# Freden

> District Court, W.D. New York · January 30, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11248789

## Case

- **Full name:** Antonio Fonseca Castillo v. Joseph Freden, in his official capacity as ICE Deputy Field Office Director
- **Court:** District Court, W.D. New York
- **Decided:** January 30, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11248789

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

ANTONIO FONSECA CASTILLO,
Petitioner,
v. 25-CV-06453-MAV
DECISION & ORDER
JOSEPH FREDEN, in his official
capacity as ICE Deputy Field Office
Director,
Respondent.

INTRODUCTION
Petitioner Antonio Fonseca Castillo, a citizen of Mexico, brought this petition
for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 on September 3, 2025, after
having been detained by the United States Department of Homeland Security
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) at the Buffalo Federal Detention
Facility “BFDF’) since August 2024. ECF No. 1 { 10. Because Petitioner is detained
under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c), an Immigration Judge held that he did not have jurisdiction
to hold a bond hearing. Jd. { 4. Petitioner maintains that his prolonged detention
without a bond hearing violates his due process rights under the Fifth Amendment
of the Constitution. Jd. 4 5. For the reasons discussed below, the Court finds that
under binding Second Circuit precedent, Petitioner is entitled to a bond hearing.
BACKGROUND
Petitioner is a citizen of Mexico who entered the United States without
inspection in 2006. Jd. § 138. On February 17, 2024, Petitioner was arrested and

charged with Alien Transportation; he was placed into removal proceedings the
following day. Id. { 14-15. See also ECF No. 5-2 at 4 (the Notice to Appear issued to
Petitioner in September 2024 alleging that he was convicted of the offense of
transporting aliens in violation of 8 U.S.C. §§ 1324(a)(1)(A)(@i) and (a)(1)(b)G)). On
August 7, 2024, Petitioner pled guilty to the charges against him, and was sentenced
to time served. Jd. § 16. On August 9, he was transferred to ICE custody and moved
to the BFDF. Id. { 17.
After several appearances before an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) regarding
deficiencies in the original Notice to Appear, the IJ found in March 2025 that
Petitioner was detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c), and therefore that he had no
jurisdiction to hear or grant Petitioner’s application for bond. Id. { 24. On June 26,
2025, the IJ ordered Petitioner removed, and his appeal to the Board of Immigration
Appeals (“BIA”) on the removal order remains pending. Jd. § 26—27. Petitioner also
appealed the IJ’s bond decision, and the BIA denied that appeal on July 25, 2025. Id.
{ 28.
As of the date of the filing of this petition, Petitioner had been detained by ICE
at BFDF for nearly 13 months. ECF No. 1.
JURISDICTION
28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(8) authorizes federal courts to grant habeas relief to
prisoners or detainees who are “in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or
treaties of the United States.” See Wang v. Ashcroft, 320 F.3d 130, 140 (2d Cir. 2003).
Federal courts retain jurisdiction under § 2241 to review purely legal statutory and

constitutional claims regarding the government’s detention authority, but
jurisdiction does not extend to “discretionary judgment,” “action,” or “decision” by the
Attorney General with respect to either detention or removal.! Jennings v. Rodriguez,
583 U.S. 281, 295 (2018) (citing, inter alia, Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 516-17
(2003)). No such discretionary judgments, actions, or decisions are at issue here. See,
e.g., Lieogo v. Freden, No. 6:25-CV-06615 EAW, 2025 WL 3290694, at *2-5 (W.D.N.Y.
Nov. 26, 2025) (rejecting the jurisdictional defenses raised by Respondents regarding
a petition involving similar issues, and explaining why 8 U.S.C. §§ 1252(e)(38),
1252(g), and 1252(b)(9) did not bar the district court’s review of the petition).
DISCUSSION
Petitioner alleges that his continued detention violates, inter alia, his right to
procedural due process under the United States Constitution. See ECF 1 33-46.
He asks the Court for a bond hearing at which the government must show by clear
and convincing evidence that Petitioner is a flight risk and/or a danger to persons or
property. Id. In response, Respondents maintain that Petitioner is not entitled to a
bond hearing because — despite the IJ’s earlier finding that Petitioner is detained
under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) — Petitioner is, “in fact” subject to mandatory detention
pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2). ECF No. 4-1 at 2. Respondents therefore ask the
Court to dismiss the petition for failure to state a claim.

1 For instance, 8 U.S.C. § 1226(e) provides that “[t]he Attorney General’s discretionary judgment
regarding the application of this section shall not be subject to review.” Additionally, judicial review
of removal orders is available only through filing a “petition for review” in a Circuit Court pursuant to
8 U.S.C. § 1252.

Thus, to resolve the instant petition, the Court must first determine which
statute governs Petitioner’s detention, and — if it finds detention is governed by
§ 1226(c) — determine whether Petitioner is entitled to a bond hearing.
I. The Statute Governing Petitioner’s Detention
Respondents argue that Petitioner is “in fact” subject to mandatory detention
under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) because he was never lawfully admitted to the United
States, and therefore remains an “applicant for admission” under the statute. The
Court disagrees.
Although the case involved a dispute regarding whether the petitioner was
detained under § 1226(a) or § 1225(b)(2), the Court addressed the substance of
Respondents’ argument regarding § 1225(b)(2) in Da Cunha v. Freden, No. 25-CV-
6532-MAV, 2025 WL 3280575 (W.D.N.Y. Nov. 25, 2025). In Da Cunha, we considered
whether a petitioner who had been present in the country for a period of years, was
not actively seeking lawful entry through inspection by an immigration officer, and
was arrested under a warrant was detained under § 1225(b)(2) or §1226(a).
We prefaced our analysis by reciting the relevant language in the statutes. Da
Cunha, 2025 WL 3280575 at *4. Section 1225(b)(2)(A) states, in pertinent part, that:
in the case of an alien who is an applicant for admission, if the
examining immigration officer determines that an alien seeking
admission is not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted, the
alien shall be detained for a proceeding under section 1229a of this title
fi.e., removal proceedings].
Among other things, we found that because the petitioner was “already in the
country” and had been for several years, and was arrested on his way to work in

Norwood, Massachusetts rather than while presenting for inspection to an
immigration officer, the government had failed to demonstrate that the petitioner
was “seeking admission” as required by 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). Da Cunha, 2025 WL
3280575 at *6. Rather, we found that § 1226(a) applied because the petitioner was
arrested on a warrant and was “already in the country... .” Id. (quoting Jennings,
583 U.S. at 289) (emphasis in the original).
Of course, § 1226(a) and § 1226(c) are different in important ways. Most
obviously, whereas the Attorney General is granted discretion under § 1226(a) to
continue to detain an alien arrested under that provision, or to release him on bond,
§ 1226(c) addresses the detention of criminal aliens and mandates that the Attorney
General “shall take into custody” an alien who has committed any of the crimes
identified in § 1226(c)(1). In other words, “§ 1226(c) makes clear that detention of
aliens within its scope [i.e., criminal aliens] must continue ‘pending a decision on
whether the alien is to be removed from the United States.” Jennings v. Rodriguez,
583 U.S. 281, 303 (2018) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1226) (emphasis added).
Nevertheless, the differences between § 1226(a) and § 1226(c) are not material
to resolving the issue as to the statute governing Petitioner’s detention here. To begin
with, the Court finds that Respondents have failed to demonstrate that Petitioner
was “seeking admission” as required under § 1225(b)(2). As in Da Cunha, the
Petitioner in this case had been living in the United States for over a decade at the
time of his detention, and there is no suggestion in the papers that he was arrested
while actively “seeking admission.” See Da Cunha, 2025 WL 3280575 at *4-6.

Furthermore, Respondents’ disagreement with the IJ’s determination that
Petitioner is detained under § 1226(c) is not rooted in any articulated defect in the
IJ’s reasoning, but rather is based upon the premise that Petitioner’s status as an
“applicant for admission” gave Respondents the discretion to detain him under
§ 1225(b)(2). Indeed, neither Petitioner nor Respondents argue in this action that the
IJ’s determination that Petitioner was inadmissible under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(@)
for committing a crime of moral turpitude was improper.? See ECF No. 5-2 (charging
Petitioner with inadmissibility under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)G)); ECF No. 5-4 (the
BIA affirming the IJ’s finding of inadmissibility under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)Q@)).
Thus, Petitioner clearly falls within the scope of 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(A), which
applies to any alien who “is inadmissible by reason of having committed any offense
covered in section 1182(a)(2) of this title.”
In short, because Respondents have failed to demonstrate Petitioner was
“seeking admission” at the time of his detention under § 1225(b)(2), and because the
IJ’s determination that Petitioner was inadmissible under § 1182(a)(2)(A)@) clearly
places Petitioner with the scope of § 1226(c)(1)(A), the Court finds that Petitioner is
detained under § 1226(c).
II. Entitlement to a Bond Hearing
In Jennings v. Rodriguez, the Supreme Court held that the statute does not
require—and in fact prohibits—the government from offering a noncitizen detained

2 Nor is it clear that the parties could so argue in this forum. As noted above, 8 U.S.C. § 1226(e)
provides that “[t]he Attorney General's discretionary judgment regarding the application of this
section shall not be subject to [judicial] review.”

under § 1226(c) the opportunity to challenge the detention at a bond hearing.
Jennings, 583 U.S. at 303. But the High Court declined to decide in that case whether
the Constitution nonetheless requires that noncitizens held under § 1226(c) be
afforded such an opportunity. Jd. at 312.
“In Black v. Decker, 103 F.4th 133 (2d Cir. 2024), the Second Circuit answered
that question, holding that ‘a noncitizen’s constitutional right to due process
precludes... unreasonably prolonged detention under section 1226(c) without a bond
hearing.” J.VM.H. v. Freden, No. 24-CV-875-LJV, 2025 WL 81919, at *5 (W.D.N.Y.
Jan. 13, 2025) (alteration in original) (quoting Black, 103 F.4th at 138). Further, it
held that the three-factor balancing test of Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976),
“supplies the proper framework for determining when and what additional
procedural protections are due such a detainee.” Id. (quoting Black, 103 F.4th at 138).
The Mathews factors require assessment of (1) “the private interest that will be
affected by the official action”; (2) “the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such
interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or
substitute procedural safeguards”; and (8) “the [gjovernment’s interest, including the
function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or
substitute procedural requirement would entail.” Black, 103 F.4th at 151 (quoting
Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335).
Applying these factors to a noncitizen held under section 1226(c), the Second
Circuit held that: (1) the petitioner’s private hberty interests were “seriously
affected” by a seven-month detention, which it described as “prolonged”; (2) there

were “very few” procedures available to noncitizens detained under section 1226(c),
which increased the risk of “erroneous deprivation” to the petitioner’s “private
liberty interests”; and (3) the government’s valid interests in ensuring a noncitizen’s
appearance at removal proceedings and in protecting the community from dangerous
noncitizens could be adequately addressed through “additional procedural
safeguards.” Foster v. Brophy, No. 24-CV-6728-FPG, 2025 WL 8338192, at *1
(W.D.N.Y. Feb. 11, 2025) (quoting Black, 103 F.4th at 151-53).
The Second Circuit concluded that the petitioner was entitled to an
“individualized bond hearing by an [immigration judge].” Black, 103 F.4th at 155.
The Second Circuit also directed that, at the bond hearing, the burden must be placed
on the government to justify continued detention “by clear and convincing evidence”
and, with respect to a detainee’s risk of flight, that the immigration judge must
“consider both [the detainee’s] ability to pay and any alternatives to detention” that
would assure his appearance. Id.
Compared to the petitioner's seven-month detention in Black v. Decker,
Petitioner’s detention here under § 1226(c) is approaching — at the time of this order

— seventeen months. Petitioner is entitled to a bond hearing consistent with binding
Second Circuit precedent. Petitioner’s § 2241 petition for habeas corpus is therefore
granted to that extent, and Respondents’ motion to dismiss is denied.
ORDER
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Petitioner is entitled to habeas relief under 28
U.S.C. § 2241 and the petition (ECF No. 1) is GRANTED insofar as Petitioner shall

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11248789. Public record. Not legal advice.