# Suggs

> District Court, N.D. Illinois · January 22, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11245905

## Case

- **Full name:** Michael S. Suggs v. City of Chicago Officer Dicera, Badge No. 14902 and Officer Koeppen, Badge No. 18927
- **Court:** District Court, N.D. Illinois
- **Decided:** January 22, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11245905

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding that an officer did not use excessive force when he pushed an arrestee into a police car despite the fact that the push caused the arrestee to bump his head

## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

MICHAEL S. SUGGS, )
)
Plaintiff, ) No. 23-cv-2327
)
v. ) Judge Jeffrey I. Cummings
)
CITY OF CHICAGO OFFICER DICERA, )
BADGE NO. 14902 and OFFICER KOEPPEN, )
BADGE NO. 18927, )
)
Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff Michael Suggs brings this action under 42 U.S.C. §1983 against Chicago Police
Officers Dante Koeppen and Angelo Dicera, (“defendants” or the “Officers”), alleging a
violation of his right to be free from excessive force during a November 18, 2021 arrest that
followed his flight from the scene of a traffic stop. Both Suggs and the Officers simultaneously
moved for summary judgment on January 27, 2025. (Dckt. ##70, 73). Suggs argues that he is
entitled to summary judgment because Koeppen used unreasonable force by slamming his head
on the ground while arresting him. Defendants deny the use of such force but argue that, even if
it occurred, the alleged use of force objectively reasonable Suggs was actively resisting arrest.
Defendants additionally argue that they are entitled to qualified immunity. For the following
reasons, the Court grants defendants’ motion for summary judgment, (Dckt. #70), and denies
Suggs’s motion for summary judgment, (Dckt. #73).
I. LEGAL STANDARD
Summary judgment is appropriate when the moving party shows “that there is no genuine
issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of
law.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247 (1986). “A genuine dispute is present
if a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party, and a fact is material if it
might bear on the outcome of the case.” Wayland v. OSF Healthcare Sys., 94 F.4th 654, 657
(7th Cir. 2024); FKFJ, Inc. v. Vill. of Worth, 11 F.4th 574, 584 (7th Cir. 2021) (the existence of a
factual dispute between the parties will not preclude summary judgment unless it is a genuine

dispute as to a material fact); Hottenroth v. Vill. of Slinger, 388 F.3d 1015, 1027 (7th Cir. 2004)
(issues of material fact are material if they are outcome-determinative).
When the moving party has met that burden, the non-moving party cannot rely on mere
conclusions and allegations to concoct factual issues. Balderston v. Fairbanks Morse Engine
Div. of Coltec Indus., 328 F.3d 309, 320 (7th Cir. 2003). Instead, it must “marshal and present
the court with the evidence [it] contends will prove [its] case.” Goodman v. Nat. Sec. Agency,
Inc., 621 F.3d 651, 654 (7th Cir. 2010). In determining whether a genuine issue of material fact
exists, all facts and reasonable inferences must be drawn in the light most favorable to the non-
moving party. King v. Hendricks Cty. Comm’rs, 954 F.3d 981, 984 (7th Cir. 2020). Ultimately,

summary judgment is granted only if “no reasonable trier of fact could find in favor of the non-
moving party.” Hoppe v. Lewis Univ., 692 F.3d 833, 838 (7th Cir. 2012) (cleaned up). Where
(as here), cross-motions for summary judgment have been filed, courts “construe all facts and
inferences therefrom in favor of the party against whom the motion under consideration is
made.” Calumet River Fleeting, Inc. v. Int’l Union of Operating Eng’rs, Local 150, AFL-CIO,
824 F.3d 645, 647 (7th Cir. 2016) (cleaned up).
II. FACTUAL RECORD

The following facts are undisputed unless otherwise noted.
In the early morning of November 18, 2021, Suggs was driving in the vicinity of 63rd
Street and Calumet Avenue when defendants activated their police car’s emergency lights to pull
Suggs’s car over for a traffic stop. (Plaintiff’s Response to Defendants’ Statement of Facts
(“DSOF Resp.”), Dckt. #85, ¶¶4, 7; Defendant’s Response to Plaintiff’s Statement of Facts
(“PSOF Resp.”), Dckt. #81, ¶¶1–2)). Defendants suspected Suggs of a municipal violation:

namely, driving with an obstructed view due to an air freshener tree hanging from his rearview
mirror. (DSOF Resp. ¶¶4–5; PSOF Resp. ¶2). Suggs exited his vehicle wearing a ski mask that
covered his head and face, but which had a cut-out for his eyes and showed a sliver of his
forehead, and fled from defendants on foot. (DSOF Resp. ¶¶7, 46; PSOF Resp. ¶3; Dckt. #80
Exs. 4 & 5). Defendants pursued Suggs, believing him to be concealing a firearm. (DSOF Resp.
¶¶9–10). One of the defendants yelled “stop” and “police” but Suggs kept running. (Id. ¶11).
While he was fleeing, Suggs tripped and dropped a handgun and an extended magazine. (Id.
¶12; PSOF Resp. ¶¶5–7). Koeppen recovered the handgun while chasing Suggs and yelled, “I
got it.” (DSOF Resp. ¶14; PSOF Resp. ¶9).

Suggs reached a fence and attempted to climb it to avoid arrest. (DSOF Resp. ¶16; PSOF
Resp. ¶10). Defendants caught up to Suggs and Dicera “grabbed Plaintiff around his mid-section
and pulled Plaintiff off the fence.” (DSOF Resp. ¶18). Dicera called out “[h]elp, help,” while
Koeppen unloaded the handgun Suggs dropped during the chase. (Id. ¶19). With Koeppen’s
help, Dicera maneuvered Suggs toward the ground. (DSOF Resp. ¶22; PSOF Resp. ¶11).
Koeppen made the verbal command, “[s]top, just stop. Get on the fuckin’ ground.” (DSOF
Resp. ¶21). As Dicera maneuvered Suggs to the ground, Suggs repeatedly stated: “I’m down,
I’m down, I’m down,” and that he was not resisting. (Id. ¶22; PSOF Resp. ¶12). Koeppen
reiterated his command to “[g]et on the ground, all the way, all the way.” (DSOF Resp. ¶23).
Defendants got Suggs on the ground on his stomach with Dicera straddling Suggs’s hip
area and Dicera’s knees touching the ground on either side of Suggs’s body, while Koeppen held
Suggs’s left arm. (PSOF Resp. ¶¶13–15). Koeppen again told Suggs “[a]ll the way. Stop.”
(DSOF Resp. ¶25). The body worn camera (“BWC”) footage shows that Suggs stayed face-
down on the ground on his stomach for approximately two seconds. (Dckt. #80, Ex. 4). Dicera

removed his hands from Suggs’s body at this point. (Id.). Suggs then “raised his head and upper
torso” off the ground,1 causing Koeppen to think that Suggs was going to flee again.2 (Id.;
DSOF Resp. ¶¶26–27). Suggs does not offer any testimony or other evidence to support why he
raised his head and torso off the ground. In response to Suggs lifting his head and torso,
Koeppen shouted, “[g]et on the fuckin ground, motherfucker!” (DSOF Resp. ¶28). Suggs
admits that he was still resisting arrest at this time. (Id. ¶36).
What happened next is in dispute. According to Suggs, Koeppen next “slammed
Plaintiff’s head to the ground.” (PSOF Resp. ¶21). Suggs does not offer his own testimony to
support this factual assertion.3 Instead, Suggs relies on the video footage from Koeppen’s BWC

and an edited video (the “Video”) that his counsel created by combining color-adjusted, slowed

1 Although Suggs contends that he only “lifted his head,” the BWC footage unequivocally shows that he
raised both his head and torso off the ground, and the footage therefore trumps Suggs’s contention to the
contrary. (PSOF Resp. ¶18; Dckt. #80, Exs. 4 & 5); Gant v. Hartman, 924 F.3d 445, 450 (7th Cir. 2019).
2 Suggs disputes this fact and cites to the BWC footage and Koeppen’s deposition testimony in which
Koeppen states that he had control over Suggs’s left arm, (DSOF Resp. ¶27 (citing Dckt. #71-2 at 20–22,
37), but neither contradicts defendants’ cited evidence which supports this material fact, (DSOF Resp.
¶27 (citing Dckt. #71-2 at 22 (Koeppen testifying that Suggs “attempted to raise his upper body to defeat
arrest,” and Koeppen “believed he was going to flee again.”))); see United States v. Bogan, 267 F.3d 614,
619 (7th Cir. 2001) (affirming the admission of lay opinion testimony under Rule 701 that was rationally
based on the witness’s observation of an incident).
3 During his deposition, Suggs testified that one of the defendants struck him on the head with a blunt
object and he neither knew which Officer struck him nor saw the blunt object used to strike him because
both Officers were “wrestling with him from behind.” (DSOF Resp. ¶¶35, 38–40). Suggs has since
abandoned any reliance on this testimony. (Dckt. #84 at 5).
down portions of the video from the BWCs of both Koeppen and Dicera. (Id.; Dckt. #75-2).4 In
their response, the Officers—who do not dispute that Koeppen forced Suggs back down to the
ground—assert that Koeppen’s BWC footage does not show that Koeppen slammed Suggs’s
head into the ground. (Dckt. #82 at 8). Suggs does not challenge the Officers’ assertion in his
reply, and the Court’s review of Koeppen’s BWC footage confirms that the Officers are correct.

The Officers further assert that the Video is inadmissible pursuant to Federal Rule of
Evidence 1002 (which provides that “[a]n original writing, recording, or photograph is required
in order to prove its content unless these rules or a federal statute provides otherwise”) and
cannot be considered on summary judgment. See Khungar v. Access Cmty. Health Network, 985
F.3d 565, 576 (7th Cir. 2021) (to defeat summary judgment a party may only rely on admissible
evidence). Suggs responds by asserting that Rule 1002 is inapplicable because the Video is not
offered to prove the “content” of the BWC footage and that the Video is instead admissible
pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 1003, which provides that “[a] duplicate is admissible to
the same extent as the original unless a genuine question is raised about the original’s

authenticity or the circumstances make it unfair to admit the duplicate.” (Dckt. #92 at 2–4
(citing cases)).
Suggs’s argument is unpersuasive. To begin, Rule 1003 is facially inapplicable because
Suggs does not claim that the Video is a “duplicate” of the “original” footage of either BWC.
See Payne v. Myers, No. 14-CV-39-GKF-TLW, 2016 WL 3884169, at *6 (N.D.Okla. Jan. 21,
2016), quoting Fed.R.Evid. 1001(4) (“‘A “duplicate” means a counterpart produced by a

4 In particular, plaintiff’s counsel created the Video “by performing the following actions: using Adobe
Premiere Pro 2025 to slow down the footage, insert frame holds, adjust the color of portions of Exhibits 4
[Koeppen’s BWC footage] and 5 [Dicera’s BWC footage], merge them together; and then using Vimeo to
add text and arrows to the merged video.” (Dckt. #75-2).
mechanical, photographic, chemical, electronic, or other equivalent process or technique that
accurately reproduces the original.’”); 6 WEINSTEIN’S FEDERAL EVIDENCE §1001.09[1], at
1001–31 (2d ed. 2019) (“The basic test for defining and establishing limits upon a ‘duplicate’ is
whether the process used is designed to insure an accurate reproduction of the original.”).
Instead, plaintiff’s counsel explains that the Video is an amalgamation of unspecified portions of

the footage from both BWCs. (Dckt. #75-2; Dckt. #92 at 3 (“Plaintiff’s attorney enhanced
Defendants Koeppen and Dicera’s respective BWC footage and combined parts to improve the
clarity of the incident.”). Notably, counsel does not attest that the Video accurately reflects the
original BWC footage. Cf. Snyder v. Tiller, No. 8 CV 470, 2010 WL 3522580, at *7 (N.D.Ind.
Aug. 30, 2010) (“[T]he enhanced portion of the video must still be authenticated by the
individual who made the enhancements. . . . That process commonly includes a description of the
changes made and an attestation that the enhanced version accurately represents the original.”)
(cleaned up).
None of the cases cited by Suggs supports the admissibility of a post-incident video

that—like the Video here—is not an accurate duplicate of the original footage of the incident.
Cf. United States v. Seifert, 445 F.3d 1043, 1045 (8th Cir. 2006) (rejecting defendant’s assertion
that “the district court erred in admitting the enhanced video because no one could know for
certain whether it accurately reflects the original”); United States v. Beeler, 62 F.Supp.2d 136,
149 (D.Me. 1999) (denying defendant’s motion to exclude evidence where the court was
satisfied “that the edited and enhanced versions of the . . . surveillance videotape are accurate,
authentic, and trustworthy representations of the original tape”). As such, the Video is not
admissible under Rule 1003.
Furthermore, even if the Video were admissible, Suggs’s claim that it shows Koeppen
placing his hand on Suggs’s head and moving it toward the ground is not substantiated by the
Court’s review of the Video.5 Indeed, despite viewing the Video multiple times, the Court
cannot discern what Suggs claims that the Video depicts. . As such, the Video does not have
sufficient clarity to place Suggs’s “‘version of events beyond the level of mere speculation or

conjecture’” as is required to create an issue of fact sufficient to deny the Officers’ motion for
summary judgment, let alone to support the entry of summary judgment in his favor. See Pam v.
City of Evansville, 154 F.4th 523, 528 (7th Cir. 2025), quoting Osborn v. JAB Mgmt. Servs., Inc.,
126 F.4th 1250, 1258 (7th Cir. 2025). In sum: Suggs has offered no admissible evidence to
support his assertion that Koeppen slammed his head into the ground.
After Koeppen forced Suggs back to the ground, Suggs alleges that he was knocked
unconscious and the Officers were able to handcuff him. (PSOF Resp. ¶22; DSOF Resp. ¶29).
The undisputed evidence shows that Suggs had no blood on his forehead before he raised his
torso and head up off the ground and that he had blood on his forehead after he was forced back

to the ground and handcuffed by the Officers. (PSOF Resp. ¶24; Dckt. #74 at 7–8). This
evidence supports a reasonable inference that Koeppen’s use of force to take Suggs back down to
the ground caused Suggs to sustain an injury to his head and momentarily knocked him
unconscious. The Officers, who admit that blood was running down Suggs’s forehead after he
was handcuffed, took Suggs to the University of Chicago Hospital where he was treated for a
laceration to his scalp and received three staples to repair his head wound. (PSOF Resp. ¶¶19,

5 Notably, Suggs admits that the Video does not show the moment that Koeppen forced him back to the
ground. (Dckt. #74 at 7 (the Video “shows Defendant Koeppen’s hand on Plaintiff’s head while
screaming, ‘Get on the ground motherfucker!’ as the camera’s view moves toward the ground and then
turns dark.”). Nor does the Officers’ BWC footage depict this moment. (Dckt. #80, Exs. 4 & 5).
25). Suggs was charged with, and pleaded guilty to, a charge of unlawful possession of a firearm
in connection with this incident. (DSOF Resp. ¶48).
III. ANALYSIS

Suggs brings a Section 1983 claim against Officers Koeppen and Dicera alleging two
theories of excessive force, only one of which remains at issue.6 Suggs’s remaining theory of
liability concerns Koeppen’s alleged use of excessive force when he forced Suggs’s head and
torso back to the ground after the Officers initially took him down and caused Suggs to sustain a
laceration to his forehead. Suggs further asserts that Koeppen had full control over him prior to
his use of force, and that Suggs was merely passively resisting by lifting his head and torso off
the ground. Koeppen, for his part, argues that he did not slam Suggs’s head on the ground, but
even presuming arguendo that he did, such force would be objectively reasonable because Suggs
was actively resisting arrest. Finally, Koeppen argues that he is entitled to qualified immunity.
A. Qualified Immunity Standard For Excessive Force Claims.

The doctrine of qualified immunity protects government officials from liability for civil
damages in situations in which their conduct does not violate a clearly established statutory or
constitutional right. Gupta v. Melloh, 19 F.4th 990, 1000 (7th Cir. 2021) (citing Pearson v.
Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009)); see also Plumhoff v. Rickard, 572 U.S. 765, 778 (2014).
“Once the defense is raised, it becomes the plaintiff’s burden to defeat it.” Smith v. Finkley, 10
F.4th 725, 737 (7th Cir. 2021) (cleaned up). “There are two inquiries in determining whether
qualified immunity applies: [1] whether the facts, taken in the light most favorable to the party
asserting the injury show that the officer’s conduct violated a constitutional right; and [2]

6 Suggs concedes that summary judgment in the Officers’ favor is warranted on his excessive force claim
related to the Officers’ alleged kicking or pressing against his lower extremities. (Dckt. #84 at 1 (“The
Court should grant summary judgment on the lower extremity injury claim.”)). Accordingly, the Court
grants defendants’ motion for summary judgment, (Dckt. #70), related to that theory of liability.
whether the right at issue was ‘clearly established’ at the time of the officer’s alleged
misconduct.” Tousis v. Billiot, 84 F.4th 692, 697 (7th Cir. 2023) (cleaned up). “Courts may
exercise their discretion when choosing which element to address first.” Sabo v. Erickson, 128
F.4th 836, 843 (7th Cir. 2025) (en banc).
Here, the Court begins with an analysis of whether Suggs has shown that the right he

claims was violated was “clearly established.” “We look to Supreme Court caselaw, our own
precedent, and surrounding circuits when discerning whether a right was clearly established.”
Pam, 154 F.4th at 530. “Unless no reasonable officer could have thought they were acting
lawfully, we must extend immunity.” Id.
A plaintiff can show that a right is “clearly established” by statute or the Constitution in
at least two ways: “(1) identify[ing] a closely analogous case that established a right to be free
from the type of force the police officers used on him, or (2) show[ing] that the force was so
plainly excessive that, as an objective matter, the police officers would have been on notice that
they were violating the Fourth Amendment.” Cibulka v. City of Madison, 992 F.3d 633, 639 (7th

Cir. 2021) (cleaned up); Steidl v. Fermon, 494 F.3d 623, 632 (7th Cir. 2007).
Suggs’s burden on this point is rigorous. As the Seventh Circuit has explained:
[A] right is clearly established for qualified immunity purposes if its contours were
sufficiently definite that any reasonable official in the defendant’s shoes would have
understood that he was violating it. In other words, existing precedent must have
placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate. And in order to
answer the question beyond debate, the Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized
that the clearly established law must share specific details with the facts of the case
at hand. Though to defeat a defendant’s assertion of qualified immunity plaintiffs
need not produce a case directly on point, defining the applicable law at a high level
of generality simply will not do. Only in the rare obvious case will the unlawfulness
of the officer’s conduct be sufficiently clear without existing precedent . . .
addressing similar circumstances. This sounds like a high bar because it is—
qualified immunity protects all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly
violate the law.
Doxtator v. O’Brien, 39 F.4th 852, 863 (7th Cir. 2022) (cleaned up). Moreover, courts “have been
‘repeatedly’ told not to ‘define clearly established law at a high level of generality’ and instead
look to ‘whether the violative nature of particular conduct is clearly established.’” Pam, 154 F.4th
at 530 (holding that specificity is “especially important in the Fourth Amendment context” because
“excessive force cases are highly fact dependent, so we must find existing precedent that ‘squarely

governs the specific facts at issue’”) (cleaned up).
The reasonableness of a use of force is a question of law for the Court to decide. See,
e.g., Bell v. Irwin, 321 F.3d 637, 640 (7th Cir. 2003). Reasonableness is determined by an
objective standard that is based on the facts and circumstances presented to the officer at the time
of the conduct at issue, rather than the officer’s subjective intent. Doxtator, 39 F.4th at 860. The
analysis of the officers’ actions must be “from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the
scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.” Weinmann v. McClone, 787 F.3d 444,
448–49 (7th Cir. 2015) (cleaned up). Moreover, “police are entitled to err on the side of caution
when faced with an uncertain or threatening situation.” Johnson v. Scott, 576 F.3d 658, 659 (7th

Cir. 2009).
To determine where a use of force was objectively reasonable, the Court considers the
following factors: : (1) the severity of the crime at issue; (2) whether the suspect poses an
immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others; (3) whether he is actively resisting arrest
or attempting to evade arrest by flight; (4) the information known to the officers at the time of
the encounter; (5) the duration of the encounter; (6) whether the individual was armed; and (7)
whether there was the need for the officers to make split-second decisions under intense,
dangerous, uncertain, and rapidly changing circumstances. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386,
396 (1989); Manery v. Lee, 124 F.4th 1073, 1079 (7th Cir. 2025); Brumitt v. Smith, 102 F.4th
444, 447 (7th Cir. 2024); Smith, 10 F.4th at 736.
B. Koeppen Had A Reasonable Belief That Suggs Was Actively Resisting Arrest By
Attempting To Flee When He Used Force To Take Suggs Back To The Ground.

The parties dispute how Suggs’s actions should be characterized at the moment he raised
his head and torso off the ground and Koeppen used force to bring him back down. Although
Suggs admits that he was resisting arrest at the time, (DSOF Resp. ¶36), he asserts that he only
“passively” resisted and that “it was clearly established that using significant force on passively
resisting persons constitutes unreasonable force.” (Dckt. #92 at 5–6; Dckt. #84 at 8–9).
Koeppen, on the other hand, asserts that his use of force was justified because Suggs was
actively resisting arrest by attempting to flee when he raised up off the ground.7
The Court need not determine what Suggs was subjectively intending to do when he
raised up off the ground. See Dockery v. Blackburn, 911 F.3d 458, 463 (7th Cir. 2018)
(“Whether [plaintiff] actually intended to resist does not matter.”). Instead, “[w]hat matters is
how a reasonable officer would construe the circumstances.” Id. Thus, given that qualified
immunity extends to “reasonable misperceptions of fact,” Koeppen is entitled to qualified
immunity even if he misjudged Suggs’s subjective intentions so long as the record shows that he
“could have mistakenly, but reasonably, believed certain facts exist[ed] to justify [the] level of
force” he used against Suggs. Pam, 154 F.4th at 531; Sabbe v. Wash. Cnty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 84

7 See, e.g., Turner v. City of Champaign, 979 F.3d 563, 569 (7th Cir. 2020) (holding that plaintiff’s active
resistance continued when he tried “to pry himself away from the officers” after they took him to the
ground); Snukis v. Taylor, 145 F.4th 734, 740 (7th Cir. 2025) (“Active resistance” includes “kicking and
flailing, declining to follow instructions while acting in a belligerent manner, and swatting an arresting
officer's hands away while backpedaling.”) (cleaned up); Anderson v. Estrada, 140 F.4th 634, 646 (5th
Cir. 2025) (“‘Pull[ing], twist[ing], turn[ing], or walk[ing]’ toward or away from an officer amount to
active resistance when those actions frustrate the officer's objective or disobey an officer’s order.”)
(cleaned up).
F.4th 807, 828 (9th Cir. 2023) (“Where an officer’s particular use of force is based on a mistake
of fact, we ask whether a reasonable officer would have or should have accurately perceived that
fact.”) (cleaned up); A.K.H. by and through Landeros v. City of Tustin, 837 F.3d 1005, 1011 (9th
Cir. 2016) (“An act taken based on a mistaken perception or belief, if objectively reasonable,
does not violate the Fourth Amendment.”); Gooden v. Howard County, 954 F.2d 960, 965–66

(4th Cir. 1992) (noting that the question is whether officers held a mistaken but reasonable
misperception of the situation).
The pertinent facts, “viewed from the vantage point” of the defendant officers on the
scene, Pam, 154 F.4th at 533, are as follows. The Officers pulled Suggs over for a traffic stop
and Suggs attempted to flee from defendants by exiting his car and taking off on foot, which
Suggs admits amounts to active resistance. Defendants pursued him and during the chase, Suggs
dropped an extended magazine and a handgun before reaching a chain-link fence. Suggs was
trying to climb over the fence when Dicera caught up and pulled Suggs off the fence by his
midsection. Defendants struggled with Suggs as they tried to maneuver him to the ground and

they shouted an order for him to get “all the way” down. Suggs eventually laid down on the
ground for barely a second before he lifted his head and torso up off the ground. Prior to Suggs
lifting his body, Koeppen had eased his hold on Suggs and his arms were no longer holding
Suggs down. When Suggs suddenly tried to lift his body, Koeppen believed that Suggs was
attempting to flee again. Koeppen then used force to take Suggs back down to the ground. At
that point, neither Officer knew whether Suggs was armed because they had not yet had the
opportunity to frisk Suggs.
Only a few seconds had elapsed between when Suggs’s prior attempt to flee ended as he
laid down flat on the ground and when he raised himself up. The Seventh Circuit has recognized
that officers are not required to recalibrate their use of force “at the precise second” a threat
changes, Snukis, 145 F.4th at 741, and they need not “repeatedly reevaluate their use of force
throughout an encounter lasting a few seconds to avoid applying extra units of force immediately
after a suspect submits.” Brumitt, 102 F.4th at 448–49 (“There were fewer than four seconds
between the moment Brumitt went limp and the moment Smith stopped using force. No case

clearly establishes that a reasonable officer must reassess his force that quickly.”); Finkley, 10
F.4th at 739 (“short-duration, high-stress episode[s] necessitate[] quick decisions in dangerous
and uncertain circumstances.”); Abbott v. Sangamon Cnty., Ill., 705 F.3d 706, 733 (7th Cir.
2013) (“To be sure, an officer will not be held liable if the circumstances under which the force
was used evolved so rapidly that a reasonable officer would not have had time to recalibrate the
reasonable quantum of force.”).
Finally, although Suggs maintains that he had already surrendered when Koeppen used
force to take him back to the ground, a reasonable officer was not required to perceive his act of
raising up off the ground in defiance of the officer’s command to remain on the ground as an act

of surrender. As the Seventh Circuit has held, “[n]o law that we know of require[s] [an officer]
to take [the arrestee’s] apparent surrender at face value” only a “split-second after” they stop
evading capture. Johnson, 576 F.3d at 660; Alicea v. Thomas, 815 F.3d 283, 288 (7th Cir. 2016)
(same); Shirley v. Rabensteine, No. 22-2147, 2023 WL 129432, at *2 (7th Cir. Jan. 9, 2023)
(“Likewise, the officers here had ample reason to doubt that [plaintiff]—who had actively
resisted arrest for hours by car, by foot, and by hiding, who was suddenly dropping onto them
from the ceiling, and who might be armed—was sincere.”); Martin v. Rivera, No. 1:13-cv-
00048, 2014 WL 3740051, at *6 (N.D.Ind. July 29, 2014) (“[E]ven if Martin did raise his hands
or somehow indicate his intent to surrender in the three seconds between when he was knocked
into the car and when Rivera struck him, Rivera would not have been required to take Martin’s
surrender at face value.”).
For all these reasons, the record supports the proposition that Koeppen (who believed
Suggs was attempting to flee again) could have reasonably—even if mistakenly—feared that
Suggs “would continue his active flight and resistance, potentially with a gun” once he raised his

body up off the ground. Shirley, 2023 WL 129432, at *2; Pam, 154 F.4th at 532 (granting
summary judgment after finding that “[r]egardless of whether Pam actually held his firearm prior
to the shooting, a reasonable officer could have thought it so”); Turner, 979 F.3d at 569 (finding
that plaintiff engaged in active resistance when he tried “to pry himself away from the officers”
after they took him to the ground).
C. Koeppen Was Entitled To Use Force To Take Suggs Back Down To The
Ground.

“The right to make an arrest necessarily carries with it the right to some degree of
physical coercion to effect it.” Sow v. Fortville Police Dep’t, 636 F.3d 293, 304 (7th Cir. 2011)
(citing Graham, 490 U.S. at 396)); Catlin v. City of Wheaton, 574 F.3d 361, 366 (7th Cir. 2009)
(same). Indeed, police officers “may use significant force to subdue someone who is actively
resisting lawful detention.” Turner, 979 F.3d at 569; Fitzgerald v. Santoro, 707 F.3d 725, 734
(7th Cir. 2013) (“We have repeatedly upheld officers’ use of force in the face of suspects
resisting arrest.”) (citing cases); see also Smith v. City of Chicago, 242 F.3d 737, 744 (7th Cir.
2001) (“A reasonable officer would have thought that [plaintiff] was trying to flee, thereby
justifying the use of a higher degree of force to protect the community and the officers than that
needed for someone who committed only a minor traffic violation.”).
Furthermore, the Seventh Circuit has recognized that “that there is no clearly established
rule forbidding a clean takedown to end mild resistance[.]” Johnson v. Rogers, 944 F.3d 966, 969
(7th Cir. 2019) (citing multiple cases);8 Buehler v. Dear, 27 F.4th 969, 988 (5th Cir. 2022) (“[A]
survey of our sister circuits’ precedent on this issue turns up ‘[m]any decisions [that] hold that
there is no clearly established rule forbidding a clean takedown [of a suspect] to end mild
resistance.’”); Robles v. Ciarletta, 797 Fed.Appx. 821, 827–28 (5th Cir. 2019) (holding that,
although assault suspect “only passively resisted” arrest, arresting officer did not violate clearly

established law by putting suspect’s “arm[] behind [his] back, press[ing] him against a fence,”
and bring him “to the ground where [the officer] put [him] in handcuffs”); Clemence v. Cnty. of
Oneida, No. 20-CV-947-JDP, 2022 WL 2713374, at *3 (W.D.Wis. July 13, 2022) (“It can be
reasonable for officers to use a takedown maneuver in the face of even mild resistance . . ., so it
was reasonable for the deputies to bring [plaintiff] to the ground to subdue him.”) (cleaned up);
Moss v. Schimp, No. 3:20-CV-107-MAB, 2022 WL 1443422, at *8 (S.D.Ill. May 6, 2022) (“[A]
clean takedown is not excessive when it is used to control an individual who poses a threat or
fails to comply with an officer’s demands.”).
Thus, even if Suggs’s act of raising his torso and body up from the ground were properly

characterized as “mild resistance” despite Suggs’s defiance of the Officers’ orders to remain on
the ground and the other relevant circumstances detailed above, Koeppen’s split-second decision
to use force to take him back down to the ground was not objectively unreasonable. This is so
even though Suggs sustained a cut to his head and may have been momentarily knocked
unconscious when he was returned to the ground. As the Seventh Circuit has held, courts should
focus on “whether the force used was reasonable, not whether things turned out badly.” Rogers,
944 F.3d at 969. Indeed, “[a]ny takedown can go awry—some suspects fall clumsily, while

8 In Johnson, the Seventh Circuit held that an officer who had taken down a handcuffed suspect who
continued standing up despite orders to stay on the ground was entitled to qualified immunity
notwithstanding the fact that the suspect suffered a compound fracture of one of his legs because of the
takedown. Johnson, 944 F.3d at 967–69.
others have fragile bones—but, if the officers use steps reasonably likely to effect a clean
takedown, an injury does not lead to liability.” Id. & at 970 (“That such [a takedown] causes
injury, perhaps because poorly executed, does not lead to liability.”); Sow, 636 F.3d at 304
(holding that an officer did not use excessive force when he pushed an arrestee into a police car
despite the fact that the push caused the arrestee to bump his head).

D. Suggs Has Failed To Identify A Closely Analogous Case That Clearly
Establishes His Right To Be Free from The Type of Force That Koeppen
Used.

As stated above in Section III(A), Suggs has the burden of showing that Koeppen’s use of
Force violated clearly established law by either: (1) identifying a closely analogous case that
established the right to be free from the force that Koeppen used on him; or (2) showing that
Koeppen’s use of force was so plainly excessive as an objective matter that he would have been
on notice that he was violating the Fourth Amendment. Cibulka, 992 F.3d at 639. In short:
“‘[c]learly established’ means that, at the time of the officer’s conduct, the law was sufficiently
clear that every reasonable official would understand that what he is doing is unlawful.” Tousis,
84 F.4th at 698 (cleaned up). Suggs has failed to meet his burden on this point.
To begin, the cases that Suggs claims are “closely analogous” are, in fact, materially
distinguishable because the plaintiffs in those cases9 (in contrast to Suggs):
• did not engage in active resistance to arrest (Becker; Abbott; Phillips; Holmes);
• made no attempt to evade arrest by fleeing (Becker; Phillips; Holmes);
• did not engage actions that called for the officers to make a split-second decision
about the use of force (Becker; Abbott; Phillips);

9 See Becker v. Elfreich, 821 F.3d 920 (7th Cir. 2016); Abbott v. Sangamon Cnty., Ill., 705 F.3d 706 (7th
Cir. 2013); Phillips v. Cmty. Ins. Corp., 678 F.3d 513 (7th Cir. 2012); Holmes v. Vill. of Hoffman Est.,
511 F.3d 673 (7th Cir. 2007).
• did not engage in any conduct suggesting to the officers that they were armed, or
which posed an immediate threat to the officers (Becker; Phillips; Holmes);
• did not engage in aggressive behavior towards the officers (Becker; Holmes); and
• were subjected to additional, significant force while either subdued and lying

immobile (Abbott), lying motionless with no reaction aside from crying out in pain to
the initial use of force (Phillips), or surrendering without resistance (Becker; Holmes).
Becker, 821 F.3d at 927–29 & n.2; Abbott, 705 F.3d at 730, 732–33; Phillips, 678 F.3d at 524–
26; Holmes, 511 F.3d at 686–87.10
Finally, the precedent and persuasive authority cited above in Section III(C) precludes the
possibility of Suggs establishing that the force used by Koeppen was so plainly excessive as an
objective matter that he would have been on notice that he was violating Suggs’s constitutional
rights. See, e.g., Kemp v. Liebel, 877 F.3d 346, 351 (7th Cir. 2017) (“In the absence of
controlling or persuasive authority, plaintiffs can demonstrate clearly established law by proving

that the defendant’s conduct was ‘so egregious and unreasonable that . . . no reasonable [official]
could have thought he was acting lawfully.’”) (cleaned up).
In sum: Suggs has failed to show that he had a clearly established constitutional right to
be free from this type of force and Koeppen is entitled to qualified immunity on plaintiff’s
excessive force claim.

10 Suggs cites two other factually inapposite cases where there were disputed issues of material fact. See
Ferguson v. McDonough, 13 F.4th 574, 577–78, 583–84 (7th Cir. 2021) (finding genuine issues of
material fact, including whether the plaintiff was either actively resisting arrest or was simply standing
next to his car with his hands in the air in surrender at the time he was tased); Cyrus v. Town of
Mukwonago, 624 F.3d 856, 862–63 (7th Cir. 2010) (finding genuine issues of material fact, including
how many times the defendant officer tased plaintiff, and explaining that there was no evidence plaintiff
was armed or could access a weapon).
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, defendants’ motion for summary judgment, (Dckt. #70), is
granted and plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment, (Dckt. #73), is denied.

Date: January 22, 2026

I. Cummings :
United States District Court Judge

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11245905. Public record. Not legal advice.