# Aska

> District Court, N.D. Illinois · January 23, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11246061

## Case

- **Full name:** Kimberly Aska v. Kenneth Yingling, et al.
- **Court:** District Court, N.D. Illinois
- **Decided:** January 23, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
WESTERN DIVISION

KIMBERLY ASKA, CASE NO. 3:23-CV-50004

PLAINTIFF,

V. HONORABLE IAIN D. JOHNSTON

KENNETH YINGLING, ET AL.

DEFENDANTS.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

“Please comply with Rule 56.1. I’m begging you.”
This plea by the Court to counsel was unsuccessful. Despite this plea and
multiple warnings in this case—and other cases—counsel still violated Rule 56.1.
Apparently, this Court’s prior decisions and standing order are insufficient. So, all
counsel are on notice—as if they weren’t before—that the failure to comply with
Local Rule 56.1 will result in the Court completely striking non-compliant
submissions.
* * *
Defendants Kenneth Yingling and Matthew Montemayer have moved for
summary judgment [282] on the remaining claims before the Court. For the
following reasons, Aska’s Rule 56.1 disclosure [290] and response [292] are stricken.
The motion for summary judgment is granted as to Counts III, IV, and V and
denied as to Counts I and II.
A Colloquy on Rule 56
In responding to a motion for summary judgment, a party asserting that a
fact is genuinely disputed must support the assertion by “citing to particular parts

of materials in the record… or showing that the materials cited [by the opposing
party] do not establish the absence… of a genuine dispute…” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
In the Northern District of Illinois, a party opposing summary judgment shall
file and serve a response to the moving party’s statement of material facts that
“complies with LR 56.1(e).” N.D. Ill. L.R. 56.1(b)(2). Responses “may not assert legal
arguments except to make an objection, including objections based on admissibility,

materiality, or absence of evidentiary support.” N.D. Ill. L.R. 56.1(e)(2). If the
opposing party wishes to assert facts not set forth in their opponent’s statement,
they may file a statement of additional material facts that must “compl[y] with LR
56.1(d).” N.D. Ill. L.R. 56.1(b)(3). This too “should not contain legal argument.” N.D.
Ill. L.R. 56.1(d)(4).
What’s more, in addition to reiterating a party’s obligations to follow both the
Federal Rules and Local Rules, this Court has emphasized that a respondent’s

statements “must… be limited to concise, discrete facts.” J. Johnston Standing
Order on Summary Judgment. “Try to tell a coherent, chronological story with the
facts. The statement of facts should not read like a Quentin Tarantino script.” Id.
Failure to properly support or address a fact permits a court to consider the
fact undisputed for purposes of the motion. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(2). The Seventh
Circuit has repeatedly held that the district court is within its discretion to enforce
strict compliance with Local Rule 56.1. Hanover Ins. Co. v. House Call Physicians of
Ill., No. 15 C 3684, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 52279 at *4-5 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 19, 2016)
(collecting cases).

* * *
Rule 56 exists for a reason. So does Local Rule 56.1. And so does this Court’s
standing order on summary judgment. Dragnet’s fictional Sgt. Joe Friday said it
best: “just the facts, ma’am.” Jim Feliciano, Just the Facts: The Enduring Legacy of
Dragnet on Radio and Beyond, USA Radio Museum (July 16, 2025)
(https://usaradiomuseum.com/radio-stations/just-the-facts-the-enduring-legacy-of-

dragnet-on-radio-and-beyond/) (last accessed Jan. 13, 2026) (noting the line is
misquoted).
When a litigant disregards these rules and orders, it makes everything more
difficult for everyone. Filings that run afoul of the rules—reading more like long-
form op-eds than nonfiction—require its readers to sift through what effectively
becomes a second crack at a winning argument. And when a litigant—or a law
firm—intentionally and pervasively circumvents the rules time and time again,

apparently seeking to obfuscate the record in the hopes that the court will simply
throw its hands up in frustration, consequences must follow or the cycle of sordid
lawyering will never end.
Aska’s Rule 56 response [292] is rife with argumentative, inflammatory, and
irrelevant commentary that runs counter to the very essence of what a “disclosure
of undisputed facts” should entail. For example:
• Defendants’ Statement ¶ 1: Plaintiff Kimberly Aska seeks to hold defendants
Yingling and Montemayer liable for injuries she allegedly sustained on
January 11, 2022, during the course of a law enforcement operation to
apprehend fugitive parolee Adam Graham (Graham), Aska’s boyfriend, who
was living at her residence located in Dekalb, Illinois. (citations omitted).1
o Aska’s Response: Disputed in part. In denying Defendants’ motion for
summary judgment, this Court determined that “whether they acted
under color of state (as opposed to federal) law” is a question that
“turns on numerous disputed facts” ... Plaintiff seeks to hold
Defendants Yingling and Montemayer accountable for violating her
constitutional rights based on the orders given by IDOC’s Chief of
Parole, instructing them to apprehend Graham… Also disputed to the
extent that Defendants suggest that Plaintiff did not sustain severe
injuries. (citations omitted).

• Defendants’ Statement ¶ 8: On January 11, 2022, law enforcement officers
including, among others, Montemayer, Yingling, Todd McCloud (McCloud),
and USMS Senior Inspector Michael Schulte (Schulte) participated in an
operation to locate and apprehend fugitive parolee Graham. (citations
omitted).
o Aska’s Response: Disputed to the extent Defendants are referring to
any federal task force “operation.” In denying Defendants’ motion for
summary judgment, this Court determined that “whether they acted
under color of state (as opposed to federal) law” is a question that
“turns on numerous disputed facts”... IDOC’s chief of parole ordered
Defendant Montemayer to coordinate the apprehension of Graham for
transporting drugs into a state facility… He ordered Montemayer
because IDOC assigned him as the lead investigator on the case.
(citations omitted).

• Defendants’ Statement ¶ 11: At the briefing, the officers also discussed
possible Dekalb locations where Graham was likely hiding, including Aska’s
residence. (citations omitted).
o Aska’s Response: Disputed in part. The cited evidence does not contain
information that Graham was “hiding.” On November 12, 2021,
Graham called IDOC to request a transfer of his parole residence to
Plaintiff’s home, and provided them with her address on Chamberlain
Drive in Dekalb, Illinois... Graham was not hiding. Defendant
Montemayer, the lead investigator, continuously doubted Graham was
residing at Aska’s home... Defendant Montemayer did not attempt to
arrest Graham until January 11, 2022, after the state’s chief of parole

1 As an aside, this statement of fact is a fair and accurate statement of the case. Indeed, the
Court will likely use it—or something similar—to explain the nature of the case to the jury.
ordered them to find Graham for transporting drugs into a state
prison... As the lead investigator, Montemayer is unaware of a single
investigative step taken prior to January 11, 2022, to apprehend
Graham. (citations omitted) (emphasis added).

• Defendants’ Statement ¶ 17: Shortly thereafter, McCloud positively identified
Graham, after Graham exited Aska’s residence and approached the vehicle
Malone had been working on. (citations omitted).
o Aska’s Response: Disputed in part. Defendants Yingling and
Montemayer did not know whether McCloud could positively identify
Graham. At best, Montemayer believed that an individual matching
Graham’s description exited Aska’s home… But since officers were
uncertain Graham was the person, they did not apprehend him even
though he apparently remained outside for approximately 5 minutes…
When Montemayer and Yingling stopped Aska’s vehicle, they remained
uncertain whether Graham was actually in the house... Later, as they
forced their way into Ms. Aska’s home, they interrogated her to find out
whether Graham was in the house… Since Ms. Aska had just woken
up, and did not know whether Graham was in the house either,
Montemayer and Yingling threatened to send her to prison. (citations
omitted) (emphasis added).

• Defendants’ Statement ¶ 37: Malone then walked around the side of the
house, entered the house, and, at approximately 1:51 p.m., opened the door
from within. Upon Malone opening the front door, Aska said, “Thank you,
Jesus!” (citations omitted).
o Aska’s Response: Disputed to the extent Defendants suggest Ms. Aska
consented to officers entering her home. From the very beginning, Ms.
Aska refused entry into her home... But Defendants Montemayer and
Yingling threatened her that, if she wouldn’t agree to help them, she
would be “arrested for impeding [their] investigation”. (citations
omitted) (emphasis added).

• Defendants’ Statement ¶ 43: While exposed at the entrance of the residence,
Aska continued to stall and as the situation grew even more dangerous,
officers ordered Aska to exit the residence, to which Aska responded, “No.” …
While refusing to exit the residence, Aska took a step back further inside of
the residence and away from the officers. (citations omitted).
o Aska’s Response: Disputed in part. Reflective of a lack of exigency, a
“few minutes” transpired at the doorway and there was no threat,
emergency, or exigency... Defendant Yingling then lunged at Ms. Aska
and she shouted her refusal at the top of her lungs. (citations omitted)
(emphasis added).
• Defendants’ Statement ¶ 46: In response, Aska pulled further away into her
residence and braced herself from being removed by placing her left hand on
the inside wall next to the interior side of the front door... Aska also hooked
her left leg around the front door to prevent herself from being removed from
the residence. (citations omitted).2
o Aska’s Response: Disputed in part. Yingling rushed into Ms. Aska’s
home, slammed her against a wall, pressed her against a stand, and
grabbed Aska by her neck and hair… Aska begged Montemayer for
help. (citations omitted) (emphasis added).

• Defendants’ Statement ¶ 47: Aska admitted at her deposition that she
resisted law enforcement’s attempts to remove her from the residence.
(citations omitted).3
o Aska’s Response: Disputed in part. Ms. Aska never fought back or
attempted to flee during this brutalization, … , but tried to shield
herself from the brutalization by taking a slight step backwards, … ,
and bracing her foot around the door to prevent her from being slung
onto the concrete. (citations omitted) (emphasis added).

• Defendants’ Statement ¶ 58: While on the front lawn and at approximately
1:53 pm, Yingling placed Aska under arrest… Officer Soderstrom assisted
Yingling in Aska’s arrest. (citations omitted).
o Aska’s Response: Disputed in part. Once Ms. Aska had been thrown to
the concrete, Yingling tackled Ms. Aska in the snow, and yelled “get on
the fucking ground!” ... Yingling applied pressure to Ms. Aska’s
shoulders, pushed her in the snow, and twisted her arms ...
Confusingly, Yingling scolded Aska, “don’t fucking come running up on
us”, although Aska had not approached them in any aggressive
manner... Then, for the very first time, Yingling told Ms. Aska that she
was “under arrest” for, in his words, “lying to us” ...

There was no reason to believe this was deserved, or that Ms. Aska
was any sort of threat to the officers or anyone else; and the officers
knew, any reasonable officer would have known, they had no probable
cause to believe she had committed a crime...

Montemayer and Yingling continued to shift their explanation for using
force against: Montemayer claims it was for “her safety”, … , but
Yingling admits there was no concern for Aska’s safety so long as they
were present. (citations omitted) (emphasis added).

2 As discussed later, video of the incident exists. The video confirms the accuracy of this
statement of fact.
3 Once again, this statement of fact is a fair and accurate characterization of Aska’s
admission in her deposition.
This list is not exhaustive. Indeed, nearly every single response that is
disputed in any form contains argumentative rhetoric more appropriate for closing
arguments before a jury than a statement of facts before summary judgment.
What’s more, many of the statements of fact are accurate representations of the
summary judgment record. Instead of admitting the facts and contesting the
inferences to be drawn from these undisputed facts in the memorandum, the

responses generally didn’t address the facts in the statement of facts. Rather,
counsel engaged in legal argument, which he and his firm have been repeatedly told
violate Rule 56.1.
Aska’s Rule 56 disclosure of additional material facts [290] is no better. For
example:
• Aska’s Statement ¶ 3: Senior Parole Agent Matthew Montemayer was
assigned to find Graham and, after reviewing law enforcement databases,
public aid transactions, social media posts, and receiving Graham’s request to
stay with Ms. Aska… he continuously doubted Graham was residing at
Aska’s home.” (citations omitted) (emphasis added).

• Aska’s Statement ¶ 4: Throughout the entire investigation, Defendants
refused to go to Ms. Aska’s home; instead, they went to multiple other
locations where they believed Graham could be found. (citations omitted)
(emphasis added).

• Aska’s Statement ¶ 5: Defendants finally decided to visit Ms. Aska’s home
after the state’s chief of parole ordered them to find Graham for transporting
drugs into a state prison. (citations omitted) (emphasis added).

• Aska’s Statement ¶ 8: The officers took Ms. Aska back to her home, which
was tranquil: the officers observed Christmas holiday decorations and did not
see or hear anything indicative of violence, noises, disturbances, or threats.
(citations omitted) (emphasis added).
• Aska’s Statement ¶ 10: Reflexive of a lack of exigency, a “few minutes”
transpired at the doorway and there was no threat, emergency, or exigency.
(citations omitted) (emphasis added).

• Aska’s Statement ¶ 11: At that point, all that happened was Ms. Aska, with
the door open, asked the officers at least five times to “give [her] a second”
because she had just woken up, and did not know whether Graham was even
in the house. (citations omitted) (emphasis added).

• Aska’s Statement ¶ 13: If somehow Yingling and Montemayer still could not
understand that she did not consent to them coming inside her home, she
shouted her refusal at the top of her lungs. (citations omitted) (emphasis
added).

• Aska’s Statement ¶ 17: In disbelief, Aska begged Montemayer for help.
(citations omitted) (emphasis added).

• Aska’s Statement ¶ 20: There is no dispute about what happened next: Ms.
Aska was slung from inside her home, into the air, and onto the concrete
outside. (citations omitted) (emphasis added).

• Aska’s Statement ¶ 22: Even this was not enough. Once Ms. Aska had been
thrown to the concrete, Yingling tackled Ms. Aska in the snow, and yelled
“get on the fucking ground!” (citations omitted) (emphasis added).

• Aska’s Statement ¶ 25: There was no reason to believe this was deserved, or
that Ms. Aska was any sort of threat to the officers or anyone else; and the
officers knew, any reasonable officer would have known, they had no probable
cause to believe she had committed a crime. (citations omitted) (emphasis
added).

Again, the list goes on.
Although lawyers may be in some sense innately argumentative, and the
Court would be inclined to forgive a one-off slip, Aska—or at the very least her
attorneys—should not feign the least bit of surprise at the decision to strike Aska’s
Rule 56.1 disclosure and response. Neither Mr. Rallins, nor his firm Loevy & Loevy,
are strangers to running afoul of Rule 56. They have been warned repeatedly, in
both this case and others, that their laissez-faire attitude toward Local Rule 56.1 is
inappropriate and may subject their client to this very outcome. For example, in
this case alone, the Court gave the following warnings:
• Dkt. 273 Summary Judgment Pre-filing Conference, held 04/14/2025:

THE COURT: … And then a word to the wise. Now, it shouldn’t be an issue
on this, but a word to the wise under Local Rule 56.1: I do not want to see a
statement of fact that goes on for three or four run-on sentences that takes up
a third of the page. That is not what the rule envisions or anticipates … And
responses are responsive to that, not additional facts or arguing over
interpretations of the facts. I’m going to view the facts in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff. So if they are admitted, they are admitted. And if
you need to add, you know, Mr. Rallins, if you need to add additional facts,
that’s what Rule 56 is for.

MR. RALLINS: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. Because if it is not complied with, I’m going to start
striking these things because we spend far too much time dealing with fights
over Rule 56.1, okay?

• Dkt. 260 Minute Entry, entered 06/04/2025: Local Rule 56.1(b)(2) responses
must “compl[y] with LR 56.1(e).” LR 56.1(e)(1), in turn, says that LR
56.1(b)(2) responses “must consist of numbered paragraphs corresponding to
the numbered paragraphs in the LR 56.1(a)(2).” And, [e]ach paragraph shall
set forth the text of the asserted fact (including its citations to the supporting
evidentiary material), and then shall set forth the response.” Plaintiffs
56.1(b)(2) response doesn't comply with 56.1(e)(1): It doesn't “set forth the
text of the asserted fact” and the numbered paragraphs don't match those in
the LR 56.1(a)(2) filing. [In its discretion, the Court then provided leave to
refile a compliant response rather than striking this noncompliant Rule 56.1
statement.]

• Dkt. 269 Memorandum Order, entered 07/07/2025 at *1 n.1: … Though Aska
departs from L.R. 56.1 on many occasions, those infractions, while
frustrating, will be forgiven… But going forward, Aska’s counsel’s firm is on
notice that future infractions will result in the Court striking the L.R. 56.1
statement. Violating L.R. 56.1 is a recurring problem with Aska’s counsel’s
firm. (citation omitted). And the Court already flagged a previous problem
with Aska’s prior filing of her L.R. 56.1 statement. Dkt. 260. The Court has
been more than charitable with Aska’s counsel’s firm’s failure to comply with
the rule.
• Dkt. 270 Summary Judgment Pre-filing Conference, held 08/14/2025:

THE COURT: … Please comply with with Rule 56.1. I’m begging you. And I
think I have already issued one warning in this case and other warnings
regarding the Loevy & Loevy firm. Don’t do what you normally do. Comply
with Rule 56.1.

As alluded to in the warnings above, this is a chronic affliction within Aska’s
firm, Loevy & Loevy, that has plagued this district for over 20 years:
• Hanania v. Loren-Maltese, 319 F.Supp.2d 814, 819 (N.D. Ill. 2004): Plaintiffs
[represented by Loevy & Loevy] should take better care to avoid argument in
their statement of facts—it only frustrates a court’s identification of the
uncontested facts… [T]he court will disregard any statements that are
merely unsupported argument, when reaching its decision on the motions for
summary judgment.

• Harris v. United States, No. 13-cv-8584, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27424 at *3
n.1 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 28, 2017): Plaintiff [represented by Loevy & Loevy]
disputed many of the facts in the Government’s Statement of Facts and
provided lengthy responses to many of them. While many of these responses
cite to evidence on the record, they often provide extraneous or
argumentative information… [S]ubstantial compliance with Local Rule 56.1
is not enough. To the extent that Plaintiff’s responses are not in strict
compliance with Local Rule 56.1, the facts that are not properly disputed will
be deemed admitted for the purposes of this Motion.

• Rivera v. Guevara, 319 F.Supp.3d 1004, 1018 (N.D. Ill. 2018): First, some
paragraphs of Rivera’s [represented by Loevy & Loevy] Local Rule 56.1
submissions include legal argument and arguments about what inferences
should be drawn from facts… The court disregards the portions of the parties’
Local Rule 56.1 submissions that make legal arguments and assert legal
conclusions, which are not factual statements at all.

• Pursley v. City of Rockford, No. 18-cv-50040, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42015 at
*4 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 11, 2024): This matter is, in short, a mess. The parties
presented the Court with 533 pages of Rule 56.1 statements, briefing, and
ancillary briefing. In the statements of fact and responses, both parties
strayed far from Rule 56.1’s requirements. The paragraphs were not short,
nor did they ‘contain only one or two individual allegations.’ (citation
omitted). The statements were also not limited to material facts—some were
immaterial, and others weren’t facts. The list goes on… Rule 56.1 was
intended to simplify the summary judgment process (citiation omitted). That
certainly didn’t happen in this case.

• Johnson v. Guevara, No. 20 C 4156, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55033 at *6 (N.D.
Ill. Mar. 24, 2025): [T]his Court sternly admonishes Johnson [represented by
Loevy & Loevy] for filing his voluminous statement of disputed facts without
leave of Court and without due regard to the Court’s summary judgment
procedures. His filing blatantly subverts the purposes of this Court’s
summary judgment procedures and egregiously disregards this Court’s
repeated directions to the parties. The Court warns Johnson that future
instances of noncompliance with the Court’s procedures will result in
sanctions, up to and including, dismissal of this case.

• Iglesias v. Guevara, No. 19-cv-6508, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 223437 at *2-4
(N.D. Ill. Nov. 13, 2025): Defendants are correct in that Iglesias [represented
by Loevy & Loevy] ‘routinely violates’ Local Rule 56 by ‘argu[ing] his case and
inject[ing] additional facts … that do not materially controvert or respond
directly to the corresponding facts or supporting record citations.’ … [T]he
Court does not believe this is ‘just shoddy work,’ as Iglesias is represented by
experienced counsel [Loevy & Loevy]. To be frank, [Loevy & Loevy] knows
better. (emphasis added).4

To be certain, this is not Aska’s fault. It is her attorneys. Unfortunately, Ms.
Aska must fall on the sword for her attorney’s shortcomings. Hinterberger v. City of
Indianapolis, 966 F.3d 523, 529 (7th Cir. 2020) (citing Wade v. Soo Line R.R. Corp,
500 F.3d 559, 564 (7th Cir. 2007)).
Even if it could, the Court is not required to evaluate each line item of Aska’s
filing to fish for facts in a sea of argument. Hinterberger, 966 F.3d at 529. As a
result of Plaintiff’s repeat noncompliance with court rules, the responsive pleading
to Defendant’s Statement of Material Facts [292], as well as the Plaintiff’s
Statement of Additional Material Facts [290], are stricken in their entirety. The
summary judgment motion shall be determined based solely on Defendants’

4 This Court is unsure whether it can take judicial notice of this, but in the undersigned’s
experience it takes a lot to exasperate Judge Valderrama.
statement of undisputed facts [278].5 Again, a video recording of the incident exists,
so that evidence will control if it conflicts with a parties’ representation. Scott v.
Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 378-81 (2007); Horton v. Pobjecky, 883 F.3d 941, 944 (7th Cir.

2018).
Background
On January 11, 2022, IDOC Senior Parole Agents Kenneth Yingling and
Matthew Montemayer were members of a team tasked with executing an arrest
warrant on fugitive Adam Graham. Defendant’s Statement [278] at ¶¶ 3, 9. At
approximately 1:30pm, Yingling and Montemayer conducted a traffic stop of

Graham’s girlfriend, Kimberly Aska, after being informed that Graham was seen
entering her home. Id. at ¶¶ 20, 23. With Aska was her cousin, Bryan Malone. Id. at
¶¶ 16, 23. During the traffic stop, Aska denied that Graham was in her home and
reported that it was another man—her daughter’s boyfriend, Travon Jackson—who
had been witnessed entering Aska’s home. Id. at ¶¶ 26-27. Police records reviewed
by Defendants at that time reflected that Jackson stood ten inches shorter and 80
pounds lighter than Graham. Id. at ¶ 27. Aska agreed to return to her home with

the officers. Id. at ¶ 28.
Upon returning to Aska’s home at approximately 1:43pm, the front door was
locked. Id. at ¶¶ 31, 35. Malone successfully entered the home “around the side of
the house,” and opened the front door from within. Id. at ¶ 37. Malone exited the

5 This decision relates solely to the instant motion for summary judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(e)(2). Aska is not foreclosed from re-introducing objections to Defendants’ statement of
facts in later pleadings or at trial. All filings must conform with all Local Rules or are
subject to being stricken.
house and Aska entered, while Defendants remained outside on the front porch. Id.
at ¶¶ 38, 39.
Aska informed Defendants that she “need[ed] a second” before letting them

into the home. Id. at ¶ 40. The officers declined to provide her this time and ordered
Aska to exit the home. Id. at ¶¶ 41-43. Yingling then entered the home and
physically removed Aska from the home. Id. at ¶ 45. Aska verbally and physically
resisted. Id. at ¶ 46; Ex. BB. She retreated into the home, yelled, and braced herself
on the frame of the door, and then hooked her leg around the front door. Id.
Montemayer removed Aska’s hand from the doorframe to assist Yingling in

removing Aska from the home. Defendant’s Statement [278] at ¶ 50. In the process
of removing Aska from the home, she suffered an injury to her knee. Id. at ¶ 52.
Aska was placed under arrest but was not criminally charged for any offense
related to the events on that day. Id. at ¶¶ 58, 64.
Aska’s home features an extensive surveillance system with video cameras
throughout her residence, including the front porch and living room. Id. at ¶ 30.
These captured the encounter at the home between Aska and Defendants. See Ex. Z,

AA-MM, and QQ-VV.
Graham was taken into custody at 3:42pm after a two-hour standoff.
Defendant’s Statement [278] at ¶ 65. After Graham’s surrender, Aska consented to
police searching her home and a protective sweep was completed, though neither
Yingling nor Montemayer were present at that time. Id. at ¶¶ 67, 70. A search
warrant for Aska’s home was signed at approximately 4:30pm and was executed by
Dekalb Police at approximately 5:27pm. Id. at ¶ 72. Neither Yingling nor
Montemayer were involved in the execution of the search warrant. Id. at ¶ 74.
Paramedics treated Aska’s knee at the scene and she declined further

treatment at that time. Id. at ¶ 75. Further testing of her knee revealed no
structural damage, and the injury does not interfere with Aska’s daily life. Id. at ¶¶
77-79.
Aska’s complaint originally brought fourteen sprawling claims against five
individuals, the City of Dekalb, and the United States.6 It has since been reduced to
just what is before the Court today: five claims against only two defendants,

Yingling and Montemayer. See Second Amended Complaint [211]; Dkts. 222, 228,
237, and 250. The five remaining counts, each brought under 18 U.S.C. § 1983,
allege excessive force, failure to intervene, deprivation of liberty, unlawful search
and seizure, and conspiracy. Second Amended Complaint [211] at ¶¶ 70-82. The
Court has previously denied summary judgment on the issue of whether defendants
were operating under color of state law. Dkt. 269.
Analysis

Summary judgment is proper “if the movant shows that there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter

6 Though not as egregious as its Rule 56.1 violations, the Court also takes note that the
“kitchen sink” approach, wasting the time of clients, litigants, and the Court alike, is also a
common Loevy & Loevy tactic. “[W]hen a valid claim exists—as is the case here—the weak
and unnecessary claims distract from and diminish the value of the valid claim.” Pursley v.
City of Rockford, No. 18-cv-50040, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42015 at *4 n.1 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 11,
2024); see also, Gurman v. Metro Hous. & Redevelopment Auth., 842 F.Supp.2d 1151, 1154
(D. Minn. 2011) (“The bad obscures the good.”).
of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A genuine dispute of material fact exists if a
reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmovant, construing the evidence
and all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmovant. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,

Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248-49 (1986); Rickher v. Home Depot, Inc., 535 F.3d 661, 664
(7th Cir. 2008). The Court need not draw every conceivable inference in favor of the
nonmovant, only reasonable ones. Moser v. Ind. Dep’t of Corr., 406 F.3d 895, 905
(7th Cir. 2005).
i. Count I: Excessive Force
The Fourth Amendment prohibits the use of excessive force during an arrest.

U.S. Const. amend. IV; Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394-95 (1989). “An officer’s
use of force is unreasonable if, judging from the totality of the circumstances at the
time of the arrest, the officer uses greater force than was reasonably necessary to
effectuate the arrest.” Phillips v. Cmty. Ins. Corp., 678 F.3d 513, 519 (7th Cir. 2012).
Though not impossible, summary judgment is generally incompatible with
claims of excessive force. See Cyrus v. Town of Mukonago, 624 F.3d 856, 862 (7th
Cir. 2010). “When material facts are in dispute, then the case must go to a jury,

whether the argument is that the police acted unreasonably because they lacked
probable cause, or that they acted unreasonably because they responded
overzealously and with too little concern for safety.” Bell v. Irwin, 321 F.3d 637, 640
(7th Cir. 2003).
To succeed, Yingling and Montemayer must effectively demonstrate that
their force was so objectively reasonable that no reasonable jury could find
otherwise. Reasonableness is a quintessential question for the jury. Becker v. City of
Evansville, No. 12-CV-182, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8414 (S.D. Ind. Jan. 26, 2015).
Even based solely on Defendants’ Statement of Facts, Defendants have failed to

overcome that significant hurdle of reasonableness, and so their motion must fail as
to the excessive force count.
It's not necessary to evaluate every moment of the encounter between Aska,
Yingling, and Montemayer to come to this conclusion. It is sufficient to say that
Defendants’ reasonableness is a disputed material question of fact. Aska will argue
that the totality of the circumstances—including officers permitting Malone to

apparently enter the home through a window just before claiming safety required
Aska’s removal from the home—demonstrates that aggressive, overzealous, and
assaultive police officers forcibly ejected her from her own home. Yingling and
Montemayer will argue that the totality of the circumstances—including Aska lying
repeatedly to them about a violent felon’s whereabouts—constituted a dangerous
and volatile situation during which they used force appropriately. Whether the
actions were reasonable is for a jury to decide based on its factual findings.

Qualified immunity fails to shield Defendants from this claim. Although it’s
true that qualified immunity provides “ample protection to all but the plainly
incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law,” it is clearly established that
use of excessive force during an arrest is a constitutional violation. Malley v. Briggs,
475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986); Holmes v. Vill. of Hoffman Estate, 511 F.3d 673, 687 (7th
Cir. 2007). Construing the facts in a light most favorable to Aska, no reasonable
officer could have believed throwing a non-resisting—or passively resisting—subject
onto her concrete stoop, causing injury, was reasonable.7
ii. Count II: Failure to Intervene

A police officer who is present and fails to intervene to prevent another officer
from infringing the constitutional rights of a citizen is liable under § 1983 if that
officer had reason to know: “(1) that excessive force was being used, (2) that a
citizen has been unjustifiably arrested, or (3) that any constitutional violation has
been committed by a law enforcement official; and the officer had a realistic
opportunity to intervene to prevent the harm from occurring.” Yang v. Hardin, 37

F.3d 282, 285 (7th Cir. 1994) (citations omitted).
Because the question of excessive force requires a jury, all that is left to
decide for this motion is whether Montemayer had a “realistic opportunity” to
intervene as a matter of law. This too is a material question of fact reserved for
determination by the jury.
A realistic opportunity to intervene may exist whenever an officer could have
“called for a backup, called for help, or at least cautioned [the excessive force

defendant] to stop.” Abdullahi v. City of Madison, 423 F.3d 763, 774 (7th Cir. 2005)
(quoting Yang, 37 F.3d at 285). “Whether an officer had sufficient time to intervene
or was capable of preventing the harm caused by the other officer is generally an
issue for the trier of fact unless, considering all the evidence, a reasonable jury

7 Of course, at trial, Aska will not receive the benefit of facts being viewed in the light most
favorable to her, nor inferences drawn in her favor. Indeed, Aska will bear the burden of
proof to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the actions were not reasonable.
Her failure to do so will undoubtably result in a motion for bill of costs from Defendants.
could not possibly conclude otherwise.” Abdullahi, 423 F.3d at 774 (quoting Lanigan
v. Vill. of E. Hazel Crest, Ill., 110 F.3d 467, 478 (7th Cir. 1997)).
Here, the incident did happen quickly. One moment, Aska was entering her

home. The next, Yingling was physically removing her from her home. But the
incident didn’t happen so quickly that Montemayer was merely standing by idly.
Indeed, he “removed Aska’s hand from the doorframe of the residence so that Aska
could be removed from the residence…” and physically touched Aska himself for as
long as five seconds. Defendant’s Statement [278] at ¶¶ 50, 55.
There is no one-size-fits-all approach for deciding how much time is sufficient

to establish a realistic opportunity to intervene. Compare Xie v. City of Chicago, No.
14-CV-6082, U.S. Dist. LEXIS 146636 at *12 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 24, 2016) (no realistic
opportunity to intervene existed when defendant had a mere two-second window to
intervene), with Morris v. City of Chicago, No. 07 C 3409, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
68419 at *3-4 (N.D. Ill. July 7, 2010) (summary judgment inappropriate when a
three to five-second break between sets of gunshots may reasonably have provided
an opportunity to intervene). Because five seconds might have been enough time for

Montemayer to intervene, it is appropriate for a jury to decide the issue.
iii. Count III: Deprivation of Liberty
Two potential claims for deprivation of liberty arose out of the events in
question: one when the Defendants executed an investigative detention (more
commonly known as a “Terry stop”) on Aska’s vehicle, and the other when
Defendants formally arrested Aska after removing her from the home.8 Summary
judgment in favor of Defendants is appropriate on both claims.
As a preliminary matter, although the complaint argues that the Terry stop

and ultimate arrest were violations of Aska’s Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment
rights, only the former provides recourse for unlawful pretrial detention. Second
Amended Complaint [211] at ¶ 80; Manuel v. City of Joliet, Ill., 580 U.S. 357, 368-70
(2017); Young v. City of Chicago, 987 F.3d 641, 645 (7th Cir. 2021). To the extent
Aska seeks redress through the Due Process Clause, summary judgment is granted.
Turning to the substantive claims through the lens of the Fourth

Amendment, Aska doesn’t address the Terry stop in her response to the motion for
summary judgment, and thus abandons any argument related to that potential
deprivation of liberty. Robertson v. Dep’t of Health Servs., 949 F.3d 371, 374 n.2 (7th
Cir. 2020) (citing Palmer v. Marion Cty., 327 F.3d 588, 597 (7th Cir. 2003)).9
Frustratingly, Aska has abandoned this claim despite her counsel’s explicit
representation to the Court at the pre-filing conference that no claims would be
abandoned. One of the many purposes of the Court’s pre-filing conference is to

remove from consideration claims that will not be pursued. See Fed. R. Civ. P.
16(c)(2)(A). Similar abandonment of claims during summary judgment briefing after
refusing to timely abandon those claims when specifically asked by the Court will

8 To the extent Aska may further argue in Count IV that she was unlawfully seized in her
person by her arrest, this analysis controls.
9 Even had it not been abandoned, the 13 minutes that elapsed between Aska leaving her
home and Aska returning to her home with Defendants is very likely insufficient to create a
de facto arrest within the Terry stop. See United States v. Bullock, 632 F.3d 1004, 1015 (7th
Cir. 2011).
result in sanctions. This type of behavior is either evidence of being completely
unprepared at the pre-filing conference, lazy lawyering, or simply bad faith.
The remaining claim—for the arrest itself—was made with probable cause, or

at least arguable probable cause, as a matter of law. So, any claim for a deprivation
of liberty related to the arrest must fail. Mustafa v. City of Chicago, 442 F.3d 544,
547 (7th Cir. 2006).10
Probable cause to justify an arrest exists if the totality of the facts and
circumstances known to the officer at the time of the arrest would cause a
reasonable person to believe that the arrestee had committed a crime. Holloway v.

City of Milwaukee, 43 F.4th 760, 769 (7th Cir. 2022) (citing Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S.
89, 96 (1964)). “Reasonableness requires an objective inquiry into all of the
circumstances known to the officer at the time that he detained the suspect.” Huff v.
Reichert, 744 F.3d 999, 1004 (7th Cir. 2014) (citing United States v. Snow, 656 F.3d
498, 500 (7th Cir. 2011)). Subjective intentions play no role in ordinary probable
cause analysis. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996). Probable cause
requires that the officer’s belief be reasonable, not that it be correct. Huff, 744 F.3d

at 1007 (citing Qian v. Kautz, 168 F.3d 949, 953 (7th Cir. 1999)).
Qualified immunity—often termed “arguable probable cause” in this
context—provides an additional layer of protection to Defendants, as even an officer

10 A finding that an arrest was made with probable cause doesn’t foreclose the possibility
that the arrest was made with excessive force. Abbott v. Sangamon Cty., Ill., 705 F.3d 706,
724 (7th Cir. 2013) (“[T]he reasonableness of an arrest… depends not only on when it is
made but also on how it was made”) (internal citation omitted). The analysis related to
Count III does not change the analysis above regarding Count I.
who reasonably but mistakenly believes that probable cause exists is shielded from
liability. Thayer v. Chiczewski, 705 F.3d 237, 247 (7th Cir. 2012).
Defendants argue that at least three statutes provided them with probable

cause to arrest Aska: 720 ILCS 5/31-5(a) (concealing or aiding a fugitive), 720 ILCS
5/31-1 (resisting or obstructing a peace officer), and 720 ILCS 5/31-4 (obstructing
justice). Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment [282] at 14-15. Because the
Court finds that probable cause, or at least arguable probable cause, existed as a
matter of law for Yingling and Montemayer to arrest Aska for concealing or aiding a
fugitive, the Court will not explore other statutes that may have also provided

probable cause.
In Illinois, it is a crime to conceal or aid a fugitive, defined as:
Every person not standing in the relation of husband, wife, child, brother or
sister to the offender, who, with intent to prevent the apprehension of the
offender, conceals his knowledge that an offense has been committed or
harbors, aids, or conceals the offender, commits a Class 4 felony.
720 ILCS 5-31-5(a)

Here, by the time the arrest was initiated, Defendants had the following
information: Graham was Aska’s boyfriend; another officer witnessed Graham
exiting and entering Aska’s household; after officers told Aska they had an arrest
warrant for Graham, Aska had told officers that they had seen a different man,
Trevon Jackson; police records indicated Jackson was significantly smaller in
stature than Graham; Aska agreed to return to her home with officers; then Aska
abruptly reported needing “a second” before allowing officers entry. Defendant’s
Statement [278] at ¶¶ 1, 17-19, 26-28, 40.
The totality of the circumstances supported officers placing Aska under
arrest for concealing or aiding a fugitive. No reasonable jury could find based on
these facts that Defendants lacked probable cause in effectuating this arrest.

Defendants knew Graham was inside the residence; Defendants knew Aska was
lying to them about Graham being in the residence; Aska attempted to mislead
Defendants by claiming it was Jackson inside her home; and Aska sought time
alone in the home with Graham. As a matter of law, a reasonable person must
believe that Aska had committed the crime of harboring or aiding a fugitive at the
time of her arrest. Holloway, 43 F.4th at 769; Beck, 379 U.S. at 96.

Even notwithstanding probable cause, there is no doubt that arguable
probable cause existed, shielding Defendants from liability for the arrest. A
reasonable officer in the same circumstances and possessing the same knowledge as
Yingling and Montemayer could certainly have reasonably believed that probable
cause existed in light of well-established law. Huff, 744 F.3d at 1007. So, they are
immune from suit regarding the arrest.
Evaluating the undisputed facts in a light most favorable to Aska, she was

not the violent felon that Graham was. Nonetheless, her actions subjected her to a
lawful arrest for at least the crime of harboring or aiding a fugitive. Summary
judgment in favor of Defendants is granted as to Count III.
iv. Count IV: Unlawful Search and Seizure
As with Count III, two potential claims for unlawful search and seizure arose
out of the events in question: one when the Defendants entered Aska’s home to
arrest her, and the other when officers executed a protective sweep of Aska’s home
in the time between Graham’s arrest and the issuance of a search warrant.
Addressing first the protective sweep, summary judgment is appropriate.

Yingling and Montemayer didn’t participate in the protective sweep of Aska’s home.
So, they can’t be held liable for the search, whether it was a lawful protective sweep,
a lawful search by consent, or an unconstitutional search. Defendant’s Statement
[278] at ¶ 70. Although warrantless searches of a home are presumptively
unreasonable, only those officers who personally search the home may be held
liable. Gaetjens v. City of Loves Park, 4 F.4th 487, 491 (7th Cir. 2021) (quoting Katz

v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967)); see also, Swanigan v. Trotter, 645
F.Supp.2d 656, 678 (N.D. Ill. 2009) (summary judgment appropriate when parties
were not personally involved in the alleged unreasonable search).
The act of the officers entering the threshold of the home is a closer call. One
material question of fact would ordinarily preclude summary judgment: did
Defendant Officers believe Graham lived in Aska’s home or just that he was present
in Aska’s home? Either way, qualified immunity shields Defendants from liability

for their entry under these circumstances.
It bears repeating that warrantless searches are presumptively
unreasonable. Gaetjens, 4 F.4th at 491; Katz, 389 U.S. at 357. The home is “first
among equals” when it comes to the Fourth Amendment. Florida v. Jardines, 569
U.S. 1, 6 (2013). But, of course, exceptions apply. Police officers may enter a home
without a warrant in exigent circumstances, including situations presenting a
“compelling need for official action and no time to secure a warrant.” Lange v.
California, 594 U.S. 295, 301 (2021) (quoting Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 382
(2014)). Police may also enter with the voluntary consent of the homeowner or an

authorized individual. United States v. Richards, 741 F.3d 843, 847 (7th Cir. 2014)
(quoting United States v. Duran, 957 F.2d 499, 501 (7th Cir. 1992)). An exception is
required even with the foregoing finding that probable cause existed to arrest Aska.
Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 749-50 (1984). Neither exigency nor consent are
applicable in the instant case. Defendant’s Reply [302] at 13 n.12.
Defendants argue their entry to the home was permissible nonetheless, due

to the valid arrest warrant for Graham. Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment
[282] at 10-12. Generally, law enforcement is prohibited from entering a third-
party’s home to effectuate an arrest warrant without first obtaining a search
warrant. Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 214-16 (1981). “[A]n arrest
warrant does not give police carte blanche to enter any dwelling in search of the
object of the warrant.” United States v. Williams, 79 F.Supp.3d 888, 895 (S.D. Ill.
2015) (quoting Mascorro v. Billings, 656 F.3d 1198, 1205 (10th Cir. 2011)). However,

when officers have “reason to believe” that the subject of their arrest warrant is
currently in the home where the suspect lives, there is an implicit authority within
the arrest warrant to enter the home. United States v. Jackson, 576 F.3d 465, 467-
68 (7th Cir. 2009) (citing Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 602 (1980)). Only if
officers are “sufficiently certain” that the subject lives in the home may they enter.
Covington v. Smith, 259 Fed.Appx. 871, 873 (7th Cir. 2008).
The Seventh Circuit has not yet entered the fray in defining what amount of
“certainty” is “sufficient.” Id. In the Second, Eighth, Tenth, Eleventh, and DC
Circuits, merely holding a reasonable belief (less than that required of probable

cause) is “sufficient.” See, e.g., United States v. Lovelock, 170 F.3d 339, 343 (2d Cir.
1999); United States v. Risse, 83 F.3d 212, 216 (8th Cir. 1996); Valdez v. McPheters,
172 F.3d 1220, 1224-25 (10th Cir. 1999); United States v. Bervaldi, 226 F.3d 1256,
1263 (11th Cir. 2000); United States v. Thomas, 423 F.3d 282, 286 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
On the other hand, in the Third and Ninth Circuits, probable cause is required. See,
e.g., United States v. Vasquez-Algarin, 821 F.3d 467, 477 (3d Cir. 2016); Motley v.

Parks, 432 F.3d 1072, 1079 (9th Cir. 2005).
One would think that if a split of authority exists, public officials would be
entitled to qualified immunity. Indeed, the Seventh Circuit believes that a split of
authority indicates that the law is not clearly established. Upton v. Thompson, 930
F.2d 1209, 1217 (7th Cir. 1991). But, strangely, there’s a split of authority on
whether a split of authority provides for qualified immunity. Compare Mocek v. City
of Albuquerque, 813 F.3d 912, 929 n.9 (10th Cir. 2015) (“A circuit split will not

satisfy the clearly established prong of qualified immunity.”) with Williams v.
Bitner, 455 F.3d 186, 193 n.8 (3d Cir. 2006) (“Even if our sister circuits had in fact
split on the issue, we would not necessarily be prevented from finding that the right
was clearly established.”). This Court believes the better view—and the one more
consistent with Seventh Circuit law, see Upton, 930 F.2d at 1217—is that a split of
authority provides for qualified immunity. See Rogers v. Pendleton, 249 F.3d 279,
287-88 (4th Cir. 2001) (“[I]f other appellate federal courts have split on the question
of whether an asserted right exists, the right cannot be clearly established for
qualified immunity purposes.”). If appellate judges sitting in quiet chambers can’t

agree on the law, why should an officer know what law is clearly established while
making split-second decisions on the street?11
But without deciding whether a split-of-authority shortcut establishing
qualified immunity exists, Defendants argue that the body of investigation
available to them at the time of entry gave them reason to believe both that
Graham was living in Aska’s house, and that he was in the house at their time of

entry. Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment [282] at 10-12. Unsurprisingly,
Aska disagrees. Plaintiff’s Response [289] at 4-5. Without rehashing the entirety of
this matter’s first order on summary judgment, much is in dispute regarding how
and why police came to be monitoring Aska’s house. More than six weeks had
elapsed between the signing of Graham’s arrest warrant and the operation which
led to both his arrest and this instant case. If officers were sufficiently certain that
Graham resided in Aska’s house prior to January 11, 2022, it would stand to reason

that they would have sooner interviewed Aska about his whereabouts and/or
monitored her house.

11 There’s a lot to not like about the doctrine of qualified immunity and its application and
attempted application. See, e.g., Hughes v. Garcia, 100 F.4th 611, 614 (5th Cir. 2024);
Zadeh v. Robinson, 928 F.3d 457, 474 (5th Cir. 2019) (Willett, J., dissenting). But until
Congress acts or the Supreme Court overrules it prior decisions, federal courts should apply
the doctrine and its rationale, not find ways to avoid it.
At the same time, observing Graham exiting and re-entering Aska’s home the
morning of his arrest, combined with evidence collected to that point, strongly
suggested he was spending time at Aska’s that may have exceeded that of a mere

visitor. It is a close call even notwithstanding the split of authority amongst the
Circuits regarding the level of scrutiny required. It is also not a decision the Court
needs to make today.
As a matter of law, it is not clearly established that entry to a third-party’s
home to remove that third-party—while armed with an arrest warrant for a violent
felon known to be inside the home—is unconstitutional, when probable cause has

established that the third party is aiding the subject of the arrest warrant.
For Aska to clear the hurdle of qualified immunity, she must demonstrate
that “every reasonable official” would have understood that Defendants’ actions
violated the Fourth Amendment. Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 11 (2015). She has
failed to do so. Aska cites to Lovi v. Vill. of Arlington Heights, 62 F.Supp.3d 756 at
767 (N.D. Ill. 2014) in her response. But this case ostensibly relates not to the
Defendants’ entry, but rather to the later protective sweep. No case cited by Aska—

or found by the Court for that matter—is on point to the uniquely nuanced matter
that this case presents. Certainly not every reasonable officer would be on notice to
the Defendants’ actions being a constitutional violation. So, Defendants are immune
from suit regarding their entry to the home.
v. Count V: Conspiracy
Finally, summary judgment is appropriate for the count of conspiracy. A civil
conspiracy is “a combination of two or more persons acting in concert to commit an

unlawful act, or to commit a lawful act by unlawful means.” Beaman v. Freesmeyer,
776 F.3d 500, 510 (7th Cir. 2015) (quoting Scherer v. Balkema, 840 F.2d 437, 441
(7th Cir. 1988)) “To establish conspiracy liability in a § 1983 claim, the plaintiff
must show that (1) the individuals reached an agreement to deprive him of his
constitutional rights, and (2) overt acts in furtherance actually deprived him of
those rights.” Beaman, 776 F.3d at 510.

Aska must allege that Defendants “directed themselves toward an
unconstitutional action by virtue of a mutual understanding[,]” and support such
allegations with facts suggesting a “‘meeting of the minds.’” Thurman v. Vill. of
Hazel Crest, 570 F.Supp.2d 1019, 1029 (N.D. Ill. 2008) (quoting Amundsen v.
Chicago Park Dist., 218 F.3d 712, 718 (7th Cir. 2000)).
Here, Aska falls well short of that requisite threshold. Rather than arguing
that Defendants conspired to use excessive force against her—or even to falsely

arrest her or search her home—she instead points as her only evidence to the
directive of the IDOC Chief of Parole to “get [Graham] off the streets.” Plaintiff’s
Response [289] at 20. Executing an arrest warrant—on a violent felon who has cut
his tether and absconded parole, no less—is not a civil conspiracy, it’s just
policework. And, regardless, Graham is not the plaintiff, Aska is. There’s no
evidence, direct or circumstantial, of an agreement to commit unconstitutional
actions against Aska.
As there is no genuine dispute as to the elements of conspiracy, summary
judgment in favor of Defendants is appropriate.
Conclusion
For the above reasons, the motion for summary judgment [282] is granted in
part and denied in part. Counts III, IV, and V are dismissed. Counts I and II shall
proceed.

Entered: January 22, 2026 By: SS Ss
Iain D. Johnston
U.S. District Judge

29

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11246061. Public record. Not legal advice.