# SINTUJ

> District Court, D. Maine · January 28, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11247683

## Case

- **Full name:** Elder Benjamin Ortiz Sintuj v. Derrick Stamper, in his official capacity Chief Patrol Agent, U.S. Border Patrol, et al.
- **Court:** District Court, D. Maine
- **Decided:** January 28, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11247683

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- explaining that, “once inside the United States” a noncitizen “present in the country may still be removed” under “Section 1226”
- finding “unnecessary detention” of noncitizens “imposes substantial societal costs”
- explaining “once an alien enters the country, the legal circumstance changes, for the Due Process Clause applies to all ‘persons’ within the United States, including aliens, whether their presence here is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent”

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MAINE

ELDER BENJAMIN ORTIZ SINTUJ, )
)
Petitioner, )
)
v. ) No. 2:26-cv-00027-JAW
)
DERRICK STAMPER, in his )
official capacity Chief Patrol Agent, )
U.S. Border Patrol, et al., )
)
Respondents. )
ORDER GRANTING PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
Finding the government’s detention of a noncitizen violates due process, the
court grants the noncitizen’s petition for writ of habeas corpus and orders the
government first to return the noncitizen to the District of Maine and then provide
the noncitizen a bond hearing in accordance with the terms of this order.
I. BACKGROUND1
Elder Benjamin Ortiz Sintuj, a resident of Middlesex County, Massachusetts,
is a Guatemalan citizen who arrived in the United States in March 2023. Pet. for
Writ of Habeas Corpus Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 ¶¶ 1-2 (ECF No. 1) (Pet.). On
January 15, 2026, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) arrested and
detained Mr. Sintuj while he was working at a construction site in Bethel, Maine. Id.
¶ 3. On January 18, 2026, alleging his immigration detention violates federal law

1 For the purposes of Mr. Sintuj’s petition for writ of habeas corpus, upon agreement of the
parties, the Court reviews the relevant facts as pleaded in his verified petition and accompanying
attachments.
and the United States Constitution, Mr. Sintuj filed a verified petition for writ of
habeas corpus and an emergency motion for a temporary restraining order blocking
his removal from the District of Maine. Pet. at 1-11; Emer. Mot. for TRO to Stop

Transfer Without Prior Consent (ECF No. 3). That same day, the Court issued a forty-
eight-hour emergency order, enjoining Respondents from transferring Mr. Sintuj
outside the District of Maine. Emer. Order Concerning Stay or Transfer of Removal
(ECF No. 4).
At the teleconference of counsel on January 20, 2026, Respondents explained
that after Mr. Sintuj filed his habeas petition but before the Court issued its

emergency order, Respondents moved Mr. Sintuj to Jackson Parish Correctional
Center in Jonesboro, Louisiana.2 Min. Entry (ECF No. 7). Given this development,
the parties agreed to amend Mr. Sintuj’s motion for TRO to block his removal from
the country and ensure his reasonable access to counsel. Id. The parties also agreed
there were no factual disputes for the Court to resolve in this matter and stipulated
to the facts in Mr. Sintuj’s verified petition and its exhibits. Id.

2 Mr. Sintuj filed his petition for writ of habeas corpus at 11:22 a.m. on Sunday, January 18,
2026. Pet. The Court issued its emergency order barring Respondents from removing Mr. Sintuj from
the District of Maine at 2:45 p.m. the same day. Respondents have represented that Mr. Sintuj
departed the state of Maine “on a U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) flight, roughly
two and a half hours before the Court’s issuance of the Emergency Order.” Return and Resp. to O.S.C.
in Opp’n to Pet. for Writ of Habeas Corpus at 1 (ECF No. 10).

It is of course possible that Respondents removed Mr. Sintuj from the District of Maine
between 11:22 a.m. and 2:45 p.m. on January 18, 2026, and ordinarily the Court would accept the
Respondents’ factual representation at face value. However, given Respondents’ disobedience of a
court order and misrepresentation of critical facts to the Court regarding another immigration case,
Da Silva-O’Leary v. Hyde, No. 2:26-cv-00036-JAW, Resp. to Mot. (ECF No. 9), the Court ORDERS
Respondents to submit an affidavit or sworn declaration confirming the exact time of Mr. Sintuj’s
departure from the District of Maine on January 18, 2026 within seven days of the date of this order.
On January 21, 2026, the Court ordered Respondents to show cause why Mr.
Sintuj’s petition should not be granted, including whether the Court can and should
order Mr. Sintuj’s return to the District of Maine, O.S.C. (ECF No. 8), and issued a

TRO blocking Respondents from removing Mr. Sintuj from the United States and
ordering Respondents provide Mr. Sintuj with reasonable access to counsel during
his period of detention. Order on Mot. for TRO (ECF No. 9) (TRO). That same day,
Respondents filed their response to the show cause order, opposing Mr. Sintuj’s
petition, Return and Resp. to O.S.C. in Opp’n to Pet. for Writ of Habeas Corpus (ECF
No. 10) (Resp’ts’ Opp’n), and Mr. Sintuj filed his reply. Pet’r’s Reply to Resp’ts’ Resp.

to O.S.C. (ECF No. 11) (Pet’r’s Reply).
II. THE PARTIES’ POSITIONS
Mr. Sintuj alleges his detention violates the Immigration Nationality Act (INA)
and his due process rights under the Fifth Amendment of the United States
Constitution. Pet. ¶¶ 29-38. Mr. Sintuj maintains he is illegally categorized as a
mandatory detainee pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2), rather than a discretionary
detainee under § 1226(a) who is entitled to a bond hearing before an Immigration

Judge. Id. ¶¶ 32-34. Pointing to recent Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA)
precedent he interprets as likely foreclosing his request for a bond hearing, Mr. Sintuj
anticipates being denied a bond hearing in violation of his Fifth Amendment due
process rights. Id. ¶¶ 26-27, 34. Mr. Sintuj also maintains, “in the interest of justice,”
the Court should order Respondents return him to the District of Maine because his
transfer to Louisiana violates “the strict letter and underlying spirit of the [Court’s]
TRO.” Pet’r’s Reply at 2-3. Mr. Sintuj seeks, inter alia, a writ of habeas corpus
ordering his immediate release, or in the alternative, an order requiring an
Immigration Judge to provide him a bond hearing as soon as possible. Pet. 10-11.

In their opposition, Respondents maintain Mr. Sintuj is properly categorized
as a mandatory detainee under § 1225(b)(2), as dictated by controlling agency
precedent. Resp’ts’ Opp’n at 2. However, Respondents acknowledge that “recent
caselaw from this Court [has] uniformly sustain[ed] challenges to DHS’s
interpretation of § 1225” and they concede Mr. Sintuj’s case is not substantially
distinguishable from that line of cases. Id. Respondents also maintain, “[a]s a matter

of practicality,” the Court should not order Mr. Sintuj’s return to the District of
Maine. Id. at 2-3. Given the accelerated briefing schedule, Respondents explain, a
merits determination in Mr. Sintuj’s favor would divest Respondents of custody
before they could arrange his return. Id. at 2. Additionally, Respondents maintain
the Court’s TRO resolved “the underlying concerns” in the court’s emergency stay
order, which was issued approximately two hours after Mr. Sintuj departed for
Louisiana, by ensuring Mr. Sintuj reasonable access to counsel and preventing his

removal from the United States, which “obviat[es] any need for [Mr. Sintuj] to be
physically present in Maine pending the resolution of his case.” Id. at 3.
III. DISCUSSION
A. Jurisdiction
As an initial matter, the Court concludes that it retains jurisdiction over Mr.
Sintuj’s habeas petition. “District courts are limited to granting habeas relief ‘within
their respective jurisdictions,’” Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 442 (2004) (quoting
28 U.S.C. § 2241(a)), and “with respect to habeas petitions ‘designed to relieve an
individual from oppressive confinement,’ the traditional rule has always been that

the Great Writ is ‘issuable only in the district of confinement.’” Id. (quoting Carbo v.
United States, 364 U.S. 611, 618 (1961)). Furthermore, under habeas law,
jurisdiction in a particular district is established when a petitioner is physically
present in the district at the same moment a petition is filed there on his behalf.
Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. at 435 (2004); United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205, 213 (1952);
Ahrens v. Clark, 335 U.S. 188, 190 (1948). Here, the Court retains jurisdiction over

this matter, because Mr. Sintuj filed his habeas petition when he was in custody in
the District of Maine.
B. The Merits
Consistent with the mass of recent caselaw addressing this question on similar
facts, the Court concludes that § 1225(b)(2) is inapplicable to Mr. Sintuj, and he is
therefore subject to discretionary detention under § 1226(a) and entitled to a bond
hearing. For the reasons explained below, the Court will not order Mr. Sintuj’s return

to the District of Maine.
1. Statutory Framework
Section 1225 applies to “applicants for admission,” defined as a noncitizen
“present in the United States who has not been admitted” or “who arrives in the
United States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1). Applicants for admission “fall into one of two
categories, those covered by § 1225(b)(1) and those covered by § 1225(b)(2).” Jennings
v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 287 (2018) (plurality opinion). Relevant here is
§ 1225(b)(2).3 Under § 1225(b)(2) “in the case of an alien who is an applicant for
admission, if the examining immigration officer determines that [the] alien seeking

admission is not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted, the alien shall
be detained” for the duration of removal proceedings. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). Thus,
§ 1225(b)(2) creates a mandatory detention scheme. See Jennings, 583 U.S. at 297
(2018) (“[N]either § 1225(b)(1) nor § 1225(b)(2) says anything whatsoever about bond
hearings”).
By contrast, § 1226 governs the “usual removal process” with an evidentiary

hearing before an immigration judge. Dept. of Homeland Sec. v. Thuraissigiam, 591
U.S. 103, 108 (2020). Section 1226(a) gives immigration authorities power to issue
an administrative warrant and either continue detention for removal proceedings or
release the noncitizen on “bond . . . or conditional parole.” 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)(1)-(2).
Section 1226(a) thus “establishes a discretionary detention framework for
noncitizens.” Gomes v. Hyde, No. 1:25-cv-11571, 2025 Dist. LEXIS 128085, at *4-5
(D. Mass. Jul. 7, 2025). However, § 1226’s discretionary detention regime has one

exception: immigration authorities “shall take into custody” any noncitizen involved
in certain enumerated criminal activities. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1). None of those
criminal activities is at issue here.

3 Section 1225(b)(1) subjects arriving noncitizens and “certain other” noncitizens “initially
determined to be inadmissible due to fraud, misrepresentation, or lack of valid documentation” to
expediated removal proceedings. Jennings, 583 U.S. at 287; 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i), (iii).
Noncitizens subject to expedited removal can avoid removal with successful asylum claims. However,
if a noncitizen detained under § 1225 does not indicate an intent to apply for asylum, express a fear of
persecution, or is “found not to have such a fear,” he is detained until removed. Id. §§ 1225(b)(1)(A)(i),
(B)(iii)(IV).
Once arrested under § 1226(a), immigration authorities make an
individualized initial custody determination after which they have discretion to
release a noncitizen if the noncitizen can “demonstrate to the satisfaction of the officer

that such release would not pose a danger to property or persons, and that the alien
is likely to appear for any future proceeding.” 8 C.F.R. § 236.1(c)(8) (2025). If the
immigration officer opts for continued detention, the noncitizen may seek review of
that decision at a bond hearing before an immigration judge. 8 C.F.R. § 236.1(d)(1)
(2025). At a bond hearing, the government bears the burden of proving “by clear and
convincing evidence that [the noncitizen] poses a danger to the community” or “by

preponderance of the evidence that [the noncitizen] poses a flight risk.” Hernandez-
Lara v. Lyons, 10 F.4th 19, 41 (1st Cir. 2021). An immigration judge’s decision to
continue detaining a noncitizen may be appealed to the BIA. 8 C.F.R. § 236.1(d)(3).
In Jennings, the Supreme Court provided guidance on the difference between
the statutes, explaining that § 1225(b)(2) “authorizes the Government to detain
certain aliens seeking admission into the country under,” while § 1226(a) “authorizes
the Government to detain certain aliens already in the country pending the outcome

of removal proceedings.” Jennings, 583 U.S. at 289 (emphasis supplied); see also id.
at 288 (explaining that, “once inside the United States” a noncitizen “present in the
country may still be removed” under “Section 1226”) (emphasis supplied)).
2. Applicability of Section 1226(a)
As Respondents concede, recent decisions from district courts within the First
Circuit and elsewhere have consistently rejected Respondents’ interpretation of
§ 1225(b)(2)’s mandatory detention scheme under similar factual circumstances. See
Mercado v. Francis, No.25-cv-6582 (LAK), 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 232876, at *9-10,
n.22 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 26, 2025) (explaining that similarly situated petitioners “have

prevailed, either on a preliminary or final basis, in 350 [out of 362] cases decided by
over 160 different judges sitting in about fifty different courts spread across the
United States”) (collecting cases); Lopez v. Trump, No. 2:25-cv-863, 2025 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 233128, at *6 (D. Vt. Nov. 17, 2025) (rejecting DHS’s application of § 1225(b)
mandatory detention to re-detain noncitizen originally released under § 1226(a));
Caiza v. Scott, No. 1:25-cv-00500-JAW, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 195270, at *7-8 (D. Me.

Oct. 2, 2025) (collecting cases).
At bottom, the district courts consistently hold that § 1225(b)(2) applies only
to those noncitizens who are actively “seeking admission,” and a noncitizen
continuously residing in the United States for more than two years cannot be
considered actively seeking admission. See, e.g., Chogllo Chafla v. Scott, No. 2:25-cv-
00437-SDN, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 184909, at *35 (D. Me. Sept. 21, 2025). Rather,
a noncitizen “already in the country pending the outcome of removal proceedings” is

subject to discretionary detention under § 1226(a). Jennings, 583 U.S. at 289. As Mr.
Sintuj explains in his petition, and Respondents do not contest, he has resided in the
United States since March 2023. Pet. ¶ 1. Therefore, Mr. Sintuj cannot be
categorized under § 1225(b)(2) as actively seeking admission. Instead, as a noncitizen
already in the country, he is properly categorized under § 1226(a)’s discretionary
detention scheme. Accordingly, Mr. Sintuj is entitled to a bond hearing before an
Immigration Judge. See Hernandez-Lara, 10 F.4th at 41.
3. Due Process

Because Mr. Sintuj is currently in the United States, he is “entitled to the full
procedural safeguards of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment,” Sampiao
v. Hyde, No. 1:25-cv-11981-JEK, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 175513, at *25 (D. Mass. Sep.
9, 2025), which provides that he will not be “deprived of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law.” U.S. CONST. amend. V; see also Zadvydas v. Davis, 533
U.S. 678, 693 (2001) (explaining “once an alien enters the country, the legal

circumstance changes, for the Due Process Clause applies to all ‘persons’ within the
United States, including aliens, whether their presence here is lawful, unlawful,
temporary, or permanent”). As the petitioner, however, Mr. Sintuj bears the burden
of demonstrating by a preponderance of the evidence that his detention violates the
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. See De Oliveira v. Joyce, 2:25-cv-00291-
LEW, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 125776, at *8 (D. Me. July 2, 2025) (citing Aditya W.H.
v. Trump, 782 F. Supp. 3d 691, 703 (D. Minn. 2025) (collecting authority)).

To determine whether detention violates procedural due process, courts apply
the three-part test set forth in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976). See Chafla,
2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 184909, at *29 (analyzing procedural due process challenge to
the detention of noncitizen held pursuant § 1226(a) using the Mathews test);
Sampiao, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 175513, at *26 (same); Hernandez-Lara, 10 F.4th at
27-28 (same). Under Mathews, a court must weigh the following three factors: (1)
“the private interest that will be affected by the official action”; (2) “the risk of an
erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable
value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards”; and (3) “the

Government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and
administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement
would entail.” Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335.
a. Private Interest
In his petition, Mr. Sintuj asserts “the most elemental of liberty interests—the
interest in being free from physical detention by [the] government.” Hamdi v.

Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 529 (2004); see also Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690 (“Freedom
from imprisonment—from government custody, detention, or other forms of physical
restraint—lies at the heart of the liberty that the [Fifth Amendment's Due Process
Clause] protects”). A noncitizen subject detained under § 1226(a) vindicates their due
process rights through a bond hearing before an Immigration Judge who requires the
government either to (1) prove by clear and convincing evidence that a noncitizen
poses a danger to the community or (2) prove by the preponderance of the evidence

that they pose a flight risk in order to detain them throughout the pendency of their
removal proceedings. See Hernandez-Lara, 10 F.4th at 41. In this case, Respondents
have refused Mr. Sintuj the bond hearing he is guaranteed under § 1226(a) and have
failed to meet their burden for his continued detention as due process requires. Mr.
Sintuj has therefore clearly established the first Mathews factor weighs in his favor.
b. Risk of Erroneous Deprivation
The second Mathews factor is “the risk of an erroneous deprivation of
[Petitioner’s] interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of
additional or substitute procedural safeguards.” Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335. The risk

of erroneous deprivation is large where, as here, Respondents have made no showing
that Mr. Sintuj presents any public safety or flight risk. Accordingly, the second
Mathews factor also weighs heavily in his favor.
c. Government Interest
Finally, the third Mathews factor considers the “Government’s interest,
including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the

additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.” Id. Respondents do
not raise any governmental interest favoring Mr. Sintuj’s continued detention
without a bond hearing. See Chafla, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 184909, at *34
(identifying governmental interest in favor of immigration habeas petitioners’
continued detention without a hearing as an “across-the-board application of an
inapplicable statute”). In fact, the public interest weighs against detention without
a hearing. See Hernandez-Lara, 10 F.4th at 33 (finding “unnecessary detention” of

noncitizens “imposes substantial societal costs”). Thus, the third Mathews factor
weighs against Respondents and in favor of Mr. Sintuj. Respondents’ detention of
Mr. Sintuj without a bond hearing pursuant to § 1226(a) therefore violates Mr.
Sintuj’s due process rights.
4. Elder Benjamin Ortiz Sintuj’s Return to the District of
Maine
Lastly, the Court orders Respondents to return Mr. Sintuj to the District of
Maine. The Court finds that Mr. Sintuj’s return to the District of Maine is necessary
to ensure he has meaningful access to counsel consistent with the Court’s January
21, 2026 TRO, particularly the Court’s order that Respondents provide Mr. Sintuj a
bond hearing. Mr. Sintuj is represented by pro bono counsel located in Portland,

Maine, Pet’r’s Reply at 2, and he maintains a statutory right to select his own counsel.
See 8 U.S.C. § 1362 (“In any removal proceedings before an immigration judge . . . the
person concerned shall have the privilege of being represented (at no expense to the
Government) by such counsel . . . as he shall choose”). The First Circuit has described
§ 1362 as an “integral part” of due process. Zeru v. Gonzales, 503 F.3d 59, 72 (1st Cir.
2007) (citation omitted). Thus, under First Circuit law, Mr. Sintuj has both a
statutory and constitutional right to counsel now and at the upcoming bond hearing.

As the Court has determined that Mr. Sintuj is entitled to a bond hearing and
entitled to counsel at the bond hearing, the Court concludes that the burden imposed
on Mr. Sintuj and his local counsel to prepare for a bond hearing if he remains in
Louisiana, more than 1,600 miles from Portland, “raises grave concerns as to his [due
process] right to access to counsel.” Cruz-Santana v. Gonzalez-Ramos, No. 26-1028
(GMM), 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12121, at *13 (D.P.R. Jan. 22, 2026) (barring the

Government from transferring a detainee from Puerto Rico to a detention facility on
the mainland because of the impact on the detainee’s right to counsel).
Although the information about Mr. Sintuj before the Court is limited, there is
no suggestion in the filings that Mr. Sintuj has a past criminal history in the United
States or that criminal charges are pending against him. Pet. ¶¶ 13-18. According

to his petition, Mr. Sintuj has been living in Massachusetts since roughly March 2023
and he was working at a construction job in Bethel, Maine when Respondents
detained him. Id. Under § 1226(a), Mr. Sintuj is entitled to a bond hearing before a
neutral decisionmaker. See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). As noted earlier, “[i]n order to
continue detaining a noncitizen under section 1226(a), the government must either
(1) prove by clear and convincing evidence that a noncitizen poses a danger to the

community or (2) prove by a preponderance of the evidence that a noncitizen poses a
flight risk.” Doe v. Tompkins, 11 F.4th 1, 2 (1st Cir. 2021); Hernandez-Lara, 10 F.4th
at 41. The Court acknowledges that the law entrusts an Immigration Judge with
decision-making authority concerning whether to continue to detain Mr. Sintuj or
release him on bond; however, the Court observes that based on this limited record,
Mr. Sintuj’s request for release raises a legitimate issue before the Immigration
Judge.

Furthermore, under these unusual circumstances, allowing Respondents to
continue detaining Mr. Sintuj outside the District of Maine, rather than ordering his
return, would incentivize Respondents in the future to transfer similarly situated
immigration detainees outside the District of Maine after the Court has retained
jurisdiction over a detainee’s habeas petition.
Accordingly, the Court orders Respondents to return Mr. Sintuj to the District
of Maine where he may remain detained pending his bond hearing.4
IV. CONCLUSION

Finding Respondents’ continued detention of Mr. Sintuj without a bond
hearing violates federal law and the Fifth Amendment of the United States
Constitution, the Court GRANTS, in part and defers in part, Elder Benjamin Ortiz
Sintuj’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (ECF No. 1) and ORDERS Respondents
to return Mr. Sintuj to the District of Maine within five days of the date of this order.
The Court otherwise DEFERS action on the merits of the pending Petition. The Court

ORDERS Respondents to file a status update within twenty-four hours of the date of
Mr. Sintuj’s return to the District of Maine, confirming his return consistent with this
order.
The Court further ORDERS Respondents to submit within seven days of the
date of this order an affidavit or sworn declaration confirming the exact time of Mr.
Sintuj’s departure from the District of Maine on January 18, 2026.
Upon Mr. Sintuj’s return to the District of Maine, the Court further enjoins

Respondents from denying Mr. Sintuj a bond hearing on the basis that 8 U.S.C.

4 The Court will schedule a conference of counsel to discuss logistics and timing. In DuPont v.
Meserve, 2:25-cv-00593-JAW, the government proposed such a roundabout and delayed return from
Louisiana to Maine that the Court ordered the noncitizen released, and he obtained documentation
that allowed him to take a commercial flight back to Maine.

In this case, one alternative would be for Respondents to agree that Mr. Sintuj could be
released on personal recognizance bond. If so, Mr. Sintuj could be released to Massachusetts and could
obtain his bond hearing there. At this point, the Court is reluctant to release Mr. Sintuj prior to his
bond hearing without Respondents’ acquiescence.

The Court will discuss these issues with counsel at the to-be-scheduled conference.
§ 1225(b)(2) applies to him and ORDERS Respondents shall provide Mr. Sintuj a bond
hearing in accordance with 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)(2) within fourteen days of the date of
his return to the District of Maine. Lastly, the Court ORDERS Respondents to file a

status report within five days of Mr. Sintuj’s bond hearing, stating whether Mr. Sintuj
has been granted bond, and, if his request was denied, the reasons for that denial.
SO ORDERED.
/s/ John A. Woodcock, Jr.
JOHN A. WOODCOCK, JR.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Dated this 28th day of January, 2026

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11247683. Public record. Not legal advice.