# Opinion

> District Court, N.D. Indiana · January 28, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11248360

## Case

- **Full name:** Khalif Abdul Mateen v. L. Smith, et al.
- **Court:** District Court, N.D. Indiana
- **Decided:** January 28, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11248360

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- recognizing “duration” is a component that plays a part in determining whether a liberty interest exists
- noting that there is not a Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process right to an inmate grievance procedure
- finding that up to ninety days in segregation does not affect liberty

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
SOUTH BEND DIVISION

KHALIF ABDUL MATEEN,

Plaintiff,

v. CAUSE NO. 3:25-CV-299-CCB-SJF

L. SMITH, et al.,

Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER
Khalif Abdul Mateen, a prisoner without a lawyer, filed a complaint. ECF 1. “A
document filed pro se is to be liberally construed, and a pro se complaint, however
inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings
drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (quotation marks and
citations omitted). Nevertheless, under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the court must review the
merits of a prisoner complaint and dismiss it if the action is frivolous or malicious, fails
to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a
defendant who is immune from such relief.
Mateen alleges that, on December 6, 2023, around 5:00 p.m., he was returning
from recreation and walked into the staff office to retrieve a roll of toilet paper. As he
was leaving, Lt. Walton (a female correctional officer) began to “horseplay” with
Mateen by slapping the roll of toilet paper out of his hands. ECF 1 at 3. After a couple of
times, Mateen became frustrated. As she bent over to pick up the toilet paper, he
grabbed Lt. Walton by the waist and tried to move her out of the way to obtain the toilet
paper. He was later accused of “pelvis thrusting” Lt. Walton. Id.

Following the incident, Mateen was housed in a Special Management Cell
(“SMC”) for twelve days under conditions that Mateen describes as harsh and
unsanitary. He was only permitted to wear a smock and his boxers, and he was
monitored by camera. He was fed finger foods, and he could only drink water or flush
the toilet with assistance from an officer. This meant that urine and feces were
sometimes in the toilet for extended periods. He was not permitted to have a

toothbrush, soap, pens, or eating utensils.
After the twelve days, Mateen was moved to a regular segregation cell.
Approximately 60 days later, a screening order was served on him charging him with
assault and battery on staff (a violation of offense A117) with serious bodily injury.
Thirty days after that, a hearing was held before Lt. Draper. The charge was reduced to

a non-consensual sexual contact on staff. He was found guilty and sanctioned with 90
days segregation and a 30-day loss of telephone privileges. He had already served 90
days in segregation, so he was moved to administrative segregation.
He appealed the finding of guilt. At the second level of appeal, his finding of
guilt was vacated, and he was granted a rehearing. Mateen does not describe any

shortcoming in the hearing process or indicate the basis for his appeal or the decision to
vacate the finding of guilt.
The rehearing took place before Sgt. L. Smith. Mateen explained to Sgt. Smith
that the charge had been lowered by Lt. Draper. He asked that video footage be
reviewed because none had been available at the first hearing. And, he explained that
he had already served the 90 day sanction. Sgt. Smith found Mateen guilty of battery on

an officer,1 and claimed that video evidence supported the finding. Sgt. Smith
sanctioned Mateen with 365 days in segregation and a 45-day loss of telephone
privileges. Mateen appealed the guilty finding. On appeal, he argued that he should not
have been found guilty of battery causing serious bodily injury because, according to
Indiana Department of Correction (“IDOC”) policy there must be a photo or other
documentation of the injury to support the finding.2 But a violation of A-117 does not

require serious bodily injury where the sanction does not include forfeiting the balance
of an inmate’s good time credits. Both Warden Ron Neal and Executive Assistant Mark
Newkirk were involved in the appeal, which was denied.
The Fourteenth Amendment provides state officials shall not “deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . . ..” U.S. Const. amend.

XIV, § 1. That said, due process is only required when punishment extends the duration
of confinement or imposes an “atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in
relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484

1 The Appendix to the IDOC’s Adult Disciplinary Process defines an A-117 offense as
“[c]omitting battery against a staff person, volunteer, independent contractor, or visitor.”
https://www.in.gov/idoc/files/ADP-Attachment-I-Offenses-3-1-2020.pdf (last visited January 27, 2026).
2 A review of the current version of the IDOC’s Disciplinary Code for Adult Offenders, which can
be found at https://www.in.gov/idoc/files/02-04-101-ADP-3-1-2020.pdf (last viewed January 27, 2026),
shows that an offender convicted of an A117 battery offense can lose all accumulated good time credit in
addition to other sanctions. However, “to take the entire balance of the offender’s accumulated earned
credit time, if possible, photographs or other documentation of the bodily injury should be included as
evidence to support a Report of Conduct alleging a violation of A117 or A115 or A100 involving bodily
harm to a staff person[.]” Id. at 40-41. There is no indication in Matteen’s complaint that the hearing
officer found that Mateen caused a serious bodily injury.
(1995). In other words, “disciplinary segregation can trigger due process protections
depending on the duration and conditions of segregation.” Jackson v. Anastasio, 150 F.4th

851, 858 (7th Cir. 2025) (quoting Marion v. Columbia Correction Inst., 559 F.3d 693, 697
(7th Cir. 2009) (emphasis in original)). Both the duration and the severity of the
conditions themselves must be considered when determining whether the prisoner’s
placement in solitary confinement triggers due process protections—the length of time
must be “substantial” and the conditions must be “unusually harsh.” Id.
Similarly, while inmates do not generally have a liberty interest in “avoiding

transfer to discretionary segregation—that is, segregation imposed for administrative,
protective, or investigative purposes[,]” Townsend v. Fuchs, 522 F.3d 765, 771 (7th Cir.
2008) (emphasis added) (citing Lekas v. Briley, 405 F.3d 602, 608–09 & 608 n.4 (7th Cir.
2005), the same analysis applies with regard to duration and the harshness of the
conditions. See e.g., Isby v. Brown, 856 F.3d 508, 524 (7th Cir. 2017) (“Prisoners do not

have a constitutional right to remain in the general population, . . . but both the
duration and the conditions of the segregation must be considered in determining
whether due process is implicated.”) (internal quotation marks, parenthesis, and
citations omitted; emphasis in original); Marion, 559 F.3d at 697-98 & nn.2–3 (collecting
cases that held segregation of two to ninety days does not trigger due process concerns

and stating, “In a number of other cases, we have explained that a liberty interest may
arise if the length of segregated confinement is substantial and the record reveals that
the conditions of confinement are unusually harsh.”) (emphasis added); Lekas, 405 F.3d
at 612 (finding that up to ninety days in segregation does not affect liberty); see also
Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 224 (2005) (recognizing “duration” is a component that
plays a part in determining whether a liberty interest exists). Once an inmate shows a

particular non-disciplinary placement implicates a liberty interest, he has a right to a
meaningful review, which periodically “evaluates the prisoner’s current circumstances
and future prospects, and, considering the reason(s) for his confinement to the program,
determines whether that placement remains warranted.’” Isby, 856 F.3d at 527
(quoting Toevs v. Reid, 685 F.3d 903, 913-14 (10th Cir. 2012)).3
Even where due process protections apply, “[p]rison disciplinary proceedings

are not part of a criminal prosecution, and the full panoply of rights due a defendant in
such proceedings does not apply.” Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974). The
Fourteenth Amendment guarantees prisoners the following procedural due process
rights in prison disciplinary hearings: (1) advance written notice of the charges; (2) an
opportunity to be heard before an impartial decision-maker; (3) an opportunity to call

witnesses and present documentary evidence in defense, when consistent with
institutional safety and correctional goals; and (4) a written statement by the fact-finder
of evidence relied on and the reasons for the disciplinary action. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418
U.S. 539, 563-73 (1974). To satisfy due process, there must also be “some evidence” in
the record to support the guilty finding. Superintendent, Mass Corr. Inst. v. Hill, 472 U.S.

3 Of note, “for any term of solitary confinement lasting more than days but less than years,
qualified immunity will often apply to claims for damages. For segregation terms measured in months,
even if an inmate’s segregation amounted to a deprivation of a liberty interest, it is unlikely that prison
officials could be held responsible for incorrectly guessing otherwise due to the ambiguity of the
parameters of the law.” Jackson, 150 F.4th at 858–59 (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).
However, because qualified immunity is an affirmative defense, this question is best left to a later stage of
the litigation.
445, 455 (1985). It is with this backdrop that the court considers whether Mateen is
entitled to due process protections and, if so, whether he received those protections.

Mateen’s initial placement in SMC for twelve days was too short to implicate due
process concerns. The conditions he describes likewise do not rise to the level of an
Eighth Amendment violation. “[T]he Constitution does not mandate comfortable
prisons....” Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 349 (1981). Conditions that merely cause
inconveniences and discomfort or make confinement unpleasant do not rise to the level
of Constitutional violations. Adams v. Pate, 445 F.2d 105, 108-109 (7th Cir. 1971).

Conditions of confinement must be severe to support an
Eighth Amendment claim; “the prison officials’ act or
omission must result in the denial of ‘the minimal civilized
measure of life’s necessities.’” Farmer [v. Brennan, 511 U.S.
825, 834 (1994)] (quoting Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347
(1981)). See also, Lunsford v. Bennett, 17 F.3d 1574, 1579 (7th
Cir. 1994) (the Eighth Amendment only protects prisoners
from conditions that “exceed contemporary bounds of
decency of a mature, civilized society.”); Jackson [v.
Duckworth,] 955 F.2d [21,] 22 [(7th Cir. 1992)].

Morissette v. Peters, 45 F.3d 1119, 1123 (7th Cir. 1995) (parallel citations omitted). Being
required to wear only a smock and boxers, being monitored by camera, being limited to
finger foods, requiring the assistance of an officer to obtain water or flush the toilet, and
being denied a toothbrush, soap, pens, and eating utensils for twelve days is
unpleasant, to be sure, but these conditions did not deny Mateen the minimum measure
of life’s necessities.
Mateen also complains about a variety of conditions while he was housed in D
cell house. First, he complains that D cell house did not have an updated fire prevention
or sprinkler system in place. He asserts that one staff person has one key and, in the
event of a fire, would need to unlock 33 separate cells on each tier with that key.

Mateen was also unhappy with how Ramadan meals were handled in D cell
house. Inmates participating in Ramadan received only two meals a day, although a
memorandum circulated in February 2025 indicated that the two meals were the
equivalent of the three meals served to other inmates. Mateen disagrees. He asserts that
inmates celebrating Ramadan receive repetitive meals of cold cut sandwiches and
vegetables, with no access to a microwave to warm their meals, which sometimes have

ice on them due to refrigeration. Instead of taking Ramadan meals, this year Mateen
decided to save his lunch and dinner trays by putting them up until sunset, even
though he knew that the food could spoil while sitting out for extended periods of time.
It is unclear if Mateen would have received different options for Ramadan if he had
been housed elsewhere or if this is how Ramadan meals are handled throughout the

prison.
Mateen also complains that the prison serves an Easter Passover meal to
everyone and a Jewish Passover meal to everyone, but Eid al-Fitr is neglected. But this
does not appear to be an issue that is limited to D cell house.4
He also complains about problems with the grievance system in D cell house.

Grievances are allegedly ignored or returned for minor errors, and grievance receipts

4 To the extent these allegations suggest a violation of the Establishment Clause, Mateen cannot
proceed because he has not alleged that any particular defendant is responsible for the alleged violation.
are not always provided. Again, it is unclear that these problems are limited to D cell
house.

These allegations, either standing alone or taken together, do not support a
finding that Mateen endured an atypical or significant hardship in relationship to the
ordinary incidents of prison life while he was housed in D cell house. Therefore, he may
not proceed on a due process claim based on his placement in D cell house following
disciplinary proceedings where he was found guilty.
Likewise, it cannot be plausibly inferred from the allegations in Matteen’s

complaint that conditions in D cellhouse violated the Eighth Amendment. Being housed
in a facility that does not have an updated fire prevention system does not exceed
contemporary bounds of decency.
His allegations regarding the meals provided to inmates participating in
Ramadan likewise do not violate the Eighth Amendment. “Prisoners have a right to

adequate food, but not to food that is tasty or even appetizing.” Isby, 856 F.3d at 522
(quoting Williams v. Berge, 102 F. App’x 506, 507 (7th Cir. 2004)). Mateen does not allege
that consuming the food provided for Ramadan violated his religious beliefs; he alleges
only that he found it lacking in variety and undesirable. This does not amount to a
constitutional violation.

While Mateen faults Alicia Wildfang for the shortcomings in the grievance
system, he has no constitutional right to access the grievance process. See Grieveson v.
Anderson, 538 F.3d 763, 770 (7th Cir. 2008) (noting that there is not a Fourteenth
Amendment substantive due process right to an inmate grievance procedure).
Therefore, he cannot proceed against Alicia Wildfang,

Finally, even if, considering the length of time Mateen was housed in D-cell
house, due process rights were required, Mateen hasn’t alleged that any of the due
process guarantees set forth in Wolff were lacking. He received advance written notice
of the charges and an opportunity to be heard before an impartial decision-maker. He
has not presented any facts suggesting he lacked an opportunity to call witnesses and
present documentary evidence in his defense. He has not presented any facts

suggesting that he did not receive a written statement by the fact-finder of evidence
relied on and the reasons for the disciplinary action. It appears that he did, because he
indicates that the hearing officer asserted that the video evidence supported the finding
of guilt.
Due process requires that there must also be “some evidence” in the record to

support the guilty finding. Superintendent, Mass Corr. Inst. v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 455 (1985).
Mateen has not argued that the guilty finding was not supported by any evidence. He
complains only that there was no picture or documentation of an injury to the officer, but
due process does not require this. At most, this is a violation of IDOC’s policy, but “42
U.S.C. § 1983 protects plaintiffs from constitutional violations, not violations of state laws

or, in this case, departmental regulations and police practices.” Scott v. Edinburg, 346 F.3d
752, 760 (7th Cir. 2003). Furthermore, as noted earlier, the IDOC’s policy provides that a
picture of documentation is required when all good time is taken away, and Mateen was not
sanctioned with a loss of good time credit.
This complaint does not state a claim for which relief can be granted. If Mateen
believes he can state a claim based on (and consistent with) the events described in this

complaint, he may file an amended complaint because “[t]he usual standard in civil
cases is to allow defective pleadings to be corrected, especially in early stages, at least
where amendment would not be futile.” Abu-Shawish v. United States, 898 F.3d 726, 738
(7th Cir. 2018). To file an amended complaint, he needs to write this cause number on a
Pro Se 14 (INND Rev. 2/20) Prisoner Complaint form which is available from his law
library. He needs to write the word “Amended” on the first page above the title

“Prisoner Complaint” and send it to the court after he properly completes the form.
For these reasons, the court:
(1) GRANTS Khalif Abdul Mateen until March 2, 2026, to file an amended
complaint; and
(2) CAUTIONS Khalif Abdul Mateen that, if he does not respond by the

deadline, this case will be dismissed under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A without further notice
because the current complaint does not state a claim for which relief can be granted.
SO ORDERED on January 28, 2026.

/s/Cristal C. Brisco
CRISTAL C. BRISCO, JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11248360. Public record. Not legal advice.