# Beckman

> District Court, M.D. Florida · January 13, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11245902

## Case

- **Full name:** John Beckman v. The Collier County Board of County Commissioners
- **Court:** District Court, M.D. Florida
- **Decided:** January 13, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11245902

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- observing that when federal law conflicts with Florida law, federal law controls under the Supremacy Clause
- holding that an employer need only provide a reasonable accommodation to its disabled employee, not the employee’s accommodation of choice

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
FORT MYERS DIVISION

JOHN BECKMAN,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No: 2:24-cv-585-JES-DNF

THE COLLIER COUNTY BOARD OF
COUNTY COMMISIONERS,

Defendant.

OPINION AND ORDER
This matter comes before the Court on review of the Motion
for Summary Judgment (Doc. #27) filed by Defendant Collier County
Board of County Commissioners (the “County” or Defendant) on
September 25, 2025. Plaintiff John Beckman (“Beckman” or
Plaintiff) filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Doc. #28)
on September 26, 2025. Both parties filed Responses to the
respective motions on October 31, 2025. (Docs. ##31, 32.) On
November 14, 2025, both parties filed Replies to the Responses.
(Docs. ##33, 34.) For the reasons set forth below, Defendant’s
motion is granted, and Plaintiff’s motion is denied.
I.
Summary judgment is appropriate only when a movant shows that
“there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(a). A genuine issue of material fact exists when the evidence
is such that a reasonable trier of fact could return a verdict for

the non-moving party. McCreight v. AuburnBank, 117 F.4th 1322,
1329 (11th Cir. 2024) (citation omitted). A fact is “material” if
it may affect the outcome of the suit under governing law.
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). In
ruling on a motion for summary judgment, a court views all evidence
and draws all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving
party. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 378 (2007); Tana v.
Dantanna’s, 611 F.3d 767, 772 (11th Cir. 2010).
II.
Beckman began his employment with the County in 2006 as an
Emergency Medical Technician. Beckman enjoyed a successful career
with the County, and by 2016 had been promoted to Battalion Chief.

At all relevant times Beckman had been able to perform the
essential functions of his employment position with an
accommodation for a gastrointestinal condition that substantially
limits his major life activities. After multiple medications
proved unsuccessful in managing the condition, on September 12,
2020, Beckman obtained a certification for medical marijuana use
from the State of Florida.
The County has implemented a Drug Free Workplace policy
pursuant to the Drug-Free Workplace Act, Fla. Stat. § 112.0455.
See also Fla. Stat. § 440.102. The County maintains a County

Manager Administrative Procedure (“CMA”) mandating a work
environment free from the unlawful use of controlled substances
(including marijuana).
In October 2020 Beckman notified both Deputy Chief Tony Camps
(“Deputy Chief Camps”) and Chief Tabatha Butcher (“Chief Butcher”)
about his medical marijuana use certification. The details of the
conversations are somewhat disputed, but the disputes are not
material to any issue in the case. Beckman would periodically
request and receive paid time off because of his medical condition.
There were no issues about Beckman’s work performance, and Beckman
continued to use the medical marijuana on and off as needed.
Beckman was only tested at work because of the random drug testing

protocol, and until September 1, 2023, he had never tested positive
for the presence of marijuana in his system.
On September 1, 2023, Beckman was selected for random drug
testing as part of the County’s testing protocol. The test came
back positive for the presence of marijuana in Beckman’s system,
and he was immediately placed on unpaid administrative leave until
completing counseling with a substance abuse professional and
returning a negative drug screening.
Beckman was cleared to return to work after testing negative
for illegal substances on October 17, 2023. By October 24, 2023,
Beckman received and signed a Behavioral Action Plan (“BAP”) which

included: (1) a thirty-day suspension credited as time served,
(2) demotion from Battalion Chief II to Paramedic II with an
approximate 24.5% pay cut, (3) a six-month driving prohibition,
(4) a six-month probationary period, and (5) ineligibility for
promotional opportunities for up to twenty-four months. Beckman
did not appeal this discipline, but was unwilling to accept the
demotion in rank. Beckman submitted a letter of resignation on
October 26, 2023, and terminated his employment with the County on
November 9, 2023. Beckman characterizes this as a constructive
discharge by the County.
After filing a formal Charge of Discrimination with the EEOC,
Beckman received his Notice of Right to Sue on April 26, 2024. He

filed the underlying Complaint (Doc. #1) on June 24, 2024, bringing
claims under the Americans with Disability Act (ADA) for disability
discrimination and retaliation (Counts I and III) and under the
Florida Civil Rights Act (FCRA) for disability discrimination and
retaliation (Counts II and IV).
III.
The County seeks summary judgment on all four of Beckman’s
claims. Beckman seeks partial summary judgment on his two FCRA
claims. All four claims implicate the interplay between federal
and Florida law regarding the medical use of marijuana. The Court
therefore begins with a discussion of those respective laws.
A. Federal Marijuana Use Laws

Federal law makes the medical use of marijuana unlawful. The
context, however, is more complicated than the rule.
Under federal law it is a criminal offense to possess even a
small amount of marijuana. 18 U.S.C. § 844(a). Possession of
small amounts of marijuana for personal use is subject to a civil
penalty, 21 U.S.C. § 844(a), but a civil penalty may not be imposed
on more than two separate occasions, 21 U.S.C. § 844(d), before
criminal penalties are applicable.
Marijuana is currently categorized as a Schedule I drug under
the Controlled Substances Act (“CSA”). 21 C.F.R. § 1308.11(d)(23).
A Schedule I drug “(1) has a high potential for abuse; (2) has no

currently accepted medical use in treatment in the United States;
and (3) lacks accepted safety use under medical supervision.”
Florida Comm'r of Agric. v. Attorney Gen. of United States, 148
F.4th 1307, 1311 (11th Cir. 2025) (citing 21 U.S.C. § 812(b)(1)).
The Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) recently proposed a new
rule to reclassify Marijuana as a Schedule III drug, which would
allow use of marijuana for medical treatment. See 21 U.S.C. §
812(b)(3). The proposed new rule, however, is still working its
way through the administrative process. See In the Matter of
Schedules of Controlled Substances: Proposed Rescheduling of
Marijuana, DEA Docket No. 1362 (January 13, 2025). Recently,

President Donald J. Trump has issued an Executive Order to speed
up consideration of the reclassification of marijuana. Increasing
Medical Marijuana and Cannabidiol Research, 90 FR 60541.
As a Florida appellate court has summarized:
[F]ederal law provides that marijuana is not safe
and has no use in medical treatment. The Controlled
Substances Act (“CSA”) classifies marijuana as a
Schedule I substance. 21 U.S.C. § 812(c), Sched.
I(c)(10). The CSA defines a Schedule I substance as one
that has “a high potential for abuse,” “has no currently
accepted medical use in treatment in the United States,”
and lacks safe use even under medical supervision. 21
U.S.C. § 812(b)(1). Indeed, mere possession of marijuana
is a federal crime everywhere in the United States. See
21 U.S.C. § 844(a) (providing criminal penalties for
“simple possession” of marijuana); cf. 21 U.S.C. §
841(b)(1)(B)(vii), (D), (E)(4) (providing criminal
penalties for distribution and possession with intent to
distribute marijuana). Although the CSA requires
periodic updates of the schedules of controlled
substances, marijuana has remained a Schedule I drug
since the CSA's enactment in 1970. See 21 U.S.C. §
812(a); Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 15 n.23, 125 S.Ct.
2195, 162 L.Ed.2d 1 (2005).

Jones v. Grace Healthcare, 320 So. 3d 191, 193–94 (Fla. 1st DCA
2021). More recently, that court stated:
Marijuana is a schedule I drug under the Controlled
Substances Act. 21 U.S.C. § 812(c)(10). Under the Act,
Schedule I drugs are deemed to have “no medicinal purpose
for treatment in the United States, have a high potential
for abuse, and lack acceptable safety measures even when
used under proper medical supervision.” 21 U.S.C. §
812(b)(1). Therefore, under the Act, there are no valid
prescriptions for marijuana. Because marijuana may not
be validly prescribed under federal law, mere possession
of marijuana is a felony under federal law. Gonzales v.
Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 14, 125 S.Ct. 2195, 162 L.Ed.2d 1
(2005).

Velez Ortiz v. Dep't of Corr., 368 So. 3d 33, 34–35 (Fla. 1st DCA
2023). In other words, “the use of marijuana for medical purposes,
even where sanctioned by state law, remains a violation of federal
law . . ..” United States v. Cannon, 36 F.4th 496, 500 (3d Cir.
2022).
Nevertheless, while the possession and use of even small
amounts of marijuana remains unlawful, Congress has virtually
guaranteed that no person will be charged with possessing or using
marijuana when participating in a state medical marijuana program.
When Congress exercises its power to appropriate government funds
1
each year pursuant to its Article I powers, such appropriation
acts are often accompanied by “riders” that limit how the money
may (or may not) be spent. See SEAN M. STIFF, CONG. RSCH. SERV.,
R46417, CONGRESS’S POWER OVER APPROPRIATIONS: CONSTITUTIONAL AND
STATUTORY PROVISIONS (2020). Every year since 2015 Congress has
included a budget rider amendment (commonly referred to as the

1
Article I of the U.S. Constitution provides, in pertinent part,
that “[n]o Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in
Consequence of Appropriations made by Law.” U.S. CONST. art. I, §
9, cl. 7.
“Rohrabacher-Farr Amendment”) providing that “[n]one of the funds
made available under this Act to the Department of Justice may be
used” to prevent any state which has legalized medical marijuana

“from implementing their own laws that authorize the use,
distribution, possession, or cultivation of medical marijuana.”
See Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, Pub.
L. No. 113-235, § 538, 128 Stat. 2130, 2217 (2014); Florida Comm'r
of Agric., 148 F.4th at 1312. Federal courts have interpreted
this rider to prohibit prosecution of individuals “who fully
complied,” United States v. McIntosh, 833 F.3d 1163, 1177 (9th
Cir. 2016), or “substantially complied”, United States v.
Bilodeau, 24 F.4th 705, 715 (1st Cir. 2022), or “comply”, United
States v. Stacy, 156 F.4th 994, 1012 (10th Cir. 2025), with their
respective State laws regulating medical marijuana use.
As a result, “. . . Congress has precluded the Department of

Justice (for now) from prosecuting crimes that Congress (for now)
chooses to maintain on the books.” Fried v. Garland, 640 F. Supp.
3d 1252, 1256 (N.D. Fla. 2022), vacated and remanded sub nom.
Florida Comm'r of Agric., 148 F.4th 1307 (11th Cir. 2025). This
type of inconsistency had led Supreme Court Justice Clarence Thomas
to observe that while “[o]nce comprehensive, the Federal
Government’s current approach is a half-in, half-out regime that
simultaneously tolerates and forbids local use of marijuana. This
contradictory and unstable state of affairs strains basic
principles of federalism and conceals traps for the unwary.”
Standing Akimbo, LLC v. United States, 141 S. Ct. 2236, 2236-37

(2021) (Thomas, J., concurring in denial of certiorari).
Nonetheless, the Court ends where it began: Federal law makes the
medical use of marijuana unlawful.
The existence of the Florida medical marijuana law, discussed
below, does not change Federal law. The Florida constitutional
amendment does not attempt to do so, providing only that medical
use of marijuana “is not subject to criminal or civil liability or
sanctions under Florida law.” Art. X, § 29(3), Fla. Const.
(emphasis added.) Nor could it, since Federal law prevails in
this area.
Even though some states—including Florida—permit
the purchase, possession, and use of marijuana for
medical purposes, federal law must prevail in
circumstances such as this. We are bound by the United
States Constitution to apply the CSA over a provision in
the Florida Constitution to the contrary. As the federal
constitution commands, the “Laws of the United States
... shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges
in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the
Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary
notwithstanding.” Art. VI, U.S. Const. (emphasis
supplied). We cannot reverse—as Jones would have us do—
the JCC's order in reliance on an undisputed
characterization of medical necessity that directly
conflicts with clear federal law. Cf. Ledoux-Nottingham
v. Downs, 210 So. 3d 1217, 1221 (Fla. 2017) (observing
that when federal law conflicts with Florida law,
federal law controls under the Supremacy Clause).
Jones, 320 So. 3d at 194.
B. Florida Marijuana Use Laws
Under Florida law, it is illegal to sell, manufacture, or

deliver, or possess with intent to sell, manufacture, or deliver,
a controlled substance. Fla. Stat. § 893.13(1)(a) (2008-present).
Cannabis, the technical name for marijuana, is classified as a
Schedule I controlled substance in Florida. Fla. Stat. §
893.03(1)(c)(7). Simple possession of marijuana remains a crime
in Florida, constituting either a felony or misdemeanor depending
on whether the amount is more or less than 20 grams. Fla. Stat. §
893.13(6)(b). See generally Wright-Johnson v. State, 405 So. 3d
501, 506 (Fla. 3d DCA 2025); Campbell v. State, 407 So. 3d 558,
561 (Fla. 2d DCA 2025).
A limited exception exists for the medical use of marijuana
as the result of a 2016 voter-approved amendment to the Florida

Constitution. This constitutional amendment mandated “the
development of a carefully regulated system for providing access
to marijuana for certain patients suffering from debilitating
medical conditions.” Florida Dep't of Health v. Florigrown, LLC,
317 So. 3d 1101, 1106 (Fla. 2021). Article X, § 29 of the Florida
Constitution provides, in pertinent part, that “[t]he medical use
of marijuana by a qualifying patient or caregiver in compliance
with this section is not subject to criminal or civil liability or
sanctions under Florida law.” Art. X, § 29(3), Fla. Const. The
Amendment contemplates that the Florida Legislature may enact laws
consistent with its provisions, Id. § 29(e) (“Nothing in this

section shall limit the legislature from enacting laws consistent
with this section”) and that the Florida Department of Health
“issue reasonable regulations necessary for the implementation and
enforcement of” its provisions for the purpose of “ensur[ing] the
availability and safe use of medical marijuana by qualifying
patients.” Id. § 29(d). See Florigrown, LLC, 317 So. 3d at 1106.
In 2017 the Florida legislature enacted Fla. Stat. § 381.986
(Medical use of marijuana) as the legislative framework to
implement and regulate the constitutional amendment. Sanctuary
Cannabis v. Florida Dep't of Health, 406 So. 3d 390, 392 (Fla. 1st
DCA 2025). The Legislature amended the definition of “cannabis”
to exclude medical marijuana. Id.; Williams v. State, 421 So. 3d

809, 816 (Fla. 2d DCA 2025). The statute imposed various
limitations, including the requirements that the marijuana:
consist of no more than certain, limited amounts; be “acquired
from a medical marijuana treatment center”; be obtained pursuant
to a “medical marijuana use registry identification card” issued
by a “qualified physician”; and be administered in a location other
than “in plain view of or in a place open to the general public;
in a school bus, a vehicle, an aircraft, or a boat; or on the
grounds of a school.” See generally Fla. Stat. § 381.986; Wright-
Johnson, 405 So. 3d at 506.
Additionally, the Florida medical use of marijuana statute

provides certain protections for employers. Section 381.986(15)
protects an employer's right to maintain and enforce a drug-free
workplace. See Fla. Stat. § 381.986(15)(a) (“This section does
not limit the ability of an employer to establish, continue, or
enforce a drug-free workplace program or policy.”). Additionally,
§ 381.986(15)(c) clarifies that “[t]his section does not create a
cause of action against an employer for wrongful discharge or
discrimination.” Fla. Stat. § 381.986(15)(c).
IV.
The Court first discusses Beckman’s two ADA claims. Beckman
asserts that he was subjected to unlawful disability
discrimination when his employer failed to accommodate his

gastrointestinal condition by permitting him to use medical
marijuana outside of work hours. Beckman also alleges that the
County retaliated against him by subjecting him to discipline
following protected disability disclosures.
The County argues that Beckman must first establish a prima
facie case of discrimination and retaliation pursuant to the
burden-shifting framework of McDonnell Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S.
792 (1973), and that Beckman has not done so. (Doc. #27, pp. 22-
23.) Additionally, the County argues that even if Beckman had
established a prima facie case for either ADA claim, he has not
established that the stated reason for the employment action was

a pretext for disability discrimination or retaliation. (Id., p.
27.) The County argues that it is therefore entitled to summary
judgment as to both the ADA discrimination claim and the ADA
retaliation claim.
A. Summary Judgment Procedure
First, a word about summary judgment procedure. The County
seems to suggest that failure to satisfy McDonnell Douglas ends
the inquiry with summary judgment in its favor. (Doc. #27, pp.
22-24.) This would be incorrect.
An employee may establish his claims using direct or
circumstantial evidence, or a combination of both. Jefferson v.
Sewon Am. Inc., 891 F.3d 911, 921 (11th Cir. 2018). When utilizing

circumstantial evidence, an employee may rely on the burden-
shifting McDonnell Douglas framework, Akridge v. Alfa Ins.
Companies, 93 F.4th 1181, 1191 (11th Cir. 2024), or if that fails,
may establish a “convincing mosaic of circumstantial evidence that
would allow a jury to infer intentional discrimination by the
decisionmaker.” Smith v. Lockheed-Martin Corp., 644 F.3d 1321,
1327–28 (11th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted)
(footnote omitted). The Eleventh Circuit has recently summarized
the McDonnell Douglas framework in employment discrimination and
retaliation cases as follows:
There, the [Supreme] Court introduced a three-part
evidentiary burden shifting framework:
1. First, the plaintiff demonstrates a prima facie
case, which may be done by showing: (i) the plaintiff is
in a protected group; (ii) the plaintiff was well
qualified; (iii) the plaintiff suffered an adverse
employment action; and (iv) the plaintiff was treated
less favorably than similarly situated employees outside
of the plaintiff's protected group.
2. Second, the burden shifts to the employer to
articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for
the adverse action.
3. Third, if the employer provides an adequate
reason, the plaintiff has the opportunity to demonstrate
that the employer's proffered rationale is pretextual.
Retaliation claims (as opposed to direct discrimination
claims) follow the same framework, but the prima facie
case is modified. There, a plaintiff must show: (i) that
she engaged in a protected activity, like filing a
complaint for discrimination; (ii) that she suffered a
material adverse action; and (iii) that there was a
causal connection between the protected activity and the
adverse action.
Ismael, 161 F. 4th at 759 (internal citations omitted.)
If plaintiffs cannot satisfy the McDonnell Douglas test, “the
inquiry does not end. Rather, a district court must turn to
evaluate the evidence before it, applying the duly promulgated
Rule 56 summary judgment standard.” Id. at 764. “[A] plaintiff
who cannot establish the McDonnell Douglas prima facie case is
entitled to a full review under the convincing mosaic standard.”
Id. at 761. Under this standard,
[a]s in other contexts, a plaintiff may avoid
summary judgment by presenting a wide range of
circumstantial evidence. Such evidence may include “(1)
suspicious timing, ambiguous statements ..., and other
bits and pieces from which an inference of
discriminatory intent might be drawn, (2) systematically
better treatment of similarly situated employees, and
(3) that the employer's justification is pretextual.”
Id. at 760 (citations omitted.)
B. ADA Discrimination
The ADA prohibits covered employers from “discriminat[ing]
against a qualified individual on the basis of disability.” 42
U.S.C. § 12112(a). To establish a prima facie case of disability
discrimination under the ADA, a plaintiff must show that he (1)
had a disability, (2) was a qualified individual, and (3) was
subjected to unlawful discrimination “on the basis of disability.”
Beasley v. O'Reilly Auto Parts, 69 F.4th 744, 754 (11th Cir. 2023).
The County does not contest that Beckman had a disability but
argues that he has not established the remaining two elements of
a prima facie discrimination claim.
(1) Qualified Individual
The County asserts that “no accommodation was due because
Beckman was not a qualified individual with a disability under the
ADA.” (Doc. #27, p. 22.) The County argues that Beckman is not
a qualified individual within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8)
because he was an employee “who is currently engaging in the
illegal use of drugs,” and the County imposed the discipline on

the basis of such drug use. (Id., p. 23.)
The ADA defines a qualified individual as one “who, with or
without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential
functions of the employment position.” 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8).
Beckman must prove he was a qualified individual “at the time of
the County’s alleged disability-based discrimination.” Stanley v.
City of Sanford, 606 U.S. ––––, 145 S. Ct. 2058, 2071 (2025).
A person illegally using drugs is excluded from the definition
of a “qualified individual.” See 42 U.S.C. § 12114(a) (“[A]
qualified individual with a disability shall not include any
employee or applicant who is currently engaging in the illegal use
of drugs, when the covered entity acts on the basis of such drug

use.”) It is not disputed that Beckman was using marijuana
pursuant to his Florida certification. This constituted illegal
use of drugs under federal law. Beckman was disciplined because
he tested positive for marijuana use. Unless there is an
applicable exception, this would exclude Beckman from being a
qualified individual.
There is an exception to this definitional exclusion: The
“illegal use of drugs . . . does not include the use of a drug
taken under supervision by a licensed health care professional, or
other uses authorized by the Controlled Substance Act.” 42 U.S.C.
§ 12110(d)(1). Beckman’s use was clearly not an “other use[]”

authorized by the Controlled Substance Act. Additionally,
persuasive federal case law holds that the use of medical marijuana
pursuant to a state-authorized program is not drug usage “taken
under supervision by a licensed health care professional.” James
v. City of Costa Mesa, 700 F.3d 394, 403 (9th Cir. 2012) (“doctor-
supervised marijuana use is an illegal use of drugs not covered by
the ADA's supervised use exception.”); Anderson v. Diamondback
Investment Group, 117 F.4th 165, 177-80 (4th Cir. 2024) (employer
not liable for failure to accommodate under the ADA where employee
was terminated based on a positive drug test for marijuana);
Eccleston v. City of Waterbury, No. 3:19-cv-1614, 2021 WL 1090754,
at *4 (D. Conn. Mar. 15, 2021) (“I agree with the courts that have

reasoned that even physician-supervised medical marijuana use does
not fit within the supervised-use exception identified in the ADA.
To read otherwise would place it in direct tension with the clear
provisions of the CSA[.]”); Steele v. Stallion Rockies, Ltd., 106
F. Supp. 3d 1205, 1212 (D. Colo. 2015) (collecting cases). See
also Velez Ortiz v. Dep't of Corr., 368 So. 3d 33, 35 (Fla. 1st
DCA 2023) (there are no valid prescriptions for marijuana under
Controlled Substance Act.)
Beckman argues that he was unquestionably a qualified
individual under Florida law because “[w]hen conduct is
constitutionally protected under state law, federal classification

cannot eliminate state civil rights protections.” (Doc. #31, p.
14.) Beckman’s argument is wrong. See Jones, 320 So. 3d at 194.
The undisputed facts demonstrate that Beckman received an
adverse employment action after testing positive for the presence
of marijuana during a random drug screening as part of the County’s
testing protocol. Beckman’s use of marijuana, even pursuant to
his Florida certificate, was illegal under federal law, and the
statutory exclusion is not satisfied by the Florida medical
marijuana program. Accordingly, Beckman was not a qualified
individual with a disability under the ADA.
(2) Causation
The County also challenges Beckman’s showing of the third

prima facia element – causation between his disability and the
employment action. (Doc. #27, pp. 25-27.) Beckman asserts that
his disabilities were “gastro-intestinal impairments that affect
the major life activities of digestion and working.” (Doc. #1, ¶
9.) Beckman further asserts that his disabilities “are the basis
for [the County’s] discriminatory employment practices toward him”
(id., ¶ 14) and that the County discriminated against him “because
of his disabilities.” (Id., ¶ 22.)
The ADA imposes a “but-for” causation standard — that is, an
adverse employment action would not have occurred but for the
plaintiff's disability. Akridge v. Alfa Ins. Companies, 93 F.4th

1181, 1192 (11th Cir. 2024). As the County correctly argues, there
is no evidence that Beckman was disciplined because of his medical
condition. None of Beckman’s asserted causation evidence (Doc.
#31, pp. 15-17) goes to his gastrointestinal disability, but rather
goes to his use of marijuana. Beckman was disciplined for using
marijuana as his remedy-of-choice in violation of the County’s
Drug Free Work policy and federal law. See Stewart v. Happy
Herman's Cheshire Bridge, Inc., 117 F.3d 1278, 1285 (11th Cir.
1997) (holding that an employer need only provide a reasonable
accommodation to its disabled employee, not the employee’s
accommodation of choice). Accordingly, Beckman has failed to
establish the causation element.

(3) Legitimate, Non-Pretextual Reason for Action
The County argues that even if Beckman could establish all
the prima facie case elements, he has not proven that the reason
for its employment action was unlawful disability discrimination
(or retaliation). (Doc. #27, pp. 27-30.) The County asserts it
imposed discipline on Beckman because he failed a drug test in
violation of the County’s established policy and there is no
evidence that this reason was a pretext for disability
discrimination.
Beckman responds that the proffered reasons for the BAP

discipline were “pure pretext” because (1) Chief Butcher testified
his discipline was more severe than it should have been; (2) the
County treated him differently than another employee; and (3) the
County’s policy provided for discretion, yet the County failed to
exercise it for Beckman. (Doc. #31, pp. 15-18.) None of these
factors would allow a reasonable jury to find pretext.
An employer may fire an employee for a good reason, a bad
reason, a reason based on erroneous facts, or for no reason at
all, as long as its action is not for a discriminatory reason.”
Nix v. WLCY Radio/Rahall Commc'ns, 738 F.2d 1181, 1187 (11th Cir.
1984), abrogated on other grounds by Lewis, 918 F.3d 1213.
“Federal courts ‘do not sit as a super-personnel department that

reexamines an entity's business decisions. No matter how medieval
a firm's practices, no matter how high-handed its decisional
process, no matter how mistaken the firm's managers, the ADEA does
not interfere. Rather our inquiry is limited to whether the
employer gave an honest explanation of its behavior.’” Chapman v.
AI Transp., 229 F.3d 1012, 1030 (11th Cir. 2000) (citations
omitted.)
The Chief’s personal view of the severity of punishment also
does not tend to establish that the reason for termination was
plaintiff’s disability, rather than his marijuana use. Indeed,

the record establishes that plaintiff’s discipline was more
lenient than typical, since the employment of 22 of 24 persons who
had tested positive for drugs while employed by the County was
terminated. Assuming the County had discretion, the failure to
exercise that discretion in favor of plaintiff is not an indication
that plaintiff’s physical ailment was the real reason. The Court
concludes that even if plaintiff had established (1) that he was
a qualified individual and (2) the causation element, he has made
no showing from which a reasonable jury could find pretext.
(4) Failure to Provide Reasonable Accommodation
The Complaint alleges that with a reasonable accommodation
Beckman could have performed the essential functions of his job.

(Doc. #1, ¶ 19.) Beckman testified that the accommodation he was
referring to was continued use of medical marijuana. (Doc. #24-
1, pp. 67-68.) The County argues that to the extent Beckman is
pursuing the aspect of his discrimination claim involving failure
to accommodate, it too is subject to summary judgment. (Doc. #27,
pp. 31-32.)
An employer's failure to reasonably accommodate a disabled
individual is itself disability discrimination. Holly v. Clairson
Indus., LLC, 492 F.3d 1247, 1262 (11th Cir. 2007). An employee is
subjected to unlawful disability discrimination when the employer
fails to provide “reasonable accommodations” for the disability

unless doing so would impose an undue hardship on the employer.
42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A); Beasley, 69 F.4th at 754. If the
plaintiff establishes that he was denied reasonable accommodation,
the burden shifts to the “employer . . . to show undue hardship.”
Earl v. Mervyns, Inc., 207 F.3d 1361, 1367 (11th Cir. 2000). An
employer need not “accommodate an employee in any manner in which
that employee desires.” Happy Herman's Cheshire Bridge, Inc., 117
F.3d at 1285 (citation omitted). Rather, an employer meets its
obligations under the ADA if it provides some reasonable
accommodation, regardless of whether it is “the accommodation of
[the employee's] choice.” Id. at 1286 (citation omitted).
An employer's duty to provide a reasonable accommodation is

not triggered unless a specific demand for an accommodation has
been made. Id. To “trigger an employer's accommodation duties, a
disabled employee need only identify a statutory disability and
explain generally how a particular accommodation would assist
[him].” Owens v. Governor's Off. of Student Achievement, 52 F.4th
1327, 1336 (11th Cir. 2022). The employee has the burden of
identifying an accommodation and demonstrating that it is
reasonable. Frazier-White v. Gee, 818 F.3d 1249, 1255 (11th Cir.
2016).
The County argues that Beckman never requested use of

medical marijuana as an accommodation, and in any event, it would
have been illegal and therefore not reasonable. (Doc. #27, pp.
31-32.) Beckman testified in deposition that he requested, and
was allowed to take, time off to attend to his medical condition.
He further testified that he never asked the County for any other
accommodation. However, Beckman has also identified conduct from
which it is reasonable to infer he was requesting to use marijuana
to obtain relief from his disability. (Doc. #31, pp. 18-19.)
Beckman states that he made the following disclosures with regard
to his medical marijuana usage: In October 2020, Beckman
"[n]otified Chief Camps of [his] medical issue getting worse and
having to use Medical Marijuana as treatment after multiple other

medications were not working." In April of 2021, he “[a]sked Chief
Camps if [he] could turn in [his medical marijuana certification]
to be upfront of the situation.” Finally, in September 2022 he “.
. . called Chief Butcher and let her know of [his medical marijuana
certification]. [He] explained that [he] had a [medical marijuana]
card and prescription for the medication as well." (Doc. #31, p.
18.)
There is no “precise form” that a request for accommodation
must take. Instead, the “circumstances must at least be sufficient
to cause a reasonable [defendant] to make appropriate inquiries

about the possible need for an accommodation.” Hunt v. Aimco
Props., L.P., 814 F.3d 1213, 1226 (11th Cir. 2016). Given the
summary judgment standard, this is sufficient to show Beckman did
make a request for accommodation.
But even construing this conduct as being a requested
accommodation to allow the use of marijuana, it was not reasonable
under the ADA because medical marijuana use was and still is
illegal under federal law. Accordingly, any failure to accommodate
claim based on the underlying facts fails as a matter of law.
(5) Individual Assessment Under the ADA
Beckman asserts that the County discriminated against him by
failing to individually assess whether he could presently perform

the essential aspects of his job while using state-authorized
medical marijuana. (Doc. #31, pp. 20-22.) But no individualized
assessment is required to determine if an employee is able to
safely function while being afforded an unreasonable
accommodation.
Beckman relies on a non-binding decision which allowed
employment discrimination claims where the employee was discharged
based on possible side effects of certain anxiety medications
without making individualized assessments of whether the
individual was able to perform his or her job. See Haynes v. City
of Montgomery, No. 2:06CV1093WKW, 2008 WL 4495711, at *3 (M.D.

Ala. Oct. 6, 2008), aff'd sub nom. Haynes v. City of Montgomery,
Ala., 344 F. App’x 519 (11th Cir. 2009). However, the facts in
this case differ substantially from those in Haynes. The
medications used by the employee in Haynes were not Schedule I
substances under the CSA; marijuana, even under the supervision of
a clinical physician, is a Schedule I substance and its use is
illegal under federal law. No individualized assessment was
authorized or required when the requested accommodation was to use
an illegal substance even if the person can function without side
effects.
(6) Interactive Process Under ADA
Beckman asserts that even if there are no protections for

medical marijuana users under the ADA, the County was nevertheless
required to engage in a good faith interactive process with regard
to his disability disclosures. (Doc # 31, p. 23.) While for
summary judgment purposes Beckman is deemed to have made the
accommodation request, the requested accommodation was still
illegal under federal law. Accordingly, there was nothing to
interact about. The employer was simply unable to change federal
law and allow an employee to use a substance which federal law
forbade. The Court grants summary judgment in favor of the County
on Beckman’s claim for disability discrimination under the ADA.
(7) Convincing Mosaic Alternative

While the record establishes Beckman has failed to establish
two of the three prima facie elements, the Court must consider if
there was other evidence which would satisfy Beckman’s burden and
avoid summary judgment. A review of the record establishes that
there is not a convincing mosaic of evidence which would allow a
reasonable jury to find either disability discrimination or
disability retaliation.
C. ADA Retaliation Claim
Beckman asserts a claim for retaliation because of protected
activity, which he identifies as his “request for reasonable
accommodation.” (Doc. #1, ¶¶ 46, 47, 55, 56.) The County seeks
summary judgment on this ADA retaliation claim.

The ADA prohibits covered employers from retaliating against
an employee who “has opposed any act or practice made unlawful by
this Act or because such individual made a charge, testified,
assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation,
proceeding, or hearing under this Act.” 42 U.S.C. § 12203(a).
Claims for retaliation are evaluated under McDonnel Douglas
framework. Tolar v. Bradley Arant Boult Commings, LLP, 997 F.3d
1280, 1289 (11th Cir. 2021). To establish a prima facie claim for
retaliation, a plaintiff must establish (1) that he engaged in a
statutorily protected activity or expression, (2) that he suffered
an adverse employment action, and (3) that there exists a causal

connection between the protected acts and the adverse employment
action. Batson v. Salvation Army, 897 F.3d 1320, 1327 (11th Cir.
2018).
A plaintiff engages in a statutorily protected activity by
making requests for accommodation under the ADA when he has a good
faith reasonable belief that he is entitled to those
accommodations. Monroe v. Fla. Dep't of Corr., 793 F. App'x 924,
928 (11th Cir. 2019). To prove a causal connection for a
retaliation claim, a plaintiff need only demonstrate “that the
protected activity and the adverse action were not wholly
unrelated.” Shotz v. City of Plantation, Fla., 344 F.3d 1161,
1180 n.30 (11th Cir. 2003) (quotation marks and emphasis omitted).

One way of doing this is by showing a close temporal proximity
between the employer's discovery of the protected activity and the
adverse action. Higdon v. Jackson, 393 F.3d 1211, 1220 (11th Cir.
2004). Temporal proximity must be “very close,” id. (quotation
marks omitted); a three-to-four-month delay is too long, Thomas v.
Cooper Lighting, Inc., 506 F.3d 1361, 1364 (11th Cir. 2007), while
a one-month gap may satisfy the test, Donnellon v. Fruehauf Corp.,
794 F.2d 598, 601 (11th Cir. 1986).
The County argues that Beckman cannot establish a retaliation
claim because he did not engage in protected activity, the use of
marijuana remained illegal, and the reason for the discipline was

not false or pretextual. Beckman responds that he made requests
for over three years, and points to the timing and severity of the
discipline after testing to support his retaliation claim.
Despite Beckman’s testimony that he did not request any
accommodation other than occasional time off, which was granted,
the Court has found that for summary judgment purposes his conduct
constitutes an implicit request for the use of medical marijuana.
The record shows that Beckman’s disability disclosures occurred in
October 2020, April 2021, and September 2022. Those implicit
requests were denied.
There is no evidence supporting Beckman’s theory that he was
retaliated against for making the request for the accommodation.

Indeed, under his theory Beckman’s employment continued for years
after he made the implicit requests. However, Beckman did not
receive and sign the BAP until October 24, 2023. The elapsed time
between the protected activity and the adverse action is, on its
own, far too remote to support an inference that the County’s
decision was motivated by Beckman’s protected activity. See
Gallimore v. City of Opa-Locka, Florida, No. 23-12241, 2025 WL
2237313, at *4 (11th Cir. Aug. 6, 2025) (“While ‘an employee's
termination within days -- or at the most within two weeks -- of
[her] protected activity can be circumstantial evidence of a causal
connection between the two,’ a gap of multiple months, in the

absence of some other evidence of retaliation, is too large a
temporal gap.” (citing Jefferson v. Sewon Am., Inc., 891 F.3d 911,
926 (11th Cir. 2018)). While Beckman counts from the drug test,
this was not a protected disclosure.
It was not the requests for an accommodation which led to his
discipline, but Beckman’s continued use of an illegal drug. There
is no evidence that the implicit requests for accommodation were
in any way related to the suspension, demotion, and other
disciplinary actions outlined in the BAP. “To establish a causal
connection, a plaintiff must show that the relevant decisionmaker
was aware of the protected conduct, and that the protected activity
and adverse actions were not wholly unrelated.” Kidd v. Mando Am.

Corp., 731 F.3d 1196, 1211 (11th Cir. 2013) (citation and
quotations omitted). “The burden of causation can be met by showing
close temporal proximity between the statutorily protected
activity and the adverse employment action.” Thomas v. Cooper
Lighting, Inc., 506 F.3d 1361, 1364 (11th Cir. 2007). However,
“in the absence of other evidence tending to show causation, if
there is a substantial delay between the protected expression and
the adverse action, the complaint of retaliation fails as a matter
of law.” Id.
The evidence before the Court indicates that the County never

subjected Beckman to any “reasonable suspicion” drug screenings
(as it was permitted to do by its Drug Free Workplace policy).
Instead, as Beckman conceded in his deposition, he was only
subjected to random drug screenings during his tenure with the
County. (Doc. #24-1, pp. 28-34.) The Court finds the temporal
gap between Beckman’s disclosures and the adverse employment
action fatal to the element of causation. Accordingly, the Court
grants the County’s Motion for Summary Judgment as to Beckman’s
ADA claim for retaliation.
V.
The FCRA forbids employers from “discriminat[ing] against any
individual . . . because of such individual's . . . handicap.”

Fla. Stat. § 760.10(1)(a). “Florida courts construe the Florida
Civil Rights Act in conformity with the federal Americans with
Disabilities Act [(“ADA”)].” Ring v. Boca Ciega Yacht Club Inc.,
4 F.4th 1149, 1155 (11th Cir. 2021) (quotation marks and brackets
omitted). See Abadi v. Walt Disney World Parks & Resorts, 338 So.
3d 1101, 1104 (Fla. 1st DCA 2022). This includes situations where
the language is similar but not identical. Ring, 4 F.4th at 1156.
The FCRA is also analyzed under the same framework as the ADA.
Holly v. Clairson Indus., L.L.C., 492 F.3d 1247, 1255 (11th Cir.
2007); Samson v. Fed. Exp. Corp., 746 F.3d 1196, 1200 n. 2 (11th
Cir. 2014). Similarly, retaliation claims brought under the FCRA

are analyzed pursuant to federal case law. Carter v. Health Mgmt.
Associates, 989 So. 2d 1258, 1262 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008).
Because the Florida Civil Rights Act does not define the term
“handicap,” Florida courts look to the ADA’s definition of a
“disability.” Byrd v. BT Foods, Inc., 948 So. 2d 921, 926 (Fla.
DCA 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted) (interpreting
“handicap” in the FCRA in the light of the definition of
“disability” in the ADA); Ring, 4 F.4th at 1155–56. The question
becomes whether the Florida medical marijuana constitutional
amendment and statute change the ADA analysis when addressing
marijuana under the FCRA.
Beckman argues that he is unquestionably a qualified

individual under Florida law because the Florida Constitution
explicitly protects the medical use of marijuana by a qualifying
patient or caregiver. (Doc. #31, p. 2.) Beckman relies heavily
on the Circuit Court of Hillsborough County’s decision in Giambrone
v. Hillsborough County, No. 20-CA-4719 (Fla. 13th Cir. Ct. Dec.
10, 2024), which found that medical marijuana use was protected
under the FCRA in light of Article X, § 29 of the Florida
Constitution and Fla. Stat. § 381.986. That decision is currently
on appeal, and in any event, state trial court decisions do not
bind federal courts as a final expression of state law. See North
Shore Med. Center, Inc. v. Cigna Health and Life Ins. Co., 68 F.4th

1241, 1244 (11th Cir. 2023).
The Court is not persuaded by Giambrone. Florida law is clear
that the FCRA follows federal law as set forth in the ADA, and
that law still classifies marijuana as an unlawful drug.
Additionally, Florida’s medical marijuana statutes specifically
protect an employer's right to maintain and enforce a drug-free
workplace. See Fla. Stat. § 381.986(15)(a) (“This section does
not limit the ability of an employer to establish, continue, or
enforce a drug-free workplace program or policy.”); Fla. Stat. §
381.986(15)(c) (“[t]his section does not create a cause of action
against an employer for wrongful discharge or discrimination.”)
The County’s motion for summary judgment as to the two FCRA claims

is granted.
Accordingly, it is now
ORDERED:
1. Defendant Collier County’s Motion for Summary Judgment
(Doc. #27) is GRANTED.
2. Plaintiff John Beckman’s Motion for Summary Judgment is
DENIED.
Clerk shall enter judgment in favor of Defendant
Collier County Board of County Commissioners as to each
count and against Plaintiff John Beckman, who shall take
nothing. The Clerk is further directed to terminate all
deadlines and to close the file.
DONE AND ORDERED at Fort Myers, Florida, this 13th day of
January 2026.

/ — OL
JGHE E. STEELE
SHEIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Copies:
Parties of record

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11245902. Public record. Not legal advice.