg, Crain, and
Siddiqui as parties in CM/ECF.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: February 2, 2026 s/ Staci M. Yandle
STACI M. YANDLE
Chief U.S. District Judge

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11249705. Public record. Not legal advice.