# CLAUSELL

> District Court, D. New Jersey · January 15, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11245927

## Case

- **Full name:** Ivelisse Clausell v. Johnson & Johnson Services, Inc.
- **Court:** District Court, D. New Jersey
- **Decided:** January 15, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

IVELISSE CLAUSELL,
Plaintiff,
Civil Action No. 25-1751 (MAS) (TJB)
° MEMORANDUM OPINION
JOHNSON & JOHNSON SERVICES, INC.,
Defendant.

SHIPP, District Judge
This matter comes before the Court upon Defendant Johnson & Johnson Services, Inc.’s
(“Defendant”) Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 8) Plaintiff Ivelisse Clausell’s (“Plaintiff”) Amended
Complaint (ECF No. 4) and Defendant’s Motion for Sanctions (ECF No. 15). Plaintiff opposed
both motions (ECF Nos. 16, 20), and Defendant replied (ECF Nos. 17, 21). The Court has carefully
considered the parties’ submissions and decides the matter without oral argument pursuant to Local
Civil Rule 78.1. For the reasons stated below, the Court grants in part and denies in part
Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss and denies Defendant’s Motion for Sanctions.
I. BACKGROUND!
A. Factual Background
This matter involves an employment discrimination dispute between Plaintiff and
Defendant that stems from Plaintiff’s allegations that she was discriminated against when she was
passed over for a promotion, and that Defendant retaliated against her after she filed a complaint

' For the purpose of considering the instant motions, the Court accepts all factual allegations in the
Amended Complaint as true. See Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 228 (3d Cir. 2008).

with Human Resources (“HR”) alleging conduct that she believed violated the law. (Compl. {[{ 2-3,
28, ECF No. 4.) Plaintiff’s employment with Defendant began in April 2016 when she joined as
Senior Counsel, Privacy Law. Ud. ¥ 5.) Most recently, Plaintiff worked as Vice President of Data
Protection Legal (“DPL”) within Defendant’s Global Legal Organization (“GLO”) and Global
Privacy Organization (“GPO”). (/d.) During the course of her employment, Plaintiff performed her
job well and earned a reputation as a subject matter expert and trusted business partner in privacy.
Ud. 16.) Plaintiff left the company in December 2019 and returned in January 2022 as Group
Leader, Global Privacy & Cybersecurity Law. Ud. 5.)
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant subsequently denied her a promotion to Chief Privacy
Officer (“CPO”) based on her ethnicity, race, and gender by pre-selecting an external candidate
and failing to provide Plaintiff an opportunity to present her qualifications through the interview
process. (/d. § 29.) The hiring manager was Ashley Watson (“Watson”), a woman who is white and
the Worldwide Vice President and General Counsel of MedTech Legal and Head of Enterprise
Privacy. Ud. | 31.) Watson announced she was looking for three things in a successful candidate
for the CPO role: “(1) someone who was a privacy expert; (2) someone who had done the job
before; and (3) someone who was ‘delightful.’” ¢d. ¥ 32.)
Plaintiff’s qualifications included that: (1) she practiced privacy law for more than fifteen
years, had been frequently asked to speak on privacy topics, and had numerous certifications in
the privacy area; (2) she had previously worked as CPO at Organon, Global Head of Privacy and
Information Security at Esperion Therapeutics, and Senior Compliance Counsel and Privacy
Officer at Otsuka Pharmaceutical; and (3) she had received a rating of “exceeds” in the “behaviors”
section of her then most recent performance evaluation and was praised by Defendant in a release

announcing her appointment to Group Leader as an “extremely collaborative” employee. □□□□
§ 34.)
Throughout July 2023, Defendant conducted “a farcical interview process” to fill the
position, but the team already knew it would hire Scott Taylor (“Taylor”), a white male external
applicant, for the role Ud. 35, 37.) Specifically, on July 5, 2023, Watson interviewed Plaintiff.
(id. § 38.) During the interview, Watson stated her preference for Taylor. Ud. J 38.) Plaintiff
attended two additional interviews on July 10, 2023: (1) one with the Worldwide Vice President of
Regulatory Law; and (2) another with Denise Weber (“Weber”) head of HR, Legal and
Government Affairs. (/d. §{ 39.) During the interview, Weber “acknowledged that... Watson had
previously informed her that she had a ‘preferred candidate.’” (/d.) Taylor was hired and started as
CPO on August 10, 2023. Ud. ¢ 41.)
After Taylor’s hire, he engaged in allegedly unethical practices that Plaintiff believes
violated the law, including the New Jersey Trade Secrets Act and the Defend Trade Secrets Act.
(id. § 43.) Plaintiff became concerned that Taylor was misappropriating trade secrets from his
former employer, Merck & Co. (“Merck”), where Plaintiff had also previously worked. (/d. § 44.)
Specifically, Plaintiff was concerned that Taylor was improperly using confidential information
and documents belonging to Merck to complete his work for Defendant, including copying and
pasting confidential work product and information from Merck-branded documents into
documents and presentations for Defendant. (/d.) Taylor also “admitted to [Plaintiff] during a [one
on one] meeting that he had ‘the whole Privacy Rulebook’ from Merck.” (Ud. § 46.) Taylor
continues to use Merck’s property in his work for Defendant. (/d.)
Taylor, thereafter, hired Raymond Farraro (“Farraro”), another white male, and his
previous employee at both Merck and Hewlett-Packard, for the position of Senior Director, Global

Privacy Governance and Assurance. (id. § 47, 48.) Since beginning his employment with
Defendant, Farraro has converted several Merck documents to Defendant’s branding by changing
the font colors. Ud. § 49.) Farraro has also stated several times that some of the documents may
have “Merck words” or that he may have forgotten to put something into Defendant’s format and
instructed other employees to change the Merck references to references about Defendant. □□□□
Plaintiff alleges this conduct “implicated [Defendant] in violating several intellectual property
laws.” id.)
On May 17, 2024, Plaintiff filed an official report with Weber from HR, after speaking to
Weber about her concerns on May 14, 2024. Ud. ¥ 52.) In the report, Plaintiff reported that Taylor
and Farraro had brought proprietary documents with them from Merck. (/d.) Plaintiff filed the
report to ensure Defendant’s compliance with intellectual property laws and ethical practices. (/d.)
Weber, however, “strategically delayed the submission of [Plaintiff’s report], and... on June 19,
2024, .. . informed [Plaintiff] that she had filed the [report] ‘anonymously,’ although” they had
“previously agreed . . . that the complaint would be filed in [Plaintiff’s] name.” (Ud. § 54.) After
May 2024, Plaintiff “provided additional information to support her [report] to... Weber and...
Kerri Loiselle” (“Loiselle”), “Senior Manager, Employee & Labor Relations, who was eventually
assigned to investigate the . . . complaint.” Ud. 4 55.) Loiselle contacted Plaintiff on July 9, 2024.

Six weeks after Plaintiff filed her report, Plaintiff had her mid-year performance review
with Taylor and Watson. Ud. □ 57.) During the meeting, Watson and Taylor stated that Defendant
was reorganizing, and that Plaintiff’s role would be eliminated as part of the reorganization. (/d.
{ 62.) Plaintiff alleges that this was done in retaliation for filing her complaint. (/d. 4 63.) On
September 26, 2024, Watson and Weber met with Plaintiff for a “[ninety]-day . . . discussion under

the New Jersey WARN Act” informing Plaintiff that her termination date was December 27, 2024.
(d. § 64.) Plaintiff’s annual bonus was also cut by fifty percent without explanation. (/d. { 68.)
On September 30, 2024, Loiselle discussed the results of her investigation into Plaintiff's
complaint and confirmed that she found that Merck materials were used but that Defendant
determined their usage was not improper. (/d. J 65.)
B. Procedural Background
Plaintiff initially filed her Complaint on March 10, 2025. (Compl., ECF No. 1.) Plaintiff,
thereafter, filed the operative Amended Complaint asserting five claims: (1) race and ethnicity
discrimination in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (“First Claim for Relief’); (2) race discrimination
in violation of the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (the “NJLAD”) (“Second Claim for
Relief”); (3) gender discrimination in violation of the NJLAD (“Fifth Claim for Relief’);
(4) whistleblower retaliation in violation of the New Jersey Conscientious Employer Protection
Act (the “NJ CEPA”) (“Sixth Claim for Relief”); and (5) whistleblower retaliation pursuant to the
Pierce Doctrine (“Seventh Claim for Relief”). (Am. Compl. {§ 70-108.)
Defendant filed the instant Motion to Dismiss on June 23, 2025. (Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss,
ECF No. 8.) Plaintiff opposed (PI.’s Opp’n Br., ECF No. 16), and Defendant replied (Def.’s Reply
Br., ECF No. 17). Defendant subsequently filed the instant Motion for Sanctions on July 14, 2025.
(Def.’s Mot. for Sanctions, ECF No. 15.) Plaintiff opposed (PI.’s Opp’n to Sanctions Br., ECF No.
20) and Defendant replied (Def.’s Reply to Sanctions Br., ECF No. 21).

* The Court notes that the causes of action in the Amended Complaint are not numbered
sequentially. (See Am. Compl.) For clarity, the Court uses the numbers in the Amended Complaint
listed as “Claims for Relief’ when referring to Plaintiff’s claims.

I. LEGAL STANDARD
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure? 8(a)(2) “requires only ‘a short and plain statement of the
claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,’ in order to ‘give the defendant fair notice of
what the .. . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)).
A district court conducts a three-part analysis when considering a motion to dismiss under
Rule 12(b)(6). See Malleus v. George, 641 F.3d 560, 563 (3d Cir. 2011). First, the court must
identify “the elements a plaintiff must plead to state a claim.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 675 (2009). Second, the court must identify all of the plaintiff’s well-pleaded factual
allegations, accept them as true, and “construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff.” Fowler vy. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). The
court can discard bare legal conclusions or factually unsupported accusations that merely state the
defendant unlawfully harmed the plaintiff. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 USS.
at 555). Third, the court must determine whether “the [well-pleaded] facts alleged in the complaint
are sufficient to show that the plaintiff has a ‘plausible claim for relief.’” Fowler, 578 F.3d at 211
(quoting /gbal, 556 U.S. at 679), A facially plausible claim “allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Jd at 210 (quoting Igbal,
556 U.S. at 678). On a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the “defendant bears the burden of showing that no
claim has been presented.” Hedges v. United States, 404 F.3d 744, 750 (3d Cir. 2005) (citing Kehr
Packages, Inc. v. Fidelcor, Inc., 926 F.2d 1406, 1409 (3d Cir. 1991)).

> All references to “Rule” or “Rules” hereafter refer to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

Wl. DISCUSSION
Defendant makes three arguments in support of dismissing the Amended
Complaint: (1) Plaintiff has failed to adequately plead that she was passed over for a promotion by
a less qualified white man; (2) Plaintiff has failed to adequately plead that she was held to a
heightened standard or terminated for a discriminatory reason; and (3) Plaintiff has failed to
adequately allege a whistleblower retaliation claim pursuant to NJ CEPA or the Pierce Doctrine.
(Def.’s Moving Br. 13-29, ECF No. 8-1.) The Court addresses each argument in turn.
A. Discrimination Claims (First, Second, and Fifth Claims for Relief)
Plaintiff’s First (Section 1981: race and ethnicity discrimination), Second (NJLAD: race
and ethnicity discrimination), and Third (NJLAD: gender discrimination) Claims for Relief are
disparate treatment claims premised on Defendant’s failure to promote Plaintiff and Defendant
subjecting Plaintiff to a heightened performance standard. (See Am. Compl. 72, 79, 86.) The
Court addresses the failure to promote theories first.
Defendant argues that the Court should dismiss Plaintiff’s failure to promote claims
because Plaintiff failed to sufficiently allege that Defendant hired Taylor instead of her for
discriminatory reasons. (Def.’s Moving Br. 14-20.) Defendant further contends that Plaintiff
alleges no facts regarding Taylor’s qualifications and how they compare to Plaintiff’s and thus fails
to state a claim. Ud. at 7-9.)
When bringing an employment discrimination claim under Section 1981, a plaintiff must
adequately allege a prima facie case of discrimination at the pleading stage under the McDonnell
Douglas burden-shifting framework. See Smith v. Phila. Works Inc., No. 22-1458, 2022 WL
16553381, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 31, 2022). New Jersey courts, moreover, have adopted the
McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework for disparate treatment claims pursuant to the

NJLAD. See Fidan v. Marba Prod., LLC, No. 24-9788, 2025 WL 2526263, at *9 (D.N.J. Sep. 3,
2025) (quoting Viscik v. Fowler Equip. Co., 800 A.2d 826, 833 (N.J. 2002)); Maddox v. City of
Newark, 50 F. Supp. 3d 606, 630 (D.N.J. 2014). The Court, accordingly, analyzes Plaintiff’s
discrimination claims together.
“Disparate treatment is demonstrated when a member of ‘a protected group is shown to
have been singled out and treated less favorably than others similarly situated on the basis of an
impermissible criterion.’” Maddox, 50 F. Supp. 3d at 630 (quoting Mandel v. UBS/PaineWebber,
Inc., 860 A.2d 945, 956 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2004)). Under the McDonnell Douglas
framework, to state a claim for race, ethnicity, or gender discrimination, a plaintiff must adequately
allege that: “(1) [she] is a member of a protected class; (2) [she] was qualified for the position [she]
sought to attain or retain; (3) [she] suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) the action
occurred under circumstances that could give rise to an inference of intentional discrimination.”
Makky v. Chertoff, 541 F.3d 205, 214 (3d Cir. 2008) (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,
411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973)). To state a disparate treatment claim under a failure to promote theory
pursuant to Section 1981 and the NJLAD, a plaintiff must plead sufficient facts to allege: “(1) that
[s]he is member of a class protected by the anti-discrimination law[s]; (2) that [s]he was qualified
for the position or rank sought; (3) that [s]he was denied promotion ... ; and (4) that others with
similar or lesser qualifications achieved the rank or position.” Dzibela v. BlackRock Inc., No.
23-2093, 2024 WL 4349813, at *8 (D.N.J. Sep. 30, 2024) (NJLAD elements) (citation modified)
(citing Dixon v. Rutgers, The State Univ. of N.J., 541 A.2d 1046, 1051 (NJ. 1988)); see also Smith,
2022 WL 16553381, at *3 (§ 1981 elements) (explaining that a plaintiff must allege that she:
“(1) belongs to a protected category; (2) applied for and was qualified for a job in an available
position; (3) was rejected; and (4) after rejection, the position stayed open and the employer

continued to seek applications from similarly qualified individuals[]” and noting “the flexibility of
the McDonnell Douglas test and applying it where a position did not remain open but instead was
filled when someone else was chosen over the plaintiff’ (first quoting Bray v. Marriott Hotels, 110
F.3d 986, 990, 990 n.5 (3d Cir. 1997))).
The Third Circuit has, in turn, found that an inference of intentional discrimination is
established when a plaintiff can show that “the employer treated a similarly situated employee who
was not a member of the plaintiff’s protected class more favorably.” LeCadre v. Att’y Gen. Pa.,
No, 23-2898, 2024 WL 2763829, at *2 (3d Cir. May 30, 2024) (citing Jones v. Sch. Dist. of Phila.,
198 F.3d 403, 413 Gd Cir. 1999)); Sarullo v. U.S. Postal Serv., 352 F.3d 789, 798 (3d Cir. 2003)
(“The ‘central focus’ of the prima facie case ‘is always whether the employer is treating some
people less favorably than others because of their race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.’”).
Importantly, however, “[t]he Supreme Court has held that in employment discrimination
cases, a plaintiff is not required to establish a prima facie case at the pleadings stage.” Kelly v. HD
Supply Holdings, Inc., No. 14-372, 2014 WL 5512251, at *3 (D.N.J. Oct. 31, 2014). “Instead, [a]
plaintiff’s claim must be facially plausible and give fair notice to the defendants of the basis of the
claim.” Id. at *4 (citing Huggard v. Crown Bank, No. 11-6194, 2012 WL 529548, at *4 (D.N.J.
Feb.17, 2012)). “Stating a claim requires a complaint with enough factual matter (taken as true) to
suggest the required element[.] The complaint must state enough facts to raise a reasonable
expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of the necessary element.” /d. (emphases in
original) (citation modified) (quoting Wilkerson v. New Media Tech. Charter Sch. Inc., 522 F.3d
315, 321-22 (3d Cir. 2008)).
Here, Plaintiff has sufficiently stated a disparate treatment claim under a failure to promote
theory. First, Plaintiff adequately alleges, and it is not disputed that, she is a member of a protected

class. See Hills v. County of Lehigh, No. 20-3089, 2021 WL 651040, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 19, 2021).
Plaintiff specifically pleads that she is both “female” and “Latina[,]|” which are protected classes.
(Am. Compl. § 16); see Fuller v. Glob. Custom Decorating, No. 04-285, 2007 WL 44507, at *15
(W.D. Pa. Jan. 5, 2007) (“The [p]laintiff is clearly a member of a protected class in being a
female,.”); Marte v. Oliver, No. 20-252, 2020 WL 6544978, at *4 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 6, 2020) (noting
that “Latin[as] . . . [are] members of a protected class” (quoting Carrasca v. Pomeroy, 313 F.3d
828, 834 (3d Cir. 2002))).
Second, Plaintiff adequately alleges that she was qualified for the position. See Mundy v.
City of Pittsburgh, No. 22-31, 2022 WL 17851629, at *11 (W.D. Pa. Dec. 22, 2022). Plaintiff
alleges that Defendant was seeking someone who: (1) was a privacy expert; (2) had done the job
before; and (3) was “delightful” for the CPO position. (Am. Compl. § 33.) Plaintiff specifically
alleges that she was qualified for the job because she: (1) had practiced privacy law for more than
fifteen years, had frequently been asked to speak on privacy topics, and had numerous
certifications in privacy; (2) had been the CPO of Organon, the Global Head of Privacy and
Information Security at Esperion Therapeutics, and Senior Compliance Counsel and Privacy
Officer at Otsuka Pharmaceutical; and (3) had received a rating of “[e]xeeds” in the “[b]ehaviors
section of her most recent performance evaluation and was praised by Defendant for her reputation
as an “‘extremely collaborative’” employee in the announcement of her appointment as Group
Leader. Ud. { 34.) These facts, taken as true, sufficiently allege that Plaintiff met the qualification
requirements for the CPO position. See Mundy, 2022 WL 17851629, at *11.
Third, Plaintiff adequately alleges, and it is not disputed, that she was denied the promotion.
(Am. Compl. § 40 (‘On July 21, 2023, . . . Watson informed [Plaintiff] that she was hiring . . .
Taylor for the role.”); see also Def.’s Moving Br. 6 (explaining that Plaintiff’s discrimination

10

claims rest on “Taylor being hired for th[e] position instead of’ Plaintiff).) Fourth, Plaintiff
specifically alleges that “Taylor . . . was the less qualified candidate.” Ud § 43.)4 Plaintiff,
accordingly, has adequately alleged not only that she was denied the promotion, but also that
Taylor—someone not of the protected class, with lesser qualifications—-achieved the position. (/d.
33-35, 40, 43.) Taken together, Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint, at minimum, gives rise to an
inference that Plaintiff was denied the CPO promotion for discriminatory reasons. See LeCadre,
2024 WL 2763829, at *2.
Plaintiff, moreover, need not specifically plead what the successful candidate’s
qualifications were at this stage. Rather, to give rise to an inference of discrimination, Plaintiff
need only plead that the candidate was similarly or less qualified. See Dzibela, 2024 WL 4349813,
at *8 (explaining that a plaintiff must allege that someone “with similar or lesser qualifications
achieved the . . . position”); Smith, 2022 WL 16553381, at *3 (explaining that a plaintiff must
allege that the employer received applications from “similarly qualified individuals”); Allen v. Best
Foods Baking Co., No. 02-3663, 2003 WL 22858351, at *6 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 22, 2003) (noting, ina
Title VI case, that plaintiff's allegations were sufficient where he alleged that positions “were
awarded to less qualified caucasian employees”); Jones v. □□ Okla. Radiation Therapy Assocs.,

4 Defendant focuses the majority of its argument on Plaintiff’s allegation that Taylor was less
qualified. (Def.’s Moving Br. 7-9, 14-20; Def.’s Reply Br. 2-10.) Specifically, Defendant argues
that Plaintiff’s allegation is threadbare and that the Amended Complaint does not adequately allege
discriminatory animus. (Def.’s Moving Br. 7-9, 14-20; Def.’s Reply Br. 2-10.) The Court disagrees.
A plaintiff does not need to make out a prima facie case of discrimination at the pleading stage but
a sufficient factual basis to plausibly give rise to an inference of discrimination. Thompson vy.
Anthem Cos., Inc., No. 18-6676, 2019 WL 2591100, at *4 (D.N.J. June 7, 2019). Moreover, “a
plaintiff can establish the fourth element by demonstrating that a similarly situated individual from
a non-protected class was promoted instead of plaintiff.” Fitzgerald v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp.,
No. 13-6979, 2016 WL 3854055, at *4 (E.D. Pa. July 13, 2016); Pouncey v. Guilford County, No.
18-1022, 2020 WL 1274264, at *9 (M.D.N.C. Mar. 17, 2020).

11

LLC, No. 16-150, 2017 WL 2953676, at *4 (N.D. Okla. July 10, 2017) (noting plaintiff sufficiently
alleged a disparate treatment claim by alleging that she was “replaced by an individual outside of
her protected class who was similarly or less qualified than her, which meets the fourth element of
the prima facie case”). Defendant’s argument that Taylor was, in fact, more qualified than Plaintiff
raises a factual dispute that cannot be resolved on a motion to dismiss.° United States v. Neary,
No. 20-14167, 2021 WL 3732910, at *15 (D.N.J. Aug. 24, 2021) (explaining that disputes of fact
cannot be resolved on a motion to dismiss); Universal Life Church Monastery Storehouse v.

Defendant requests that the Court take judicial notice of Taylor’s qualifications and credentials
and includes a declaration in support of that request. (Def.’s Moving Br. 7-8, 17-20; see generally
Richard G. Rosenblatt Decl. in Support of Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss (“Rosenblatt Decl.”), ECF No.
8-2.) The Court declines to do so because the dispute regarding Taylor’s qualifications is more
appropriate for consideration on a motion for summary judgment. Stallworth v. Milan Laser Corp.
LLC, No. 25-393, 2025 WL 2637234, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Sep. 12, 2025) (“The proper place to resolve
factual disputes . . . is not on a motion to dismiss, but on a motion for summary judgment.” (citation
modified) (internal quotations and citation omitted)). “As a general matter, [moreover,] a district
court ruling on a motion to dismiss may not consider matters extraneous to the pleadings.” Jn re
Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1426 (3d Cir. 1997) (citing Angelastro v.
Prudential-Bache Sec., Inc., 764 F.2d 939, 944 (3d Cir. 1985)).
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McGeever, No. 21-618, 2022 WL 214238, at *3 (W.D. Pa. Jan. 25, 2022) (“The Court cannot...
resolve the factual dispute raised by Defendant’s argument” on a motion to dismiss.).°
The Court, accordingly, denies Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s First, Second,
and Fifth Claims for Relief.’
B. Retaliation Claims (Sixth and Seventh Claims for Relief)
Defendant argues that Plaintiff has failed to plead sufficient facts to support a reasonable
belief on her part that the materials used by Taylor and Farraro were Merck’s trade secrets or
otherwise proprietary. (Def.’s Moving Br. 9-12.)

The cases Defendant cites to support its argument that Plaintiff must allege in detail the hired
candidate’s qualifications, moreover, are distinguishable. See, e.g., Dzibela, 2024 WL 4349813, at
(dismissing plaintiff's claims because plaintiff failed to plead: “any specific promotion he
sought; when he applied for” or “was rejected for that position; whether the . . . position was filled;
and if so, by whom and what that person’s qualifications were”; and “any facts regarding
[pllaintiff’s specific qualifications”); Khalifeh v. Duff & Phelps Corp., No. 16-4572, 2017 WL
1003220, at *4 (D.N.J. Mar. 15, 2017) (finding that plaintiff had not sufficiently pled a failure to
promote claim because the complaint did not allege: “any specific promotion or position that
[p]laintiff sought .. . [;] the requirements of any such position|;]” plaintiff’s “qualifications in
relation to any such position[;] the qualifications of any other employee that received a promotion
instead[;] or any other facts describing the circumstances of such discrimination”); Ayala v. NJ.
Dept of Law & Pub. Safety, Div. of State Police, No. A-6125-09T1, 2011 WL 5041395, at *4 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. Oct. 25, 2011) (affirming the trial court’s grant of a motion to dismiss because
the complaint was “bereft of any specifics with regard to each plaintiff’s application for promotion;
[plaintiff's] qualifications; the dates of the rejection; whether the sought after position was filled
and, if so, by whom; and, if there was a successful candidate, the successful candidate’s
qualifications”). As reflected by the Amended Complaint’s detailed allegations, the Amended
Complaint here has no such flaw.
1 To the extent Plaintiff relies on a disparate treatment claim based on a theory that she was held
to a heightened performance standard, the Court explicitly rejects such a theory because Plaintiff
has not plead any factual allegations to show that she was subjected to such a heightened
performance standard. (See generally Am. Compl.); see, e.g., Bacon v. Merakey Phila., No.
21-4547, 2023 WL 5635594, at *6 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 31, 2023) (explaining that the plaintiff failed to
demonstrate that other employees were treated more favorably that he was). Plaintiff, moreover,
does not meaningfully argue that she stated a claim pursuant to such a theory. (See Pl.’s Opp’n Br.
8 (explaining that Plaintiffs assertions that “she was subjected to differential performance
standards” “are not discrete claims,” but are “evidence of the discriminatory environment at
Defendant”).)
13

i. NJ CEPA — Whistleblower Retaliation (Sixth Claim for Relief)
Under the NJ CEPA, an employer may not take retaliatory action against an employee who
“objects to, or refuses to participate in any activity, policy[,| or practice, which the employee
reasonably believes .. . is incompatible with a clear mandate of public policy concerning |] public
health, safety or welfare[.]” N.J. Stat. Ann. § 34:19-3(c). Carrying out this statutory mandate, the
New Jersey Supreme Court has prescribed that, to state a claim under NJ CEPA, a plaintiff must
adequately allege that:
(1) [s]he reasonably believed that h[er] employer’s conduct was
violating a law or rule or regulation promulgated pursuant to law[;]
(2) [s]he objected to the conduct[;] (3) an adverse employment
action was taken against h[er]; and (4) a causal connection exists
between the whistle-blowing activity and the adverse employment
action.
Sarnowski v. Air Brooke Limousine, Inc., 510 F.3d 398, 404 (Gd Cir. 2007) (citing Dzwonar □□
McDevitt, 828 A.2d 893, 900 (N.J. 2003)).
Here, Plaintiff adequately alleges a NJ CEPA retaliation claim. First, contrary to
Defendant’s arguments, Plaintiff adequately alleges that she reasonably believed that Defendant’s
conduct was violative of the law. (See Am. Compl. {J 43-46 (explaining that Plaintiff believed
Taylor violated the New Jersey Trade Secrets Act (the “NJTSA”) and the Defend Trade Secrets
Act (the “DTSA”) by “improperly using confidential information and documents belonging to
Merck” including “Merck’s Privacy Rulebook, Privacy Functional Deployment Standards, [and]
other associated policies and standards . . . which included. . . proprietary information belonging
to Merck”; and that Taylor told Plaintiff “that he had ‘the whole Privacy Rulebook’ from Merck”
which Plaintiff “did not believe he should have”), 49-50 (explaining that Farraro “has repeatedly
‘converted’ several Merck documents to [Defendant’s] branding[,]” and that he “instructed other
employees to just ‘change’ those Merck references to [Defendant] . . . implicating Defendant] in

14

violating several intellectual property laws” and that Taylor and Farraro’s “conduct runs afoul of
the law”).) These facts sufficiently allege that Plaintiff reasonably believed that Taylor and
Farraro’s conduct violated the NJTSA and the DISA. See Gomez Noriega v. City of Jersey City,
No. 24-10599, 2025 WL 2701755, at *2 (D.N.J. Sep. 23, 2025) (“Pleading a reasonable belief that
an employer’s conduct constituted a violation is sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss.”); Levins
v. Braccia, No. A-4290-7T2, 2009 WL 1658610, at *4 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. June 16, 2009)
(explaining that “the plaintiff need not show that her employer ‘actually violated the law’” because
that is required to satisfy this prong is that the plaintiff show that she ‘reasonably believes’
that her employer’s conduct was violating the law” (internal citations omitted)); Stapleton v. DSW,
Inc., 931 F. Supp. 2d 635, 639 (D.N.J. 2013) (same); Southward v. Elizabeth Bd. of Educ.,
No. 15-3699, 2017 WL 111924, at *5 (D.N.J. Jan. 11, 2017) (“A plaintiff alleging a CEPA violation
need not prove that law or public policy was actually contravened[.]’’).
Second, Plaintiff adequately alleges that she performed “whistle-blowing” activity by filing
a report with HR. (Am. Compl. {{f 52, 55-56); see N.J. Stat. Ann. 34:19-3(a)(1), (c)(1). To satisfy
the second prong, Plaintiff must allege that she engaged in a whistle-blowing activity which is
defined as an objection to, or refusal “to participate in any activity, policy or practice which the
employee reasonably believes .. . is in violation of a law, or a rule or regulation promulgated
pursuant to law....”’N.J. Stat. Ann. § 34:19-3(c). Here, Plaintiff specifically alleges that she “filed
an official report” with HR reporting her concerns that Taylor and Farraro “had brought proprietary
documents from their previous employer, which she . . . believed contained intellectual property
belonging to that company.” (Am. Compl. § 52); see Rickerson v. Pinnacle Foods Inc., No.
17-4469, 2017 WL 6034147, at *3 (D.N.J. Dec. 6, 2017) (finding that plaintiff adequately alleged

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the second prong where his complaint alleged that he “reported what he believed to be unethical
or illegal conduct . . . to [the defendant’s] Chief Ethics Officer’).
Third, Plaintiff adequately alleges that she suffered an adverse employment action—
namely, pretextual performance feedback, reducing her annual bonus by fifty percent, constructive
discharge, and termination of her employment. (Am. Compl. □□ 58, 62, 64, 68, 96); see, e.g.,
Rickerson, 2017 WL 6034147, at *3 (“[T]ermination is an adverse employment action.”).
Fourth, Plaintiff adequately alleges that there was a causal connection between the
whistle-blowing activity and her termination. (Am. Compl. f§ 44-68, 94-96.) In determining
whether a causal connection exists, Plaintiff must allege some facts “such that the court can infer
that if the employer’s actions remain unexplained, it is more likely than not that such actions were
based on impermissible reasons.” Bowles v. City of Camden, 993 F. Supp. 255, 264, 265 (D.N.J.
1998). The evidence of a causal connection may be circumstantial. See Maimone v. City of Ail.
City, 903 A.2d 1055, 1064-65 (2006). Here, Plaintiff alleges that she spoke to someone in HR on
May 14, 2024, then filed a report on May 17, 2024. (Am. Compl. § 52.) Plaintiff further alleges
that on June 26, 2024, she had a performance review with Taylor and Watson where she received
a “pretextual negative performance review,” was informed that her position would be eliminated,
and that “there was no place for [Plaintiff] at the [c]ompany.” Ud. {| 58, 62.) While she was not
officially terminated until December 27, 2024, the temporal proximity between the allegations that
Plaintiff was informed “unequivocally” that her “role would be eliminated” on June 26, 2024, just
over a month after she filed her complaint, is enough to allege a causal connection at the pleading
stage. Ud. Jf] 57, 62, 64); Rickerson, 2017 WL 6034147, at *3 (finding that three months between
plaintiff's complaint and his termination was enough to show a causal connection at the pleading
stage); Hilburn v. Bayonne Parking Auth., No. 07-5211, 2009 WL 235629, at *8 (D.N.J. Jan. 30,

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2009) (“[C]onsidering the temporal proximity between [d]efendants’ alleged retaliatory conduct
and [p]laintiffs’ whistle-blowing activities, it appears that, at least at this stage, [p]laintiffs have
properly established a causal connection[.|’); Leverett v. Williams-Sonoma Direct, Inc., No.
23-2405, 2023 WL 9039568, at *4 (D.N.J. Dec. 30, 2023) (finding that plaintiff sufficiently alleged
a causal connection because of, among other things, the temporal proximity of the whistle-blowing
activity and plaintiff’s termination).
Moreover, because “CEPA is remedial legislation [it] must . . . be construed liberally in
employees’ favor.” Fraternal Order of Police, Lodge 1 v. City of Camden, 842 F.3d 231, 240 (3d
Cir. 2016). Plaintiff, accordingly, sufficiently alleges that Defendant retaliated against her in
violation of NJ CEPA. Chun v. Sushi Maru Express Corp., No. 17-6411, 2018 WL 3158815, at
*4-5 (D.N.J. June 28, 2018) (finding plaintiff sufficiently alleged a CEPA claim for retaliation
when the complaint stated in part that plaintiff reasonably believed that defendants violated
regulations and laws, plaintiff voiced her concerns to defendants, and defendants terminated
plaintiff because of plaintiffs whistle-blowing activity); Brown v. City of Long Branch, 380 F.
App’x 235, 239 (3d Cir. 2010) (finding plaintiff sufficiently alleged a CEPA claim for retaliation
when the complaint stated in part that plaintiff believed defendant violated his right to medical
privacy, plaintiff complained to a supervisor, and defendant terminated plaintiff only once he began
to complain). The Court therefore denies Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Sixth Claim
for Relief.
2. Pierce Doctrine — Whistleblower Retaliation (Seventh Claim for Relief)
The New Jersey Supreme Court has held that an employee has a common law claim for
wrongful discharge, “when the discharge is contrary to a clear mandate of public policy.” Pierce
v. Ortho Pharma. Corp., 417 A.2d 505, 512 (N.J. 1980). New Jersey has since recognized “Pierce

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claims” for discrimination, whistleblowing, and retaliation. See Shakib v. Back Bay Rest. Grp.,
Inc., No. 10-4564, 2011 WL 4594654, at *8 (D.N.J. Sep. 30, 2011). “The sources of public policy
include legislation; administrative rules, regulations or decisions; and judicial decisions.” Id.
(citation omitted). Critically though, “more is needed than simply the breach of public policy
affecting a single person’s rights to constitute the breach of a ‘clear mandate’ of public policy that
Pierce requires.” Hennessey v. Coastal Eagle Point Oil Co., 609 A.2d 11, 19-20 (N.J. 1992). A
plaintiff must “prove not only that he or she complained about [an employer’s] policy, but that his
or her resulting discharge violated a clear mandate of public policy.” Tartaglia v. UBS Paine Webber
Inc., 961 A.2d 1167, 1184 (N.J. 2008). As such, “[i]f an employee does not point to a clear
expression of public policy, the court can grant a motion to dismiss[.]” Pierce, 417 A.2d at 513.
Here, Plaintiff fails to sufficiently allege that any public policy was affected. (See generally
Am. Compl.) While Plaintiff has alleged that Defendant’s conduct may have violated certain
intellectual property rights of Merck, that is insufficient because Defendant’s potential
misappropriation of Merck’s trade secrets is not a “violation of a clear mandate of public policy,”
and Plaintiff fails to plead any factual allegations to support her conclusory statement that such
actions “were clearly contrary to a mandate of public policy[.]” (See Am. Compl. § 102); Pierce,
417 A.2d at 512; Tucker v. United Parcel Serv, No. 12-1024, 2013 WL 5406651, at *4 (D.N.J.
Sep. 25, 2013) (granting defendants’ motion to dismiss where, among other things, plaintiff failed
to “provide any facts to explain precisely how [d]efendants violated public policy” and noting that
“li]fan employee does not point to a clear expression of public policy the court can grant a motion
to dismiss” (second quote quoting Bell v. K.A. Indus. Servs., LLC., 567 F. Supp. 2d. 701, 709 n.12
(D.N.J. 2008)); Lee v. ElectrifAi, LLC, No. 23-2239, 2024 WL 4182541, at *7 (D.N.J. Sep. 13,

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2024) (“As [p]laintiff fails to allege any public policy that [d]efendants purportedly violated, the
Court will dismiss her Pierce claim.”),
Because Plaintiff has failed to allege any public policy that Defendant violated, the Court
grants Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss as to Plaintiff’s Seventh Claim for Relief.
C. Defendant’s Motion for Sanctions
Rule 11 imposes an affirmative duty on parties to conduct a reasonable inquiry into the
factual and legal basis of claims before filing them with the court. See Bus. Guides, Inc. v.
Chromatic Comme’ns Enters., Inc., 498 U.S. 533, 551 (1991). It provides, in relevant part, as
follows:
(b) Representations to the Court. By presenting to the court a
pleading, written motion, or other paper—whether by signing,
filing, submitting, or later advocating it—an attorney or
unrepresented party certifies that to the best of the person’s
knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an inquiry
reasonable under the circumstances:
(1) it is not being presented for any improper purpose, such
as to harass, cause unnecessary delay, or needlessly increase
the cost of litigation;
(2) the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions are
warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for
extending, modifying, or reversing existing law or for
establishing new law;
(3) the factual contentions have evidentiary support or, if
specifically so identified, will likely have evidentiary
support after a reasonable opportunity for further
investigation or discovery; and
(4) the denials of factual contentions are warranted on the
evidence or, if specifically so identified, are reasonably
based on belief or a lack of information.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b).

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Although Rule 11 is intended to discourage the filing of frivolous, unsupported, or
unreasonable claims, “sanctions are warranted only in the exceptional circumstances where a claim
or motion is patently unmeritorious or frivolous.” Paris v. Pennsauken Sch. Dist., No. 12-7355,
2013 WL 4047638, at *6 (D.N.J. Aug. 9, 2013) (quoting Goldenberg v. Indel, Inc., No. 09-5202,
2011 WL 1134454, at *2 (D.N.J. Mar. 25, 2011)). Indeed, the Third Circuit has recognized that
sanctions should be imposed only in those rare instances where the evident frivolousness of a claim
or motion amounts to an “abuse[] of the legal system.” Doering v. Union Cnty. Bd. of Chosen
Freeholders, 857 F.2d 191, 194 (3d Cir. 1988).
Based on what is before the Court, including the fact that the Court denied the majority of
Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, the Court does not find that the claims brought by Plaintiff are so
frivolous as to merit sanctions as an abuse of the legal system. See Hisey v. QualTek USA, LLC,
No. 18-5129, 2019 WL 3936555, at *18 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 20, 2019) (declining to impose sanctions
because plaintiff’s claims were “not frivolous”). This case, accordingly, does not rise to the
exceptional level where sanctions are warranted, and the Court therefore denies Defendant’s
Motion for Sanctions.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth herein, Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss is granted in part and
denied in part. Defendant’s Motion for Sanctions is denied. The Court will issue an Order
consistent with this Memorandum Opinion.

8/ Michael A. Shipp
MICHAEL A. SHIPP
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
DATED: JANUARY 15, 2026

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11245927. Public record. Not legal advice.