# Scott

> District Court, S.D. Illinois · January 28, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11247762

## Case

- **Full name:** Daniel R. Scott v. Wexford Health Source, Dr. Gordon, A. Desai, Jane Does 1-5, John Doe 1
- **Court:** District Court, S.D. Illinois
- **Decided:** January 28, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

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## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

DANIEL R. SCOTT, B80603, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
vs. )
) Case No. 25-cv-2077-DWD
WEXFORD HEALTH SOURCE, )
DR. GORDON, )
A. DESAI, )
JANE DOES 1-5, )
JOHN DOE 1, )
)
Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

DUGAN, District Judge:
Plaintiff Daniel Scott, an inmate of the Illinois Department of Corrections (IDOC)
currently detained at Pinckneyville Correctional Center, brings this civil rights action
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged deprivations of his constitutional rights. (Doc.
1). Plaintiff filed a complaint and a supplemental complaint. Plaintiff alleges that the
defendants have violated his rights by failing to provide treatment for his cervical spinal
issues. Plaintiff’s pleadings (Docs. 1, 12-1) are now before the Court for preliminary
review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Under Section 1915A, the Court is required to
screen prisoner complaints to filter out non-meritorious claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a)-
(b). Any portion of a complaint that is legally frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim
upon which relief may be granted, or asks for money damages from a defendant who by
law is immune from such relief must be dismissed. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). At this juncture,
the factual allegations of the pro se complaint are to be liberally construed. Rodriguez v.
Plymouth Ambulance Serv., 577 F.3d 816, 821 (7th Cir. 2009).
The Complaint

As a preliminary matter, Plaintiff filed his “supplemental complaint” (Doc. 12-1)
within about a month of filing his original complaint, and he filed it before his pleadings
were served on anyone. Based on the Motion for Leave to Supplement (Doc. 12), he
clearly wishes to replace the original complaint with the updated pleading (Doc. 12-1).
Plaintiff was within his right to submit an amended pleading as a matter of course under

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)(1), so the Court will review his Amended Pleading
(Doc. 12-1).
Plaintiff alleges that he first began to seek treatment at Pinckneyville for symptoms
of cervical spine compression in October of 2023. (Doc. 12-1 at 9). Specifically, he alleges
that during sick call in October of 2023, he told Jane Doe 1 (a nurse) that he was

experiencing numbness in his left hand and pinky. Jane Doe 1 merely informed him he
would have to submit two more sick call requests about the issue before he could be seen.
(Doc. 12-1 at 9). Plaintiff alleges that on his third sick call visit, Jane Doe 2 then “moved
the goal post” by informing him that he had to be seen for three consecutive sick call visits
within a month before he could be referred to a doctor. (Doc. 12-1 at 10). Plaintiff

complains that the requirement for an inmate to be seen at sick call three times before a
doctor’s visit is a Wexford policy and an intentional delay tactic. (Doc. 12-1 at 9-10).
He alleges that the sick call policy created an obstacle course, during which he was
forced to endure an eleven-month delay before he was sent off-site for an EMG test that
revealed a compressed ulnar nerve in his right arm. He further alleges that an additional
six months lapsed before he was sent off-site to an orthopedic specialist who found

paralysis of his left index finger and muscle atrophy in his left hand that were too
advanced for surgical or therapeutic intervention. (Doc. 12-1 at 10).
Admist the delays, Plaintiff alleges that from May of 2024 onward he saw
Defendants Desai, Dr. Gordon, and John Doe 1 (a nurse practitioner). He claims he
showed the providers visible muscle atrophy, but they failed to take reasonable steps to
ensure treatment. Plaintiff specifically alleges that he saw Desai beginning in June of

2024, and that he saw her three times between then and March of 2025. (Doc. 12-1 at 12).
He claims that he vividly described neck pain, whole-body tremors, and muscle atrophy
in his hands and arms. He alerted her that a previous MRI of his cervical spine revealed
arthritis. Despite his reported symptoms, Desai’s sole course of action was to refer him
for an EMG nerve test. He claims Desai choose this option to cut costs, and it was not

sufficient to assess his medical needs. (Doc. 12-1 at 12).
Plaintiff further alleges that he saw Dr. Gordon over the course of three or four
months. (Doc. 12-1 at 12). He says he saw Dr. Gordon on May 10, 2025, and described
many symptoms, but all that Dr. Gordon did was recommend a third off-site EMG test.
(Doc. 12-1 at 8). Plaintiff saw Dr. Gordon again for a third time in July of 2025, and during

the appointment he confronted Dr. Gordon about his suspicion that he was suffering
from cervical spine nerve compression, which would only be detectable via an MRI.
(Doc. 12-1 at 8). Plaintiff alleges that Dr. Gordon conceded an MRI would be necessary,
but stated he could not make a referral to any sort of specialist until he had been seeing
Plaintiff for at least nine months. Dr. Gordon indicated that this limitation existed
because Wexford admonished Pinckneyville medical staff for sending patients to off-site

specialists too quickly. (Doc. 12-1 at 8-9).
By way of background, Plaintiff also alleges that from October of 2023-May 2024,
and from June 2024-October 2024, Jane Does 1-5 were responsible for collecting sick call
slips in his housing unit and they regularly disregarded his sick call requests. (Doc. 12-1
at 11). He claims that their failure to regularly run sick call is indicative of the larger
healthcare failures at Pinckneyville.

Near the end of the complaint, Plaintiff alleges that in July of 2025 Centurion
Health took over for Wexford Health Source. (Doc. 12-1 at 13). He claims that although
a nurse practitioner referred him to an off-site neurologist for an MRI, four months lapsed
without the visit taking place. (Doc. 12-1 at 13). Plaintiff seeks monetary damages. (Id.).
Based on the allegations in the Complaint, the Court will designate the following

claims:
Claim 1: Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim against
Defendants Jane Doe 1 and Jane Doe 2 for their insistence
that Plaintiff adhere to the sick call visit policy;

Claim 2: Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim against
Desai, Dr. Gordon, and John Doe 1 for their alleged role in
Plaintiff’s care from March of 2024-July of 2025;

Claim 3: Monell claim against Wexford for implementing the three
sick call policy and directing medical staff to delay
specialist appointments to cut costs.

The parties and the Court will use these designations in all future pleadings and orders
unless otherwise directed by a judicial officer of this Court. Any claim that is mentioned
in the Complaint but not addressed in this Order is considered dismissed without
prejudice as inadequately pled under Twombly. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.

544, 570 (2007) (an action fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted if it does
not plead “enough facts to state a claim that is plausible on its face”).
Preliminary Dismissal
Plaintiff faults Jane Does 1-5 for their alleged mishandling of the sick call slips that
he alleges he submitted from October 2023 onward. A blanket assertion that one or more
defendants caused a harm is not sufficient to state a claim under § 1983. See e.g., Brooks v.

Ross, 578 F.3d 574, 580 (7th Cir. 2009) (the assertion that “one or more of the Defendants”
engaged in harmful conduct does not adequately connect specific defendants to illegal
acts). To the extent that Plaintiff has more specific allegations about encounters with Jane
Does 1 and 2, those will be analyzed in association with Claim 1, but the umbrella
assertion against Jane Does 1-5 is insufficient to proceed and Jane Does 3-5 will be

dismissed as this is the only mention of them in the factual allegations.
Analysis
Claim 1
An Eighth Amendment claim arising from the denial of medical care consists of
an objective and a subjective component. Berry v. Peterman, 604 F.3d 435, 439–40 (7th Cir.
2010). A plaintiff must show that he suffered from a serious medical condition (i.e., an

objective standard) and also show that each defendant responded with deliberate
indifference (i.e., a subjective standard). Id. To satisfy the subjective component, a
prisoner must demonstrate that an official knew of and disregarded an excessive risk to
inmate health. Greeno v. Daley, 414 F.3d 645, 653 (7th Cir. 2005). Neither medical
malpractice, nor mere disagreement with a doctor’s medical judgment will amount to

deliberate indifference. Id. Additionally, an inmate is not entitled to demand specific
care, and a medical professional may choose from a range of acceptable courses of care.
Walker v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 940 F.3d 954, 965 (7th Cir. 2019).
Plaintiff alleges that he presented to Jane Doe 1 and Jane Doe 2 during the prison’s
sick call process. He claims that when he saw Jane Doe 1 he reported left hand and pinky
numbness, signs of ulnar nerve compression. He does not indicate if Jane Doe 1 offered

any treatment options, and instead just alleges that she told him he would have to
complete two more sick call visits before he could be referred to a doctor. As for Jane
Doe 2, Plaintiff alleges that when he eventually saw her for a third sick call visit, she
moved the benchmark, alleging that he had to have three visits in a single month. He
does not indicate she offered any care. Though an inmate is not entitled to demand

specific care, his allegations suggest that Jane Doe 1 and Jane Doe 2 offered no care at all
and simply insisted he keep following a repetitive process that was not affording him any
relief. At this early stage of review, the Court will allow Plaintiff to proceed against Jane
Doe 1 and Jane Doe 2 on the premise that they offered no care and simply instructed
Plaintiff to proceed with what they knew would be a slow and drawn out process to seek

a doctor’s referral. Plaintiff also alleges Jane Does 1 and 2 participated in disregarding
countless sick call slips, which further supports the notion that they played a role in his
delayed access to care despite knowing that he sought care frequently.
Claim 2
Plaintiff alleges that he saw Defendants Desai and Dr. Gordon on multiple
occasions from June of 2024-July of 2025, and he discussed deteriorating symptoms with

them, but they offered nothing other than an EMG. He alleges Dr. Gordon even admitted
an MRI would be appropriate but stated he could not yet make the referral due to
Wexford’s instructions to delay specialist visits. Plaintiff may proceed against Desai and
Gordon.
By contrast, Plaintiff also alleges that sometime in or after March of 2024 he saw

John Doe 1, a nurse practitioner. Plaintiff does not provide any greater specificity about
when he saw John Doe 1, what he told John Doe 1 or showed him about his symptoms,
or how John Doe 1 responded. As such, the allegations against John Doe 1 are insufficient
to plausibly establish his personal responsibility for the harms Plaintiff alleges. John Doe
1 will be dismissed without prejudice for failure to plead a sufficient claim.

Claim 3
Plaintiff alleges that he was harmed by Wexford’s policy requiring inmates to visit
sick call three times before they could be seen by a doctor. He additionally alleges that
providers would not send him out to a specialist in an effort to cut costs at Wexford’s
behest. These allegations are sufficient to proceed under Monell on the theory that

Wexford’s direct policy regarding sick call, or their policy, custom, or practice concerning
specialist visits or testing caused Plaintiff harm by delaying his access to timely care.
Plaintiff further alleges that when he eventually saw an orthopedic specialist, he was told
that his left ring finger and left hand had suffered permanent deformities or atrophy that
could not be repaired via surgery or therapy. These allegations are sufficient to proceed
at this preliminary juncture.

By contrast, to the extent that Plaintiff complains of recent conduct by Centurion,
he has not pled a sufficient claim because Centurion is not listed as a party in the case
caption, and he does not seek any relief specific to Centurion.
Disposition
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT Claim 1 survives against Jane Doe 1 and 2,
Claim 2 survives against Desai and Dr. Gordon, and Claim 3 survives against Wexford

Health Source. By contrast, Claim 2 is insufficient to proceed against John Doe 1. Plaintiff
has also failed to state a claim against Jane Does 3-5. The Clerk of Court shall
TERMINATE Defendants John Doe 1, and Jane Does 3-5.
The Clerk of Court shall ADD the Warden of Pinckneyville in official capacity only
to help identify Jane Does 1 and 2. Plaintiff has already provided a physical description

of Jane Does 1 and 2 in his complaint (Doc. 12-1 at 3). Once the Warden has entered an
appearance, next steps will be set to identify John Doe.
The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to prepare for Defendants Desai, Dr. Gordon,
and Warden of Pinckneyville (official capacity for Jane Doe identification): (1) Form 5
(Notice of a Lawsuit and Request to Waive Service of a Summons), and (2) Form 6

(Waiver of Service of Summons). The Clerk is DIRECTED to mail these forms, a copy of
the Complaint (Doc. 12-1), and this Memorandum and Order to Defendants’ place of
employment as identified by Plaintiff. If a Defendant fails to sign and return the Waiver
of Service of Summons (Form 6) to the Clerk within 30 days from the date the forms were
sent, the Clerk shall take appropriate steps to effect formal service on Defendant, and the
Court will require Defendant to pay the full costs of formal service, to the extent

authorized by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
If a Defendant cannot be found at the work address provided by Plaintiff, the
employer shall furnish the Clerk with the Defendant’s current work address, or, if not
known, the Defendant’s last-known address. This information shall be used only for
sending the forms as directed above or for formally effecting service. Any documentation
of the address shall be retained only by the Clerk. Address information shall not be

maintained in the court file or disclosed by the Clerk.
Defendants are ORDERED to timely file an appropriate responsive pleading to
the Complaint and shall not waive filing a reply pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(g).
Pursuant to Administrative Order No. 244, Defendants need only respond to the issues
stated in this Merits Review Order.

If judgment is rendered against Plaintiff, and the judgment includes the payment
of costs under Section 1915, Plaintiff will be required to pay the full amount of the costs,
regardless of whether his application to proceed in forma pauperis was granted. See 28
U.S.C. § 1915(f)(2)(A).
Plaintiff is ADVISED that he is under a continuing obligation to inform the Clerk

of Court and each opposing party of any address changes; the Court will not
independently investigate his whereabouts. This shall be done in writing and not later
than 14 days after a change of address occurs. Failure to comply with this order will
cause a delay in the transmission of court documents and may result in dismissal of this
action for failure to prosecute. FED. R. CIV. P. 41(b).

The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to enter the standard HIPAA Order in this case
because it will involve the exchange of medical records.
Plaintiff’s Motion to for Leave to Supplement (Doc. 12) is GRANTED and the
Court reviewed his Amended Pleading (Doc. 12-1).
IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 28, 2026 /s/ David W. Dugan
________________________
DAVID W. DUGAN
United States District Judge
NOTICE TO PLAINTIFF
The Court will take the necessary steps to notify the appropriate defendants of your
lawsuit and serve them with a copy of your complaint. After service has been achieved,
the defendants will enter their appearance and file an Answer to the complaint. It will
likely take at least 60 days from the date of this Order to receive the defendants’ Answers,
but it is entirely possible that it will take 90 days or more. When all of the defendants
have filed Answers, the Court will enter a Scheduling Order containing important
information on deadlines, discovery, and procedures. Plaintiff is advised to wait until
counsel has appeared for the defendants before filing any motions, to give the defendants
notice and an opportunity to respond to those motions. Motions filed before defendants’
counsel has filed an appearance will generally be denied as premature. Plaintiff need not
submit any evidence to the Court at his time, unless otherwise directed by the Court.

The Court wishes to remind the Plaintiff that litigation is often viewed a series of hurdles
that the Plaintiff must clear to get to another hurdle. Initial screening is such a hurdle, but
it is a very low one for the Plaintiff to clear. As noted above, surviving initial screening
only requires the bare statement of a claim that, if proven, could entitle Plaintiff to some
relief. At trial, he will need to prove by a preponderance of evidence that the facts alleged
actually occurred and that those facts satisfy the legal requirements for recovery. Trial is
the highest and most difficult of hurdles for any Plaintiff to clear.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11247762. Public record. Not legal advice.