# Brown

> District Court, N.D. Illinois · January 26, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11247702

## Case

- **Full name:** Tonyelen Brown, on behalf of Plaintiff and a class v. Keough & Moody, P.C., and Bay Property Services, Inc.
- **Court:** District Court, N.D. Illinois
- **Decided:** January 26, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11247702

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- stating that “litigants need not plead around defenses”
- finding that “the time and money Plaintiffs spent defending the debt collection lawsuits” plausibly constituted actual damages under the ICFA
- stating that the ICFA “provides remedies for … economic injuries” that are calculable

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

TONYELEN BROWN, )
on behalf of Plaintiff and a class, )
)
Plaintiff, )
) No. 25-cv-02799
v. )
) Judge April M. Perry
KEOUGH & MOODY, P.C., )
and BAY PROPERTY SERVICES, INC., )
)
Defendants. )

OPINION AND ORDER
Tonyelen Brown (“Plaintiff”) brings this putative class action lawsuit against Keough &
Moody, P.C. (“K&M”) and Bay Property Services, Inc. (“BPS”) under the Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act (“FDCPA”) and Illinois state law. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges a violation of the
FDCPA by K&M (Count I), a violation of the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business
Practices Act (“ICFA”) by BPS (Count II), and a claim for unjust enrichment against both
defendants (Count III). Doc. 1. Before this Court is BPS’s motion to dismiss Counts II and III
under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1)1 and 12(b)(6). Doc. 27. For the following
reasons, BPS’s motion to dismiss is denied.
BACKGROUND
This action arises out of K&M’s and BPS’s attempts to collect a debt on behalf of the
Arbors of Justice Condominium Association. Doc. 1 ¶ 15. K&M is a law firm which advertises
itself as “providing full-service representation to condominium, townhome, and homeowners’
associations” and “regularly institutes legal proceedings seeking the eviction of delinquent

1 BPS moved for dismissal under Rule 12(1), but it presumably meant Rule 12(b)(1). Doc. 27 at 1.
owners and obtaining judgments against delinquent owners.” Id. ¶¶ 7-9. BPS engages in the
business of managing condominiums and other community associations. Id. ¶¶ 13-14.
On September 27, 2024, K&M filed an eviction and collections action against Plaintiff in
state court for a property located in Justice, Illinois. Id. ¶ 16; Doc. 1-1 at 3. The state court
complaint attached ledgers prepared by BPS, which listed a “Late Admin Fee – Collections

Admin Charge” of $200 from August 1, 2024. Doc. 1 ¶¶ 17-18. Plaintiff alleges that this amount
did not correspond to a late fee or regular assessment related to Plaintiff’s condominium and
instead represented a charge by BPS for handing over the debt collection file to K&M. Id. ¶ 19.
Either K&M or BPS prepared a 30-day notice and demand, which was then mailed to Plaintiff.
Id. ¶ 20. The state court action was settled and nonsuited when Plaintiff paid the debt and
additional sums for attorneys’ fees and costs. Id. ¶¶ 5, 23. Plaintiff now contends that nothing in
the declaration or bylaws recorded by the Arbors of Justice Condominium Association
authorized such an administrative fee, and any attempt to collect the supposed debt was therefore
illegal. Id. ¶ 26.

LEGAL STANDARD
A motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) challenges the
Court's subject matter jurisdiction. When a defendant brings a 12(b)(1) motion, “the district court
must accept as true all material allegations of the complaint, drawing all reasonable inferences
therefrom in the plaintiff's favor, unless standing is challenged as a factual matter.” Remijas v.
Neiman Marcus Group, LLC, 794 F.3d 688, 691 (7th Cir. 2015). If a defendant factually
challenges the basis for federal jurisdiction, the “district court may properly look beyond the
jurisdictional allegations of the complaint and view whatever evidence has been submitted on the
issue to determine whether in fact subject matter jurisdiction exists.” Apex Digital, Inc. v. Sears,
Roebuck & Co., 572 F.3d 440, 444 (7th Cir. 2009). It is the plaintiff's burden to establish
standing. Id. at 443.
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a case may be dismissed when a plaintiff
fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. A 12(b)(6) motion is a challenge to the
sufficiency of a complaint, not its merits. See Gibson v. City of Chicago, 910 F.2d 1510, 1520

(7th Cir. 1990). When considering such a motion, the Court accepts as true all well-pleaded facts
in the complaint and draws all reasonable inferences from those facts in the plaintiff's favor. See
Kubiak v. City of Chicago, 810 F.3d 476, 480–81 (7th Cir. 2016). To survive a motion to
dismiss, a plaintiff need only include “a short and plain statement of a claim that is plausible on
its face and entitles them to relief.” Roldan v. Stroud, 52 F.4th 335, 339 (7th Cir. 2022). The
short and plain statement must “give the defendant fair notice of what the claim is and the
grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). A claim is
facially plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). The factual allegations in the complaint must be sufficient to “raise a
right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. The law is clear that a
“formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Id.
ANALYSIS
In its motion to dismiss, BPS argues that dismissal is appropriate because: (1) Plaintiff
lacks Article III standing due to lack of injury; (2) the ICFA claim is not plausibly alleged due to
lack of damages or due to the voluntary payment doctrine; and (3) Plaintiff’s unjust enrichment
claim fails because it cannot stand independent of the ICFA claim and because the parties have a
contract. BPS also asserts for the first time in its reply brief that dismissal of the ICFA claim is
appropriate because there was no deceptive or unfair practice, and that dismissal of the unjust
enrichment claim is warranted because BPS is not alleged to have received a direct benefit or
payment from Plaintiff.
I. Article III Standing
The Court begins, as it must, with Article III standing. Article III of the Constitution

limits the jurisdiction of the federal courts to “Cases” and “Controversies.” U.S. Const. art. III, §
2. The requirement of standing derives from this provision and has three elements: plaintiff must
have (1) a concrete and particularized injury in fact (2) that is traceable to the defendant's
conduct and (3) that can be redressed by judicial relief. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S.
555, 560–61 (1992). Only injuries that are sufficiently concrete, particularized, and actual or
imminent qualify as injuries in fact. TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 594 U.S. 413, 423-24 (2021).
A plaintiff unaffected by defendant's supposed misconduct is not injured. Spuhler v. State
Collection Serv., Inc., 983 F.3d 282, 286 (7th Cir. 2020) (plaintiffs lacked concrete injury where
evidence showed inaccurate communication from debt collector did not “detrimentally affect[ ]

the debtors’ handling of their debts.”). Standing is jurisdictional, and without standing the case
must be dismissed. See United States v. Hays, 515 U.S. 737, 742 (1995).
The Court concludes that Plaintiff has adequately pled Article III standing. The complaint
alleges that BPS tried to collect a debt from Plaintiff that was not owed – specifically, a “Late
Admin Fee – Collections Admin Charge” of $200 that was not authorized by Plaintiff’s
condominium declaration or bylaws. Doc. 1 ¶¶ 18-19. As part of this debt collection, K&M filed
a lawsuit against Plaintiff which Plaintiff felt forced to settle because she risked being evicted.
Id. ¶ 28. According to the complaint, Plaintiff arranged to pay both the debt and “additional sums
for attorney’s fees and costs.” Id. ¶ 23. This payment of a debt Plaintiff allegedly did not owe
clearly constitutes an injury for the purposes of Article III standing. See Larkin v. Fin. Sys. of
Green Bay, Inc., 982 F.3d 1060, 1066 (7th Cir. 2020) (noting that a violation which causes a
plaintiff “to pay debts they did not owe” would constitute “a concrete injury that might support
... standing to sue”). Moreover, Plaintiff’s injury is traceable to BPS’s conduct, as BPS allegedly
claimed it was owed the fee when passing the case along to K&M. Finally, Plaintiff’s injury can

be redressed by repayment of the sums that Plaintiff was allegedly coerced to pay. Thus, all the
elements of Article III standing have been met for the purposes of a motion to dismiss.
II. ICFA
The next question is whether Plaintiff has plausibly alleged a claim under the ICFA. The
ICFA “is a regulatory and remedial statute intended to protect consumers, borrowers, and
business persons against fraud, unfair methods of competition, and other unfair and deceptive
business practices.” Robinson v. Toyota Motor Credit Corp., 775 N.E.2d 951, 960 (Ill. 2002).
“The elements of an ICFA claim are: (1) a deceptive or unfair act or practice by the defendant;
(2) the defendant's intent that the plaintiff rely on the deceptive or unfair practice; and (3) the

unfair or deceptive practice occurred during a course of conduct involving trade or commerce.”
Rao v. J.P. Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., 153 F.4th 541, 555–56 (7th Cir. 2025) (internal citation
omitted). When the plaintiff is a private party, the plaintiff must show she suffered “actual
damage” as a result of the defendant's ICFA violation. Camasta v. Jos. A. Bank Clothiers, Inc.,
761 F.3d 732, 739 (7th Cir. 2014). The ICFA allows for recovery for either deceptive or unfair
conduct, see Robinson, 775 N.E.2d at 960, and Plaintiff here proceeds under both theories of
recovery. Doc. 1 ¶ 49.
Plaintiff argues that a violation of ICFA occurred because the $200 administrative fee
was not authorized under the Illinois Condominium Property Act and therefore should not have
been requested in an eviction action. In relevant part, 765 ILCS 605/9.2 states:
(c) Other than attorney's fees, no fees pertaining to the collection of a unit owner's
financial obligation to the Association, including fees charged by a manager or managing
agent, shall be added to and deemed a part of an owner's respective share of the common
expenses unless: (i) the managing agent fees relate to the costs to collect common
expenses for the Association; (ii) the fees are set forth in a contract between the
managing agent and the Association; and (iii) the authority to add the management fees
to an owner's respective share of the common expenses is specifically stated in the
declaration or bylaws of the Association.

(emphasis added). Courts have extended ICFA protections to the condominium owner and
condominium association relationship when owners pay association fees in exchange for work
and services. See Speights-Carnegie v. Blackstone Condo. Ass'n, No. 15-CV-3781, 2016 WL
2644864, at *6 (N.D. Ill. May 10, 2016); see also People ex rel. Daley v. Datacom Sys. Corp.,
585 N.E.2d 51, 64 (Ill. 1991) (discussing intent of Illinois legislature to extend the reach of ICFA
broadly, and finding that that debt collection practices are embraced by the ICFA).
BPS argues that the ICFA claim is not plausibly pled because there is no allegation of
actual damages. The Court disagrees. The complaint alleges that Plaintiff was forced to pay not
only a $200 debt she did not owe, but also attorneys’ fees and costs. This qualifies as actual
damages. Morris v. Harvey Cycle & Camper, Inc., 911 N.E.2d 1049, 1053 (Ill. App. Ct. 2009)
(stating that the ICFA “provides remedies for … economic injuries” that are calculable); Grant–
Hall v. Cavalry Portfolio Servs., LLC, 856 F.Supp.2d 929, 942 (N.D. Ill. 2012) (finding that “the
time and money Plaintiffs spent defending the debt collection lawsuits” plausibly constituted
actual damages under the ICFA).
In the alternative, BPS argues that even if actual damages were plausibly alleged,
Plaintiff’s recovery is barred by the voluntary payment doctrine. The voluntary payment doctrine
“embodies the ancient and universally recognized rule that money voluntarily paid under a claim
of right to the payment and with knowledge of the facts by the person making the payment
cannot be recovered back on the ground that the claim was illegal.” McIntosh v. Walgreens Boots
All., Inc., 135 N.E.3d 73, 80 (Ill. 2019) (internal citation omitted). To avoid application of the
doctrine, a party must show that the claim asserted was unlawful and that the payment was not

voluntary. Id. “In addition to compulsion or duress, other recognized exceptions to the voluntary
payment doctrine include fraud or misrepresentation or mistake of a material fact.” Id. at 80-81.
The voluntary payment doctrine is an affirmative defense. Harris v. ChartOne, 841
N.E.2d 1028, 1031 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005). As a result, dismissal due to the voluntary payment
doctrine would only be appropriate if the complaint’s factual allegations unambiguously
establish all the elements of the defense. Doe v. GTE Corp., 347 F.3d 655, 657 (7th Cir. 2003)
(stating that “litigants need not plead around defenses”).
In this case, the complaint does not unambiguously establish that the voluntary payment
doctrine applies because the complaint asserts that the payment was not, in fact, voluntary.

Rather, the complaint alleges that Plaintiff had “little choice” but to agree to pay the fees levied
against her by BPS because she risked being evicted from her home. Doc. 1 ¶ 28. Plaintiff argues
that the high costs of defending even an unfair lawsuit equate to coercion, an exception to the
voluntary payment doctrine. Drawing all reasonable inferences in Plaintiff’s favor, the possibility
of coercion during settlement negotiations raises factual questions not appropriately resolved on
a motion to dismiss. See Crain v. Lucent Techs., Inc., 739 N.E.2d 639, 644 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000)
(noting that under Illinois law the question of the applicability of the voluntary payment doctrine
and exceptions thereto is essentially factual and that the “resolution of this issue will require the
presentation of evidence so that the court or fact finder can determine whether a payment was
voluntarily made without protest and without fraud or mistake.”). Therefore, the Court will not
dismiss the ICFA claim based upon the voluntary payment doctrine.
The only other challenge BPS raises to the ICFA claim is whether Plaintiff adequately
alleged a deceptive or unfair practice. However, this argument was raised for the first time in
BPS’s reply brief and was therefore waived. Gold v. Wolpert, 876 F.2d 1327, 1331 n. 6 (7th Cir.

1989); Dexia Crédit Local v. Rogan, 629 F.3d 612, 625 (7th Cir. 2010).2 For these reasons, the
Court denies BPS’s motion to dismiss the ICFA claim alleged in Count II.
III. Unjust Enrichment
BPS next argues that the unjust enrichment claim fails: (1) because unjust enrichment is
not a standalone tort and is dependent on a plausible ICFA claim; and (2) because a claim of
unjust enrichment is not viable when there is an express contract. BPS adds in its reply that
“Plaintiff fails to plead that BPS directly received the disputed payment or otherwise retained a
benefit that would make retention inequitable.” Doc. 36 at 3. Having already found that the ICFA
claim is plausibly alleged, it is unnecessary to address BPS’s first argument. Moreover, as

already discussed, the third argument which was raised for the first time in BPS’s reply brief has
been waived. The Court thus limits its analysis to the question of whether Plaintiff’s express
contract with the Arbors of Justice Condominium Association bars the unjust enrichment claim
against BPS.

2 BPS also attempted to add a new argument seven months after its opening brief was filed, citing two
recently-decided cases from this district. Doc. 54. Both cases were decided based upon factual arguments
not made by BPS in this case. Specifically, the defendants in those cases argued that the condominium
declarations and bylaws at issue in their cases explicitly authorized the fees charged by the management
companies. These cases did not create new law. The argument raised in those cases was available to BPS
at the time it filed its opening brief, and its failure to raise it constitutes waiver – at least for the purposes
of this motion to dismiss.
Unjust enrichment claims may be predicated on either quasi-contract or tort theories.
Peddinghaus v. Peddinghaus, 692 N.E.2d 1221, 1225 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998). When the relationship
between the parties “is governed by contract, they may not bring a claim of unjust enrichment
unless the claim falls outside the contract.” Utility Audit, Inc. v. Horace Mann Serv. Corp., 383
F.3d 683, 688-89 (7th Cir. 2004). When the claim arises from tortious conduct, “existence of a
specific contract does not defeat [a] cause of action.” Peddinghaus, 692 N.E.2d at 1225.
Here, BPS’s argument that the unjust enrichment claim is barred due to a contract fails
because Plaintiff’s complaint nowhere asserts the existence of a contract between Plaintiff and
BPS. At most, the complaint alleges contracts in the form of the condominium declaration and
bylaws between the Arbors of Justice Condominium Association and Plaintiff. Doc. 1 ¥ 26; see
Hutsonville Cmty. Unit Sch. Dist. No. I v. Illinois High Sch. Ass'n, 195 N.E.3d 798, 804 (Il.
App. Ct. 2021) (Tn Illinois, the constitution and bylaws of associations can constitute a contract
between the association and its members.”). But BPS is not the same entity as the condominium
association; BPS is a third party hired by the association to manage its building. Plaintiffs claim
arises not out of any breach of contract between BPS and Plaintiff, but out of BPS’s alleged
abuse of its power over Plaintiff to try to coerce unjustified fees from Plaintiff. For these reasons,
the claim of unjust enrichment is not obviously barred by any express contract and the Court
denies BPS’s motion to dismiss Count III.
CONCLUSION
BPS’s motion to dismiss is denied. BPS is to answer the complaint by February 16, 2026.

Dated: January 26, 2026
APRIL M. PERRY
United States District Judge

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11247702. Public record. Not legal advice.