# Shechtman

> District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania · January 22, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11245976

## Case

- **Full name:** Michael Shechtman v. U.S. Xpress Inc., U.S. Xpress Leasing, and Quami Wallen
- **Court:** District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania
- **Decided:** January 22, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

MICHAEL SHECHTMAN, No. 4:23-CV-01156

Plaintiff, (Chief Judge Brann)

v.

U.S. XPRESS INC.,
U.S. XPRESS LEASING, and
QUAMI WALLEN,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

JANUARY 22, 2026
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Michael Shechtman (“Plaintiff”) filed a four-count complaint against
Defendants U.S. Xpress Inc. (“U.S. Xpress”), U.S. Xpress Leasing (“Xpress
Leasing”), and Quami Wallen (“Wallen”) (collectively, “Defendants”).1 Plaintiff
brought a direct negligence claim against Wallen, both direct and vicarious liability
negligence claims against U.S. Xpress, and a direct negligence claim against Xpress
Leasing.2 Parties proceeded to discovery and, after a slew of discovery disputes,
completed discovery on July 25, 2025.3

1 Doc. 1 (Compl.).
2 Doc. 1 at 5, 7, 8, 11 (Counts I–IV).
Defendants then filed the instant motion for partial summary judgment,
moving to dismiss the following: Plaintiff’s punitive damages claims against Wallen

and U.S. Xpress, Plaintiff’s direct liability claim against U.S. Xpress, and all of
Plaintiff’s claims against Xpress Leasing.4 The motion is now ripe for disposition.
For the reasons stated below, it is granted.

II. DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, summary judgment is appropriate
where “the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and

the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”5 Material facts are those “that
could alter the outcome” of the litigation, “and disputes are ‘genuine’ if evidence
exists from which a rational person could conclude that the position of the person
with the burden of proof on the disputed issue is correct.”6 A defendant “meets this

standard when there is an absence of evidence that rationally supports the plaintiff’s
case.”7 Conversely, to survive summary judgment, a plaintiff must “point to
admissible evidence that would be sufficient to show all elements of a prima facie

case under applicable substantive law.”8 “Further, in ruling on a summary judgment

4 Doc. 50 at 2-3.
5 FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a).
6 EBC, Inc. v. Clark Bldg. Sys., Inc., 618 F.3d 253, 262 (3d Cir. 2010).
7 Clark v. Mod. Grp. Ltd., 9 F.3d 321, 326 (3d Cir. 1993).
8 Id.
motion a court may, in appropriate cases, render partial summary judgment pursuant
to Rule 56(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.”9

Party testimony is sufficient to raise a genuine dispute of material fact on an
issue: “‘a single, non-conclusory affidavit or witness's testimony, when based on
personal knowledge and directed at a material issue, is sufficient to defeat summary
judgment.’”10 “This is true even where, as here, the information is self-serving.”11

However, courts are not required to credit conclusory testimony, that is, evidence
failing to set forth specific factual assertions and instead regurgitating opinions and
conclusions.12 “[C]onclusory testimonial evidence cannot defeat summary

judgment.”13
In assessing “whether there is evidence upon which a jury can properly
proceed to find a verdict for the [nonmoving] party,”14 the Court “must view the

facts and evidence presented on the motion in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party.”15 Moreover, “[i]f a party fails to properly support an assertion of
fact or fails to properly address another party’s assertion of fact as required by Rule

9 Kramer v. Newman, 840 F. Supp. 325, 327 (E.D. Pa. 1993).
10 Paladino v. Newsome, 885 F.3d 203, 209 (3d Cir. 2018) (quoting Lupyan v. Corinthian
Colleges, Inc., 761 F.3d 314, 320 (3d Cir. 2014)).
11 Id.
12 Daimler v. Moehle, No. 23-2611, 2025 WL 1355138, at *5 (3d Cir. May 9, 2025).
13 Id.; see also Gonzalez v. Sec’y of Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 678 F.3d 254, 263 (3d Cir. 2012).
14 Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986) (quoting Schuylkill & Dauphin Imp.
Co. v. Munson, 81 U.S. 442, 448 (1871)).
15 Razak v. Uber Techs., Inc., 951 F.3d 137, 144 (3d Cir. 2020).
56(c),” the Court may “consider the fact undisputed for purposes of the motion.”16
Finally, although “the court need consider only the cited materials, . . . it may

consider other materials in the record.”17
B. Undisputed Facts
With that standard outlining the framework for review, I now turn to the
undisputed facts, resolving doubts in favor of the Plaintiff, the non-moving party.

The case arises from a low-speed motor vehicle collision between two tractor-
trailers occurring on October 5, 2022.18 The accident took place at a truck stop, with
Defendant Wallen backing his tractor-trailer into the driver’s side of the cab of

Plaintiff Shechtman’s tractor-trailer.19 It was around 10:00 p.m. when the accident
occurred, and the parking area was relatively poorly lit.20 Plaintiff was sleeping in
the bunk of his tractor at the time of the collision.21
After the accident, Defendant Wallen drove his truck away from Plaintiff’s

truck before circling around and asking Plaintiff and another witness to assist him
with backing into the parking space adjacent to Plaintiff’s tractor trailer.22 Plaintiff

16 FED. R. CIV. P. 56(e)(2); see also Weitzner v. Sanofi Pasteur Inc., 909 F.3d 604, 613-14 (3d
Cir. 2018).
17 FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c)(3).
18 Doc. 51 (Statement of Material Facts) ¶¶ 1, 7, 11, 12; Doc. 52 (Counterstatement of Material
Facts) at 6-7.
19 Doc. 51 ¶¶ 7, 10; Doc. 52 ¶ 1.
20 Doc. 51 ¶ 8.
21 Doc. 51 ¶ 5; Doc. 52 ¶ 1.
22 Doc. 51-2 (Defendants’ Exhibit B “DXB”) at 37:19-25.
believed that, at first, it appeared that Defendant Wallen was “trying to leave” the
scene.23

Pennsylvania State Police Trooper Brian Kitko (“Trooper Kitko”) responded
to the scene, interviewing both Plaintiff and Defendant Wallen.24 The accident
caused modest property damage to Plaintiff’s tractor and trailer, and Plaintiff did not
report any personal injuries at the scene.25 This crash was deemed “preventable” by

U.S. Xpress’s internal monitoring system.26
At the time of the collision, Defendant Wallen was employed by U.S. Xpress
with his truck provided to him by Xpress Leasing27 and acting in the course of his

employment.28 U.S. Xpress hired Defendant Wallen two months prior, on August 9,
2022.29 At the time of his hiring, Defendant Wallen had three to six months of truck
driving experience and then underwent several days of training with U.S. Xpress.30
During that training, Defendant Wallen passed his Enhanced Backing Test.31

On his employment application, Defendant reported a history of driving
violations, including a reckless driving charge from August 202032 and three other

23 Id.
24 Doc. 51 ¶¶ 9-10;
25 Id. at ¶¶ 12-13.
26 Doc. 52-5 (Plaintiff’s Exhibit D “PXD”) at 82:16-24.
27 Doc. 52 ¶ 5; Doc. 51 ¶ 23.
28 Doc. 51 ¶ 14.
29 Doc. 51 ¶ 18; Doc. 52 ¶ 5.
30 Doc. 52 ¶ 6; Doc. 51 ¶ 19.
31 Doc. 51-9 (DXI); Doc. 51 ¶ 20.
32 Doc. 52 ¶ 8 (Defendant was going 89 miles per hour in a 55 mile per hour zone).
speeding violations in June, August, and December of 2020.33 Defendant Wallen
also failed to disclose to U.S. Xpress in his application that he had a previous DUI

charge, resulting in license suspension.34 The totality of Defendant Wallen’s traffic
record includes in excess of fifty traffic violations.35
In the hiring process, U.S. Xpress confirmed that Defendant Wallen had prior

truck driving experience, confirmed his license and motor vehicle record, and
confirmed his prior work experience through a combination of third-party vendor
information as well as personally contacting prior employers.36 It is unclear from the
record whether U.S. Xpress had actual knowledge of Defendant Wallen’s traffic

history, as U.S. Xpress uses a “three to five year ‘look-back’ period” for prior traffic
and criminal offenses.37 For the purposes of this motion, the Court resolves this
dispute by assuming that, with a driving record search, Defendant U.S. Xpress could

have known of the totality of Defendant Wallen’s driving history.
Curiously, during his time at U.S. Xpress, Defendant Wallen created three Tik
Tok videos that show him recording himself while driving at high speeds on open

33 Doc. 52-6 (PXE) at 63-64.
34 Doc. 52 ¶ 7.
35 Doc. 52-10 (PXI).
36 Doc. 51 ¶ 16.
37 Doc. 52 ¶ 27. In his brief in opposition, Plaintiff switches between claiming that Defendant
U.S. Xpress would have been aware of Defendant Wallen’s record with “[a] simple
investigation” Doc. 52 at 25, and claiming that Defendant U.S. Xpress did know of the driving
record, Doc. 52 at 24. The exhibits Plaintiff cites for the proposition that Defendant U.S. Xpress
knew of Defendant Wallen’s seven-year suspension of his driver’s license, Doc. 52 at 24 n.7,
do not provide support for such a claim. Defendant U.S. Xpress has not advanced a position
one way or the other.
stretches of highway.38 These Tik Toks were public and used the hashtag #trucking.39
Defendant U.S. Xpress did not monitor all social media accounts for noncompliance

with company policy,40 but prior to the instant crash had been in litigation with a
different employee that involved improper cell phone use.41 There was also minimal
monitoring in place for cell phone usage by drivers.42

Within a month of his hiring, in September 2022, Defendant Wallen was
involved in a different accident.43 This accident was deemed “preventable,” meaning
the driver “was able to take reasonable action to avoid the accident without causing
another accident.”44 After the September 2022 accident, Defendant U.S. Xpress had

a telephone call with Defendant Wallen and placed him on “accident probation” until
June 2023.45 Following the instant accident in October 2022, Defendant Wallen was
also involved in an accident in November 2022, deemed “non preventable.”46 Then,

in December 2022, Defendant Wallen was involved in yet another “preventable”
accident.47 Defendant Wallen continued to drive for Defendant U.S. Xpress until

38 Doc. 52-7 (PXF); Doc. 52-8 (PXG); Doc. 52-9 (PXH).
39 Doc. 52 ¶ 11.
40 Doc. 52-5 (PXD) at 95:25-96:3.
41 Doc. 52-6 at 17-18.
42 Doc. 52-5 at 95:1-96:11.
43 Id. at 78:15-79-10.
44 Id.
45 Id. at 79:15-18, 81:11-23.
46 Id. at 84:7-12.
47 Id. at 85:3-10.
January 15, 2023, at which point he took voluntary leave and discontinued his
employment.48

C. Analysis
As referenced above, Defendants move for partial summary judgment as to
the following: Plaintiff’s punitive damages claims against Wallen and U.S. Xpress,
Plaintiff’s direct liability claim against U.S. Xpress, and all of Plaintiff’s claims

against Xpress Leasing.49
Preliminarily, Plaintiff consents to dismissal of all claims against U.S. Xpress
Leasing and the entry of summary judgment in its favor.50 Accordingly, summary

judgment is granted in favor of Xpress Leasing, and all claims against it are
dismissed without prejudice.
1. Punitive Damages
Defendants move for summary judgment on Plaintiff’s punitive damages

claims against Defendants Wallen and U.S. Xpress. Plaintiff’s claims against
Defendants, both direct and vicarious, sound in negligence under Pennsylvania
law.51 Federal courts sitting in diversity must apply state substantive law, including

the standard for punitive damages.52

48 Id. at 22:3-15.
49 Doc. 50 at 2-3.
50 Doc. 52 at 31.
51 Doc. 1 at 5-9.
52 See Wilson v. TA Operating, LLC, No. 4:14-CV-00771, 2017 WL 569195, at *3 (M.D. Pa. Feb.
13, 2017) (Brann, J.); Jones v. Silver Creek Transport, LLC, 701 F. Supp. 3d 284 (W.D. Pa.
2023).
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Hutchinson v. Luddy set forth the
standard applied uniformly by courts in this district.53 “The Pennsylvania Supreme

Court has held that punitive damages may not be awarded for negligence or gross
negligence. . . . [r]ather, such damages are only appropriate where the Defendant has
acted with ‘willful, wanton, or reckless conduct.’”54 “‘Punitive damages may be

awarded for conduct that is outrageous, because of the defendant's evil motive or his
reckless indifference to the rights of others.’”55 “[W]hen assessing the propriety of
the imposition of punitive damages, ‘[t]he state of mind of the actor is vital. The act,
or the failure to act, must be intentional, reckless or malicious.’”56 In this context, a

“reckless” mental state refers only to deliberate indifference or conscious disregard
of facts that create a high degree of risk of physical harm to another.57
The Third Circuit has recognized that, on summary judgment, district courts

may determine whether a plaintiff has met the standard for a punitive damage
claim.58

53 Hutchinson, 582 Pa. 114, 121-22 (Pa. 2005); Wilson, 2017 WL 569195, at *3-4 (collecting
cases).
54 Manfred v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 106 F. Supp. 3d 678, 689 (W.D. Pa. 2015) (citing
Hutchinson, 582 Pa. at 121-22).
55 Hutchinson, 582 Pa. at 121 (quoting Feld v. Merriam, 506 Pa. 383 (1984).
56 Id. at 122.
57 Id. at 122-23.
58 Vitalis v. Sun Constructors, Inc., 481 F. App’x 718, 729 (3d Cir. 2012) (citing Pichler v.
UNITE, 542 F.3d 380, 387 (3d Cir. 2008) (“If, on remand, the District Court determines that
summary judgment is appropriate as to plaintiffs’ punitive damages claim, then a trial will be
unnecessary”)); Cochetti v. Desmond, 572 F.2d 102, 103 (3d Cir. 1978) (“[T]o the claim for
punitive damages, we conclude that on the record before the district court summary judgment
was proper.”).
a. Defendant Wallen
First, Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiff’s claim of punitive damages

against Defendant Wallen. Plaintiff responds with two assertions that he claims
justify a finding of punitive damages: first, that Defendant Wallen “attempted to flee
the scene of the collision;” and second, that Defendant Wallen’s Tik Tok videos
show a propensity for reckless driving.59 Neither is sufficient to survive Defendants’

motion.
At the outset, Plaintiff’s claims that Defendant attempted to flee the scene of
the collision are unsupported. It is true that “flight from the scene of an automobile

accident, without attempting to stop or render aid,” can demonstrate a degree of
reckless indifference justifying punitive damages.60 However, the evidence provided
here does not show what Plaintiff claims that it does; the only evidence of

Defendant’s “attempted flight” is Plaintiff’s deposition testimony, where he stated
that, after the crash, Defendant initially pulled his truck away from the accident
before making a U-turn and coming back to park next to Plaintiff’s truck.61 Plaintiff
characterizes this testimony as Defendant Wallen “attempt[ing] to leave the crash

site before he was stopped by Plaintiff,” but the deposition materials cited provide
no such assertion that Plaintiff, or anyone, did anything to “stop” Defendant or to

59 Doc. 52 at 21-23.
60 Guy v. Eliwa, No. 4:23-CV-00412, 2023 WL 5916468, at *6 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 11, 2023) (Brann,
J.).
61 Doc. 52-3 (PXD) at 37:12-38:8.
force him to U-turn.62 On the contrary, Plaintiff’s testimony only indicates that
Defendant pulled his truck around and parked.63 There is no other evidence to

suggest that Defendant Wallen was “attempting to flee” the scene.64 Without more,
Defendant Wallen’s act in pulling his truck around and parking does not show a
mental state of culpability high enough to justify punitive damages.

Subsequently, Plaintiff rests on the Tik Tok videos to support Defendant
Wallen’s “habitual tendency to drive recklessly,” which Plaintiff asserts
demonstrates reckless indifference.65 Plaintiff argues that these videos alone could
lead a jury to conclude that Defendant Wallen was using his cell phone at the time

of the crash, which Plaintiff avers would render punitive damages appropriate.66 I do
not agree. Aside from the propensity evidence, Plaintiff points to nothing in the
record suggesting that Defendant was on his phone at the time of the crash.67 Plaintiff

62 Doc. 52 at 22; Doc. 52-3 at 37:12-38:8.
63 Doc. 52-3 at 37:12-38:8.
64 Nor is this situation comparable to Guy v. Eliwa, a case that Plaintiffs rely on, as Guy involved
a high-speed collision where Defendant made no effort to stop or render aid and then fled the
scene. 2023 WL 5916468 at *1. The facts in Eliwa show evidence of a culpable mental state
rendering punitive damages appropriate, but those facts are clearly distinguishable from the
facts in this case.
65 Doc. 52 at 22.
66 Id. at 22-24.
67 The Court does not believe that the Tik Tok evidence would be admissible to show that
Defendant was likely reckless or using his cell phone on the day in question, as it is classic,
textbook propensity evidence barred by Federal Rule of Evidence 404. See, e.g., Prescott v.
R&L Transfer, Inc., 111 F. Supp. 3d 650, 662-63 (W.D. Pa. 2015) (where past incidents of
poor driving were inadmissible to show the driver acted in conformity with his prior conduct,
but would have been admissible against the employer to show negligent hiring had those claims
not been dismissed); Williams v. Boulevard Lines, Inc., No. 10 Civ. 2924, 2013 WL 5652589,
at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2013) (finding prior driving violations inadmissible against the driver
has not presented, for instance, phone records showing that Defendant Wallen was
using his cell phone at or around the incident.68

Moreover, from the propensity evidence alone, no reasonable jury could find
that Defendant was likely on his cell phone at the time of the accident. All three Tik
Toks were filmed while Defendant Wallen was on an open stretch of highway, with
none filmed while backing up or actively maneuvering the truck.69 The probative

value of propensity evidence, if even considered by the Court, is “slight” at best.70
And here, it is insufficient.
Finally, even if a rational jury could somehow conclude that Defendant was

using his phone at the time of the crash, this is still insufficient to meet the punitive
damages standard. “[C]ell phone usage while driving, without more, is typically
insufficient to support a finding of recklessness,” barring some “aggravating factors

to prove propensity or character for negligent driving, but admissible against the employer to
prove negligent hiring and retention).

However, I am hesitant to completely bar consideration of the evidence based on an argument
not raised by Defendants. Evidence need not be admissible in its current form to be considered
at summary judgment. Fraternal Order of Police, Lodge 1 v. City of Camden, 842 F.3d 231,
239 (3d Cir. 2016). Neither party has addressed the issue, and perhaps parties are aware of
some manner in which this evidence would be admissible currently unknown to the Court.
Accordingly, I will consider the evidence for purposes of summary judgment, but note that the
probative value of propensity evidence is “slight,” if any. Prescott, 111 F. Supp. 3d at 662
(quoting the Advisory Committee’s Note to Rule 404(a)).
68 Cf Brown v. White, No. 21-1387, 2022 WL 1664343, at *3 (E.D. Pa May 25, 2022) (where the
court held that a reasonable jury could conclude the driver was on his phone from cell phone
records and the dashcam footage showing a possible cell phone light glowing).
69 See Doc. 52-7; 52-8; 52-9 (PXF-H).
70 See, e.g., Carpenter v. Vaughn, 888 F. Supp. 635, 650 (M.D. Pa. 1994).
[that] render the cell phone usage particularly egregious.”71 Given that there is no
evidence Defendant Wallen was using his cell phone at the time of the accident at

all, let alone using it in a way that would give rise to aggravating circumstances,
Plaintiff has not made a showing that Defendant Wallen’s conduct rises to conduct
so outrageous, extreme, or intentional as to justify an award of punitive damages.

Accordingly, I find that punitive damages against Defendant Wallen would
be inappropriate, given that Plaintiff has failed to present any genuine issue of fact
tending to show “willful, wanton, or reckless conduct.”72 Accordingly, I will grant
Defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to Plaintiff’s punitive damages claims

against this Defendant.
b. Defendant U.S. Xpress
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has clarified that negligent hiring may be

the basis for a punitive damages claim if the same Hutchinson standard of outrageous
conduct described above has been met.73 Plaintiff must set forward sufficient
evidence to demonstrate that 1) Defendant U.S. Xpress had a subjective appreciation
of the risk of harm to which Plaintiff was exposed, and 2) that Defendant acted or

failed to act in conscious disregard of that risk.74 A growing trend of district courts

71 Brown v. White, 2022 WL 1664343, at *3.
72 Hutchinson, 582 Pa. at 121-22.
73 Hutchinson v. Luddy, 582 Pa. 114, 126 (2005).
74 See, e.g., Felkner v. Werner Enters., No. 13-2189, 2014 WL 1013474, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 14,
2014) (citing to Hutchinson, 870 A.2d at 772).
in the Third Circuit demonstrates that an employee’s prior “accidents or incidents
cannot serve as a basis for punitive damages against an employer when there is no

nexus between the driving violations and the conduct leading to the accident such
that an employer would have a conscious appreciation of the risk.”75 “Therefore, in
determining the sufficiency of evidence for punitive damages, ‘there must be some
nexus between [alleged] violations and the cause of the accident.’”76

In determining whether punitive damages are appropriate, courts look to
Defendant’s training of the driver with regard to the specific circumstances of the
accident,77 and the driver’s driving record with a focus on similar previous

accidents.78 Some courts allow for punitive damages for employers who were on
notice that their employee was violating the Federal Motor Carrier Safety

75 Felkner, 2014 WL 1013474, at *6; Achey v. Crete Carrier Corp., No. 07-CV-3592, 2009 WL
9083282, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 30, 2009); Ditzler v. Wesolowski, No. 05-325, 2007 WL
2253596, at *7 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 3, 2007); Villagran v. Freightbull, Inc., 698 F. Supp. 3d 807,
810 (E.D. Pa. 2023).
76 Villagran, 698 F. Supp. 3d at 810 (quoting Achey, 2009 9083283 at *7-8 and State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 422 (2003) (“A defendant’s dissimilar acts,
independent from the acts upon which the liability was premised, may not serve as the basis
for punitive damages.”)).
77 Villagran, 698 F. Supp. 3d at 811 (“Plaintiff draws no link between [Defendant’s] supposed
egregious conduct and its failure to train on this one subject.”); Felkner, 2014 WL 1013474, at
*6 (“[T]here is no evidence that Werner trained or encouraged their drivers to blow their air
horns and drive through yellow lights in a situation where they did not think they could stop
for a red light.”).
78 Achey, 2009 WL 9083282, at *5 (where a driver had a litany of prior accidents but none relating
to his sleep apnea that caused the accident in question); Felkner, 2014 WL 1013474, at *6;
Villagran, 698 F. Supp. 3d at 811-12 (noting Defendant’s few prior infractions over a long
history of commercial driving, and that none were for reckless driving nor involved a license
suspension).
Regulations (“FMCSRs”) when the same violation contributed to the accident.79 It
is unclear when the failure to check driving records of prospective employees alone

may be sufficient to warrant punitive damages.80
Whether the facts present here would be sufficient for a finding of punitive
damages is a difficult question. Plaintiff’s main argument is that Defendant U.S.

Xpress’s hiring of Defendant Wallen with his questionable driving record is itself
sufficient to be outrageous conduct.81 Defendant responds by pointing out that, in
hiring, Defendant U.S. Xpress “conducted a background check, confirmed that
Defendant Wallen had a valid and current commercial driver’s license, and gave him

several days’ worth of training.”82 In the Court’s mind, Defendant has the better
argument here; punitive damages are not appropriate given the facts of this case.
First, Defendant Wallen did not have a prior history of incidents like the one

at issue, namely, accidents resulting from the improper maneuvering of vehicles.

79 See Brown v. Brooks, No. 23-2966, 2024 WL 4643528, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 31, 2024)
(collecting cases).
80 See, e.g., Brown, 2024 WL 4642538, at *4 (“[B]y itself the failure to check driving records of
prospective employees may be insufficient to establish ‘a sufficiently high degree of risk of
harm to others as to warrant punitive damages’”) (quoting Dillow v. Myers, 78 Pa. D. & C. 4th
225, 239 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2005)); but see Ditzler v. Wesolowski, No. 3:2005-325, 2007 WL
2253596, at *6 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 3, 2007); cf Carson v. Tucker, 5:20-CV-00399, 2020 WL
4015244, at *5-6 (E.D. Pa. July 16, 2020) (“The allegations also do not mention any previous
incidents that may put [driver’s] driving capabilities in question such as a known medical
condition or previous accidents and safety violations with a nexus to the current incident.”).
The Court is unaware of, and Plaintiff has not provided, any cases holding that poor driving
record alone is sufficient to allow punitive damages. See Achey, 2009 WL 9083282, at *5
(where hiring a driver with a far worse record of accidents than Plaintiff here was still
insufficient to raise punitive damages).
81 Doc. 52 at 24-27.
82 Doc. 55 (Reply Br.) at 6.
Instead, Plaintiff points to his speeding violations, reckless driving violation, and
DUI license suspension.83 From the record, it appears that Defendant Wallen’s

driving history includes seatbelt violations; driving without insurance, license or
registration violations; defective equipment violations; speeding violations; and
several violations for which the Court simply cannot decipher the underlying
rationale.84 Defendant Wallen’s license had also been suspended multiple times in

the past, which he reported to Defendant U.S. Xpress on his application and listed
the reason as unpaid parking tickets.85
The most similar violation to the one at hand would be any improper driving

citations or accidents resulting from the poor maneuvering of vehicles. From the
record provided by Plaintiff, Defendant Wallen has one “improper lane change”
violation, but apparently no accidents before the one occurring in September 2022.86

The circumstances of Defendant Wallen’s DUI are unknown, and there is no
evidence that the DUI led to any type of accident or property damage.87 Accordingly,
Defendant Wallen’s admittedly poor driving record would not put Defendant U.S.
Xpress on notice that he would be so likely to cause accidents or property damage

as to raise a high degree of risk of physical harm to others.

83 Doc. 52 at 24-27.
84 Doc. 52-10 (PXI); Doc. 52-6 (PXE).
85 Doc. 52 at 25 (citing Doc. 52-6 (PXE) at 61).
86 Doc. 52-10 (PXI).
87 The only record evidence for Plaintiff’s DUI is the excerpted driving record provided in the
Stidham report. Doc. 52-6 (PXE) at 35.
Next, the instant accident, with minor property damage and apparently some
injuries to Plaintiff’s person, is not particularly serious, and it is the kind likely to

result from a low-speed vehicular backing accident. Defendant U.S. Xpress
presumably did not train Defendant Wallen to purposefully back into other trucks,
nor did he previously demonstrate an inability to do so.88 Indeed, Defendant U.S.

Xpress trained Defendant Wallen on proper backing procedures and then
administered a test, which he passed.89 Therefore, there is no evidence that
Defendant U.S. Xpress could subjectively appreciate a high risk of harm to Plaintiff,
or others like him, from accidents such as this.

Plaintiff also takes issue with Defendant U.S. Xpress’s monitoring, or lack
thereof, of Defendant Wallen’s cell phone usage.90 This contention is unpersuasive
for two reasons. First, as discussed above, there is no evidence that Defendant

Wallen’s cell phone usage, including his regrettable Tik Tok tendencies, contributed
in any way to the accident here. Furthermore, while Defendant Wallen’s Tik Toks
were public, there is no reason to believe that Defendant U.S. Xpress was on notice
of his improper videography while driving. Defendant Wallen’s Tik Tok account did

not even use his real name,91 and there is no evidence that a search by Defendant
Wallen’s name would have found these videos. It is both impracticable and

88 See Felkner, 2014 WL 1013474, at *6.
89 Doc. 50-9 (DXI).
90 Doc. 52 at 26.
91 Doc. 52-8; Doc. 52-9; Doc. 52-10 (PXF-H).
inappropriate to impose punitive damages upon Defendant U.S. Xpress for failing
to monitor every trucking related hashtag to see if any of the millions of daily posted

videos were made by an employee.
Additionally, the expert report of Joey Stidham submitted by Plaintiff includes
conclusions that Defendant U.S. Xpress showed a willful, reckless, and conscious

disregard for the safety of other motorists when they allowed drivers “to utilize their
cell phones and social media” while driving.92 As noted above, there is no evidence
that Defendant Wallen was utilizing his phone or social media at the time of this
accident. Stidham’s report also concludes that, because of Wallen’s driving record,

“U.S. Xpress should not have hired” him,93 but the standard for punitive damages is
much higher than whether Defendant U.S. Xpress should not have hired Defendant
Wallen.

Plaintiff also references this Court’s decision in Guy v. Eliwa, arguing that
Defendant’s failure to monitor or audit Wallen’s driving record contributes to a
finding of recklessness.94 However, Eliwa involved a driver violating FMCSRs
about hours, and the Defendant company knew or had reason to know he was

violating policy.95 Here, there is no evidence that Defendant’s failure to monitor or
audit Wallen’s driver logs did anything to contribute to the accident. Plaintiff makes

92 Doc. 52-6 (PXE) at 59;
93 Id. at 64.
94 Doc. 52 at 27; 2023 WL 5916468.
95 Eliwa, 2023 WL 5916468, at *8.
no allegation that Wallen was, for instance, sleep deprived or that he was violating
other applicable FMCSRs.96 Accordingly, the Court sees Defendant U.S. Xpress’s

failure, if any, to monitor Defendant Wallen’s driving logs as a non-issue for this
motion, as Plaintiff has not shown a causal relation between the alleged failure to
audit and the accident.

Plaintiff’s argument essentially rests on Defendant’s hiring of Defendant
Wallen despite his poor driving record.97 Surely some number of prior violations, or
a prolific and serious history of accidents, could render a driver so “palpably
inadequate” or “egregiously underqualified” as to support an award of punitive

damages against the company that hired him.98 But the facts of this case do not rise
to that level. Defendant Wallen’s driving history, while indeed problematic, is not
so serious as to demonstrate that U.S. Xpress had deliberate indifference or

conscious disregard of facts that create a high degree of risk of physical harm to
another.99 There is no “causal nexus” arising between his prior violations and the
instant accident.

96 Doc. 52 at 24-27.
97 Plaintiff provides no cases that have found a lengthy record of driving violations alone
sufficient to sustain an award of punitive damages. Doc. 52 at 24-27. Plaintiff provides as an
exhibit the jury slip of what Plaintiff claims to be a similar case, where a jury apparently found
punitive damages appropriate, Doc. 52 at 27, but does not provide the factual basis or a means
to locate the factual basis. Despite efforts to locate the case and verify the factual basis, the
Court has been unable to do so.
98 See Villagran, 698 F. Supp. 3d at 811 (using these terms to refer to the driver’s trainers when
considering a claim of punitive damages in a negligent hiring case).
99 Hutchinson, 582 Pa. at 121.
While Defendant Wallen should probably not again be permitted to drive
commercially, especially after his multiple accidents at U.S. Xpress, Plaintiff has not

presented evidence that would allow a reasonable jury to conclude that hiring him
was “outrageous” such that U.S. Xpress had an “evil motive” or “reckless
indifference to the rights of others.”100 Accordingly, Defendants’ motion for

summary judgment on Plaintiff’s claim for punitive damages against Defendant U.S.
Xpress is granted.
b. Direct Liability Against U.S. Xpress
“[F]ederal courts in Pennsylvania have found ‘a plaintiff cannot pursue a

claim against an employer for negligent entrustment, hiring, supervision, or training
when the employer admits that its employee was acting within the scope of
employment when the accident occurred.””101 An exception exists, though, when
plaintiffs can sustain a punitive damages claim against the employer.102

The parties are in agreement about the state of the law on this issue, only
disputing whether punitive damages are appropriate here or not.103 For the reasons
enumerated above, Plaintiff has not made out a viable punitive damages claim and,

100 Id.
101 See, e.g., Tjokrowidjojo v. San Lucas, No 20-6564, 2021 WL 1143379, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Mar.
25, 2021) (collecting cases).
102 Id.
103 Doc. 52 at 27-28, Doc. 50 at 10-11.
therefore, the exception does not apply here. Accordingly, Defendants’ motion for
summary judgment on Plaintiff’s direct claims against U.S. Xpress is also granted.

III. CONCLUSION
Defendants’ motion for partial summary judgment is granted for all claims
related to U.S. Xpress Leasing, for punitive damages against Defendant Wallen,

for punitive damages against U.S. Xpress, Inc., and for direct liability claims
against U.S. Xpress, Inc. Plaintiff’s claims against U.S. Xpress Leasing are
dismissed without prejudice. Judgment is entered in favor of U.S. Xpress, Inc. for
Plaintiff’s direct liability claims.

An appropriate Order follows.

BY THE COURT:

s/ Matthew W. Brann
Matthew W. Brann
Chief United States District Judge

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11245976. Public record. Not legal advice.