# Sanchez v. United States

> United States Court of Federal Claims · January 29, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11248386

## Case

- **Court:** United States Court of Federal Claims
- **Decided:** January 29, 2026
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Opinion
- **Judges:** Marian Blank Horn
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

In the United States Court of Federal Claims
No. 25-565C
Filed: January 29, 2026

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * **
*
BIANCA M. SANCHEZ, *
*
Plaintiff, *
v. *
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UNITED STATES, *
*
Defendant. *
*
*
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * **

Pheobe A. Clark, Wukela Law Firm, Florence, SC, for plaintiff.

Kelly E. Palamar, Trial Attorney, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division,
United States Department of Justice, Washington DC, for defendant. With her were
Albert S. Iarossi, Assistant Director, Commercial Litigation Branch; Patricia M.
McCarthy, Director, Commercial Litigation Branch; and Brett A. Shumate, Assistant
Attorney General, Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, Washington, DC.
Darrel Waugh, Assistant General Counsel, Federal Bureau of Prisons.

OPINION

HORN, J.

On March 31, 2025, plaintiff Bianca M. Sanchez filed a complaint in the United
States Court of Federal Claims alleging two causes of action, count one “Breach of
Contract” and count two “Quantum Meruit/Unjust Enrichment,” as a result of an alleged
failure by the Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) to perform its obligations under an alleged
2018 Student Loan Repayment Agreement which plaintiff signed. On June 16, 2025,
defendant filed a motion to dismiss plaintiff’s complaint. Defendant argues that count one
of plaintiff’s complaint for “Breach of Contract” should be dismissed pursuant to Rule
12(b)(6) (2024) of the Rules of the United States Court of Federal Claims (RCFC) for
failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted because, as further discussed
below, “the Student Loan Repayment Agreement that Ms. Sanchez signed on April 18,
2018 was never signed or approved by either the [BOP’s] Regional Director or the BOP’s
Personnel Director, and thus did not constitute a binding contract.” (alteration added;
internal citations omitted). Defendant further argues that count two of plaintiff’s complaint
for “Quantum Meruit/Unjust Enrichment” must be dismissed pursuant to RCFC 12(b)(1)
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Defendant’s motion to dismiss has been fully briefed
and oral argument was held.

FINDINGS OF FACT

The context in which plaintiff’s case arose is that the BOP established a Student
Loan Repayment Program pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 5379 (2024) which states, “[t]he head
of an agency may, in order to recruit or retain highly qualified personnel, establish a
program under which the agency may agree to repay (by direct payments on behalf of
the employee) any student loan previously taken out by such employee.” 5 U.S.C.
§ 5379(b)(1) (alteration added). An implementing regulation reflects that the statute at 5
U.S.C. § 5379 “authorizes agencies to establish a student loan repayment program for
the purpose of recruiting or retaining highly qualified personnel.” 5 C.F.R. § 537.101
(2024). The statute at 5 U.S.C. § 5379(b)(2) provides:

Payments under this section [titled “Student loan repayments”] shall be
made subject to such terms, limitations, or conditions as may be mutually
agreed to by the agency and employee concerned, except that the amount
paid by an agency under this section may not exceed—

(A) $10,000 for any employee in any calendar year; or
(B) a total of $60,000 in the case of any employee.

5 U.S.C. § 5379(b)(2) (alteration added). An employee selected to receive benefits under
a student loan repayment program “must agree in writing, before receiving any such
benefit, that the employee will— (A) remain in the service of the agency for a period
specified in the agreement (not less than 3 years), unless involuntarily separated[.]” 5
U.S.C. § 5379(c)(1) (alteration added). The statute at 5 U.S.C. § 5379(f) also requires
that benefits under a student loan repayment program “shall be in addition to basic pay
and any other form of compensation otherwise payable to the employee involved.” 5
U.S.C. § 5379(f).

In the appendix filed with defendant’s motion to dismiss, defendant submitted BOP
Program Statement 3530.02 (2016) (hereinafter Program Statement 3530.02), an internal
BOP document, which offered guidance for the implementation of the BOP’s Student
Loan Repayment Program. According to Program Statement 3530.02, under the BOP’s
Student Loan Repayment Program, the BOP may agree to repay all or part of a current
employee’s outstanding student loans in the amount of “up to $10,000 per year (up to a
maximum loan repayment of $30,000 for three years), and may not be prorated should
the service agreement be unfulfilled.” Program Statement 3530.02 states that “[b]efore a
student loan repayment may be paid, the candidate or employee must sign a Student
Loan Repayment Agreement (Attachment C-14) to complete a minimum of 36 months of
employment with DOJ, beginning on the date of the first repayment.” (alteration added).
Additionally, Program Statement 3530.02 states that “[a]n employee who fails to complete
at least 36 months of DOJ service as the initial Repayment Agreement established or 12
months of DOJ service under a supplemental Repayment Agreement is indebted to the

2
Federal Government and must repay all student loan repayments received under the
relevant agreement.” (alteration added). Moreover, Program Statement 3530.02 states
that student loan repayments “[a]re not considered part of the employee’s rate of basic
pay for any other purpose.” (alteration added). According to Program Statement 3530.02,
approval for BOP Student Loan Repayment Agreements begins with the Chief Executive
Officer of the BOP institution requesting “each student loan repayment in writing through
the Regional Director,” followed by the Regional Director’s approval or disapproval of the
request, and, if approved by the Regional Director, concluding with the forwarding of the
request “to the Staffing and Employee Relations section (SERS) for routing to the Bureau
Personnel Director, and the Assistant Director over the discipline involved” for final
approval.

According to plaintiff’s complaint, plaintiff began working at the BOP in
Bennettsville, South Carolina on January 22, 2017. Plaintiff alleges that the BOP offered
plaintiff an opportunity to participate in the Student Loan Repayment Program in 2018 in
exchange for remaining in the service of the agency for three years. Plaintiff claims that
a BOP Human Resources Specialist, Ms. Beth Graham, offered plaintiff a Student Loan
Repayment Agreement via email on April 17, 2018, which plaintiff signed on April 18,
2018. (hereinafter the alleged April 2018 Student Loan Repayment Agreement). The
alleged April 2018 Student Loan Repayment Agreement stated: “In consideration of the
repayment of my outstanding Federally-insured student loan balance as described below,
I Bianca M. Sanchez agree to remain in the service of the Bureau of Prisons for a period
of 36 months, beginning on the date that the repayment is made.” (emphasis added). The
alleged April 2018 Student Loan Repayment Agreement signed by plaintiff also stipulated
that the “loan repayment schedule will be as follows: the Bureau of Prisons will repay
$30,000.00 in outstanding Federally-insured student loans directly to FedLoan Servicing
in one repayment of $10,000 in calendar year 2018, one repayment of $10,000 in
calendar year 2019, and one repayment of $10,000 in calendar year 2020.” Plaintiff
alleges in her complaint, however, that she believed that her 36-month work obligation
began upon her signing the alleged April 2018 Student Loan Repayment Agreement. It
appears from the record before the court that in 2018, after plaintiff signed the alleged
April 2018 Student Loan Repayment Agreement, a government official with authority to
enter into the alleged April 2018 Student Loan Repayment Agreement, for reasons not
identified in the record currently before the court, did not sign the alleged April 2018
Student Loan Repayment Agreement. In her complaint, plaintiff alleges that the defendant
failed to properly process and sign the paperwork after Ms. Sanchez signed the alleged
2018 Student Loan Repayment Agreement on April 18, 2018.

Thereafter, defendant sent plaintiff a second Student Loan Repayment Agreement
to sign for participation in the BOP’s Student Loan Repayment Program in exchange for
remaining in the service of the agency for three years, which plaintiff signed on January
4, 2019. (hereinafter the January 2019 Student Loan Repayment Agreement). The
January 2019 Student Loan Repayment Agreement sent to plaintiff again stated: “In
consideration of the repayment of my outstanding Federally-insured student loan balance
as described below, I Bianca M. Sanchez agree to remain in the service of the Bureau of
Prisons for a period of 36 months, beginning on the date that the repayment is made.”

3
(emphasis added). The January 2019 Student Loan Repayment Agreement however,
which listed different dates for repayment, stipulated that the “loan repayment schedule
will be as follows: the Bureau of Prisons will repay $30,000.00 in outstanding Federally-
insured student loans directly to FedLoan Servicing in one repayment of $10,000 in
calendar year 2019, one repayment of $10,000 in calendar year 2020, and one repayment
of $10,000 in calendar year 2021.” The three repayment dates listed in the January 2019
Student Loan Repayment Agreement were in 2019, 2020, and 2021, rather than 2018,
2019, and 2020, which were the repayment dates listed in the alleged April 2018 Student
Loan Repayment Agreement. Both the alleged April 2018 Student Loan Repayment
Agreement and the January 2019 Student Loan Repayment Agreement stated that
plaintiff agreed to reimburse the government for any repaid amounts if plaintiff voluntarily
departed from the BOP prior to completing the required 36-month service period
beginning on the date that the repayment is made. In accordance with the January 2019
Student Loan Repayment Agreement, the BOP made a $10,000.00 payment on plaintiff’s
behalf on June 9, 2019 and defendant argues that plaintiff’s required 36-month service
period began to run on June 9, 2019; the date defendant made its first repayment on
behalf of plaintiff. The BOP made a second $10,000.00 payment on July 19, 2020, and a
third $10,000.00 payment on June 6, 2021. The government did not make, and plaintiff
was not the recipient of, any repayment in 2018.

Resolution of the dispute currently before the court in the above captioned case
depends on whether the alleged April 2018 Student Loan Repayment Agreement was a
valid contract between plaintiff and defendant and whether the alleged April 2018 Student
Loan Repayment Agreement was entered into by a government official with actual
authority to bind the United States to a contract. The court, therefore, addresses the
various signatures appearing on the alleged April 2018 Student Loan Repayment
Agreement, the January 2019 Student Loan Repayment Agreement, and two related
human resources documents in the record before the court. The copy of the alleged April
2018 Student Loan Repayment Agreement in the record before the court, submitted by
defendant in the appendix with defendant’s motion to dismiss and also attached to
plaintiff’s response to defendant’s motion to dismiss, 1 was signed by Ms. Sanchez and
dated April 18, 2018, but is missing a witness signature on the line on which a human
resources representative is supposed to sign. Defendant also submitted a BOP human
resources document in the appendix with its motion to dismiss, which defendant contends
is associated with the alleged April 2018 Student Loan Repayment Agreement
(hereinafter the 2018 HR Pre-Approval Document). Although not addressed by plaintiff or
defendant in their submissions to the court in this case, the court notes that the 2018 HR
Pre-Approval Document contains a single, digital signature dated April 18, 2018 by
Federal Correctional Institution (FCI) Bennettsville Warden Travis Bragg next to the title

1 The only exhibits included with plaintiff’s complaint are the United States Court of
Federal Claims’ Civil Cover Sheet and a photocopy of an envelope showing that plaintiff’s
complaint was received by the United States Court of Federal Claims on March 31, 2025.
Plaintiff did not attach any other exhibits to her complaint, including either the alleged April
2018 Student Loan Repayment Agreement or the January 2019 Student Loan Repayment
Agreement.
4
“CEO.” 2 The 2018 HR Pre-Approval Document is not, however, signed by the BOP
Regional Director, Bureau Personnel Director, Assistant Director, or any other BOP or
Department of Justice official. On the final page of the 2018 HR Pre-Approval Document,
under the heading “Final Action,” the approval box is unchecked and the box next to the
“amount approved” is blank. Moreover, plaintiff does not allege, and has not produced
any documentation to demonstrate, that the alleged April 2018 Student Loan Repayment
Agreement was ever signed or approved by a government employee with authority to
sign on behalf of the United States. Nor has plaintiff alleged or demonstrated that any
repayments were made by the BOP on plaintiff’s behalf in 2018.

The copy of the January 2019 Student Loan Repayment Agreement in the record
before the court, submitted by defendant in the appendix with defendant’s motion to
dismiss and also attached to plaintiff’s response to defendant’s motion to dismiss,
includes Ms. Sanchez’s signature and an illegible signature, beginning with the letter “B”
and followed by the letters “HRS.” 3 Both Ms. Sanchez’s signature and the illegible
signature are dated January 4, 2019. Ms. Sanchez’s signature is written on the line that
indicates “Witness (HR representative),” rather than on the signature line for an individual
signee. Neither plaintiff nor defendant, however, have challenged the validity of the
January 2019 Student Loan Repayment Agreement, nor has either party identified the
person to whom the above-described illegible signature belongs. Defendant also
submitted a separate human resources approval document in the appendix with its motion
to dismiss, which defendant contends is associated with the January 2019 Student Loan
Repayment Agreement (hereinafter the 2019 HR Approval Document). The 2019 HR
Approval Document contains three digital signatures. Specifically, the first page of the
2019 HR Approval Document contains a digital signature by FCI Bennettsville Warden
Travis Bragg dated April 18, 2018 next to the title “CEO.” The first page of the 2019 HR
Approval Document also contains a digital signature by Ms. Shannon Phelps dated March
4, 2019, and indicates that Ms. Phelps was “[a]cting for” the BOP Regional Director.
(alteration added). Moreover, the final page of the 2019 HR Approval Document contains,
under the heading “Final Action,” a digital signature by Ms. Leona Smith dated June 5,
2019 and indicates that Ms. Smith was “[a]cting for” the Bureau Personnel Director.
(alteration added). The approval box is checked and the “amount approved” indicates
“30,000.” Although the final page of the 2019 HR Approval Document also contains a field
for the BOP Assistant Director’s signature, for reasons not identified in the record before

2 At oral argument on defendant’s motion to dismiss, defendant stated that Mr. Bragg was

the Warden of FCI Bennettsville, which would be the CEO of FCI Bennettsville for
purposes of the approval process detailed in Program Statement 3530.02.
3 Based on the record before the court, it appears that the letters “HRS” may refer to a

Human Resources Specialist in BOP’s Human Resource Management Division.

5
the court, that signature field is blank and, instead, the box next to the letters “N/A” is
checked. 4

On August 23, 2021, plaintiff submitted a voluntary resignation from the BOP,
effective September 9, 2021. 5 According to plaintiff’s complaint, when Ms. Sanchez
ceased working at the BOP in 2021, “Defendants 6 made representations that Plaintiff had
not worked 3 years and was ineligible for Student Loan Repayment.” Plaintiff alleges in
her complaint that defendant “never informed plaintiff that her work time from the date
she signed the [alleged April 2018 Student] Loan Repayment Agreement in April 2018
was not being credited toward the 3 year work requirement for Student Loan
Repayment[.]” (alterations added). In her response to defendant’s motion to dismiss,
plaintiff states that, after her resignation, she “was sent bills from USDA/NFC [United
States Department of Agriculture/National Finance Center] Administrative Collections
beginning December 5, 2022 for $27,705,” 7 and that “she contested the amount due on
the bill dispute form dated December 5, 2022,” a copy of which plaintiff attached to her

4 While Program Statement 3530.02 states that final approval of BOP Student Loan

Repayment Agreements rests with “the Bureau Personnel Director, and the Assistant
Director over the discipline involved,” as noted above, the 2019 HR Approval Document
is not signed by the BOP’s Assistant Director. Neither plaintiff nor defendant, however,
have challenged the validity of the January 2019 Student Loan Repayment Agreement.
5 The court notes that, after a gap in service, defendant indicated to the court at oral

argument on defendant’s motion to dismiss that Ms. Sanchez, recently, had been
reemployed at the BOP, and was, at the time of the oral argument, again, a valued
employee at the BOP.
6 Unless otherwise noted, all quotes are reproduced as written in the briefs signed and

submitted by plaintiff’s attorney, which, although not all included in this Opinion, contain
numerous typographic errors, which are repeated throughout plaintiff’s submissions to
the court.
7 Plaintiff alleges that the Department of Agriculture, National Finance Center sent her a

bill for $27,705.00 and that, after contesting the bill, she received a demand letter stating
that she was required to pay $27,705.00 to the Department of Justice. Subsequently, as
discussed below, plaintiff submitted a request for waiver form to the BOP requesting that
the $27,705.00 payment demand be “forgiven,” which BOP Regional Director William
Lothrop denied and stated that plaintiff was “responsible for the bill in the amount of
$27,705.00.” The record before the court demonstrates, and the parties do not dispute,
that plaintiff signed the January 2019 Student Loan Repayment Agreement on January
4, 2019, that plaintiff resigned from the BOP on September 9, 2021, and that the BOP
made three student loan repayments on plaintiff’s behalf as a result of the January 2019
Student Loan Repayment Agreement between 2019 and 2021, totaling $30,000.00. The
court notes that the discrepancy between the amount agreed to be paid by the BOP,
$30,000.00, and the payment demand, $27,705.00, is not explained in the parties’
briefings or in the record before the court.
6
response to defendant’s motion to dismiss. (alteration added). On January 4, 2022,
plaintiff received a demand letter stating that she was required to pay $27,705.00 to the
United States Department of Justice by January 25, 2022, because she had failed to
complete her service agreement. On January 5, 2022, plaintiff sent an email to the BOP’s
Consolidated Processing Unit regarding the demand letter, which stated:

My name is Bianca Sanchez. I was previously employed by the Bureau of
Prisons, Federal Correctional Institution Bennettsville, as the Quality
Management/Infectious Disease Nurse. After closely approaching five
years in the bureau, I elected to depart on September 9, 2021, with prior
notice.

This email is in regards to a Demand Notice For Payment letter I received
through the USPS on January 4, 2022. The letter states that I must pay
$27,705.00 to the U.S [sic] Department of Justice by 1/25/2022, for failure
to complete the SVC agreement. After contacting the HRM [Human
Resource Manager] at FCI BEN [Federal Correctional Institution
Bennettsville], I was informed that this was in reference to my student loan
repayment agreement. I am emailing you today requesting a waiver to
forgive this payment demand.

I have reviewed all documents that I had previously printed and sent to my
personal email in reference to my student loan repayment. After thorough
review, I was able to understand how I was in violation of my agreement.
The initial agreement that I signed on 4/18/18 stated that I must fulfill 36
months in the bureau beginning the date that the repayment is made. It also
stated that a payment would be made in 2018, 2019, and 2020. However,
after failure of my local HRS to submit requested documents on my behalf
up to the region in a timely manner, I was required to resign [sic] my
agreement for resubmission. After carefully reviewing the agreement that I
was asked to resign [sic] on 1/3/19, I noticed that it stated the same details
and information, as the initial agreement, with the exception of the loan
repayment years which newly reflected 2019, 2020, and 2021.

Although this change was not brought to my attention when I was asked to
sign the new agreement, I do understand that it was my responsibility to
thoroughly review the document. However, I am still kindly asking that you
consider my request to forgive this repayment demand. Although I may have
not completed 36 months of bureau service beginning the date of payment,
I have completed well over 36 months at FCI BEN as either a Clinical Nurse
or the Quality Management/Infectious Disease Nurse.

I have attached all the documents and emails in reference to my extensive
ongoing student loan repayment request that I have access to, here at
home, for your review. Please feel free to contact me by either email or
phone, both listed below. I look forward to a response from you soon.

7
(emphasis in original; alterations added). On the next day, January 6, 2022, plaintiff also
submitted to the BOP her “Request for Compromise of Claim for Erroneous Pay” form
requesting that the $27,705.00 payment demand be “forgiven.” Plaintiff’s “Request for
Compromise of Claim for Erroneous Pay” form also stated: “Signed 1st SLRP [Student
Loan Repayment Program] Agreement in 2018. Due to an administrative oversight, the
SLRP request was not approved in 2018. The request had to be resubmitted by the HR
Department for processing and approval/disapproval. The new request was approved
June 2019.” (alteration added). In a memorandum dated June 14, 2022, BOP Regional
Director Lothrop denied plaintiff’s “Request for Compromise of Claim for Erroneous Pay”
and stated that plaintiff was “responsible for the bill in the amount of $27,705.00.” Plaintiff
alleges, however, that Regional Director Lothrop’s memorandum “was not provided to
Plaintiff in response to her submitted Compromise of Claim request” and that, instead,
“Plaintiff had to request the status of her compromise of claim,” which the BOP
subsequently provided to her via email on October 31, 2022. Based on allegations in
plaintiff’s complaint, as of the date of plaintiff’s complaint, her student loan debt has gone
to collections and continues to accrue interest.

On January 31, 2024, plaintiff filed a lawsuit in the Fourth Judicial Circuit Court,
Marlboro County, South Carolina claiming that the BOP had breached a contract to repay
a portion of plaintiff’s loans, that defendant is liable to plaintiff under a quantum meruit
theory, and that defendant was negligent for failing to process the alleged April 2018
Student Loan Repayment Agreement plaintiff had signed. On March 6, 2024, the case
was removed to the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, after
which the defendants named by plaintiff, the Department of Justice Attorney General
Merrick B. Garland and the BOP, filed a motion to dismiss the case for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction. On December 31, 2024, the United States District Court for the District
of South Carolina issued an order granting the defendants’ motion to dismiss for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction. See Sanchez v. Garland, No. 4:24-cv-01149-JD (D.S.C. Dec.
31, 2024). The United States District Court for the District of South Carolina Judge
concluded that the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina lacked
subject matter jurisdiction over Ms. Sanchez’s breach of contract claim, which he stated
“is subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the [United States] Court of Federal Claims.” Id.
(alteration added). With respect to Ms. Sanchez’s quantum meruit claim, the United
States District Court for the District of South Carolina Judge determined that “Sanchez’s
quantum meruit and contract claims are the same” because “the ‘source of the rights upon
which’ Sanchez bases her claims is exclusively the purported agreement.” Id. The United
States District Court for the District of South Carolina Judge also stated in a footnote:
“The Court has concluded . . . that Sanchez has only one contract claim. But even if that
were not so, Sanchez’s quantum meruit claim is a claim implied in law. The Court of
Federal Claims has no jurisdiction over such claims.” Id. (internal reference omitted)
(citing Hercules Inc. v. United States, 516 U.S. 417, 423 (1996)). The United States
District Court for the District of South Carolina Judge also dismissed that part of plaintiff’s
claim within the District Court’s jurisdiction that alleged a tort committed by defendant
because plaintiff had provided “no basis for the Court to conclude that any extra-
contractual relationship between Sanchez and Defendants created the duty of care

8
Sanchez asserts was breached in this case.” Id. The United States District Court for the
District of South Carolina Judge considered “whether to dismiss or transfer the action”
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1631 (2024) and, after recounting the requirements of the statute
at 28 U.S.C. § 1631, stated that “[t]he Court need not reach all three elements to conclude
transfer is inappropriate. Here, the interests of justice would be served by dismissing
Sanchez’s contract claim without prejudice with leave to refile in the [United States] Court
of Federal Claims.” Sanchez v. Garland, No. 4:24-cv-01149-JD (alterations added).
Explaining his rationale for dismissing Ms. Sanchez’s breach of contract claim, rather than
ordering a transfer, the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina Judge
stated:

In an email attached to Sanchez’s response upon which she relied heavily
in disputing that she failed to exhaust her administrative remedies, Sanchez
acknowledged that she “was able to understand how [she] was in violation
of [her] agreement” and that Sanchez “may have not completed 36 months
of bureau service beginning the date of payment . . . .” Of course, Sanchez’s
entire claim—which the Court takes as true—turns on the fact that
Defendants declined to uphold their side of the bargain. Sanchez’s
concession that she breached the terms of the agreement suggests that her
claim has no merit.

Id. (alterations, omission, and emphasis in original; internal citations omitted).

As indicated above, after the dismissal in District Court, on March 31, 2025, plaintiff
filed her complaint in the United States Court of Federal Claims. In her complaint, plaintiff
asserts that defendant failed to perform its obligations under the alleged April 2018
Student Loan Repayment Agreement she had signed and that, “as a result of Plaintiff’s
performance in reliance on the promise of student loan repayment, Plaintiff has a vested
right to receive payment of student loans by Defendant, which was linked to Plaintiff’s
services performed as an employee of Defendant.” In count one of plaintiff’s complaint,
she asserts that defendant breached an alleged contract between her and defendant by
refusing to honor the terms of the alleged April 2018 Student Loan Repayment Agreement
with the BOP without notice or explanation. Plaintiff also alleges, in count two of her
complaint, a quantum meruit claim in which plaintiff contends that defendant received the
benefit of three years of plaintiff’s labor without fulfilling all the terms of the alleged April
2018 Student Loan Repayment Agreement. Plaintiff, therefore, claims that “Defendant’s
retention and utilization of the work performed by Plaintiff, without fully compensating
Plaintiff for work and productivity, despite promising and representing to Plaintiff that it
[plaintiff’s student loan contributions] would be paid, is unjust and inequitable.” (alteration
added).

In response to plaintiff’s complaint, defendant filed a motion to dismiss count one
for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted and count two for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction. Defendant argues that plaintiff’s breach of contract claim,
count one of plaintiff’s complaint, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted
because no contract existed between plaintiff and defendant in 2018 and because plaintiff

9
is the one who breached the January 2019 Student Loan Repayment Agreement by
voluntarily terminating her employment on September 9, 2021, before the date specified
by the terms of the January 2019 Student Loan Repayment Agreement, June 9, 2022.
Relying on the January 2019 Student Loan Repayment Agreement that both parties
appear to have accepted as a valid contract, defendant argues that since the January
2019 Student Loan Repayment Agreement provided that the 36-month service
requirement began on the date of the first repayment, which was made on June 9, 2019,
plaintiff breached the agreement by voluntarily resigning on September 9, 2021, prior to
June 9, 2022. Defendant also points out that plaintiff acknowledged that “I was able to
understand how I was in violation” of the January 2019 Student Loan Repayment
Agreement in an email dated January 5, 2022 to the BOP’s Consolidated Processing Unit.
Furthermore, defendant argues that plaintiff has acknowledged her failure to complete
the 36-month service requirement by asking for a waiver for the money she owed. 8
Additionally, defendant argues that even if the alleged April 2018 Student Loan
Repayment Agreement could be considered a valid contract, plaintiff’s breach of contract
claim “would have arisen more than six years before the complaint was filed in this case
on March 31, 2025, and so would be barred by the statute of limitations.” Regarding count
two of plaintiff’s complaint, defendant argues that the quantum meruit claim must be
dismissed because this court does not possess subject matter jurisdiction over plaintiff’s
quantum meruit claim.

In her response to defendant’s motion to dismiss, plaintiff argues that “[b]ased on
the complaint allegations alone, Plaintiff has alleged a breach of contract with respect to
the 2018 SLRP agreement.” (alteration added). Plaintiff argues that the alleged April 2018
Student Loan Repayment Agreement should not be subject to the approval process
described in Program Statement 3530.02 because “Plaintiff’s SLRP agreements make no
mention of the three tier approval process and provides a clear loan repayment schedule
in 2018 and 2019.” With respect to count two, plaintiff’s quantum meruit claim, plaintiff
argues that she is “entitled to compensation” because she “conferred on the government
her services as a nurse, which the government accepted from 2017 – 2021,” yet the
government claimed her 2018 student loan repayment agreement was invalid. Plaintiff
also argues that she “has alleged an express or implied contract with the government
when she provided proof that she was offered and accepted SLRP agreements and
performed the contract as presented to her.” Defendant’s motion to dismiss has been fully
briefed and the court held oral argument.

8 Because plaintiff is allowed to pursue alternative modes of recovery without admitting

fault, that plaintiff sought a waiver for her repayment does not necessarily constitute a
concession of wrongdoing.
10
DISCUSSION

Count One: Breach of Contract

As indicated above, defendant argues that plaintiff’s breach of contract claim
should be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. When
examining what must be pled in order to state a claim, a plaintiff need only state in the
complaint “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to
relief.” RCFC 8(a)(2) (2024); see also Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555
(2007). The United States Supreme Court has stated:

While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not
need detailed factual allegations, ibid. [Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47
(1957)]; Sanjuan v. American Bd. Of Psychiatry and Neurology, Inc., 40
F.3d 247, 251 (C.A.7 1994), a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the “grounds”
of his “entitle[ment] to relief” requires more than labels and conclusions, and
a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do, see
Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986) (on a motion to dismiss, courts
“are not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual
allegation”). Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief
above the speculative level, see 5 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice
and Procedure §1216 pp. 235-236 (3d ed. 2004) (hereinafter Wright &
Miller) (“[T]he pleading must contain something more . . . than . . . a
statement of facts that merely creates a suspicion [of] a legally cognizable
right of action”), on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint
are true (even if doubtful in fact), see, e.g., Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A.,
534 U.S. 506, 508 n.1 (2002); Nietzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989)
(“Rule 12(b)(6) does not countenance . . . dismissals based on a judge’s
disbelief of a complaint’s factual allegations”); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S.
232, 236 (1974) (a well-pleaded complaint may proceed even if it appears
“that a recovery is very remote and unlikely”) . . . . [W]e do not require
heightened fact pleading of specifics, but only enough facts to state a claim
to relief that is plausible on its face.

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555-56, 570 (footnote and other citations omitted;
omissions in original); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atl.
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555-57, 570); Boyd v. United States, 134 F.4th 1348, 1352
(Fed. Cir. 2025); Cotter Corp., N.S.L. v. United States, 127 F.4th 1353, 1366 (Fed. Cir.
2025); AlexSam, Inc. v. Aetna, Inc., 119 F.4th 27, 39 (Fed. Cir. 2024); Bot M8 LLC v.
Sony Corp. of Am., 4 F.4th 1342, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2021); First Mortg. Corp. v. United
States, 1961 F.3d 1331, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2020); Am. Bankers Ass’n v. United States, 932
F.3d 1375, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2019); Frankel v. United States, 842 F.3d 1246, 1249 (Fed.
Cir. 2016); A & D Auto Sales, Inc. v. United States, 748 F.3d 1142, 1157 (Fed. Cir. 2014);
Bell/Heery v. United States, 739 F.3d 1324, 1330 (Fed. Cir.), reh’g and reh’g en banc
denied (Fed. Cir. 2014); Kam-Almaz v. United States, 682 F.3d 1364, 1367 (Fed. Cir.
2012) (“The facts as alleged ‘must be enough to raise a right to relief above the

11
speculative level, on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even
if doubtful in fact).’” (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555)); Totes-lsotoner
Corp. v. United States, 594 F.3d 1346, 1354-55 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 562 U.S. 830
(2010); Bank of Guam v. United States, 578 F.3d 1318, 1326 (Fed. Cir.) (“In order to avoid
dismissal for failure to state a claim, the complaint must allege facts ‘plausibly suggesting
(not merely consistent with)’ a showing of entitlement to relief.” (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 545, 557)), reh’g and reh’g en banc denied (Fed. Cir. 2009), cert.
denied, 561 U.S. 1006 (2010); Cambridge v. United States, 558 F.3d 1331, 1335 (Fed.
Cir. 2009) (“[A] plaintiff must plead factual allegations that support a facially ‘plausible’
claim to relief in order to avoid dismissal for failure to state a claim.” (quoting Bell Atl.
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 544)); Cary v. United States, 552 F.3d 1373, 1376 (Fed.
Cir.) (“The factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the
speculative level. This does not require the plaintiff to set out in detail the facts upon which
the claim is based, but enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”
(internal citations omitted) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 570)), reh’g
denied (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 557 U.S. 937 (2009); SLSCO, Ltd. v. United States, 176
Fed. Cl. 767, 773 (2025); Day v. United States, 176 Fed. Cl. 634, 637 (2025); Otis v.
United States, 176 Fed. Cl. 1, 6 (2025); Tyson v. United States, 174 Fed. Cl. 205, 209
(2024), aff’d, No. 2025-1443, 2025 WL 945653 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 26, 2025); Del Mar v.
United States, 173 Fed. Cl. 159, 164 (2024); BCG Fed. Corp. v. United States, 172 Fed.
Cl. 543, 553 (2024). “Dismissal ‘for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted is appropriate when the facts asserted by the claimant do not entitle him to a legal
remedy.’” Conti v. United States, 168 Fed. Cl. 547, 554 (2023) (quoting Lindsay v. United
States, 295 F.3d 1252, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2002)), aff’d, No. 2024-1403, 2024 WL 4100410
(Fed. Cir. Sept. 6, 2024).

In the case currently before this court, plaintiff requests relief from this court for an
alleged breach of contract by defendant based on the alleged April 2018 Student Loan
Repayment Agreement which plaintiff had signed. Defendant argues, however, that there
was no binding Student Loan Repayment Agreement between the parties until the 2019
student loan repayment request was properly approved by defendant in 2019 by the BOP
Regional Director and the Bureau Personnel Director. Defendant contends that the
January 2019 Student Loan Repayment Agreement was the only contract between the
government and plaintiff that was signed by an authorized government official for the BOP,
and that defendant could not have breached the alleged April 2018 Student Loan
Repayment Agreement since, according to defendant, it was not a fully executed contract
by both plaintiff and defendant.

To have privity of contract with the United States government, and, therefore, to
invoke jurisdiction in the United States Court of Federal Claims for an alleged breach of
contract claim, plaintiff “must show that either an express or implied-in-fact contract
underlies [the] claim.” Trauma Serv. Grp. v. United States, 104 F.3d 1321, 1325 (Fed. Cir.
1997) (alteration added); see also Fairholme Funds, Inc. v. United States, 26 F.4th 1274,
1293-94 (Fed. Cir. 2022), cert. denied, 143 S. Ct. 563 (2023); Turping v. United States,
913 F.3d 1060, 1065 (Fed. Cir. 2019); Park Props. Assocs., L.P. v. United States, 916
F.3d 998, 1002 (Fed. Cir. 2019), cert. denied, 589 U.S. 1133 (2020). “An express contract

12
“‘must be manifested by words, either oral or written, which contains agreement and/or
mutual assent.”’” Frankel v. United States, 118 Fed. Cl. 332, 335 (2014) (quoting Essen
Mall Props. v. United States, 21 Cl. Ct. 430, 439 (1990), and quoting Webster University
v. United States, 20 Cl. Ct. 429, 433 (1990)), aff’d, 842 F.3d 1246 (Fed. Cir. 2016). As
explained by the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit:

There are four requirements to form a contract with the Government: “(1)
mutuality of intent to contract; (2) lack of ambiguity in offer and acceptance;
(3) consideration; and (4) a government representative having actual
authority to bind the United States.” These elements apply to both express
and implied-in-fact contracts.

Boyd v. United States, 134 F.4th at 1352 (internal citations omitted); see also Fairholme
Funds, Inc. v. United States, 26 F.4th at 1293-94; Columbus Reg’l Hosp. v. United States,
990 F.3d 1330, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2021); Am. Bankers Ass’n v. United States, 932 F.3d at
1381; Bank of Guam v. United States, 578 F.3d at 1326 (quoting Trauma Serv. Grp. v.
United States, 104 F.3d at 1325); see also Chattler v. United States, 632 F.3d 1324, 1330
(Fed. Cir. 2011) (citing Trauma Serv. Grp. v. United States, 104 F.3d at 1325); Night Vision
Corp. v. United States, 469 F.3d 1369, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 550 U.S. 934
(2007); Hanlin v. United States, 316 F.3d 1325, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (“Thus, the
requirements for an implied-in-fact contract are the same as for an express contract; only
the nature of the evidence differs.”); City of Cincinnati v. United States, 153 F.3d 1375,
1377 (Fed. Cir. 1998); San Carlos lrr. & Drainage Dist. v. United States, 877 F.2d 957,
959 (Fed. Cir. 1989); Platinum Servs., Inc. v. United States, 177 Fed. Cl. 325, 341 (2025);
Kennedy Collective v. United States, 174 Fed. Cl. 545, 554 (2025); GBA Assocs. Ltd.
P’ship v. United States, 171 Fed. Cl. 93, 100 (2024); Kehmeier v. United States, 170 Fed.
Cl. 393, 397-98 (2024); Yifrach v. United States, 145 Fed. Cl. 691, 698 (2019), aff’d, 825
F. App’x 899 (Fed. Cir. 2020); Stanwyck v. United States, 127 Fed. Cl. 308, 312 (2016);
Huntington Promotional & Supply, LLC v. United States, 114 Fed. Cl. 760, 767 (2014);
Eden Isle Marina, Inc. v. United States, 113 Fed. Cl. 372, 492 (2013); Council for Tribal
Emp. Rts. v. United States, 112 Fed. Cl. 231, 243 (2013), aff’d, 556 F. App’x 965 (Fed.
Cir. 2014); BioFunction, LLC. v. United States, 92 Fed. Cl. 167, 172 (2010); Mastrolia v.
United States, 91 Fed. Cl. 369, 384 (2010) (citing Flexfab, L.L.C. v. United States, 424
F.3d 1254, 1265 (Fed. Cir. 2005), and citing Abraham v. United States, 81 Fed. Cl. 178,
184 (2008)); see also Trauma Serv. Grp. v. United States, 104 F.3d at 1325; Weeks v.
United States, 124 Fed. Cl. 630, 633 (2016); Vargas v. United States, 114 Fed. Cl. 226,
233 (2014); Prairie Cnty., Mont. v. United States, 113 Fed. Cl. 194, 202 (2013), aff’d, 782
F.3d 685 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 577 U.S. 923 (2015); Cal. Hum. Dev. Corp. v. United
States, 87 Fed. Cl. 282, 293 (2009), aff’d, 379 F. App’x 979 (Fed. Cir. 2010); Aboo v.
United States, 86 Fed. Cl. 618, 629, aff’d, 347 F. App’x 581 (Fed. Cir. 2009); SGS-92-
X003 v. United States, 74 Fed. Cl. 637, 653-54 (2007); Arakaki v. United States, 71 Fed.
Cl. 509, 514 (2006), aff’d, 228 F. App’x 1003 (Fed. Cir. 2007); Fincke v. United States,
230 Ct. Cl. 233, 244, 675 F.2d 289, 295 (1982); Russell Corp. v. United States, 210 Ct.
Cl. 596, 608-09 (1976).

13
For a valid contract to come into existence, a person with authority to bind the
government must also accept. See Federal Crop Ins. Corp. v. Merrill, 332 U.S. 380, 384
(1947) (“Whatever the form in which the Government functions, anyone entering into an
arrangement with the Government takes the risk of having accurately ascertained that he
who purports to act for the Government stays within the bounds of his authority. The
scope of this authority may be explicitly defined by Congress or be limited by delegated
legislation, properly exercised through the rule-making power. And this is so even though,
as here, the agent himself may have been unaware of the limitations upon his authority.”);
see also Ravi v. United States, 104 F.4th 1359, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2024). It is key to contract
formation with the government that, “[t]he law requires that a Government agent who
purports to enter into or ratify a contractual agreement that is to bind the United States
have actual authority to do so.” Monarch Assurance P.L.C. v. United States, 244 F.3d
1356, 1360 (Fed. Cir.) (alteration added) (citing Trauma Serv. Grp. v. United States, 104
F.3d at 1325), reh’g and reh’g en banc denied (Fed. Cir. 2001); see also Liberty
Ammunition, Inc. v. United States, 835 F.3d 1388, 1401 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“A Government
agent must have actual authority to bind the Government to a contract.”) (citing Trauma
Serv. Grp. v. United States, 104 F.3d at 1325). “The corollary is that any party entering
into an agreement with the Government accepts the risk of correctly ascertaining the
authority of the agents who purport to act for the Government[.]” Monarch Assurance
P.L.C. v. United States, 244 F.3d at 1360 (alteration added) (citing Federal Crop Ins.
Corp. v. Merrill, 332 U.S. at 384); see also Snyder & Assocs. Acquisitions LLC v. United
States, 133 Fed. Cl. 120, 126 (2017). “Actual authority may be either express or implied.”
Liberty Ammunition, Inc. v. United States, 835 F.3d at 1402 (citing Salles v. United States,
156 F.3d 1383, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 1998)); see also H. Landau & Co. v. United States, 886
F.2d 322, 324 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (“Although apparent authority will not suffice to hold the
government bound by the acts of its agents, implied actual authority, like expressed actual
authority, will suffice.”) (internal citations omitted); White v. United States, 175 Fed. Cl.
226, 238 (2025); Yifrach v. United States, 169 Fed. Cl. 33, 57 (2024); Panther Brands,
LLC v. United States, 146 Fed. Cl. 204, 215 (2019). A government official has “express
actual authority to bind the government in contract only when the Constitution, a statute,
or a regulation grants it to that agent in unambiguous terms.” Jumah v. United States, 90
Fed. Cl. 603, 612 (2009), aff’d, 385 F. App’x 987 (Fed. Cir. 2010); White v. United States,
175 Fed. Cl. at 238; Yifrach v. United States, 169 Fed. Cl. at 56; Tracy v. United States,
55 Fed. Cl. 679, 682 (2003); McAfee v. United States, 46 Fed. Cl. 428, 435 (2000)). A
government official “has implied actual authority to enter an agreement only when that
authority is an ‘integral part of the duties assigned to [the] government employee.’” Liberty
Ammunition, Inc. v. United States, 835 F.3d at 1402 (alteration in original) (quoting H.
Landau & Co. v. United States, 886 F.2d at 324); see also White v. United States, 175
Fed. Cl. at 238; Abare v. United States, 167 Fed. Cl. 478, 491-92 (2023). “[P]laintiffs have
the burden of demonstrating the relevant government representative had actual authority
to enter the alleged contract.” Yifrach v. United States, 169 Fed. Cl. at 56 (alteration
added) (citing Harbert/Lummus Agrifuels Projects v. United States, 142 F.3d 1429, 1432
(Fed. Cir. 1998), and citing Doe v. United States, 48 Fed. Cl. 495, 501 (2000)).

Although no one with authority to bind the government initially entered into a
contract, in limited circumstances, a contract can come into existence if it is subsequently

14
ratified by someone who has the authority to contract on behalf of the government. See
Winter v. Cath-dr/Balti Joint Venture, 497 F.3d 1339, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2007);
Harbert/Lummus Agrifuels Projects v. United States, 142 F.3d at 1433-34. The ratifying
official must have actual or constructive knowledge of the unauthorized acts in order to
subsequently ratify a contract. See Harbert/Lummus Agrifuels Projects v. United States,
142 F.3d at 1433 (“Agreements made by government agents without authority to bind the
government may be subsequently ratified by those with authority if the ratifying officials
have actual or constructive knowledge of the unauthorized acts.”) (citing United States v.
Beebe, 180 U.S. 343, 354 (1901)). Ratification of a previously invalid contract “requires
knowledge of material facts involving the unauthorized act and approval of the activity by
one with authority.” Winter v. Cath-dr/Balti Joint Venture, 497 F.3d at 1347 (citing
Harbert/Lummus Agrifuels Projects v. United States, 142 F.3d at 1433-34). The United
States Supreme Court has stated:

Where an agent has acted without authority and it is claimed that the
principal has thereafter ratified his act, such ratification can only be based
upon a full knowledge of all the facts upon which the unauthorized action
was taken. This is as true in the case of the government as in that of an
individual. Knowledge is necessary in any event. If there be want of it,
though such want arises from the neglect of the principal, no ratification can
be based upon any act of his. Knowledge of the facts is the essential
element of ratification, and must be shown or such facts proved that its
existence is a necessary inference from them.

United States v. Beebe, 180 U.S. at 354 (internal citations omitted). Ratification must be
based on a demonstrated acceptance of the contract, and silence is not a sufficient
demonstration of this acceptance. See Harbert/Lummus Agrifuels Projects v. United
States, 142 F.3d at 1434 (“Silence in and of itself is not sufficient to establish a
demonstrated acceptance of the contract by the CO [Contracting Officer].”) (alteration
added); see also EWG Assocs., Ltd. v. United States, 231 Ct. Cl. 1028, 1030 (1982)
(“Ratification, however, must be based on a demonstrated acceptance of the contract.”).

Plaintiff acknowledges in her response to defendant’s motion to dismiss that the
plaintiff bears the burden of having to show specifically which term or condition of the
contract defendant breached. See Gonzalez-McCaulley Inv. Grp., Inc. v. United States,
93 Fed. Cl. 710, 715 (2010) (“[T]here is a minimum burden for Plaintiff, in asserting a
breach of contract claim, to explicitly identify the provisions and terms of the contract that
have been breached.”) (alteration added) (quoting Garreaux v. United States, 77 Fed. Cl.
726, 730 (2007)); see also RCFC 9(k) (2024) (“In pleading a claim founded on a contract
or treaty, a party must identify the substantive provisions of the contract or treaty on which
the party relies. In lieu of a description, the party may annex to the complaint a copy of
the contract or treaty, indicating the relevant provisions.”); Kinsey v. United States, 176
Fed. Cl. 762, 765 (stating that RCFC 9(k) “mandates that a plaintiff cite the substantive
provisions of the contract that form the foundation of its breach of contract claim”), recons.
denied, 177 Fed. Cl. 208 (2025); Deweese v. United States, 171 Fed. Cl. 187, 198 (2024)
(“A plaintiff that attaches a copy of the alleged contract to the complaint and ‘identif[ies]

15
the provisions and terms of the contract that have been breached’ satisfies its burden
under RCFC 9(k) because doing so allows the court to ‘render a decision . . . know[ing]
the relevant terms of the contract.’”) (alterations and omission in original) (quoting
Garreaux v. United States, 77 Fed. Cl. at 730), aff’d, No. 2024-1791, 2024 WL 5002116
(Fed. Cir. Dec. 6, 2024), cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 1942, reh’g denied, 145 S. Ct. 2811
(2025); Tomko v. United States, No. 24-773C, 2024 WL 5279873 (Fed. Cl. Dec. 2, 2024),
aff’d, No. 2025-1312, 2025 WL 1911494 (Fed. Cir. July 11, 2025). The court notes,
however, that plaintiff did not attach a copy of either the alleged April 2018 Student Loan
Repayment Agreement or the January 2019 Student Loan Repayment Agreement to her
complaint.

In the case currently before the court, plaintiff alleges that the alleged April 2018
Student Loan Repayment Agreement was a valid contract between plaintiff and
defendant. Plaintiff claims that there was an offer and an acceptance of the alleged April
2018 Student Loan Repayment Agreement because, according to plaintiff, defendant
made an offer when Human Resources Specialist Beth Graham presented plaintiff with
the alleged April 2018 Student Loan Repayment Agreement via email on April 17, 2018,
and plaintiff accepted that offer by signing the alleged April 2018 Student Loan
Repayment Agreement on April 18, 2018. Plaintiff claims that she met the terms of the
alleged April 2018 Student Loan Repayment Agreement because she had “well fulfill[ed]
the obligation of 3 years of service having worked 2017 – 2021.” (alteration added).
Plaintiff also alleges that defendant breached the alleged April 2018 Student Loan
Repayment Agreement, which she had signed, because the agreement stated that the
loan repayment schedule would be “one repayment of $10,000 in calendar year 2018,
one repayment of $10,000 in calendar year 2019, and one repayment of $10,000 in
calendar year 2020,” but defendant never made any repayment in 2018. Plaintiff also tries
to argue that “Defendant had a duty to properly process the 2018 agreement as promised
to Plaintiff as an employment retention or incentive” and that her breach of contract claim
arose because “Defendant failed to properly process” the alleged April 2018 Student Loan
Repayment Agreement after she signed it on April 18, 2018. Moreover, plaintiff argues
that the alleged April 2018 Student Loan Repayment Agreement should not be subject to
the approval process outlined in Program Statement 3530.02, described above, but not
stated in the alleged April 2018 Student Loan Repayment Agreement itself, because
“unless there is explicit language incorporating BOP regulations or statutes into a
contract, the court should not import into a contract, these terms and policies and
procedures that are outside of the contract presented to Plaintiff.” 9 Plaintiff claims that
“[b]y using the processing and policy arguments about when the time of service began,
when the agreement was offered accepted and/or ratified, and the processing of the 2018

9 Although plaintiff does not clarify which statutes, regulations, and policies she refers to

in her responsive briefing, based on the record before the court, plaintiff may be referring
to the statute at 5 U.S.C. § 5379, its implementing regulations at 5 CFR Part 537, and
Program Statement 3530.02. As indicated above, the BOP established the Student Loan
Repayment Program pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 5379 and its implementing regulations, and
Program Statement 3530.02 provides guidance for the implementation of the BOP’s
Student Loan Repayment Program.
16
and 2019 SLRP agreements, Defendant appears to incorporate statute or regulations into
the 2 page contract that is the SLRP agreement.” (alteration added).

Defendant makes a number of arguments in response, including that the alleged
April 2018 Student Loan Repayment Agreement is not a valid contract because,
according to defendant, no government official with authority to contract signed or
otherwise approved the alleged April 2018 Student Loan Repayment Agreement after
plaintiff signed the alleged agreement in 2018. Defendant argues that the “BOP human
resources contact [Ms. Beth Graham] who provided Ms. Sanchez the agreement did not
possess actual authority to bind the United States in contract such that the agreement
could be offered on April 17, 2018, for Ms. Sanchez to sign the following day” and result
in a contract between plaintiff and defendant at that time. (alteration added). Moreover,
defendant argues that even if the alleged April 2018 Student Loan Repayment Agreement
could be considered a contract binding on the United States, plaintiff is the party in breach
because the alleged April 2018 Student Loan Repayment Agreement stated that plaintiff
agreed “to remain in the service of the Bureau of Prisons for a period of 36 months,
beginning on the date that the repayment is made,” yet plaintiff failed to satisfy the 36-
month service requirement because the first repayment made by defendant was not made
until June 9, 2019 and plaintiff voluntarily departed BOP service prior to June 9, 2022.
Defendant also argues that “nothing in the 2018 document, even if it could be considered
a contract that existed between the parties, imposed an obligation on BOP to ‘process’
the document in a particular manner.” Further, defendant argues that “the policy [referring
to Program Statement 3530.02] and statute [referring to 5 U.S.C. 5379] are not cited to
be incorporated as terms of the agreement [with plaintiff], but detail the authority by which
BOP may enter a SLRP agreement.” (alterations added). Finally, defendant asserts that

if BOP did, in fact, breach the “contract” by failing to make a payment in
2018, then Ms. Sanchez’s claim for such breach would have arisen more
than six years before the complaint was filed in this case on March 31, 2025,
and so would be barred by the statute of limitations.

In plaintiff’s case, although plaintiff alleges that a 2018 contract came into
existence, plaintiff has not alleged in her complaint, demonstrated with evidence, or even
argued in her submissions to the court, that a government employee authorized to enter
binding contracts on behalf of the United States entered into the alleged April 2018
Student Loan Repayment Agreement with plaintiff on behalf of the BOP. 10 Nor has plaintiff

10 In fact, plaintiff’s complaint contains only a single reference to the term “authority.”

Under the heading “PARTIES” in plaintiff’s complaint, plaintiff states: “Merrick B. Garland,
(hereinafter “Garland”), is the Attorney General of the United States and the head of the
United States Department of Justice. BOP is an agency of the United States Department
of Justice. As such, Garland has ultimate authority over BOP decisions.” (capitalization
and emphasis in original; citation omitted). Plaintiff does not, however, allege that Merrick
B. Garland signed or otherwise approved the alleged April 2018 Student Loan Repayment
Agreement on behalf of the BOP. Moreover, the court notes that the only proper defendant

17
responded with evidence to defendant’s argument that no government official with
authority to bind the government to a contract signed the alleged April 2018 Student Loan
Repayment Agreement. Based on the record before the court, plaintiff has not supplied
proof of any documentation to demonstrate that the individual plaintiff claims sent her the
alleged April 2018 Student Loan Repayment Agreement, Human Resources Specialist
Beth Graham, FCI Bennettsville Warden Travis Bragg, whose digital signature appears
on the 2018 HR Pre-Approval Document, or any other government employee authorized
to enter binding contracts on behalf of the United States, entered into the alleged April
2018 Student Loan Repayment Agreement with plaintiff on behalf of the BOP. Nor has
plaintiff identified any statute, regulation, or document, delegating or granting either Mr.
Bragg or Ms. Graham actual authority to enter into contracts on behalf of the United
States. See Jumah v. United States, 90 Fed. Cl. at 612 (a government official has “express
actual authority to bind the government in contract only when the Constitution, a statute,
or a regulation grants it to that agent in unambiguous terms”). Plaintiff also has not alleged
or provided documentation to establish that finalizing and entering into Student Loan
Repayment Agreements on behalf of the BOP was an “integral part of the duties assigned”
to Mr. Bragg or Ms. Graham, such that either BOP employee could have had implied
actual authority to enter into contracts on behalf of the United States. See Liberty
Ammunition, Inc. v. United States, 835 F.3d at 1402. In addition to the apparent lack of
actual authority of Ms. Graham, the government official identified by plaintiff in her
complaint as the BOP employee who provided plaintiff with the alleged April 2018 Student
Loan Repayment Agreement, the court notes that the signature line on the alleged April
2018 Student Loan Repayment Agreement where an “HR representative” was supposed
to sign was left blank in the copy of the alleged April 2018 Student Loan Repayment
Agreement in the record before the court. Moreover, as indicated above, on the final page
of the 2018 HR Pre-Approval Document in the record before the court, under the heading
“Final Action,” the approval box is unchecked and the box next to the “amount approved”
is blank.

In its motion to dismiss, defendant cites Anoruo v. United States, 136 Fed. Cl. 90
(2018), aff’d, 759 F. App’x 956 (Fed. Cir. 2019), with the parenthetical “discussing SLRP
requirements” to try to support its argument that “there was no binding contract between
the parties until the FCI Bennettsville Warden’s written loan repayment request was
approved in 2019 by the Regional Director and the BOP’s Personnel Director in
Washington, D.C.” In the Anoruo v. United States case, Dr. Joseph Anoruo, a Department
of Veterans Affairs employee, who worked as a clinical pharmacist with the VA Southern
Nevada Healthcare System (VASNHS), sought student loan debt reimbursement
allegedly promised to him under two federal student loan reimbursement programs
including, as relevant here, the “Student Loan Repayment Program,” pursuant to 5 U.S.C.
§ 5379. The United States Court of Federal Claims Judge in Anoruo v. United States

for any action before the United States Court of Federal Claims is the United States, not
its officers. See RCFC 10(a) (2024); see also United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584,
588 (1941) (“[I]f the relief sought [in the United States Court of Federal Claims] is against
others than the United States the suit as to them must be ignored as beyond the
jurisdiction of the court.”) (alterations added).
18
stated that “Mr. Bright,” who the Judge identified as the “VASNHS medical center director,”
“offered to compensate Dr. Anoruo the sum of $40,000 out of local funds.” Anoruo v.
United States, 136 Fed. Cl. at 92. The Judge in Anoruo v. United States stated that “Mr.
Bright was contemplating use of the federal Student Loan Repayment Program,” but that
“when the final SLRP paperwork was presented to Dr. Anoruo in 2009, the sum offered
had been reduced to $13,300,” and that “Dr. Anoruo refused to agree” to the reduced
sum. Id. at 92-93. The Judge in Anoruo v. United States found that “[c]learly, Plaintiff’s
right to a payment under the SLRP was never established and cannot be enforced”
because the underlying statute requires a “written agreement” and “[w]hen the VA offered
a $13,300 compromise in the form of a written offer under the SLRP the following year,
Dr. Anoruo rejected it.” Id. at 94-95 (alterations added). On appeal, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed, in an unreported opinion, the United
States Court of Federal Claims’ decision and stated that “although he [Dr. Anoruo] alleges
a written offer to pay him $13,300, he also alleges that he rejected that offer, which thus
did not create a contract.” Anoruo v. United States, 759 F. App’x 956, 961 (Fed. Cir. 2019)
(alteration added). This court notes that it is unclear, based on the Anoruo v. United States
opinions, whether Mr. Bright had authority to enter into contracts on behalf of the
government and whether the “final SLRP paperwork” that was presented to Dr. Anoruo
was signed or otherwise approved by the government. Although the Anoruo v. United
States case refers to the Student Loan Repayment Program, the Anoruo v. United States
case is factually very different from the specific facts in the case brought by Ms. Sanchez
in this court and involved a different federal agency which may have had different
procedures for entering into student loan repayment agreements.

Moreover, although plaintiff does not mention FCI Bennettsville Warden Travis
Bragg in her complaint or in her responsive briefing, or allege in her complaint or in her
responsive briefing that FCI Bennettsville Warden Travis Bragg had actual authority to
enter into binding contracts on behalf of the United States, the court notes that Mr. Bragg’s
digital signature appears on the 2018 HR Pre-Approval Document. Defendant’s attorney
of record, as an officer of this court appearing for defendant, however, has represented
that Mr. Bragg did not have actual authority to enter into binding contracts on behalf of
the United States at the time relevant to this case. More significantly, as indicated above,
plaintiff has not produced any evidence to demonstrate that Mr. Bragg had actual
authority, either express or implied, to enter into binding contracts on behalf of the United
States at the time he digitally signed the 2018 HR Pre-Approval Document. In fact, plaintiff
acknowledged in her “Request for Compromise of Claim for Erroneous Pay” form that her
“SLRP request was not approved in 2018,” “had to be resubmitted by the HR Department
for processing and approval/disapproval,” and “[t]he new request was approved June
2019.” (alteration added). Therefore, plaintiff has failed to carry her burden to assert or
demonstrate that a government official with actual authority to contract on behalf of the
United States approved and agreed to the alleged April 2018 Student Loan Repayment
Agreement. See Snyder & Assocs. Acquisitions LLC v. United States, 133 Fed. Cl. at 126
(“Government agents must have actual authority to bind the Government in contract—
they do not have apparent authority. Private parties bear the risk that Government agents
may not have actual authority to bind the Government, even when the agents themselves
believe they have such authority.”) (citations omitted).

19
Nor has plaintiff alleged facts in her complaint to demonstrate that the alleged April
2018 Student Loan Repayment Agreement was subsequently ratified by a government
official with authority to bind the government to a contract. In her complaint, plaintiff
alleges that “Defendants are aware that Plaintiff accepted employment on January 22,
2017 and signed the initial loan repayment agreement in April 2018 and worked for
Defendants for a period of 3 years.” These facts, however, even taken as true as
described by plaintiff, are not sufficient to demonstrate the existence of the alleged April
2018 Student Loan Repayment Agreement as a binding contract between the parties, or
to demonstrate ratification of the alleged April 2018 Student Loan Repayment Agreement.
Plaintiff has not identified a government official with authority to bind the government who
had “full knowledge of all the facts upon which” plaintiff claims the alleged 2018 Student
Loan Repayment Agreement came into existence and who “demonstrated acceptance”
of the alleged April 2018 Student Loan Repayment Agreement. See United States v.
Beebe, 180 U.S. at 354 (“Where an agent has acted without authority and it is claimed
that the principal has thereafter ratified his act, such ratification can only be based upon
a full knowledge of all the facts upon which the unauthorized action was taken.”); see also
Harbert/Lummus Agrifuels Projects v. United States, 142 F.3d at 1434; EWG Assocs., Ltd.
v. United States, 231 Ct. Cl. at 1030. Plaintiff’s failure to identify an individual with authority
to enter into the alleged April 2018 Student Loan Repayment Agreement, or an individual
with authority to subsequently ratify the alleged April 2018 Student Loan Repayment
Agreement, is fatal to plaintiff’s breach of contract claim.

As mentioned previously, despite presenting no evidence that a government official
with actual authority to bind the United States to a contract entered into the alleged April
2018 Student Loan Repayment Agreement with plaintiff, plaintiff argues that the alleged
April 2018 Student Loan Repayment Agreement should not be subject to the approval
process outlined in Program Statement 3530.02 because the approval process was not
stated in the alleged April 2018 Student Loan Repayment Agreement itself. According to
plaintiff, “unless there is explicit language incorporating BOP regulations or statutes into
a contract, the court should not import into a contract, these terms and policies and
procedures that are outside of the contract presented to Plaintiff.” Defendant argues,
however, that defendant cited the statute at 5 U.S.C. § 5379 and Program Statement
3530.02 in its briefing, not to be incorporated as terms of the alleged April 2018 Student
Loan Repayment Agreement, but to detail the procedures pursuant to which the BOP may
enter into a Student Loan Repayment Agreement. In Trauma Service Group v. United
States, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit examined Department
of Defense Instruction 6010.12 to determine whether a Military Treatment Facility (MTF)
commander had actual contracting authority to bind the United States to a contract and
stated:

While an MTF commander has authority to negotiate an MOA
[Memorandum of Agreement] to the extent authorized in 10 U.S.C. § 1096,
the commander must forward this MOA to the Director, CHAMPUS [Civilian
Health and Medical Program of the Uniformed Services] and the Surgeon
General of the Army for approval prior to final execution of the agreement.

20
Trauma Serv. Grp. v. United States, 104 F.3d at 1327 (citing Department of Defense
Instruction 6010.12(F)(1)) (alterations added). Likewise, this court considers statutes and
regulations to determine whether a government official has express actual authority to
enter into contracts on behalf of the United States. See, e.g., White v. United States, 175
Fed. Cl. at 238; Yifrach v. United States, 169 Fed. Cl. at 56; Panther Brands, LLC v. United
States, 146 Fed. Cl. at 215. This court also has considered internal agency procedures
and guidance to determine whether a government employee had implied actual authority
to bind the United States to a contract. See, e.g., Bailey v. United States, 54 Fed. Cl. 459,
506 (2002) (examining the United States Attorneys’ Manual to determine that certain
United States Attorney’s Office personnel lacked express or implied authority to contract
on behalf of the United States), aff’d, 94 F. App’x 828 (Fed. Cir. 2004); McAfee v. United
States, 46 Fed. Cl. at 437 n.5 (examining United States Department of Justice Civil
Directive 14-95 to determine whether a United States Attorney had implied actual
contracting authority); Roy v. United States, 38 Fed. Cl. 184, 191 (1997) (examining the
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Field Office Manual of Investigative Operations and
Guidelines & Administrative Operations and Procedures to determine that FBI field agents
lacked actual contracting authority); Contel of California, Inc. v. United States, 37 Fed. Cl.
68, 73 (1996); Cruz-Pagan v. United States, 35 Fed. Cl. 59, 62 (1996) (examining the
Drug Enforcement Agency Agent’s Manual and stating that “the doctrine of implied actual
authority cannot be used to create an agent’s actual authority to bind the government in
contract when the agency’s internal procedures specifically preclude that agent from
exercising such authority”). Therefore, the fact that the alleged April 2018 Student Loan
Repayment Agreement did not explicitly reference the statute at 5 U.S.C. § 5379 or
Program Statement 3530.02 should not, in and of itself, prevent this court from
considering either when determining whether a government official with actual authority
approved the alleged April 2018 Student Loan Repayment Agreement.

The statute at 5 U.S.C. § 5379(b)(3) states that “[n]othing in this section shall be
considered to authorize an agency to pay any amount to reimburse an employee for any
repayments made by such employee prior to the agency’s entering into an agreement
under this section with such employee.” 5 U.S.C. § 5379(b)(3) (alteration added).
Program Statement 3530.02 outlines the approval process for the BOP to enter into such
statutory agreements with BOP employees as follows:

The Chief Executive Officer must request each student loan repayment in
writing through the Regional Director, who will approve or disapprove the
request. If the request is approved, it is forwarded to the Staffing and
Employee Relations section (SERS) for routing to the Bureau Personnel
Director, and the Assistant Director over the discipline involved (Attachment
C-12) for final approval.

Program Statement 3530.02 indicates that the approval process for BOP Student Loan
Repayment Agreements begins with the “request” of the Chief Executive Officer of the
BOP institution involved, but that “final approval” authority for BOP Student Loan
Repayment Agreements rests with the Bureau Personnel Director and the Assistant
Director over the discipline involved. At oral argument on defendant’s motion to dismiss,

21
the Department of Justice attorney of record, representing the United States, represented
to the court that the copy of Program Statement 3530.02 in the record before the court
had been, at the time of the facts relevant to plaintiff’s claims, available to Ms. Sanchez
as a BOP employee via the BOP’s intranet and still “is available currently to Ms. Sanchez
because she’s employed [by the BOP] again.” (alteration added). Regardless, because,
as explained above, the court finds that plaintiff has failed to carry her burden of
establishing that the alleged April 2018 Student Loan Repayment Agreement was a valid
contract between plaintiff and the government based on plaintiff’s failure to allege actual
or implied authority, even without resorting to Program Statement 3530.02, resolution of
the case currently before the court does not depend on whether or not Program Statement
3530.02 had to be incorporated into the alleged April 2018 Student Loan Repayment
Agreement, or whether plaintiff had knowledge of the BOP approval process.

Thus, since plaintiff has not alleged facts to demonstrate that her alleged April 2018
Student Loan Repayment Agreement was a valid contract executed or ratified by a
government official with actual authority, plaintiff has failed to state a claim for breach of
contract based on the alleged April 2018 Student Loan Repayment Agreement. In
contrast, the January 2019 Student Loan Repayment Agreement appears to have been
accepted as a valid contract by both parties and was signed by both plaintiff and
defendant. 11 Moreover, it appears from the record before the court that the government
followed the repayment schedule set out in the January 2019 Student Loan Repayment
Agreement by making a $10,000.00 payment on plaintiff’s behalf on each June 9, 2019,
July 19, 2020, and June 6, 2021, whereas no payment was made by the government in
2018, and the memorandum issued by BOP Regional Director Lothrop, on June 4, 2022,
acknowledged the 2019 contract. Plaintiff, however, appears to have breached the
January 2019 Student Loan Repayment Agreement by voluntarily resigning on
September 9, 2021, without fulfilling the 36-month service period beginning on the date
that the first repayment was made, which would have ended on June 9, 2022, and which
resulted in the defendant seeking repayment of the monies paid under the January 2019
Student Loan Repayment Agreement. As discussed above, Ms. Sanchez acknowledged
in her January 5, 2022 email to the BOP’s Consolidated Processing Unit that “I was able
to understand how I was in violation of my agreement,” that “I may have not completed
36 months of bureau service beginning the date of payment,” which occurred on June 9,
2019, and that “I do understand that it was my responsibility to thoroughly review the
document.” In sum, plaintiff’s breach of contract claim regarding the alleged April 2018

11 As discussed above, although Program Statement 3530.02 states that final approval of

BOP Student Loan Repayment Agreements rests with “the Bureau Personnel Director,
and the Assistant Director over the discipline involved,” (emphasis added), the signature
field for the BOP Assistant Director is blank in the copy of the 2019 HR Approval
Document in the record before the court. As indicated above, however, the parties have
not challenged the validity of the January 2019 Student Loan Repayment Agreement.
22
Student Loan Repayment Agreement has failed to state a claim for which relief can be
granted by this court. 12

As indicated above, defendant also argues, in the alternative, that if, for argument’s
sake, as plaintiff alleges, a 2018 contract had come into existence between plaintiff and
defendant, which it did not, plaintiff’s complaint in this court was filed after the expiration
of the applicable statute of limitations for filing plaintiff’s lawsuit in this court. The statute
at 28 U.S.C. § 2501 (2024) prescribes a six-year statute of limitations for filing claims in
the United States Court of Federal Claims arising under the Tucker Act’s waiver of
sovereign immunity. See 28 U.S.C. § 2501 (“Every claim of which the United States Court
of Federal Claims has jurisdiction shall be barred unless the petition thereon is filed within
six years after such claim first accrues.”). “The six-year statute of limitations set forth in
section 2501 is a jurisdictional requirement for a suit in the Court of Federal Claims.” John
R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 457 F.3d 1345, 1354 (Fed. Cir.), reh’g en banc
denied (Fed. Cir. 2006), aff’d, 552 U.S. 130 (2008); see also Etchegoinberry v. United
States, 132 F.4th 1374, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2025); Winnemucca Indian Colony v. United

12 The statute at 5 U.S.C. § 5379(c)(3), addressing the government’s right of recovery in

the event of voluntary separation before the end of a service agreement date, states that
“[t]he head of the agency concerned may waive, in whole or in part, a right of recovery
under this subsection if it is shown that recovery would be against equity and good
conscience or against the public interest.” (alteration added). Program Statement 3530.02
also reads “[t]he Attorney General may waive the right of recovery of an employee’s debt
under 5 U.S.C. § 5514 in whole or in part if it is determined that recovery would be against
equity and good conscience or against the public interest.” (alteration added). Based on
the record before the court in plaintiff’s case, it appears that plaintiff could well have been
and be an appropriate candidate for waiver. Although plaintiff’s complaint fails to allege
sufficient facts to demonstrate that the parties entered into a Student Loan Repayment
Agreement in 2018, the record before the court demonstrates that plaintiff worked for the
BOP for over four years between January 22, 2017 and September 9, 2021. Moreover,
the 2018 HR Pre-Approval Document in the record before the court stated that “Ms.
Sanchez has experience and expertise that proves to be an asset to FCI Bennettsville,”
“Ms. Sanchez has displayed exceptional character and dedication in her position with the
Bureau of Prisons,” and “Ms. Sanchez’s continued employment is essential to the
institution meeting the inmate populations need.” Additionally, defendant represented to
the court at the oral argument on the defendant’s motion to dismiss that Ms. Sanchez was
recently rehired to work at the BOP again, and defendant stated at oral argument that
plaintiff once again continues to be a valuable BOP employee. Although not within the
ability of this court to order equitable relief, the record suggests that the BOP might well
consider Ms. Sanchez for the waiver process outlined in the statute at 5 U.S.C.
§ 5379(c)(3) (and Program Statement 3530.02); provided the BOP’s Student Loan
Repayment Program, or a similar program, still exists at the BOP. See United States v.
Amdahl Corp., 786 F.2d 387, 391-92 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (“While we are not unsympathetic
with the plight of [plaintiff], we cannot bind the respondent to an unauthorized agreement
. . . [plaintiff] assumed the risk that the respondent had actual authority to enter into the
bargain to which the parties had agreed.”) (alterations and omission added).
23
States, 156 F.4th 1339, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2025) (“The statute of limitations in section 2501
is jurisdictional and requires that a claim be filed ‘within six years after such claim first
accrues.’” (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2501, and citing Chemehuevi Indian Tribe v. United
States, 104 F.4th 1314, 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2024))); Ideker Farms, Inc. v. United States, 71
F.4th 964, 974-75 (Fed. Cir. 2023); Jones v. United States, 30 F.4th 1094, 1100 (Fed. Cir.
2022) (“To fall within the jurisdiction of the Court of Federal Claims, a claim against the
United States filed in that court must be ‘filed within six years after such claim first
accrues.’” (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2501, and citing John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United
States, 552 U.S. 130, 132-35 (2008))), cert. denied, 143 S. Ct. 566 (2023); Katzin v.
United States, 908 F.3d 1350, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (“The Tucker Act statute of limitations
is jurisdictional; we must therefore determine whether Plaintiffs’ claims are timely before
proceeding to the merits of the takings claim.” (citing John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United
States, 552 U.S. at 136)), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 443 (2019); Nix v. United States, 174
Fed. Cl. 260, 266 (2024); Roseberry-Andrews v. United States, 144 Fed. Cl. 29, 33,
appeal dismissed, No. 2019-2386, 2019 WL 11815040 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 19, 2019).

The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has indicated that a
claim accrues “‘when all events have occurred to fix the Government’s alleged liability,
entitling the claimant to demand payment and sue here for his money.’” Samish Indian
Nation v. United States, 419 F.3d 1355, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (quoting Martinez v. United
States, 333 F.3d 1295, 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1177 (2004)); see
also Winnemucca Indian Colony v. United States, 156 F.4th at 1348 (“For the purposes
of section 2501, a cause of action against the government accrues ‘when all the events
which fix the government’s alleged liability have occurred and the plaintiff was or should
have been aware of their existence.’” (emphasis in original) (quoting Hopland Band of
Pomo Indians v. United States, 855 F.2d 1573, 1577 (Fed. Cir. 1988)); Ideker Farms, Inc.
v. United States, 71 F.4th at 975 (“A claim accrues ‘when all the events have occurred
which fix the liability of the Government’ and the plaintiff ‘was or should have been aware’
that the claim existed.” (quoting Goodrich v. United States, 434 F.3d 1329, 1333 (Fed. Cir.
2006) (quoting Hopland Band of Pomo Indians v. United States, 855 F.2d at 1577)));
FloorPro, Inc. v. United States, 680 F.3d 1377, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2012); Mildenberger v.
United States, 643 F.3d 938, 944-45 (Fed. Cir. 2011); Martinez v. United States, 333 F.3d
at 1303 (“A cause of action cognizable in a Tucker Act suit accrues as soon as all events
have occurred that are necessary to enable the plaintiff to bring suit, i.e., when ‘all events
have occurred to fix the Government’s alleged liability, entitling the claimant to demand
payment and sue here for his money.’” (quoting Nager Elec. Co. v. United States, 177 Ct.
Cl. 234, 240 (1966))); see also Schow v. United States, 177 Fed. Cl. 75, 81 (2025); Kropp
Holdings, Inc. v. United States, 176 Fed. Cl. 512, 544 (2025); White v. United States, 175
Fed. Cl. at 232; Eden Isle Marina, Inc. v. United States, 113 Fed. Cl. at 481; Brizuela v.
United States, 103 Fed. Cl. 635, 639, aff’d, 492 F. App’x 97 (Fed. Cir. 2012), cert. denied,
568 U.S. 1251 (2013).

As summarized by the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in
Holmes v. United States:

24
Section 2501 states that all claims that otherwise fall within the jurisdiction
of the Court of Federal Claims “shall be barred unless the petition thereon
is filed within six years after such claim first accrues.” 28 U.S.C. § 2501. A
cause of action first accrues when all the events have occurred that fix the
alleged liability of the government and entitle the claimant to institute an
action.

Holmes v. United States, 657 F.3d 1303, 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (citing Ingrum v. United
States, 560 F.3d 1311, 1314 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 558 U.S. 878 (2009)); see also
Etchegoinberry v. United States, 132 F.4th at 1379; White v. United States, 175 Fed. Cl.
at 232; Parkwood Assocs. Ltd. P’ship v. United States, 97 Fed. Cl. 809, 813-14 (2011)
(“Because, as noted, this requirement is jurisdictional, plaintiff bears the burden of
demonstrating that its claims were timely.” (citing Alder Terrace, Inc. v. United States, 161
F.3d 1372, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 1998))), aff’d, 465 F. App’x 952 (Fed. Cir. 2012); Klamath Tribe
Claims Comm. v. United States, 97 Fed. Cl. 203, 209 (2011).

Accrual of a claim is “‘determined under an objective standard’” and plaintiff does
not have to possess actual knowledge of all the relevant facts in order for a cause of
action to accrue. See FloorPro, Inc. v. United States, 680 F.3d at 1381 (quoting Fallini v.
United States, 56 F.3d 1378, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1243 (1996));
see also Gov’t of Greece Hellenic Air Force v. United States, 166 Fed. Cl. 546, 551 (2023),
aff’d, No. 2023-2174, 2025 WL 1099627 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 14, 2025); Etchegoinberry v.
United States, 165 Fed. Cl. 696, 725 (2023), aff’d, 132 F.4th 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2025); Osborn
v. United States, 47 Fed. Cl. 224, 233 (2000). Moreover, “for purposes of determining
when the statute of limitations begins to run, the ‘proper focus’ must be ‘upon the time of
the [defendant’s] acts, not upon the time at which the consequences of the acts [become]
most painful.’” Navajo Nation v. United States, 631 F.3d 1268, 1277 (Fed. Cir. 2011)
(emphasis and alterations in original) (quoting Del. State Coll. v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250, 258
(1980)). The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in Holmes v. United
States offered further explanation, writing,

the “accrual of a claim against the United States is suspended, for purposes
of 28 U.S.C. § 2501, until the claimant knew or should have known that the
claim existed.” Id. [Holmes v. United States, 92 Fed. Cl. 311,] 319 [(2010)]
(quoting Young v. United States, 529 F.3d 1380, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 2008)). For
the accrual suspension rule to apply, the plaintiff “must either show that the
defendant has concealed its acts with the result that plaintiff was unaware
of their existence or it must show that its injury was ‘inherently unknowable’
at the accrual date.” Young, 529 F.3d at 1384 (quoting Martinez v. United
States, 333 F.3d 1295, 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (en banc)).

Holmes v. United States, 657 F.3d at 1317 (alterations added; footnotes omitted).

In her case, plaintiff alleges that defendant breached the alleged April 2018
Student Loan Repayment Agreement by failing to process the alleged agreement after
plaintiff signed it on April 18, 2018, and by failing to make any student loan repayment on

25
plaintiff’s behalf in 2018 pursuant to the loan repayment schedule listed in the alleged
April 2018 Student Loan Repayment Agreement. Both of these breaches alleged by
plaintiff relate to events that could have occurred at some time during 2018, but no later
than December 31, 2018. Therefore, the events that conceivably could have fixed the
liability of the government with regard to plaintiff’s alleged breach of contract claim
occurred, at the very latest, by December 31, 2018. See Samish Indian Nation v. United
States, 419 F.3d at 1369 (“A claim accrues under [28 U.S.C.] § 2501 ‘when all events
have occurred to fix the Government’s alleged liability, entitling the claimant to demand
payment and sue here for his money.’”) (alteration added) (quoting Martinez v. United
States, 333 F.3d at 1303). According to defendant, plaintiff should have known about any
possible alleged breach for failing to process the alleged April 2018 Student Loan
Repayment Agreement, or failing to make a 2018 loan payment on plaintiff’s behalf, in
2018 because she had a copy of the alleged April 2018 Student Loan Repayment
Agreement, with the relevant repayment dates and conditions, and would have been able
to view her student loan balance, and, therefore, she should have known that no payment
had been made on her behalf in 2018 pursuant to an alleged April 2018 Student Loan
Repayment Agreement. As a result, given that any breach of contract claim arising from
the alleged 2018 Student Loan Repayment Agreement would have accrued by December
31, 2018, at the latest, plaintiff would have had to file a lawsuit for breach of contract in
this court by at least December 31, 2024, or within six years of the relevant 2018 dates.
See 28 U.S.C. § 2501. Plaintiff, however, filed her complaint in this court on March 31,
2025. Therefore, even if the alleged April 2018 Student Loan Repayment Agreement
could have been considered a valid contract, which it cannot, a claim for breach of
contract for failure to make a 2018 payment, or failure to process the alleged April 2018
Student Loan Repayment Agreement, would be barred by the applicable six-year statute
of limitations. 13

13 As discussed more fully above, in plaintiff’s previous action in the United States District

Court for the District of South Carolina, the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina Judge concluded that “transfer is inappropriate” and, instead, “the
interests of justice would be served by dismissing Sanchez’s contract claim without
prejudice with leave to refile in the [United States] Court of Federal Claims.” Sanchez v.
Garland, No. 4:24-cv-01149-JD (alteration added). In the December 31, 2024 order, the
United States District Court for the District of South Carolina Judge also stated briefly in
a footnote that “the six-year limitations period does not prevent Sanchez from re-filing her
contract claim in the [United States] Court of Federal Claims.” Id. (alteration added). The
United States District Court for the District of South Carolina Judge did not elaborate
further regarding the application of the statute of limitations to a future lawsuit brought by
plaintiff in the United States Court of Federal Claims. Given that the United States District
Court for the District of South Carolina Judge dismissed plaintiff’s previous action, rather
than transferred plaintiff’s action to this court, and given that plaintiff filed a new action in
the United States Court of Federal Claims, it is the filing date of plaintiff’s action in the
United States Court of Federal Claims that is relevant to the application of the Tucker
Act’s six-year statute of limitations in this case. See Henke v. United States, 60 F.3d 795,
800 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (“Had Henke’s case been transferred by the district court to cure the

26
Plaintiff also argues that defendant’s “negligence is evidence of breach of contract
in the US Court of Federal Claims” and that defendant “had a duty to properly process
the 2018 agreement as promised,” and negligently failed to do so. Plaintiff cites Bird &
Sons, Inc. v. United States, 190 Ct. Cl. 426 (1970), to try to support her claim that
negligence can be evidence of a breach of contract. Bird & Sons, Inc. v. United States,
however, is a 1970 United States Court of Claims case in which a specific contract clause
stated that “Bird & Sons would be responsible for all maintenance and repairs to the truck
‘other than that caused by abuse or neglect on the part of the Government.’” Id. at 428.
The plaintiff in Bird & Sons, Inc. v. United States subsequently claimed that the
government had treated the trucks negligently and, therefore, had breached the specific
clause of the contract that explicitly prohibited that negligent behavior. See id. at 429. The
Court of Claims case of Bird & Sons, Inc. v. United States, therefore, does not support a
general proposition, as plaintiff suggests, that “negligence is evidence of breach of
contract in the US Court of Federal Claims,” but rather the Bird & Sons, Inc. v. United
States case suggests that a breach of contract claim will not be barred in this court if a
specific contract clause which prohibits negligent behavior is included in a contract signed
by both parties. Id. at 431 (“[W]here an alleged ‘negligent’ act constitutes a breach of a
contractually created duty, the Tucker Act does not preclude relief.”) (alteration added).
By contrast, in the case currently before the court, there was no 2018 contract, and,
certainly, no contract clause which explicitly prohibited a specific negligent action, such
as failing to process the alleged April 2018 Student Loan Repayment Agreement. The
alleged April 2018 Student Loan Repayment Agreement does not contain a clause, such
as the one in Bird & Sons Inc. v. United States, explicitly prohibiting a specific negligent
action. The Bird & Sons Inc. v. United States analysis of Tucker Act jurisdiction does not
assist plaintiff in the current case.

Apparently in an effort to cover a broad range of possible, albeit unsuccessful,
bases for plaintiff’s allegations, plaintiff also states that her claims fall “under the Tucker
Act 28 USC §§ 1346(a)(2) and 1491 and Federal Tort Claims Act, both within the
jurisdiction of the United States Court of Federal Claims.” To the extent that plaintiff may
be seeking to raise claims based on allegations of tortious conduct, such as negligence
by agency officials not processing the alleged 2018 Student Loan Repayment Agreement

want of jurisdiction, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1631, the date of filing in the district court
would be taken as the date of commencing the action in the Court of Federal Claims. But
in this case the district court simply dismissed the suit without ordering a transfer, and 28
U.S.C. § 1631 is not applicable.”) (citation omitted). The United States District Court for
the District of South Carolina Judge also indicated that “Sanchez’s quantum meruit claim
is a claim implied in law” and that “[t]he Court of Federal Claims has no jurisdiction over
such claims.” Sanchez v. Garland, No. 4:24-cv-01149-JD (alteration added). As stated
above, plaintiff filed her complaint in this court on March 31, 2025, more than six years
after an alleged breach of contract claim would have accrued had the alleged 2018
Student Loan Repayment Agreement been a valid contract, which the court has
determined above it is not. Accordingly, the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina Judge’s statement in dicta about the statute of limitations does not control
the outcome in the above captioned case.
27
that plaintiff signed, the Tucker Act specifically excludes tort claims from the jurisdiction
of this court. See 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1) (2024). Moreover, the United States District
Court for the District of South Carolina with jurisdiction over plaintiff’s tort claim dismissed
plaintiff’s tort claim, without prejudice, because plaintiff had provided “no basis for the
Court to conclude that any extra-contractual relationship between Sanchez and
Defendants created the duty of care Sanchez asserts was breached in this case.”
Sanchez v. Garland, No. 4:24-cv-01149-JD. In addition to the plain language of the Tucker
Act, precedents uniformly indicate that this court does not have jurisdiction to adjudicate
claims sounding in tort. See Keene Corp. v. United States, 508 U.S. 200, 214 (1993);
Allen v. United States, 88 F.4th 983, 986 (Fed. Cir. 2023); Rick’s Mushroom Serv. Inc., v.
United States, 521 F.3d 1338, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (“The plain language of the Tucker
Act excludes from the Court of Federal Claims jurisdiction claims sounding in tort.”); Alves
v. United States, 133 F.3d 1454, 1459 (Fed. Cir. 1998); Brown v. United States, 105 F.3d
621, 623 (Fed. Cir.) (“Because Brown and Darnell’s complaints for ‘fraudulent
assessment[s]’ are grounded upon fraud, which is a tort, the court lacks jurisdiction over
those claims.”) (alteration in original), reh’g denied (Fed. Cir. 1997); Golden Pac. Bancorp
v. United States, 15 F.3d 1066, 1070 n.8 (Fed. Cir.), reh’g denied, en banc suggestion
declined (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 961 (1994); Otis v. United States, 176 Fed. Cl.
at 10; Lambro v. United States, 175 Fed. Cl. 536, appeal dismissed, No. 2025-1825, 2025
WL 2304784 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 11, 2025); Steele v. United States, 175 Fed. Cl. 765, 766
(2025); Lewis v. United States, 175 Fed. Cl. 507, 512 (2025) (“The Tucker Act expressly
limits this court’s jurisdiction to ‘cases not sounding in tort.’” (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1);
Rick’s Mushroom Serv., Inc. v. United States, 521 F.3d at 1343)); Robinson v. United
States, 170 Fed. Cl. 125, 130 (2024); Martin v. United States, 169 Fed. Cl. 342, 345
(2024) (“[I]t is well settled that this Court ‘lacks jurisdiction to hear . . . FTCA [Federal
Torts Claims Act] claim[s] for allegedly tortious conduct by the United States or its agents
because it is specifically barred from hearing tort cases.’”) (first and second alterations
added; third alteration and omission in original) (quoting Canuto v. United States, 615 F.
App’x 951, 953 (Fed. Cir. 2015), and citing 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1)); Walker v. United
States, 168 Fed. Cl. 171, 176 (2023); Rancho de Dias Alegres LLC v. United States, 168
Fed. Cl. 139, 144 (2023); Hastings v. United States, 165 Fed. Cl. 1, 5 (2023); Jackson v.
United States, 162 Fed. Cl. 282, 291 (2022); Kinney v. United States, 161 Fed. Cl. 644,
649 (2022) (“[T]his court is expressly prohibited from exercising jurisdiction over tort
claims.”) (alteration added); Turner v. United States, 160 Fed. Cl. 242, 245 (2022);
Schneiter v. United States, 159 Fed. Cl. 356, 367 (2022) (“[T]o the extent that plaintiff
asserts a tort claim, that claim must be dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.”)
(alteration added); Sin Hang Lee v. United States, 142 Fed. Cl. 722, 728 (2019), aff’d sub
nom. Lee v. United States, 819 F. App’x 908 (Fed. Cir. 2020); Kant v. United States, 123
Fed. Cl. 614, 616 (2015) (“[Plaintiff’s] claims for ‘conversion’ and ‘fraud’ sound in tort and
this court lacks jurisdiction to hear tort claims.”) (alteration added); Golden v. United
States, 118 Fed. Cl. 764, 772 (2014) (“Cases sounding in tort, such as defamation, are
expressly excluded by the [Tucker Act].”) (alteration added); Cox v. United States, 105
Fed. Cl. 213, 218 (“[P]laintiffs contend that the United States has engaged in tortious
conduct, including harassment and persecution, malfeasance, fraud, abuse, and
deception . . . . However, the Court of Federal Claims does not possess jurisdiction to
entertain claims sounding in tort.” (omission added; alteration added)), appeal dismissed,

28
(Fed. Cir. 2012); Jumah v. United States, 90 Fed. Cl. at 607 (“[I]t is well-established that
the Court of Federal Claims does not have jurisdiction over tort claims.”) (alteration
added). Therefore, if plaintiff asserts claims sounding in tort, such claims are not within
the jurisdiction of this court as set forth in the Tucker Act and must be dismissed.

Additionally, as indicated above, plaintiff also asserts that her claims fall under the
statute at 28 U.S.C. § 1346, which provides:

(a) The district courts shall have original jurisdiction, concurrent with the
United States Court of Federal Claims, of:

(1) Any civil action against the United States for the recovery of any internal-
revenue tax alleged to have been erroneously or illegally assessed or
collected, or any penalty claimed to have been collected without authority
or any sum alleged to have been excessive or in any manner wrongfully
collected under the internal-revenue laws;

(2) Any other civil action or claim against the United States, not exceeding
$10,000 in amount, founded either upon the Constitution, or any Act of
Congress, or any regulation of an executive department, or upon any
express or implied contract with the United States, or for liquidated or
unliquidated damages in cases not sounding in tort, except that the district
courts shall not have jurisdiction of any civil action or claim against the
United States founded upon any express or implied contract with the United
States or for liquidated or unliquidated damages in cases not sounding in
tort which are subject to sections 7104(b)(1) and 7107(a)(1) of title 41. For
the purpose of this paragraph, an express or implied contract with the Army
and Air Force Exchange Service, Navy Exchanges, Marine Corps
Exchanges, Coast Guard Exchanges, or Exchange Councils of the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration shall be considered an express or
implied contract with the United States.

(b)(1) Subject to the provisions of chapter 171 of this title, the district courts,
together with the United States District Court for the District of the Canal
Zone and the District Court of the Virgin Islands, shall have exclusive
jurisdiction of civil actions on claims against the United States, for money
damages, accruing on and after January 1, 1945, for injury or loss of
property, or personal injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act
or omission of any employee of the Government while acting within the
scope of his office or employment, under circumstances where the United
States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance
with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred.

28 U.S.C. § 1346(a) (2024). Subsection 1346(a)(2), cited by plaintiff in her complaint,
discusses only the United States District Courts’ concurrent jurisdiction with the United
States Court of Federal Claims for actions “not exceeding $10,000 in amount” and “not

29
sounding in tort.” 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(2). The statutory language is plain that “the Court
of Federal Claims may not adjudicate claims sounding in tort” and that “jurisdiction over
tort claims against the United States lies exclusively in federal district courts.” Feist v.
United States, 148 Fed. Cl. 168, 171 (2019) (citing U.S. Marine, Inc. v. United States, 722
F.3d 1360, 1365-66 (Fed. Cir. 2013)). In sum, count one of plaintiff’s complaint must be
dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to RCFC
12(b)(6) and, to the extent plaintiff tries to state a tort claim in count one, it also must be
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction pursuant to RCFC 12(b)(1).

Count Two: Quantum Meruit

Plaintiff’s complaint in this court also sets forth, as count two, a quantum meruit
claim for recovery. In count two of her complaint, plaintiff alleges that she performed
services as a nurse at the BOP which the government accepted from 2017 until 2021 and
that “Defendant has received the benefit of the bargain from the professional services
and practice productivity of Plaintiff, for which Plaintiff has not been fully compensated
per her contractual agreement with Defendants.” Defendant, however, argues that this
court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over plaintiff’s quantum meruit claim because,
according to defendant, an implied-in-fact contract cannot exist given that plaintiff alleges
in her complaint that an express, written contract existed in her case.

“Subject-matter jurisdiction may be challenged at any time by the parties or by the
court sua sponte.” Folden v. United States, 379 F.3d 1344, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (citing
Fanning, Phillips & Molnar v. West, 160 F.3d 717, 720 (Fed. Cir. 1998)), reh’g and reh’g
en banc denied (Fed. Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 545 U.S. 1127 (2005); see also ECC Int’l
Constructors, LLC v. Sec’y of Army, 79 F.4th 1364, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2023) (“‘[C]ourts must
enforce jurisdictional rules sua sponte, even in the face of a litigant’s forfeiture or waiver.’”
(quoting Santos-Zacaria v. Garland, 598 U.S. 411, 416 (2023)) (alteration added); St.
Bernard Parish Gov’t v. United States, 916 F.3d 987, 992-93 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“[T]he court
must address jurisdictional issues, even sua sponte, whenever those issues come to the
court’s attention, whether raised by a party or not, and even if the parties affirmatively
urge the court to exercise jurisdiction over the case.” (citing Foster v. Chatman, 578 U.S.
488, 496 (2016)) (alteration added); Int’l Elec. Tech. Corp. v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 476
F.3d 1329, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2007); Haddad v. United States, 152 Fed. Cl. 1, 16 (2021);
Fanelli v. United States, 146 Fed. Cl. 462, 466 (2020). The Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1491,
grants jurisdiction to this court as follows:

The United States Court of Federal Claims shall have jurisdiction to render
judgment upon any claim against the United States founded either upon the
Constitution, or any Act of Congress or any regulation of an executive
department, or upon any express or implied contract with the United States,
or for liquidated or unliquidated damages in cases not sounding in tort.

28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1). As interpreted by the United States Supreme Court, the Tucker
Act waives sovereign immunity to allow jurisdiction over claims against the United States
(1) founded on an express or implied contract with the United States, (2) seeking a refund

30
from a prior payment made to the government, or (3) based on federal constitutional,
statutory, or regulatory law mandating compensation by the federal government for
damages sustained. See United States v. Navajo Nation, 556 U.S. 287, 289-90 (2009);
see also Me. Cmty. Health Options v. United States, 590 U.S. 296, 322-23 (2020); United
States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 216 (1983); Sanford Health Plan v. United States, 969
F.3d 1370, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2020); Alvarado Hosp., LLC v. Price, 868 F.3d 983, 991 (Fed.
Cir. 2017); Greenlee Cnty., Ariz. v. United States, 487 F.3d 871, 875 (Fed. Cir.), reh’g
and reh’g en banc denied (Fed. Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1142 (2008); Palmer v.
United States, 168 F.3d 1310, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 1999); Gulley v. United States, 150 Fed.
Cl. 405, 411 (2020); Kuntz v. United States, 141 Fed. Cl. 713, 717 (2019). “Not every
claim invoking the Constitution, a federal statute, or a regulation is cognizable under the
Tucker Act. The claim must be one for money damages against the United States . . . .”
United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. at 216 (omission added); see also Chemehuevi Indian
Tribe v. United States, 104 F.4th at 1321 (“For jurisdiction to lie under the Tucker Act,
“‘the allegation must be that the particular provision of law relied upon grants the claimant,
expressly or by implication, a right to be paid a certain sum.”’” (quoting Doe v. United
States, 100 F.3d 1576, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (quoting Eastport Steamship Corp. v. United
States, 178 Ct. Cl. 599, 605, 372 F.2d 1002, 1008 (1967)), reh’g denied and en banc
suggestion denied (Fed. Cir. 1997))); United States v. White Mountain Apache Tribe, 537
U.S. 465, 472 (2003); Allen v. United States, 88 F.4th at 986 (“The Tucker Act does not
create substantive rights, so a plaintiff filing in the Court of Federal Claims ‘must identify
a separate source of substantive law that creates the right to money damages.’ . . . ‘[T]he
absence of a money-mandating source [is] fatal to the court’s jurisdiction under the Tucker
Act.’”) (quoting Fisher v. United States, 402 F.3d 1167, 1172-73 (Fed. Cir. 2005)
(omission added; alterations in original); N.Y. & Presbyterian Hosp. v. United States, 881
F.3d 877, 881 (Fed. Cir. 2018); Smith v. United States, 709 F.3d 1114, 1116 (Fed. Cir.),
cert. denied, 571 U.S. 945 (2013); RadioShack Corp. v. United States, 566 F.3d 1358,
1360 (Fed. Cir. 2009); Rick’s Mushroom Serv., Inc. v. United States, 521 F.3d at 1343
(“[P]laintiff must . . . identify a substantive source of law that creates the right to recovery
of money damages against the United States.”) (alteration and omission added); Olson
v. United States, 152 Fed. Cl. 33, 40-41 (2021); Jackson v. United States, 143 Fed. Cl.
242, 245 (2019), appeal dismissed, 2020 WL 8254415 (Fed. Cir. 2020). In Ontario Power
Generation, Inc. v. United States, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit identified three types of monetary claims for which jurisdiction is lodged in the
United States Court of Federal Claims:

The underlying monetary claims are of three types. . . . First, claims alleging
the existence of a contract between the plaintiff and the government fall
within the Tucker Act’s waiver . . . . Second, the Tucker Act’s waiver
encompasses claims where “the plaintiff has paid money over to the
Government, directly or in effect, and seeks return of all or part of that sum.”
Eastport S.S. [Corp. v. United States, 178 Ct. Cl. 599, 605-06,] 372 F.2d
[1002,] 1007-08 [(1967)] (describing illegal exaction claims as claims “in
which ‘the Government has the citizen’s money in its pocket’” (quoting
Clapp v. United States, 127 Ct. Cl. 505, 117 F. Supp. 576, 580 (1954)) . . . .
Third, the Court of Federal Claims has jurisdiction over those claims where

31
“money has not been paid but the plaintiff asserts that he is nevertheless
entitled to a payment from the treasury.” Eastport S.S., 372 F.2d at 1007.
Claims in this third category, where no payment has been made to the
government, either directly or in effect, require that the “particular provision
of law relied upon grants the claimant, expressly or by implication, a right to
be paid a certain sum.” Id.; see also [United States v. ]Testan, 424 U.S.
[392,] 401-02 [(1976)] (“Where the United States is the defendant and the
plaintiff is not suing for money improperly exacted or retained, the basis of
the federal claim-whether it be the Constitution, a statute, or a regulation-
does not create a cause of action for money damages unless, as the Court
of Claims has stated, that basis ‘in itself . . . can fairly be interpreted as
mandating compensation by the Federal Government for the damage
sustained.’” (quoting Eastport S.S., 372 F.2d at 1009)). This category is
commonly referred to as claims brought under a “money-mandating”
statute.

Ont. Power Generation, Inc. v. United States, 369 F.3d 1298, 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2004)
(alterations and first two omissions added); see also Bell v. United States, 20 F.4th 768,
770 (Fed. Cir. 2021); Samish Indian Nation v. United States, 419 F.3d at 1364; Twp. of
Saddle Brook v. United States, 104 Fed. Cl. 101, 106 (2012).

“Determination of jurisdiction starts with the complaint, which must be well-pleaded
in that it must state the necessary elements of the plaintiff’s claim, independent of any
defense that may be interposed.” Holley v. United States, 124 F.3d 1462, 1465 (Fed. Cir.)
(citing Franchise Tax Bd. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1983)),
reh’g denied (Fed. Cir. 1997); see also Klamath Tribe Claims Comm. v. United States, 97
Fed. Cl. at 208; Gonzalez-McCaulley Inv. Grp., Inc. v. United States, 93 Fed. Cl. at 713.
A plaintiff need only state in the complaint “a short and plain statement of the grounds for
the court’s jurisdiction,” and “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief.” RCFC 8(a)(1), (2); Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(1), (2) (2025); see also
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677-78 (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555-
57, 570); Bd. of Supervisors of Issaquena Cnty., Miss. v. United States, 84 F.4th 1359,
1364 (Fed. Cir. 2023) (“To survive a motion to dismiss, ‘the complaint must contain
‘sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.’’”) (quoting A & D Auto Sales, Inc. v. United States, 748 F.3d at 1157 (quoting
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Bell Atl. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570)). To
properly state a claim for relief, “[c]onclusory allegations of law and unwarranted
inferences of fact do not suffice to support a claim.” Bradley v. Chiron Corp., 136 F.3d
1317, 1322 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (alteration added); see also McZeal v. Sprint Nextel Corp.,
501 F.3d 1354, 1363 n.9 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (Dyk, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part)
(quoting C. WRIGHT AND A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1286 (3d ed.
2004)); “A plaintiff’s factual allegations must ‘raise a right to relief above the speculative
level’ and cross ‘the line from conceivable to plausible.’” Three S Consulting v. United
States, 104 Fed. Cl. 510, 523 (2012) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. at
555), aff’d, 562 F. App’x 964 (Fed. Cir.), reh’g denied (Fed. Cir. 2014); see also Hale v.
United States, 143 Fed. Cl. 180, 190 (2019). As stated in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, “[a] pleading

32
that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of
action will not do.’ 550 U.S. at 555. Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders ‘naked
assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678
(quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555) (first alteration added).

A quantum meruit claim is “‘[a] claim or right of action for the reasonable value of
services rendered.’” United Pac. Ins. Co. v. United States, 464 F.3d 1325, 1329 (Fed. Cir.
2006) (quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 1276 (8th ed. 2004)) (alteration in original). There
are two types of quantum meruit claims: implied-in-law and implied-in-fact. See Seh Ahn
Lee v. United States, 895 F.3d 1363, 1373-74 (Fed. Cir. 2018); Int’l Data Prods. Corp. v.
United States, 492 F.3d 1317, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2007); Allied Home Mortg. Cap. Corp. v.
United States, 95 Fed. Cl. 769, 785 (2010). The United States Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit has stated:

Recovery in quantum meruit is typically “based on an implied-in-law
contract.” Because the jurisdiction of the Claims Court [now the United
States Court of Federal Claims] over contract claims “extends only to
contracts either express or implied in fact, and not to claims on contracts
implied in law,” that court ordinarily does not entertain quantum meruit
claims. However, we have on occasion approved the use of quantum meruit
or quantum valebant as a measure of damages for breach of an implied-in-
fact contract.

Seh Ahn Lee v. United States, 895 F.3d at 1373-74 (alteration added; internal citations
omitted) (quoting Int’l Data Prods. Corp. v. United States, 492 F.3d at 1325; Perri v. United
States, 340 F.3d 1337, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2003), and citing United States v. Amdahl Corp.,
786 F.2d at 393). When distinguishing implied-in-law and implied-in-fact contracts, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit also has stated:

Generally speaking, implied-in-law contracts “impose duties that are
deemed to arise by operation of law” in order to prevent an injustice,
whereas implied-in-fact contracts are “founded upon a meeting of the
minds, which, although not embodied in an express contract, is inferred, as
a fact, from conduct of the parties showing, in light of the surrounding
circumstances, their tacit understanding.”

Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co. v. United States, 654 F.3d 1305, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2011)
(quoting City of Cincinnati v. United States, 153 F.3d at 1377). As indicated above, the
United States Court of Federal Claims only has jurisdiction over quantum meruit claims
based on an implied-in-fact contract. 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1); see also Seh Ahn Lee v.
United States, 895 F.3d at 1373-74.

In Trauma Service Group v. United States, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit explained:

33
To show jurisdiction in the Court of Federal Claims, TSG must show that
either an express or implied-in-fact contract underlies its claim. A well-
pleaded allegation in the complaint is sufficient to overcome challenges to
jurisdiction. Spruill v. Merit Sys. Protection Bd., 978 F.2d 679, 686 (Fed. Cir.
1992). TSG’s complaint alleges that an express and, in the alternative, an
implied-in-fact contract underlies its claim. This allegation suffices to confer
subject matter jurisdiction in the Court of Federal Claims.

Trauma Serv. Grp. v. United States, 104 F.3d at 1325. Therefore, to survive a motion to
dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, plaintiff’s complaint need only contain a non-
frivolous allegation that an express or implied-in-fact contract underlies her claim. See id.;
see also Engage Learning, Inc. v. Salazar, 660 F.3d 1346, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“We
have held that jurisdiction under this provision [28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1)] requires no more
than a non-frivolous allegation of a contract with the government.” (alteration added;
emphasis in original) (citing Lewis v. United States, 70 F.3d 597, 602, 604 (Fed. Cir.
1995))); Gould, Inc. v. United States, 67 F.3d 925, 929-30 (Fed. Cir. 1995); Hanlin v.
United States, 214 F.3d 1319, 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (“Mr. Hanlin’s complaint presents a
non-frivolous allegation of the existence of an implied-in-fact contract; this is sufficient to
confer jurisdiction in the Court of Federal Claims under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1491(a)(1).”); Mendez v. United States, 121 Fed. Cl. 370, 378-79 (2015).

In Ms. Sanchez’s complaint, she does not explicitly allege that an implied-in-fact
contract existed between plaintiff and defendant. Rather, in her filings submitted to this
court, plaintiff describes the alleged April 2018 Student Loan Repayment Agreement at
issue as an express contract, and in her quantum meruit claim, generally, as an “implied
contract” and an implied-in-fact contract. Plaintiff alleges in her complaint that there is a
basis for her quantum meruit claim because plaintiff conferred on the government her
services as a nurse, which the government accepted, from 2017 until 2021, and “Plaintiff
has not been fully compensated per her contractual agreement with Defendants.” In her
response to defendant’s motion to dismiss, plaintiff also tries to explain that she “has
alleged an express or implied contract with the government when she provided proof that
she was offered and accepted SLRP agreements and performed the contract as
presented to her.” Further, in her response brief, plaintiff, quoting Seh Ahn Lee v. United
States, 895 F.3d at 1366, argues that this court has jurisdiction over her quantum meruit
claim “when a contractor provides goods or services in good faith under an express
contract that is later rescinded for invalidity.” Plaintiff also asserts in her response brief
that “at the very least, the 2018 SLRP agreement provided by BOP to Plaintiff, is an
[i]mplied contract in fact as Defendant made the offer to and accepted the performance
of Plaintiff and then claimed the agreement was invalid.” (alteration added). Additionally,
as discussed more fully below, plaintiff also argues in her response brief that she “is
entitled to compensation as decided in Int’l Data Prods. Corp. v. United States[, 492 F.3d
1317 (Fed. Cir. 2007),] based on Defendant’s claims that the agreement is invalid.”
(alteration added). Finally, citing United States v. Amdahl Corp, 786 F.2d 387, plaintiff
further argues in her response brief that she is “entitled to recovery for the services she
provided Defendant and the agreement presented to her was deemed unenforceable by
the government.” Based on the allegations in plaintiff’s complaint and, as discussed more

34
fully below, the fact that plaintiff attempts to model her quantum meruit theory of recovery
on the International Data Products Corp. v. United States and United States v. Amdahl
Corp. cases, plaintiff may be trying to allege that an implied-in-fact contract underlies her
quantum meruit claim. 14 If so, this allegation is sufficient to confer subject matter
jurisdiction in the United States Court of Federal Claims under the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1491(a)(1). See Seh Ahn Lee v. United States, 895 F.3d at 1374 (“Because the plaintiffs
seek to model their quantum meruit theory of relief on the Amdahl case, we treat their
argument as being based on an implied-in-fact contract theory over which the Claims
Court has jurisdiction.”).

With respect to defendant’s assertion that an implied-in-fact contract cannot exist
in plaintiff’s case regarding a 2018 agreement because plaintiff “alleges” an express
contract in her complaint, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has
stated that “the existence of an express contract precludes the existence of an implied-
in-fact contract dealing with the same subject matter, unless the implied contract is
entirely unrelated to the express contract.” Seh Ahn Lee v. United States,
895 F.3d at 1370 (quoting Bank of Guam v. United States, 578 F.3d at 1329); see also
Bitmanagement Software GmBH v. United States, 989 F.3d 938, 949 (Fed. Cir. 2021);
Peter v. United States, 6 Cl. Ct. 768, 780 (1984) (“The rule that the existence of an
express contract preempts an implied contract has full effect only when the parties to both
contracts are the same.”). It is not a question of whether one or both types of contracts
were alleged by a plaintiff, rather what type of contract did or did not come into existence
based on the facts presented to the court. In the case currently before this court, as
explained above, no express contract came into existence between plaintiff and
defendant in 201

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11248386. Public record. Not legal advice.