# Dunn

> District Court, N.D. Illinois · January 21, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11245855

## Case

- **Full name:** Kathy Dunn v. Cook County et al.
- **Court:** District Court, N.D. Illinois
- **Decided:** January 21, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

Kathy Dunn, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
)
v. ) No. 25 C 9521
)
)
Cook County et al., )
)
Defendants. )
Memorandum Opinion and Order
Plaintiff Kathy Dunn was an employee of defendant Cook County
Department of Public Health (“CCDPH”) until her termination in
October 2023. Because of that firing and a litany of other alleged
acts that preceded it, Ms. Dunn has sued CCDPH, Cook County, and
the Cook County Health and Hospital System under Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Americans with Disabilities Act
(“ADA”), the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”), the
Family and Medical Leave Act, (“FMLA”), and Illinois common law.
Before me are the defendants’ motions to dismiss and to strike
pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) and 12(f). For the reasons that
follow, I grant the former in part and the latter in full.
1
I.
The following facts are drawn from Dunn’s complaint. For
present purposes, I treat them as true.
Dunn was an employee of CCDPH for nearly forty years. Over
the last twenty-five years of that period, Dunn taught nursing
classes at universities in the area. She confined her teaching to

hours during which she was not working for CCDPH, and her
employment with the universities was approved by her CCDPH
supervisors. Sometime before 2022, Dunn disciplined three
employees, one of whom threatened to retaliate against her and
then accused her of violating dual employment rules. Following an
investigation by the Cook County Office of the Independent
Inspector General (“OIIG”), CCDPH determined that Dunn had
violated restrictions on dual employment. On September 11, 2023,
an attorney for CCDPH, Rachel Marrello, gave Dunn the option to
either retire or be terminated. In order to take CCDPH’s decision
to the Cook County Appeals Board, Dunn opted to be fired.
Dunn alleges that the OIIG’s finding was pretextual and that

CCDPH fired her not for dual employment violations but because of
her sex, age, race, religion, and national origin. ECF 1 at 6–7.
She writes, inter alia, that black employees, a younger employee,
and male employees either did not report their dual employment or
performed poorly and, unlike her, were neither disciplined nor
2
fired. Id. at 4–5. Dunn adds that she was “subjected to unwelcome
sexual conduct” including “derogatory comments...[and] unwanted
touching” as well as “repeated racial slurs, derogatory comments
about her race, [and] offensive jokes” by black employees. Id. at
5. Dunn reported this treatment and asserts that retaliation for

those reports is another reason behind her firing. Id. at 8.
Separately, in 2022, Dunn was injured on the job and developed
bursitis.1 At some time between then and her firing, Dunn requested
to work from home full time, and CCDPH denied that request. Dunn
reports that “a non-white non-disabled female employee in charge
of environmental food service or manager of food safety” was
allowed to work from home full time. Id. at 6. In May 2023, Dunn
requested leave under the FMLA.2 Dunn was granted FMLA leave and
was slated to return in November 2023. CCDPH terminated Dunn while
she was on leave in September 2023; she cites retaliation for her
taking FMLA leave as a third reason for her firing.

1 Bursitis entails a painful inflammation of the joints. Mayo
Clinic Staff, “Bursitis,” Mayo Clinic (Aug 25, 2022),
mayoclinic.org/diseases=conditions/bursitis/symptoms-
causes/syc-20353242.
2 Dunn does not explain why exactly she needed to go on leave;
given the placement in the complaint, it seems related to her
bursitis.
3
Dunn filed a charge against CCDPH with the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) on April 7, 2024. In the “Why you
believe you were discriminated against” section, she checked boxes
for age, color, disability, race, and sex. In the “What happened
to you that you believe was discriminatory” section, she wrote:

I worked for CCDPH for 39 years without any disciplinary
action against me. I taught nursing for 25 years on
weekends and at night that was approved by my
supervisors. Three disgruntled workers made false
accusations and I was given the choice of retirement or
termination by HR director Rachel Marrello. I chose
termination because I didn’t violate any dual employment
rules. I have documented evidence and testimony of my
innocence and will appear before the O.C. Appeal Board.
The lead accuser was a younger Black male (who threatened
retaliation). My supervisor was Black/female, the
Department Head is a Black male, the Chief Executive of
Nursing is Indian. My replacement is Black, has less
education, no public health experience, and is younger
than I am.
All employees who have been hired since spring 2023 have
been persons of color. The CCDPH attorney did not follow
department procedures nor did the OIIG’s office conduct
a thorough investigation.
ECF 1-1 at 1.
The EEOC issued a right to sue letter on May 15, 2025, and
Dunn filed this lawsuit on August 11, 2025. Across twelve counts3
citing Title VII, the ADEA, the ADA, the FMLA, and Illinois common

3 Due to a typographical error, Dunn’s complaint skipped Count
VIII; as such, while the last count is numbered XIII, there are
twelve in total.
4
law, Dunn alleges that defendants subjected her to discriminatory
treatment in her working conditions, discriminatory discharge,
retaliatory discharge, harassment, the intentional infliction of
emotional distress, and a hostile work environment due to her age,
disability, race, national origin, religion, and sex.

II.
Dismissal for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) is proper “when the allegations in a
complaint, however true, could not raise a claim of entitlement to
relief.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 558 (2007).
In reviewing a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), I
accept as true a plaintiff’s well-pleaded factual allegations and
draw all reasonable inferences in a plaintiff’s favor.
Killingsworth v. HSBC Bank Nevada, N.A., 507 F.3d 614, 618 (7th
Cir. 2007).
To survive a motion to dismiss, the well-pleaded facts of the
complaint must allow the court to infer more than the mere
possibility of misconduct. McCauley v. City of Chicago, 671 F.3d

611, 616 (7th Cir. 2011). Additionally, the Court “need not accept
as true ‘legal conclusions[, or t]hreadbare recitals of the
elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory
statements.’” Brooks v. Ross, 578 F.3d 574, 581 (7th Cir. 2009)
(quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)).
5
All the same, a motion to dismiss tests the sufficiency of
the complaint, not the merits of the plaintiff’s claim. Gibson v.
City of Chicago, 910 F.2d 1510, 1520 (7th Cir. 1990). And facial
plausibility exists “when the plaintiff pleads factual content
that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the

defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S.
at 678.
III.
Defendants move to dismiss most of Dunn’s counts (II–VI, IX–
X) by arguing that she has failed to exhaust her administrative
remedies. Defendants then move to dismiss all Dunn’s counts on the
basis that they simply fail to state a claim. And defendants
contend that I must strike Dunn’s requests for punitive damages
because she cannot recover any in a suit against a municipality.
A. The EEOC Charge
Before suing under Title VII, a plaintiff must exhaust her
administrative remedies by filing a charge with the EEOC and
receiving a right to sue letter. Chaidez v. Ford Motor Co., 937

F.3d 998, 1004 (7th Cir. 2019). The same is true under the ADA,
Riley v. City of Kokomo, 909 F.3d 182, 189 (7th Cir. 2018), and
the ADEA, Flannery v. Recording Industry Ass’n of America, 354
F.3d 632, 637 (7th Cir. 2004). After filing with the EEOC, a
plaintiff can only include those claims in her complaint in federal
6
court that were part of her original EEOC charge. See McKenzie v.
Ill. Dept. of Transp., 92 F.3d 473, 481 (7th Cir. 1996) (citing
Cheek v. Western and Southern Life Ins. Co., 31 F.3d 497, 500 (7th
Cir. 1994)).
An EEOC charge need not encompass each fact that a plaintiff

later alleges in her complaint to meet the exhaustion requirement.
Cheek, 31 F.3d at 500. A majority of complainants at the EEOC are
laypersons who complete their charges without the assistance of a
lawyer, and courts should read their charges generously. See Taylor
v. Western & Southern Life Ins. Co., 966 F.2d 1188, 1195 (7th Cir.
1992). As such, a plaintiff may sue on the claims that she makes
out in her EEOC charge and those claims that are “like or
reasonably related to the allegations of the charge and growing
out of such allegations.” Geldon v. South Milwaukee School Dist.,
414 F.3d 817, 819 (7th Cir. 2005) (citations omitted).
Claims are “like or reasonably related” to the charge when
“(1) ‘there is a reasonable relationship between the allegations

in the charge and the claims in the complaint;’ and (2) ‘the claim
in the complaint can reasonably be expected to grow out of an EEOC
investigation of the allegations of the charge.’” Chaidez, 937
F.3d 1004 (quoting Cheek, 31 F.3d at 500). At minimum, the charge
and complaint must “describe the same conduct and implicate the
same individuals.” Cheek, 31 F.3d at 501 (emphasis in original).
7
That the charge and complaint “generally assert the same kind of
discrimination is not sufficient without some factual relationship
between them.” Chaidez, 937 F.3d at 1005. Where a plaintiff brings
suit on claims that she has not included in her EEOC charge and
which are not “like or reasonably related” to those in that charge,

she has failed to exhaust her administrative remedies as to those
claims and they will be subject to dismissal. Id. at 1004–06.
Dunn’s EEOC charge focuses on her firing and the inadequate
investigation of her dual employment and says little about the
discrimination that she alleges in the complaint:
I worked for CCDPH for 39 years without any disciplinary
action against me...
[After t]hree disgruntled workers made false
accusations...I was given the choice of retirement or
termination...I chose termination because I didn’t
violate any dual employment rules...
The CCDPH attorney did not follow department procedures
nor did the OIIG’s office conduct a thorough
investigation [of whether I broke the dual employment
rules].
ECF 1-1 at 1. The only language in the charge related to the
discrimination in Dunn’s complaint is the following:
The lead accuser [of the three disgruntled workers] was
a younger Black male...
My supervisor was Black/female, the Department Head is
a Black male, the Chief Executive of Nursing is Indian.
My replacement is Black, has less education, no public
health experience, and is younger than I am.
8
All employees who have been hired since spring 2023 have
been persons of color.
Id.
Most of the claims in Dunn’s complaint are absent from and
are not “like or reasonably related to” the claims in her EEOC
charge. Dunn has failed to exhaust her administrative remedies as
to all of her ADA claims (Counts IV–VI), given that her EEOC charge
never mentions disability—her ADA claims are not “reasonably
related” to the facts alleged in the charge. Riley, 909 F.3d at
189. Dunn has likewise failed to exhaust her remedies as to her
non-FMLA retaliation claims (II, V, IX) because the EEOC charge
describes neither protected activity nor retaliation against her
for it; it does not “describe the same conduct” as her complaint.

Cheek, 31 F.3d at 501 (emphasis in original). And Dunn has failed
to exhaust her remedies as to her hostile work environment claims
(III, IV, X) because the EEOC charge does not allege any of the
harassment or abuse on which those claims are based. Id.
Dunn seeks to broaden the scope of the EEOC charge by
directing me to a “Supplemental Information” letter that she sent
the EEOC in November 2024. Assuming arguendo that I can consider
it, the letter does not sufficiently broaden the scope of the

9
charge.4 The letter, while more detailed than the charge, is
focused on the same thing: that she was fired for violation of
dual employment rules after an insufficient or otherwise defective
investigation by the OIIG, and not on the discrimination at which
her complaint is aimed. ECF 17-2 at 1–6. Even considered in full,

the letter would not amend the EEOC charge such that it would
reasonably relate to the claims in Counts II–VI and IX–X. Those
must be dismissed.
That leaves Count I—discrimination under Title VII due to
race, religion, or national origin—and Count VII—discrimination
based on age. Reading the EEOC charge as generously as possible,
I find that it implies, by stating that Dunn’s supervisor, her
department head, and the chief executive of nursing at CCDPH were
of different races from her, that Dunn was fired because of her
race. ECF 1-1 at 1. In the same way, because the charge states
that Dunn’s replacement was both younger and less qualified than
her, I read it to imply that she was discharged due to her age.

Id. Thus, her discriminatory discharge claims at Counts I and VII
could “reasonably be expected to grow out of an EEOC investigation

4 Cheek suggests that I can consider it “to the extent that the
letter may be considered an amendment to the original charge
within the meaning of 29 C.F.R. § 1601.12(b),” which allows a
charge to be amended “‘to clarify and amplify allegations made
therein.’” 31 F.3d at 502.
10
into” the allegations in the charge. Cheek, 31 F.3d at 500. As
such, Dunn has exhausted her administrative remedies as to claims
in those counts.
But to be clear, the claims that Dunn has preserved are
narrower than those laid out in her complaint. Because the EEOC

charge does not imply that Dunn’s national origin, religion, or
sex were at issue, any claim in Count I that she was terminated
because of those factors is outside of the scope of the charge—
there is no “factual relationship between” the two sets of
allegations. Chaidez, 937 F.3d at 1005. Likewise, because the
charge does not mention any adverse employment action on CCDPH’s
part besides Dunn’s firing, Dunn has failed to exhaust her remedies
as to any claim at Counts I and VII based on any adverse employment
action other than her termination. Id.
B. Failure to State a Claim
With the above out of the way, I consider whether Dunn states
a claim at the surviving counts (I, VII, and XI–XIII).
1. Count I—Title VIII Discriminatory Discharge

When shorn of those elements which Dunn did not include in
her EEOC charge, her claim in Count I boils down to that she was
fired because she was white. Dunn pleads that the following were
“examples of [CCDPH] treating similarly situated [non-white]
employees...more favorably than [her].” ECF 1 at 4. “An African-
11
American male employee who worked as Associate Administrator
performed little or no substantive work and/or did not attend
meetings but was not disciplined or terminated.” ECF 1 at 4. Dunn
“was disciplined more harshly than African-American or minority or
non-white employees.” Id. “On information and belief, Defendants

replaced Dunn with several African American employees.” Id. “[T]wo
African-American employees with the title Public Health Nurse III
and IV were not performing their jobs, but were not disciplined.”
Id.
Under Title VII, a plaintiff can make out a prima facie case
of discrimination by offering evidence that “(1) he is a member of
a protected class; (2) he was qualified for the applicable
positions; (3) he suffered an adverse employment action; and (4)
similarly-situated persons not in the protected class were treated
more favorably.” Martino v. Western & Southern Financial Grp., 715
F.3d 195, 202 (7th Cir. 2013) (citations omitted).
Here, Dunn’s theory is that she, unlike non-white employees

who broke the rules, was fired. And while her pleadings could be
more robust, she states a prima facie case. She is a member of a
protected class. McDonald v. Sante Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S.
273, 279–280 (1976). She pleads that she was qualified for the
position she held. She was fired. And though she will need to
develop these facts moving forward, she has alleged that similarly
12
situated non-white employees—an associate administrator and the
employees with which she was replaced—were treated more favorably
than her. She has pled “enough facts to state a claim to relief
that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.
2. Count VII—ADEA Discriminatory Discharge
What remains of this count is that Dunn was discharged because

of her age. In service of this theory, Dunn alleges the following
facts. “An employee younger than Dunn was given significantly less
work and verbally treated better than Dunn.” ECF 1 at 5. And
“younger employees were not disciplined or terminated despite poor
performance or similar conduct for which [Dunn] was disciplined or
terminated.” Id. at 15.
Like with Title VII, to make out a prima facie case of age
discrimination under the ADEA, Dunn can show, inter alia, that
younger, similarly-situated employees were treated more favorably
than she was. Radue v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 219 F.3d 612, 617
(7th Cir. 2000) (overruled on other grounds by Ortiz v. Werner
Enterprises, Inc., 834 F.3d 760, 765–66 (7th Cir. 2016)). To do

that, the plaintiff must plead specific facts about those
employees, like “showing that [they] dealt with the same
supervisor, were subject to the same standards, and had engaged in
similar conduct without such differentiating or mitigating

13
circumstances” as would justify disparate treatment. Id. at 617–
18.
Here, Dunn has only gestured towards a prima facie case. She
has asserted that younger employees were better treated, but she
has failed to plead any facts about these younger employees (or

their supervisors or what standards they were subject to); instead,
she has given me “mere conclusory statements” which cannot survive
defendants’ motion to dismiss. Brooks, 578 F.3d at 581 (citing
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678).
3. Count XI—FMLA Retaliation
In Count XI, Dunn asserts that defendants violated her rights
under the FMLA by either denying her leave to which she was
entitled or by firing her in retaliation for taking FMLA leave.
ECF 1 at 17–18. In service of those assertions, Dunn pleads the
following facts. “In March of 2022, Dunn fell and was injured on
the job, injuring her hip. Dunn underwent surgery...and was
diagnosed with chronic bursitis.” Id. at 3. “On information and
belief, Dunn’s [bursitis] substantially limits her in one or more

major life activities.” Id. at 5. “At all relevant times, Dunn had
a ‘serious health condition,’” which was presumably her bursitis.
Id. In May 2023, “Dunn requested leave pursuant” to the FMLA, and
“[p]rior to being terminated in 2023, Dunn was given” FMLA leave.

14
Id. at 6. “On September 11, 2023, while Dunn was on family medical
leave,” defendants terminated her employment. Id.
Defendants argue that Dunn has failed to state a claim for
denial of FMLA leave, given that she pleads that CCDPH in fact
granted her leave. I agree. Defendants then argue that Dunn fails

to state a claim for retaliation because she fails to plead that
she was entitled to FMLA leave.
To make out an FMLA claim, an employee must show that “(1) he
was eligible under the FMLA, (2) his employer was covered by the
FMLA, (3) he was entitled to leave under the FMLA, (4) he provided
notice of his intent to take leave, and (5) his employer denied
him FMLA benefits to which he was entitled.” Lutes v. United
Trailers, Inc., 950 F.3d 359, 363 (7th Cir. 2020) (citing 29 U.S.C.
§ 2615). An employee is entitled to leave under the FMLA if “(1)
she is afflicted with a ‘serious health condition’ and (2) that
condition renders her unable to perform the functions of her job.”
Guzman v. Brown County, 884 F.3d 633, 638 (7th Cir. 2018). The

FMLA defines a “serious health condition” as “an illness, injury,
impairment, or physical or mental condition that involves—(A)
inpatient care in a hospital, hospice, or residential medical care
facility; or (B) continuing treatment by a health care provider.”
29 U.S.C. 2611(11).

15
As at Counts I and VII, the factual allegations Dunn offers
to support Count XI are vague and conclusory. She states that
“[a]t all relevant times” she had a “serious health condition,”
but other than noting that she had bursitis, she does not plead
that she had a condition requiring inpatient care or continuing

treatment as required by 29 U.S.C. § 2611(11). ECF 1 at 5. She
writes that her bursitis entitled her to FMLA leave, but at no
point does she plead that the condition rendered her unable to
perform her duties. Guzman, 833 F.3d at 638. Although she writes
that the bursitis impaired “one or more major life activities,”
she does not name which activities, and I cannot find on that basis
that she has pled that the bursitis made her incapable of work.
ECF 1 at 5. Dunn has failed to plead sufficient facts to survive
defendants’ Rule 12(b)(6) motion. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
4. Count XII—Retaliatory Discharge
At Count XII, Dunn alleges that defendants committed the
Illinois tort of retaliatory discharge. In service of that claim,
she alleges that on “August 28, 2023, [Dunn] filed a worker’s

compensation claim in Kathy Dunn v. Cook County Health Department
in 23WC022359,” and that on “December 17, 2012, [Dunn] had also
filed a worker’s compensation claim in Kathy Dunn v. Cook County
in 12WC043254.” Defendants argue first that the 2012 worker’s
compensation claim is too remote in time to be causally related to
16
Dunn’s firing in September 2023. Second, they attach a transcript
from another proceeding where Ms. Dunn apparently admits that the
CCDPH was already planning on firing her on August 25, 2023; thus,
they argue, her September firing could not have been retaliation
for an August claim for worker’s compensation.

To make out a claim for retaliatory termination for worker’s
compensation, an employee must show: “(1) that he was an employee
before the injury; (2) that he exercised a right granted by the
Worker’s Compensation Act; and (3) that he was discharged and the
discharge was causally related to his filing a claim under the
Workers’ Compensation Act.” Clemons v. Mechanical Devices Co., 704
N.E.2. 403, 335–36 (Ill. 1998).
Dunn has pled that she was an employee, was injured, and that
she exercised her rights under the Worker’s Compensation Act. Dunn
apparently filed her worker’s compensation claim after CCDPH
intimated that it would be firing her, but it is “well-established
that ‘[t]he fact that a plaintiff has not filed a [worker’s

compensation] claim in Illinois prior to her discharge does not
preclude her from bringing a retaliatory discharge cause of
action.’” Planell v. Whitehall North, LLC, 2015 IL App (1st)
140799, at *1, *14 (2015) (quoting Reinneck v. Taco Bell Corp.,
696 N.E.2d 839, 842 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998)). It is sufficient for a
plaintiff to plead that she “was discharged in anticipation of
17
[her] filing a worker’s compensation claim.” Fuentes v. Lear
Siegler, Inc., 529 N.E.2d 40, 42 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988).
Defendants argue that Dunn failed to plead that CCDPH was on
notice that she might file for worker’s compensation in August of
2023. But at that point, Dunn had filed for compensation once in

the past and had gone on FMLA leave for her bursitis. It was
reasonable to foresee that she might file for worker’s compensation
a second time. This is more than a threadbare recitation of the
elements of retaliatory discharge, and Count XII survives the
motion. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678
5. Count XIII—Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
In Count XIII, Dunn alleges that defendants committed the
Illinois tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress
(“IIED”). Beyond the facts pled at the preceding counts, Dunn adds
that defendants “engaged in truly extreme and outrageous conduct”
which was “intentional or so reckless that Defendants knew severe
emotional distress was substantially certain to result” and that
the conduct “caused [Dunn] to suffer severe emotional distress.”

ECF 1 at 20.
Defendants respond that Dunn’s IIED claim is barred by the
statute of limitations contained in Illinois’s Tort Immunity Act.
745 Ill. Comp. Stat. 10/8-101(a). I agree.

18
Dunn contends that the statute of limitations should have
been tolled because of actions defendants allegedly took in her
appeal of her firing with the Cook County Appeals Board. I do not
see how. If Dunn had been treated so egregiously as to warrant the
filing of an IIED claim, she would have been on notice immediately,
regardless of her action in front of the Appeals Board. As such,
her ITIED claim needed to be filed within a year of her firing in
September 2024. 745 Ill. Comp. Stat. 10/8-101 (a).
C. Punitive Damages
The parties agree that Dunn is not entitled to punitive
damages. As such, I strike her requests for punitive damages.
Iv.
I grant defendants’ motion to dismiss in part and deny it in
part. All claims at Count I other than Dunn’s discriminatory
discharge on account of her race are dismissed. Count XII survives
as pled. Counts II-XI and XIII are dismissed.

ENTER ORDER:

fo BudAm~
Elaine E. Bucklo
United States District Judge
Dated: January 21, 2026

19

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11245855. Public record. Not legal advice.