# Barnett

> District Court, S.D. Ohio · January 20, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11249281

## Case

- **Full name:** Major Sean Barnett v. United States Air Force, et al.
- **Court:** District Court, S.D. Ohio
- **Decided:** January 20, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
WESTERN DIVISION AT DAYTON

MAJOR SEAN BARNETT, :
:
Plaintiff, : Case No. 3:25-cv-228
:
v. : Judge Thomas M. Rose
:
UNITED STATES AIR FORCE, et al., : Magistrate Judge Michael R. Merz
:
Defendants. :
______________________________________________________________________________

ENTRY AND ORDER DENYING MOTIONS FOR INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
(DOC. NOS. 23, 24, 50, 59); ADOPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS
ON MOTION FOR CIVIL CONTEMPT (DOC. NO. 38), OVERRULING
PLAINTIFF’S OBJECTIONS TO THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S REPORT
AND RECOMMENDATIONS ON MOTION FOR CIVIL CONTEMPT (DOC.
NO. 41), AND DENYING PLAINTIFF’S COMBINED MOTION FOR CIVIL
CONTEMPT OF COURT (DOC. NO. 28); DENYING MISCELLANEOUS
MOTIONS (DOC. NOS. 40, 43, 51, 52, 53); GRANTING, IN PART, AND
DENYING, IN PART, DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS (DOC. NO. 64);
AND, GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S UNOPPOSED MOTION FOR EXTENSION
OF TIME TO FILE REPLY IN SUPPORT OF PENDING MOTIONS (DOC. NO.
68) AND PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE SUR-REPLY IN
RESPONSE TO DEFENDANTS’ REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO
DISMISS (DOC. NO. 71)
______________________________________________________________________________

At present, the Court must address a number of pending docket entries in this case, brought
by pro se Plaintiff Major Sean Barnett (“Barnett”) pursuant to the Administrative Procedures Act,
5 U.S.C. § 701, et seq. (the “APA”). (See Doc. No. 1.) On one hand, the Court is faced with
various motions filed by Barnett. Barnett has filed motions requesting temporary and preliminary
injunctive relief (“Motions for Injunctive Relief”)1; he has filed Plaintiff’s Combined Motion for

1 See Renewed Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction (Doc. No. 23); Renewed Motion
for Expedited Consideration of Plaintiff’s Renewed Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary
Injunction (Doc. No. 24); Plaintiff’s Emergency Motion to Compel Restoration of the Status Quo Ante (Doc. No. 50);
Plaintiff’s Combined Motion for Clarification and for Expedited Consideration Requesting Temporary Enjoining of
NPDB Reporting Pending Court Determination (Doc. No. 59).
Civil Contempt of Court (“Contempt Motion”) (Doc. No. 28), which Magistrate Judge Michael R.
Merz recommends denying in his Report and Recommendations on Motion for Civil Contempt
(“Contempt R&R”) (Doc. No. 38); Barnett has submitted several miscellaneous motions, where
he attempts to either unilaterally set deadlines, dictate the facts reflected in the record, or persuade
the Court to otherwise enact a sort of petty vengeance on the Defendants (“Miscellaneous

Motions”)2; and, lastly, Barnett has filed Plaintiff’s Unopposed Motion for Extension of Time to
File Reply in Support of Pending Motions (Doc. No. 68) and Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File
Sur-Reply in Response to Defendants’ Reply in Support of Motion to Dismiss (Doc. No. 71), both
of which the Court summarily GRANTS in the interest of justice and proceeds with its analysis
herein accordingly.
On the other side, the Court must adjudicate Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (“Defendants’
Motion” or the “Motion to Dismiss”) (Doc. No. 39). There, Defendants the United States Air
Force (“Air Force”), Defense Health Agency (“DHA”), and the Secretary of the Air Force
(“Secretary”) (collectively, “Defendants”) argue that Barnett has failed to state a claim. (Doc. No.

39 at PageID 400.) Specifically, Defendants contend that Barnett’s APA claims must fall because
Barnett failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. (Id. at PageID 403-07.) Additionally,
Defendants suggest that Barnett’s accompanying claims must be dismissed, as none of the statutes
relied on by Barnett with respect to those claims provide him a cause of action. (Id. at PageID

Each of these motions, irrespective of what it is titled or which verbiage it employs, requests the same injunctive relief.
Therefore, to best construe the entirety of Barnett’s arguments for injunctive relief, the Court interchangeably refers
to the cited motions as the “Motions for Injunctive Relief.”
2 See Plaintiff’s Motion to Certify Facts of Contempt (Doc. No. 40); Plaintiff’s Amended Motion to Certify Facts of
Contempt (Doc. No. 43); Plaintiff’s Motion for Order to Show Cause Why Defendants Should Not be Held in Civil
Contempt (Doc. No. 51); Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Production of the Complete Administrative Record, Personnel
File, Plaintiffs [sic] Exhibits 1-5, and Transparency Certifications (Doc. No. 52); Plaintiff’s Coordinated Motion for
Structured Relief and Scheduling Order (Doc. No. 53).
408-10.) Since filing the Motion to Dismiss, Defendants have conceded that the DHA has taken
final agency action against Barnett and, therefore, Barnett’s APA claim concerning DHA should
survive Defendants’ Motion. (Doc. No. 64 at PageID 529.) Defendants maintain that Barnett has
failed to state a claim in all other respects. (Id.)
Upon consideration, the Court: DENIES Barnett’s Motions for Injunctive Relief;

ADOPTS Magistrate Judge Merz’s Contempt R&R, OVERRULES Plaintiff’s Objections to the
Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendations on Motion for Civil Contempt (“Objections”)
(Doc. No. 41), and DENIES Barnett’s Contempt Motion; DENIES Barnett’s Miscellaneous
Motions; and, GRANTS, IN PART, and DENIES, IN PART, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss.
The Court sets forth its rationale for these determinations below.
I. BACKGROUND
At bottom, this action concerns Barnett’s ability to practice medicine at Wright Patterson
Air Force Base Medical Center (“WPMC”). (See Doc. No. 1 at PageID 1-2.) At all times relevant,
Barnett was an enlisted Air Force staff nephrologist at WPMC. (Id. at PageID 2.) In 2023,

Defendants began taking steps to separate Barnett from the Air Force and suspend his privilege to
practice medicine at DHA facilities like WPMC. (Id. at PageID 3.) These processes continued
throughout 2024 and 2025. (See Doc. No. 1-2 at PageID 16.) Whether rightly or wrongly, this
suit was filed in July of 2025. (Doc. No. 1.)
The administrative processes pertaining to Barnett’s position and privilege to practice at
WPMC allegedly began, to one degree or another, in May of 2023. In the months leading up to
May 2023, Barnett’s colleagues and superiors apparently perceived Barnett to be mentally unwell.
(See Doc. No. 1-2 at PageID 18.) In particular, these individuals reported issues with Barnett’s
purported use of social media to lambast the United States government and elected officials. (Id.)
Moreover, Barnett’s cohorts at WPMC allegedly believed Barnett was disregarding advice and
consulting on patient cases that were not his. (Id.) On May 2, 2023, Barnett did allegedly email
a patient safety report to military investigators concerning a patient who it is not clear he was
consulted to treat. (Doc. No. 1 at PageID 3; Doc. No. 1-4 at PageID 85-86.) Yet, Barnett claims,
in a conclusory fashion, that the concerns of his peers and supervisors were meritless and based

on forged documentation. (Doc. No. 1 at PageID 3.)
Nonetheless, on May 12, 2023, Barnett’s superiors allegedly requested Barnett be subject
to a mental health evaluation to determine if he was fit for military service. (Doc. No. 1-2 at
PageID 18.) On November 17, 2023, after a second evaluation, officials issued a report allegedly
diagnosing Barnett with a personality disorder and recommending he be separated from the Air
Force. (Id. at PageID 36.)
In the nearly two years following this report, Barnett was administratively separated from
the Air Force and DHA restricted Barnett’s practice privileges. (See Doc. No. 1 at PageID 3.)
Although the administrative proceedings were not final when Barnett came to this Court with his

Hybrid Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief Under the Administrative Procedures Act,
Damages Under the Military Claims Act, and Whistleblower Retaliation (“Complaint”) (Doc. No.
1), DHA has since made a final agency decision to revoke Barnett’s practice privileges. (Doc. No.
57.) Barnett has also purportedly been separated from the Air Force since filing this action. (Doc.
No. 34.) However, the record does not reflect that Barnett challenged his separation through an
intermediate administrative body, as he did with respect to his privileges to practice medicine.
Apparently dissatisfied with Defendants’ administrative processes, Barnett filed his
Complaint on July 7, 2025. (Doc. No. 1.) In the Complaint, Barnett alleges six supposed causes
of action, listed as follows: violation of the APA; declaratory judgment; injunctive relief;
mandamus; retaliation under whistleblower protection statute; and, damages under the Military
Claims Act. (Id. at PageID 6.) In sum, although alleged in a highly conclusory manner, Barnett
avers that the adverse actions taken against him at WPMC by the Air Force and DHA were
arbitrary and capricious, and, contrary to law insofar as Defendants’ processes were retaliatory and
flouted Barnett’s constitutional rights. (Doc. No. 1-1 at PageID 10-13.)

Since bringing the current suit, Barnett has inundated the Court’s docket with motions.
(See generally Docket.) But as the smoke settles, the Court finds it most fitting to address Barnett’s
many motions in three broad categories. First, Barnett has filed his Motions for Injunctive Relief.
Barnett filed his most recent of these motions on December 3, 2025, and the matter was fully
briefed on December 29, 2025. (Doc. Nos. 59, 67, 74.) Second, Barnett has lodged the Contempt
Motion, which is the subject of Magistrate Judge Merz’s Contempt R&R. (Doc. No. 28, 38.) And,
third, Barnett has filed a slew of Miscellaneous Motions whereby he attempts to certify otherwise
unestablished facts, unilaterally dictate a case schedule, or reprimand Defendants for perceived
slights. (See e.g., Doc. No. 51 at PageID 485-87.) The most recent of these Miscellaneous

Motions, being filed on November 24, 2025 (Doc. No. 52), became ripe for review and decision
when Barnett filed his final reply brief on December 29, 2025. (Doc. No. 74.)
In addition to Barnett’s filings, Defendants submitted their own Motion to Dismiss on
September 29, 2025. (Doc. No. 39.) Barnett responded on October 17, 2025 (Doc. No. 46), during
a lapse in federal appropriations which prevented Defendants’ counsel from timely prosecuting
the Motion to Dismiss. Once the government shutdown ended, Defendants were granted an
extension of time and they filed their final reply brief in support of the Motion to Dismiss on
December 12, 2025. (Doc. No. 64.) As stated above, Barnett then followed Defendants’ reply in
support of the Motion to Dismiss with a motion for leave to file a sur-reply and an accompanying
proposed sur-reply, which the Court respectively grants and considers accordingly herein. Thus,
the Court considers Defendants’ Motion ripe for review and decision.
II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW
When reviewing the pending motions in this matter, the Court must adhere to three
particular legal standards: the standard for motions to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6);

the standard of review applicable to a magistrate judge’s report and recommendations and
objections thereto; and, the standard used to evaluate a litigant’s claim to injunctive relief.
A. Motions to Dismiss Under Rule 12(b)(6)
“The purpose of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss is to allow a defendant to test whether,
as a matter of law, the plaintiff is entitled to legal relief even if everything alleged in the complaint
is true.” Bihn v. Fifth Third Mortg. Co., 980 F. Supp. 2d 892, 897 (S.D. Ohio 2013) (citing Mayer
v. Mylod, 988 F. 2d 635, 638 (6th Cir. 1993)). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must
contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). A claim is facially plausible when it includes

“factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
for the misconduct alleged.” Id. This standard is not the same as a probability standard, but “asks
for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. “Where a complaint
pleads facts that are merely consistent with a defendant’s liability, it stops short of the line between
possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus,
if a plaintiff has “not nudged [its] claims across the line from conceivable to plausible, [the]
complaint must be dismissed.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).
When ruling on a motion to dismiss, the Court must accept the factual allegations of the
complaint as true and construe them in a light most favorable to the non-moving party. Id. at 554-
55. However, the Court is not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual
allegation. Id. at 555-56. “In evaluating a motion to dismiss [a court] may consider the complaint
and any exhibits attached thereto, public records, items appearing in the record of the case and
exhibits attached to the defendant’s motion to dismiss so long as they are referred to in the
complaint and are central to the claims contained therein.” Luis v. Zang, 833 F.3d 619, 626 (6th

Cir. 2016) (internal quotation marks omitted).
B. Reports and Recommendations
Generally, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b), a district court may appoint a magistrate judge
in the district to consider non-dispositive matters in a given case. When a matter is referred to a
magistrate judge, the magistrate must ultimately “file his proposed findings and recommendations
… with the court,” and serve a copy of the report on all parties to the case. 28 U.S.C. § 636
(b)(1)(C). In turn, any party to the subject litigation may file his objections to the magistrate
judge’s report and recommendations within fourteen days of being served with the same. 28
U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Once a party files written objections to a magistrate judge’s report, “[a] judge

of the court shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified
proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made.” Id. “The judge may also
receive further evidence or recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions.” Id.
C. Motions for Injunctive Relief
A litigant may seek preliminary injunctive relief in the form of a temporary restraining
order (“TRO”) or a preliminary injunction, under Fed. R. Civ. P. 65. TROs are typically issued ex
parte “if immediate and irreparable harm is shown and the movant’s attorney certifies why notice
is not required.” Muffler Man Supply Co., Inc. v. TSE Auto Serv., Inc., 739 F. Supp. 3d 598, 602
(E.D. Mich. 2024) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b)(1)). In this vein, “TROs ‘should … preserv[e] the
status quo only [until] a hearing’ can be held.” Muffler Man, 739 F. Supp. 3d at 602 (quoting
Vector Rsch. V. Howard Att’ys, 76 F.3d 692, 696 (6th Cir. 1996)) (alterations in original).
By any token, a court considering whether to grant preliminary injunctive relief must
balance four specific factors: “(1) whether the movant has established a substantial likelihood or
probability of success on the merits; (2) whether the movant would suffer irreparable injury

without the preliminary [injunctive relief]; (3) whether the issuance of the preliminary [injunctive
relief] would cause substantial harm to others; and (4) whether the public interest would be served
by the issuance of the preliminary [injunctive relief].” Churchill Downs Tech. Initiatives Co. v.
Michigan Gaming Control Bd., 767 F. Supp. 3d 556, 579 (W.D. Mich. 2025) (citing Kentucky v.
Hagel, 759, F.3d 588, 600 (6th Cir. 2014)). Importantly, preliminary injunctive relief shall not be
awarded if the plaintiff cannot demonstrate some likelihood of success on the merits and
irreparable harm. See generally Int’l. Union of Painters & Allied Trades Dist. Council No. 6 v.
Smith, 148 F.4th 365, 371 (6th Cir. 2025). In particular, “[t]he irreparable harm factor is
indispensable because, without it, a plaintiff cannot show why he needs relief now rather than at

the lawsuit’s end.” Smith, 148 F.4th at 371 (citing D.T. v. Sumner Cnty. Schs., 942 F.3d 324, 326-
27 (6th Cir. 2019)). The party pursuing preliminary injunctive relief “bears the burden of justifying
such relief.” Moms for Liberty – Wilson Cnty., Tenn. v. Wilson Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 155 F.4th 499,
508 (6th Cir. 2025) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
Finally, as a rule, preliminary injunctive relief “is an extraordinary remedy involving the
exercise of a very far-reaching power, which is to be applied only in the limited circumstances
which clearly demand it.” Churhill Downs Tech., 767 F. Supp. 3d at 579 (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted). To that end, “[w]hether to issue a preliminary injunction is in the
discretion of the district court.” Churchill Downs Tech., 767 F. Supp. 3d at 597 (citing Planet Aid
v. City of St. Johns, 782 F.3d 318, 323 (6th Cir. 2015)).
III. ANALYSIS
Broadly speaking, the motions currently at issue can most aptly be categorized as the
Miscellaneous Motions, the Contempt Motion and the Contempt R&R, Defendants’ Motion to

Dismiss, and Barnett’s Motions for Injunctive Relief. The Court considers these pending motions
as such.
A. Miscellaneous Motions
At the outset, the Court denies the entirety of Barnett’s Miscellaneous Motions. To
reiterate, Barnett’s Miscellaneous Motions seek, to one extent or another, to certify unestablished
facts, unilaterally dictate the trajectory of this case, or simply enact punitive measures against
Defendants. (See Doc. Nos. 43 at PageID 431-33; 51 at PageID 484-85; 52 at PageID 488-89; 53
at PageID 493-94.)
In effect, the Court construes Barnett’s Miscellaneous Motions as motions for sanctions

under Fed. R. Civ. P. 11. The Court notes that each of Barnett’s Miscellaneous Motions requests
relief in order to remedy an equitable wrong caused by Defendants’ alleged violation of Court
orders. In an attempt to certify unestablished facts pertaining to Defendants’ ultimate liability,
Barnett points to Defendants’ purported failure to follow Court orders or otherwise dispute facts
alleged in the Complaint. (See Doc. No. 43 at PageID 432-33.) Along these lines, Barnett’s
Miscellaneous Motions include a similar request to require Defendants to show cause why the
Court should not hold them in contempt for perceived slights against Barnett. (Doc. No. 51 at
PageID 484-87.) And, for good measure, Barnett uses the Miscellaneous Motions to attempt to
dictate a truncated trajectory for this action. (Doc. No. 53 at PageID 493-95.) In doing so, he
alleges that adhering to his schedule is the only way to restore parity supposedly tainted by
Defendants’ failure to adhere to the Court’s orders. (Id.)
For a court to impose such Rule 11 sanctions on a litigant, “the movant must produce clear
and convincing evidence that shows that he violated a definite and specific order of the court ….”
Elec. Workers Pension Tr. Fund of Loc. Union 58, IBEW v. Gary’s Elec. Serv. Co., 340 F.3d 373,

379 (6th Cir. 2003) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). By this token, Barnett’s
contentions are improper. As explained in greater detail below, Barnett has not shown by clear
and convincing evidence that Defendants have violated a Court order. Instead, Barnett has cried
foul on the basis of conclusory allegations. Indeed, upon review of the Miscellaneous Motions,
the Court finds that Barnett’s arguments misrepresent the law and are rooted in fantasy rather than
fact. Entertaining such motions is, frankly, a waste of judicial resources. Hence, Barnett’s
Miscellaneous Motions are DENIED.
B. Contempt Motion and the Contempt R&R
The Court now considers Barnett’s Contempt Motion, the Contempt R&R, and Barnett’s

Objections thereto. Prior to the Contempt Motion’s filing, the Parties agreed to an order requiring
Defendants’ counsel to notify Barnett and the Court when Defendants took final agency action
with respect to Barnett’s administrative separation and DHA practice privileges. (Doc. No. 22.)
In early September 2025, the Air Force allegedly provided Barnett with a separation date, but
Defendants’ counsel did not immediately notify the Court. (Id. at PageID 321.) Barnett responded
by filing the Contempt Motion, arguing that Defendants willfully violated the Court’s prior agreed
order. (Id.) By the Contempt R&R, Magistrate Judge Merz recommends denying the Contempt
Motion because Barnett has failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that holding
Defendants in contempt will serve a compensatory or remedial purpose. (Doc. No. 38 at PageID
398-99.)
The Court has conducted a de novo review of the record with respect to the Contempt
Motion and those portions of the Contempt R&R which were objected to. The Court has also
considered Barnett’s Objections and finds them to be not well-taken. To obtain a civil contempt

ruling, the movant must “prove by clear and convincing evidence that the respondent violated the
court’s prior order.” N.L.R.B. v. Cincinnati Bronze, Inc., 829 F.2d 585, 590 (6th Cir. 1987)
(quoting In re Newton, 718 F.2d 1015, 1022 (11th Cir. 1983)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
The Court generally agrees with the Contempt R&R insomuch as it posits that a finding of civil
contempt here would not serve a remedial purpose. However, to add, Barnett has also not shown
by clear and convincing evidence that the Court’s prior agreed order was disobeyed to begin with.
The agreed order required Defendants to provide notice on taking final agency action. Although
Barnett was given a separation date, nothing in the record suggests that the Air Force had taken
such final agency action. To the contrary, the letter attached to Barnett’s Contempt Motion

indicated that Barnett could still seek review of the decision to separate him through the Air Force
Board for Correction of Military Records (“AFBCMR”). (Doc. No. 28-1 at PageID 325.) In the
absence of a final agency action here, Defendants would have had no corresponding notice
obligation. Accordingly, Barnett has failed to show Defendants to be in contempt.
Therefore, the Court hereby ADOPTS Magistrate Judge Merz’s Contempt R&R,
OVERRULES Barnett’s Objections thereto, and DENIES the Contempt Motion.
C. Motion to Dismiss
The Court turns next to the Motion to Dismiss, where Defendants argue that each of
Barnett’s alleged causes of action fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. (Doc.
No. 39 at PageID 400.) The Court considers Defendants’ Motion along these lines in three parts.
First, the Court reviews Barnett’s causes of action alleged under the Military Claims Act and the
purported Military Whistleblower Protection Act. Second, the Court examines Barnett’s causes
of action for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief. Lastly, the Court disposes of Barnett’s
claims brought pursuant to the APA and his cause of action for mandamus relief.

1. Military Claims Act and Whistleblower Protection
The Court has first determined to dismiss Barnett’s alleged causes of action under the
Military Claims Act, 10 U.S.C. § 2733, and whistleblower protections provided by 10 U.S.C. §
1034. Neither of these statutes gives way to a cognizable private right of action. Rather, the
Military Claims Act authorizes military officials to settle certain claims raised against the United
States. 10 U.S.C. § 2733(a). Meanwhile, 10 U.S.C. § 1034 does no more than guarantee internal
administrative procedures to protect from retaliation on the basis of protected communications. At
present then, Barnett has failed to state a claim under the Military Claims Act and the purported
Military Whistleblower Protection Act because he cannot as a matter of law. The claims simply

do not exist unto themselves. Therefore, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ Motion with respect to
these causes of action.3
2. Claims for Declaratory Judgment and Injunctive Relief
Looking to Barnett’s causes of action for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief, the
Court finds these claims cannot survive Defendants’ Motion. Regarding declaratory judgment,
the Declaratory Judgment Act authorizes courts to declare a litigant’s substantive rights “[i]n a
case of actual controversy within [the court’s] jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a). In other words,
the Declaratory Judgment Act establishes a remedy, but it “does not create an independent cause

3 Listed in the Complaint as Counts V and VI.
of action.” Davis v. U.S., 499 F.3d 590, 594 (6th Cir. 2007) (citing Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips
Petroleum Co., 399 U.S. 667, 671 (1950)). Similarly, the law is clear that “‘[i]njunctive relief is
not a cause of action, it is a remedy.’” Kaplan v. Univ. of Louisville, 10 F.4th 569, 587 (6th Cir.
2021) (quoting Thompson v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., 563 F. App’x. 440, 443 n.1 (6th Cir.
2014)). In light of these legal authorities, Barnett’s claims for declaratory judgment and injunctive

relief cannot stand as independent causes of action. Rather, Barnett may only pursue these avenues
for relief by way of his cognizable causes of action, if any. Therefore, the Court GRANTS
Defendants’ Motion as applied to Barnett’s purported claims for declaratory judgment and
injunctive relief.4
3. Mandamus Relief and APA Claims
The Court shifts its focus again to consider the justiciability of Barnett’s claims under the
APA as well has his claim for mandamus relief. To clarify the latter, “[m]andamus ‘is a drastic
and extraordinary remedy reserved for really extraordinary causes.’” In re Levang, 154 F.4th 444,
448-49 (6th Cir. 2025) (quoting Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for D.C., 542 U.S. 367, 380 (2004))

(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Generally, to obtain mandamus relief, a plaintiff
“‘must (1) have no other adequate means of obtaining relief, (2) demonstrate a right to issuance
that is clear and indisputable, and (3) show that issuance of the writ is appropriate under the
circumstances.’” In re Levang, 154 F.4th 444, 449 (quoting In re Univ. of Mich., 936 F.3d 460,
466 (6th Cir. 2019)). Yet, where a plaintiff “seeks both mandamus relief and relief under the APA,
Courts apply the same principles and standards both to determine jurisdiction and to assess the
merits.” Huron Mountain Club v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 545 F. App’x. 390, 393 (6th Cir.
2013) (quoting Nelson v. United States, 107 F. App’x. 469, 471 (6th Cir. 2004)) (internal quotation

4 Listed in the Complaint as Counts II and III.
marks omitted). Put most simply, in this case, Barnett’s claim to mandamus relief will rise and
fall with his APA claims. See Omar v. Blinken, 756 F. Supp. 3d 520, 529 (S.D. Ohio 2024)
(“Because the Court may review [p]laintiffs’ claims under the APA, it may therefore review the
request for mandamus”).
Substantively then, in their Motion to Dismiss, Defendants contend that Barnett’s APA

claims cannot stand because Barnett did not exhaust his administrative remedies before filing the
Complaint. (Doc. No. 39 at PageID 403-07.) Since lodging their Motion to Dismiss, Defendants
have conceded that DHA has taken final agency action regarding Barnett’s practice privileges and,
therefore, Barnett’s APA claim against DHA may proceed. (Doc. No. 64 at PageID 529.) The
Court agrees and DENIES Defendants’ Motion with respect to Barnett’s APA claim against DHA.
However, whether Barnett has stated an actionable claim under the APA for his administrative
separation from the Air Force remains at issue.
For his part, Barnett argues that he did exhaust his administrative remedies. (Doc. No. 46
at PageID 453.) Specifically, as it pertains to Barnett’s administrative separation, Barnett states,

in a conclusory fashion, that he “has exhausted the [AFBCMR] concerning retaliation, discharge,
and PTSD.” (Id. at PageID 454.) Alternatively, Barnett posits that he should be excused from the
APA’s exhaustion requirement. (Id.)
Fundamentally, the APA provides that “[a] person suffering legal wrong because of agency
action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant
statute, is entitled to judicial review thereof.” 5 U.S.C. § 702. Notwithstanding, the APA narrows
the range of reviewable agency actions to “final agency action for which there is no other adequate
remedy in a court.” This final agency action requirement comports with the Supreme Court’s
“administrative-exhaustion doctrine, which ‘provides that no one is entitled to judicial relief for a
supposed or threatened injury until the prescribed administrative remedy has been exhausted.’”
Pakdel v. City and Cnty. of San Francisco, California, 594 U.S. 474, 479 (2021) (quoting
Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 88-89 (2006)).
“Exhaustion requirements must be applied ‘with a regard for the particular administrative
scheme at issue.’” Joseph Forrester Trucking v. Dir., Off. Of Workers’ Comp. Programs, 987

F.3d 581, 590 (6th Cir. 2021) (quoting Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 765 (1975)). Military
servicemembers seeking to challenge personnel actions, as Barnett does here, must exhaust all
available intraservice corrective measures before pursuing judicial review. Harkness v. Dep’t. of
Navy, 858 F.3d 437, 444 (6th Cir. 2017). Reviewing courts have found this exhaustion
requirement to be particularly necessary in military personnel actions, “given the judiciary’s lack
of expertise in areas of military judgment and its long-standing policy of non-intervention in
internal military affairs.” Heidman v. U.S., 414 F. Supp. 47, 48 (N.D. Ohio 1976) (collecting
cases). Consequently, courts in the Sixth Circuit have largely found that a military branch’s
personnel action will not be considered final and justiciable unless and until the servicemember

has sought review of the personnel action through his branch’s Board for Correction of Military
Records. See Seepe v. Dep’t. of the Navy, 518 F.2d 760, 764 (6th Cir. 1975); see also Heidman,
414 F. Supp. at 48-49 (N.D. Ohio 1976).
In the instant action, Barnett has failed to exhaust available administrative remedies related
to his separation from the Air Force. Barnett may have received a separation date, but he did not
seek review of that decision through the AFBCMR. At most, Barnett has provided a relatively
non-descript letter, signed on May 11, 2025, from AFBCMR officials advising that Barnett’s
application for correction of military records would be denied. (Doc. No. 28-1 at PagID 325.)
However, this letter cannot constitute final agency action separating Barnett because Barnett could
not seek administrative review of such a decision until he was effectively separated from the Air
Force. Recall that Barnett had not received a separation date when he filed this suit in July 2025,
and did not receive an actual separation date from the Air Force until September 2025. On the
current record, had the Air Force made a final decision regarding Barnett’s employment at WPMC
in May of 2025, it is not plausible to think that the organization would have waited four months to

provide Barnett with a separation date. What is more, Barnett has offered neither allegation nor
evidence which would allow the Court to reasonably infer otherwise.
The Court further finds that no equitable exceptions to the general administrative
exhaustion requirement of the APA may be applied to Barnett’s case. In the past, courts have
recognized that a plaintiff may be excused from a non-jurisdictional exhaustion requirement along
equitable grounds. See Seepe, 518 F.2d at 762; see also Hagel, 759 F.3d at 599. In some instances,
exhaustion may be excused “if a litigant can show: (1) that requiring exhaustion will result in
irreparable harm; (2) that the administrative body is wholly inadequate; or (3) that the
administrative body is biased, making recourse to the agency futile.” Hagel, 759 F.3d at 599

(citations omitted). In the military context, courts may also excuse the exhaustion requirement
“where the complaint involve[s] a matter of law only and [does] not require or involve application
of military expertise ….” Seepe, 518 F.2d at 762 (citations omitted).
Here, the Court cannot tether any of these excuses to Barnett’s failure to exhaust
administrative remedies with respect to his separation from the Air Force. Barnett has certainly
put words to paper on the issue, but he has said absolutely nothing. To be sure, requiring Barnett
to exhaust his administrative remedies would not irreparably harm him, but would give him an
opportunity to obtain the relief he seeks in this case. To that end, the Court is of the understanding
that the AFBCMR would have the authority to grant Barnett the full ambit of relief he pursues in
this action. Moreover, Barnett has not demonstrated the AFBCMR to be biased to the point of
futility and the Court cannot conceive of a valid reason why the Air Force’s personnel action
against Barnett would not be a fact-intensive matter and subject to military expertise. Rather, the
Court could likely benefit from a complete administrative record, compiled by those with a
working knowledge of the Air Force’s personnel standards and practices.

Ultimately, the Court finds that Barnett has inexcusably failed to exhaust his administrative
remedies with respect to his administrative separation from the Air Force. Accordingly, the Court
GRANTS Defendants’ Motion as to Barnett’s APA claim in this regard.5
D. Motions for Injunctive Relief
The Court sets its sights last on Barnett’s Motions for Injunctive Relief. For the sake of
clarity, in light of the foregoing, consideration of the Motions for Injunctive Relief will be limited
to DHA’s decision to revoke Barnett’s practice privileges. To the extent that the Motions for
Injunctive Relief are aimed at Barnett’s administrative separation from the Air Force, the Motions
for Injunctive Relief are DENIED.

As it relates to his DHA practice privileges, Barnett seeks a TRO until such time as the
Court may conduct a preliminary injunction hearing. (See e.g., Doc. No. 23 at PageID 279.) In
particular, Barnett petitions for the Court to enjoin Defendants from “[m]aintaining or
disseminating any adverse credentialing determinations” or “[i]nterfereing with [Barnett’s]
civilian medical practice or employment.” (Id.) In support, Barnett states that the DHA’s adverse
action against him violated DHA procedures and Barnett’s constitutional rights. (Id. at PageID

5 On January 9, 2026, while the Court was preparing the instant Order, Barnett filed Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 76), seeking judgment in his favor regarding his administrative separation from the Air
Force. Because the Court finds that Barnett has failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted in this respect,
Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 76) is hereby rendered MOOT.
278.) Barnett further submits that he will face irreparable harm in the way of loss of medical
licensure and damage to his professional reputation. (Id.)
The Court finds that Barnett is unlikely to succeed on the merits, as he must to secure
injunctive relief. As pertinent to Barnett’s case, the statutory text of the APA requires that an
agency action can only be held unlawful if the action is:

(A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance
with law;
(B) contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity;
(C) in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short of statutory
right;
(D) without observance of procedure required by law;
(E) unsupported by substantial evidence in a case subject to sections
556 and 557 of this title or otherwise reviewed on the record of an agency hearing
provided by statute; or
(F) unwarranted by the facts to the extent that the facts are subject to trial de novo
by the reviewing court.

5 U.S.C. § 706(2). By this text alone, Barnett’s allegations are insufficient to succeed or raise a
substantial question regarding his APA claim against DHA. Barnett has alleged that the DHA
violated his rights and forged documentation to do so. (See Doc. No. 1 at PageID 3.) These are
conclusory allegations and Barnett has provided the Court with no substantive factual allegations
that would allow for such inferences. Indeed, the majority of the substantive facts to be gleaned
from the Complaint come from attachments thereto; attachments which facially undercut Barnett’s
conclusory suggestion that DHA’s actions ran afoul of procedure and the Constitution.
Nor is Barnett likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of injunctive relief. The
DHA has not revoked Barnett’s privilege to practice medicine altogether. Rather, the DHA found
cause to suspend Barnett’s privileges at WPMC specifically and committed to report this finding
to the National Practitioners Database. Barnett has every right and opportunity to dispute and
correct DHA’s report through the Database. If that dispute were successful, Barnett would
effectively receive the same relief he seeks here. Thus, the Court finds that Barnett’s Motions for
Injunctive Relief must be DENIED, as he appears unlikely to succeed on the merits of his case
and he cannot establish irreparable harm.
The Court further finds that it may reach this conclusion without conducting a preliminary
injunction hearing. Generally, Fed. R. Civ. P. 65 “‘contemplates that the issuance of a preliminary

injunction shall be upon notice to the adverse party and after a hearing.’” Certified Restoration
Dry Cleaning Network, L.L.C. v. Tenke Corp., 511 F.3d 535, 552 (6th Cir. 2007) (quoting
Carpenters’ Dist. Council v. Cicci, 261 F.2d 5, 8 (6th Cir. 1958)). However, a hearing is not
required where there are no disputed material factual issues. Id. at 552-53. Here, there are no
disputed material factual issues to justify an evidentiary hearing concerning Barnett’s Motions for
Injunctive relief. Again, all of Barnett’s allegations which might give rise to a dispute are wholly
conclusory in nature. The Court will not find a dispute of material fact based upon conclusory
allegations. See Anatomic & Clinical Lab'y Assocs., P.C. v. Cigna Health & Life Ins. Co., No.
3:22-CV-00767, 2023 WL 6392732, at *10, n. 6 (M.D. Tenn. Sept. 29, 2023) (declining to find a

dispute of material fact when plaintiff’s dispute was based on mere conclusory allegations). Were
the Court to find otherwise, parties could take control of the Court’s docket by simply stating their
conjecture. This, the Court finds, would impermissibly curtail judicial discretion in the issuance
of injunctive relief. As such, the Court denies Barnett’s Motions for Injunctive Relief without
conducting a preliminary injunction hearing.
IV. CONCLUSION
In sum, and in accordance with the foregoing, the Court rules as follows:

1. The Court hereby DENIES Barnett’s Miscellaneous Motions, to wit:
Plaintiff’s Motion to Certify Facts of Contempt (Doc. No. 40); Plaintiff’s
Amended Motion to Certify Facts of Contempt (Doc. No. 43); Plaintiff’s
Motion for Order to Show Cause Why Defendants Should Not be Held in
Civil Contempt (Doc. No. 51); Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Production of
the Complete Administrative Record, Personnel File, Plaintiffs [sic] Exhibits
1-5, and Transparency Certifications (Doc. No. 52); and Plaintiff’s

Coordinated Motion for Structured Relief and Scheduling Order (Doc. No.
53). The Clerk of Court is hereby DIRECTED to dispose of said
Miscellaneous Motions accordingly on the Court’s docket;
2. The Court hereby ADOPTS the Report and Recommendations on Motion for
Civil Contempt (Doc. No. 38), OVERRULES Plaintiff’s Objections to the
Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendations on Motion for Civil
Contempt (Doc. No. 41), and DENIES Plaintiff’s Combined Motion for Civil
Contempt of Court (Doc. No. 28);
3. The Court hereby GRANTS, IN PART, and DENIES, IN PART,

Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Doc. No. 39). Specifically, the Court
DENIES Defendants’ Motion with respect to Barnett’s APA claim against
DHA. The Court hereby GRANTS Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss in all
other respects. Consequently, the Air Force and the Secretary, as well as the
claims against them, are hereby DISMISSED from this action and Plaintiff’s
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 76) is hereby rendered
MOOT. The Clerk is DIRECTED to dispose of these filings on the Court’s
docket accordingly;
4. The Court hereby DENIES Barnett’s Motions for Injunctive Relief, to wit:
Renewed Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary
Injunction (Doc. No. 23); Renewed Motion for Expedited Consideration of
Plaintiff’s Renewed Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and
Preliminary Injunction (Doc. No. 24); Plaintiff’s Emergency Motion to
Compel Restoration of the Status Quo Ante (Doc. No. 50); Plaintiff’s

Combined Motion for Clarification and for Expedited Consideration
Requesting Temporary Enjoining of NPDB Reporting Pending Court
Determination (Doc. No. 59). The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to dispose
of Barnett’s Motions for Injunctive relief on the Court’s docket in keeping
with this finding; and,
5. The Parties are hereby provided NOTICE that the Court shall conduct a
telephone conference with the Parties on Wednesday, February 4, 2026, at
10:30 AM. At that time, the Court intends to forge a path forward in this case
regarding Barnett’s remaining APA claim against the DHA. Separate notice

of call-in information to issue.
DONE and ORDERED in Dayton, Ohio, this Tuesday, January 20, 2026.
s/Thomas M. Rose
________________________________
THOMAS M. ROSE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11249281. Public record. Not legal advice.