# King

> District Court, E.D. Missouri · January 23, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11245771

## Case

- **Full name:** Robert T. King v. City of St. Louis
- **Court:** District Court, E.D. Missouri
- **Decided:** January 23, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11245771

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- noting the City’s concession that it was the successor-in-interest to judgments incurred by the Board
- noting Rule 25(c) “is procedural only and does not affect the substantive rights of the parties”
- affirming substitution where plaintiff was unable to show “so much as a smidgen of prejudice stemming from the substitution of parties”

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
EASTERN DIVISION

ROBERT T. KING, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) Case No. 4:24-CV-1594-ZMB
)
CITY OF ST. LOUIS, )
)
Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on the St. Louis Board of Police Commissioners’s Motion for
Substitution of Parties and Substitution of Counsel, Docs. 16, 17, and its subsequent request to
withdraw those motions, Docs. 32, 33. Given the Board’s withdrawal of consent and the potential
prejudice that substitution could cause Plaintiff Robert T. King, the Court denies the motions to
substitute and denies as moot the Board’s motions to withdraw.
BACKGROUND
I. Factual Background
These instant motions are the latest salvo in a long-running battle between the City of St.
Louis and the State of Missouri over the St. Louis Metropolitan Police Department (SLMPD).
In 2012, a ballot initiative paved the way for a locally controlled police department to replace the
existing state-controlled Board of Police Commissioners. State ex rel. Hawley v. City of St. Louis,
531 S.W.3d 602, 604 (Mo. Ct. App. 2017). The referendum required the City to “adopt an
ordinance accepting responsibility, ownership, and liability as successor-in-interest for contractual
obligations, indebtedness, and other lawful obligations of the board of police commissioners,” MO.
REV. STAT. § 84.344 (2012), which it did in 2013, ST. LOUIS, MO., REV. CODE ch. 3.12.005 (2013).
Perhaps unsurprisingly, a disagreement arose as to whether the City had to accept all of the
Board’s liabilities as its successor-in-interest. Missouri courts broadly answered yes, requiring the
City to accept the Board’s obligations to indemnify former officers, among other liabilities. See,
e.g., Holmes v. Steelman, 624 S.W.3d 144, 147 (Mo. banc 2021); Banks v. Slay, 875 F.3d 876, 880
n.7 (8th Cir. 2017) (noting the City’s concession that it was the successor-in-interest to judgments
incurred by the Board). Efforts to recover on those old liabilities are still ongoing. Holmes v.
Zellers, 2025 WL 2110585, at *6 (Mo. Ct. App. July 29, 2025) (noting that the litigation over
responsibility for judgments “resembles three card monte”), transfer granted (Mo. Nov. 4, 2025).
After more than a decade of local oversight, the Missouri General Assembly enacted a
statute reasserting state control over the SLMPD in March 2025. MO. REV. STAT. § 84.325. Using
nearly identical language to the prior law transferring control to the City, the statute decrees that
the State would “accept responsibility, ownership, and liability as successor-in-interest for
contractual obligations and other lawful obligations of the municipal police department.” Compare
id., with MO. REV. STAT. § 84.344.4 (2012). While counsel for the Board initially agreed that the
Board members1 should be substituted in place of the City for the purposes of pending litigation
across a number of different cases, it reversed course after this Court issued an order finding that
the State had not assumed liabilities for injuries caused by the SLMPD during local control. Doc.
31 (citing Clark v. City of St. Louis, No. 4:21-CV-788-JMD, Doc. 212 (E.D. Mo. Sept. 30, 2025));
see also Gatlin v. Welle, No. 4:25-CV-43-ACL, 2026 WL 60356, at *3 (E.D. Mo. Jan. 5, 2026)

(concluding that “the statute did not transfer all of the City's liabilities to the State”). And now that
“the shoe is on the other foot,” the City has similarly insisted across multiple cases that the transfer
of control brings with it the assumption of liabilities. See, e.g., Doc. 34 at 2; Swink v. Love, No.
4:25-CV-569-ZMB, Doc. 40 at 32 (E.D. Mo. Oct. 10, 2025); Welle, 2026 WL 60356, at *2.

1 The Board itself is a non-suable entity. Edwards v. Baer, 863 F.2d 606, 609 (8th Cir. 1988). As such, jurisdiction
over the Board may be obtained only by suing the Board members in their official capacity. Doc. 23 ¶ 9. Any
references to the Board should be construed as references to the Board members in their official capacity.
II. Procedural Background
King originally filed his complaint in state court, and Defendants filed a timely Notice of
Removal in late 2024. Doc. 1. Following Defendants’ initial motion to dismiss, King amended his
complaint in June 2025. Docs. 4, 13. The operative complaint alleges that the SLMPD denied King

reasonable accommodation, benefits, and wages because of his disability, which was the direct
result of a work-related injury in 2018. Doc. 13 at 5. He further alleges that he was retaliated
against for seeking to enforce his rights under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and
Missouri Human Rights Act (MHRA). Id.
The Board filed a motion to substitute itself for the City following the SLMPD’s return to
state control. Doc. 16. After the ruling in Clark, however, the Board filed a motion to withdraw its
prior request for substitution. Doc. 33. The Court conducted a hearing on substitution and related
issues. Doc. 27; see also Swink, No. 4:25-CV-569-ZMB, Doc. 40. At the hearing, the Court granted
the Defendants’ partial motion to dismiss, leaving only the ADA and MHRA claims against the
City of St. Louis. Id. The City and Board submitted thorough post-hearing briefs. Docs. 31, 34.

LEGAL STANDARD
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(c) “permits substitutions when an interest is transferred
during a lawsuit.” ELCA Enters. v. Sisco Equip. Rental & Sales, 53 F.3d 186, 191 (8th Cir. 1995)
(internal alterations omitted). This procedure allows “an action to continue unabated when an
interest in a lawsuit changes hands, rather than requiring the initiation of an entirely new lawsuit.”
Id. (citation omitted). “The decision whether to substitute parties lies within the discretion of the
trial judge and he may refuse to substitute parties in an action even if one of the parties so moves.”
Froning’s, Inc. v. Johnston Feed Serv., 568 F.2d 108, 110 n.4 (8th Cir. 1978).
DISCUSSION
Based on the unique circumstances of this case, the Court finds that substitution under Rule
25(c) is not appropriate. Even ignoring the complex questions of statutory construction addressed
in Clark, substitution is not the appropriate mechanism for adding the Board given its withdrawal
of consent. Further, the Board’s position is that it has Eleventh Amendment immunity against the
ADA claims. As such, allowing the City to be substituted out of the case would unduly prejudice
King. That said, the City remains free to pursue dismissal, and nothing in this decision should be

read to foreclose other mechanisms of adding the Board, such as an amended complaint, joinder,
or impleader.
The most significant roadblock to substitution is the new position taken by the Board.
While previously asserting that it was the successor-in-interest to the City under MO. REV. STAT.
§ 84.325, see Doc. 16, the Board now accepts responsibility for only those obligations arising after
the SLMPD returned to state control, Doc. 31. The Court has been unable to locate any authority
supporting the substitution of a successor-in-interest over the objection of the alleged successor.2
Substitution is further complicated by the Board’s position that it has Eleventh Amendment
immunity against the ADA claims. Doc. 30 at 20–21. The key feature of a “substituted party” is
that it “merely steps into the same position of the original party.” C.F.C.S. Invs., LP v.
Transamerica Occidental Life Ins. Co., No. 4:16-CV-396-JAR, 2017 WL 282403, at *2 (E.D. Mo.
Jan. 23, 2017) (quotation omitted); see also ELCA Enters. 53 F.3d at 191 n.5 (emphasizing that a
substituted party “assumes an identical position . . . in the lawsuit”). But the Board would not simply
step into the City’s shoes because it intends to assert a defense otherwise unavailable to the City.

2 In any case, a defining feature of Rule 25(c) is that it is a procedural measure. Even absent substitution, if a party is
later found to be a successor-in-interest, “the judgment will be binding on the successor in interest even though the
successor is not named.” 7C WRIGHT & MILLER’S FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 1958 (3d ed. 1998); see also
In re Covington Grain Co., 638 F.2d 1357, 1361 (5th Cir. 1981) (noting Rule 25(c) “is procedural only and does not
affect the substantive rights of the parties”). If the Board is later determined to be a successor in interest, any judgment
obtained against the City automatically would transfer and be binding upon the Board.
As such, allowing substitution risks prejudicing King. Couf v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc’y,
2003 WL 27384629, at *2 (D. Minn. Dec. 17, 2003) (“Substitution may be permitted as long as it
will not affect either party’s substantive rights.” (citing ELCA Enters. 53 F.3d at 191); cf Potvin
v. Speedway LLC, 891 F.3d 410, 416 (1st Cir. 2018) (affirming substitution where plaintiff was
unable to show “so much as a smidgen of prejudice stemming from the substitution of parties”).
Thus, at this juncture, the City is the only remaining Defendant—with King’s ADA and MHRA
claims still pending against it. See Doc. 27.
As noted above, this order should not be construed to limit other mechanisms for removing
the City or adding the Board. If the City believes the allegations against it are insufficient—as
King may agree based on his statements at the hearing, Doc. 30 at 10—it can advance that
argument in a motion to dismiss. And while the Court had anticipated the Board would be added
to the case at the hearing, Doc. 30 at 26, nothing prevents King from moving to amend the
complaint to add the Board members in their official capacity (or any other parties he believes are
relevant) given that the Board subsequently changed its position, see Docs. 31-33.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, the Court DENIES the Board of Police Commissioners’s [16] Motion to
Substitute Parties and [17] Substitution of Counsel. Further, the Court DENIES as moot the
Board’s [32] Withdrawal of Request for Substitution of Counsel, and [33] Withdrawal of Motion
for Substitution of Parties.
So ordered this 23rd day of January 2026.
Qt._ ie
ZACHARY M. BLUESTONE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11245771. Public record. Not legal advice.