# Opinion

> District Court, M.D. Florida · January 9, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11245597

## Case

- **Full name:** Jane Doe (J.T.A.) v. Wyndham Hotels & Resorts, Inc., et al.
- **Court:** District Court, M.D. Florida
- **Decided:** January 9, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

JANE DOE (J.T.A.), Civil Action No. 25-00687 (SDW) (JSA)
Plaintiff,
OPINION
v.
WYNDHAM HOTELS & RESORTS, January 9, 2026
INC., et al.,
Defendants.
WIGENTON, District Judge.
Before this Court is Defendant Quest Airport Hotel LLC’s (“Franchisee Defendant” or

“Quest”) Motion to Dismiss (D.E. 20) Plaintiff Jane Doe (J.T.A.)’s (“Plaintiff”) Complaint (D.E.
1 (“Compl.”)) pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 12(b)(2), (b)(3), and (b)(6).
This opinion is issued without oral argument in accordance with Rule 78 and Local Civil Rule
78.1. For the reasons stated herein, Franchisee Defendant’s Motion is GRANTED IN PART and
DENIED IN PART. This Court transfers the instant matter to the United States District Court for
the Middle District of Florida.1
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

1 Franchisee Defendant adopts and incorporates the arguments set forth in Franchisor Defendants,
Wyndham Hotels & Resorts, Inc., Wyndham Hotel Group, LLC, and Ramada Worldwide Inc.’s
Motion to Dismiss (D.E. 9) pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). In its Opinion dated September 24, 2025,
this Court denied Franchisor Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss. (D.E. 26.) As such, this Court
declines to address the merits of the Motion to Dismiss.
Plaintiff alleges that from 2013 through 2015, she was trafficked at the Orlando Ramada
Inn located at 7500 Augusta National Dr, Orlando, FL 32822 (the “Subject Ramada”). (Compl.
¶¶ 16, 26.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendants, Wyndham Hotels & Resorts, Inc., Wyndham Hotel
Group, LLC, and Ramada Worldwide Inc. (“Franchisor Defendants”), along with Franchisee

Defendant “owned, operated, controlled and/or managed” the Subject Ramada and facilitated
Plaintiff’s sexual exploitation. (Id. ¶¶ 16–17; ¶ 7.) Franchisor Defendants all have their principal
place of business in Parsippany, New Jersey. (Id. ¶ 21.) Franchisee Defendant is a Florida limited
liability company (“LLC”) with its principal place of business in Florida. (Id. ¶ 17.) Plaintiff
alleges that Franchisee Defendant owned the Subject Ramada during the years she was trafficked.
(Id.)
On January 23, 2025, Plaintiff initiated this lawsuit, alleging violations of the Trafficking
Victims Protection Reauthorization Act (“TVPRA”), 18 U.S.C. §§ 1591 and 1595. (D.E. 1.)
Plaintiff alleges she is “a victim of sex trafficking” under the TVPRA and seeks compensation for
the harms stemming from the alleged TVPRA violations. (Compl. ¶ 9.) Count I alleges that

Franchisee Defendant is liable as a perpetrator; Count II alleges that all Defendants are liable as
beneficiaries and Count III asserts that Franchisor Defendants are vicariously liable for the acts of
their franchisees and those franchisees’ subagents. (Id. at ¶¶ 125–138.)
On May 15, 2025, Franchisee Defendant moved to dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint under
Rules 12(b)(2), 12(b)(3), and 12(b)(6), arguing that: (1) this Court lacks personal jurisdiction; (3)
venue is not proper in the District of New Jersey; and (3) that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim
against it. (D.E. 15.) The parties timely completed briefing.
II. LEGAL STANDARD2
When reviewing a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(2), courts “must accept all of the
plaintiff’s allegations as true and construe disputed facts in favor of the plaintiff.” Carteret Sav.
Bank, FA v. Shushan, 954 F.2d 141, 142 n.1 (3d Cir. 1992). Once a jurisdictional defense is raised,

the plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating the facts necessary to establish personal jurisdiction
and “must prov[e] by affidavits or other competent evidence that jurisdiction is proper.” Metcalfe
v. Renaissance Marine, Inc., 566 F.3d 324, 330 (3d Cir. 2009) (alteration in original) (quoting
Dayhoff Inc. v. H.J. Heinz Co., 86 F.3d 1287, 1302 (3d Cir. 1996)). If the court does not hold an
evidentiary hearing, a plaintiff need only present “a prima facie case for the exercise of personal
jurisdiction by ‘establishing with reasonable particularity sufficient contacts between the
defendant and the forum state.’” Mellon Bank (E.) PSFS, Nat’l Ass’n v. Farino, 960 F.2d 1217,
1223 (3d Cir. 1992) (quoting Provident Nat’l Bank v. Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 819 F.2d 434,
437 (3d Cir. 1987)).

Rule 12(b)(3) provides that a motion to dismiss may be made on the basis of improper
venue. In the Third Circuit, the burden of demonstrating improper venue is placed on the
defendant. See Myers v. Am. Dental Ass'n, 695 F.2d 716, 724–25 (3d Cir. 1982). When a court
concludes that venue is improper, it may dismiss the case or transfer it to another district pursuant
to Section 1406(a). Ferratex, Inc. v. U.S. Sewer & Drain, Inc., 121 F. Supp. 3d 432, 436 (D.N.J.
2015); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) (“The district court of a district in which is filed a case laying
venue in the wrong division or district shall dismiss, or if it be in the interest of justice, transfer
such case to any district or division in which it could have been brought.”).

2 Because this Court does not reach the Rule 12(b)(6) arguments raised in Franchisee Defendant’s
Motion, the Rule 12(b)(6) standard is omitted.
III. DISCUSSION
Franchisee Defendant contends that Plaintiff’s Complaint against it should be dismissed
for lack of personal jurisdiction and improper venue. (Mov. Br. at 10–22.) Franchisee Defendant
argues there is neither general nor specific personal jurisdiction and that venue is improper because

the events giving rise to Plaintiff’s claims occurred outside of New Jersey. (Id.) This Court
addresses each argument in turn.
A. Personal Jurisdiction
Federal courts in New Jersey exercise personal jurisdiction to the extent permitted by New
Jersey law. See Miller Yacht Sales, Inc. v. Smith, 384 F.3d 93, 96 (3d Cir. 2004). New Jersey’s
long-arm statute provides for the exercise of personal jurisdiction over non-residents “to the
uttermost limits permitted by the United States Constitution.” Charles Gendler & Co. v. Telecom
Equip. Corp., 508 A.2d 1127, 1131 (N.J. 1986) (quoting Avdel Corp. v. Mecure, 277 A.2d 207, 209
(N.J. 1971)). “Personal jurisdiction under the Due Process Clause depends upon ‘the relationship
among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation.’” IMO Indus. v. Kiekert AG, 155 F.3d 254, 259

(3d Cir. 1998) (quoting Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 204 (1977)). Courts in New Jersey “look
to federal law for the interpretation of the limits” on personal jurisdiction. Id. (citing Mesalic v.
Fiberfloat Corp., 897 F.2d 696, 698 n.5 (3d Cir. 1990)).
i. General Jurisdiction
Under the Constitution, personal jurisdiction can be established either through general or
specific jurisdiction. Bristol-Myers Squibb v. Superior Ct. of Cal., 582 U.S. 255, 262 (2017).
General jurisdiction exists when a defendant’s “affiliations with the State are so ‘continuous and
systematic’ as to render them essentially at home in the forum State.” Daimler AG v. Bauman,
571 U.S. 117, 127 (2014) (quoting Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S.
915, 919 (2011)). To support general jurisdiction, a defendant’s “contacts [with the forum state]
need not relate to the subject matter of the litigation,” but must rise to “a ‘very high threshold of
business activity.’” Ameripay, LLC v. Ameripay Payroll, Ltd., 334 F. Supp. 2d 629, 633 (D.N.J.
2004) (quoting Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinea v. Ins. Co. of N. America, 651 F.2d 877, 891

n.2 (3d Cir. 1981)).
Franchisee Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to establish it is “at home” in
New Jersey, particularly where the Complaint asserts the Franchisee Defendant’s state of
registration, principal place of business, and registered agent are in Florida. (Mov. Br. at 12.)
Corporations are generally deemed “at home” in their place of incorporation and principal place
of business. Daimler, 571 U.S. at 137; see Canal Ins. Co. v. Fema Trucking, LLC, No. 20-17953,
2022 WL 3227188, at *4 (D.N.J. Aug. 20, 2022) (“[G]eneral jurisdiction over a limited liability
company only tends to exist in its state of citizenship.”). For purposes of general personal
jurisdiction, Franchisee Defendant is deemed “at home” in Florida, not New Jersey. Thus, this
Court lacks general jurisdiction over Franchisee Defendant.

ii. Specific Jurisdiction
Franchisee Defendant argues that entering into a franchise agreement with a New Jersey-
based entity does not provide plausible grounds to confer this Court with jurisdiction. (Mov. Br.
at 13.) Further, Franchisee Defendant emphasizes that “the alleged unlawful conduct that forms
the foundation of Plaintiff’s claims against [Franchise Defendant] occurred exclusively within the
borders of Florida, not New Jersey.” (Id. at 15.) Plaintiff counters that her Complaint adequately
pleads specific jurisdiction over Franchisee LLC. (Opp. Brief at 6.)
Specific jurisdiction exists when a plaintiff’s claim “arises from or relates to conduct
purposely directed at the forum state.” Marten v. Godwin, 499 F.3d 290, 296 (3d Cir. 2007) (citing
Helicopteros Nacionales de Colom., S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414–15 & n.9 (1984)). The
specific jurisdiction inquiry has three steps and is conducted on a claim-by-claim basis. Id. First,
a defendant must have “purposefully directed his activities” at the forum. Id. (quoting Burger
King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472 (1985)). Second, the plaintiff’s claim must “‘arise

out of or relate to’ at least one of those specific activities.” Id. (citing Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at
414). Third, courts consider whether the exercise of jurisdiction otherwise comports with “fair
play and substantial justice.” Burger King, 471 U.S. at 476. As applied to this case, Plaintiff must
show that Franchisee Defendant purposefully availed itself of the privilege of conducting activities
in New Jersey and that her claims arise out of Franchisee Defendant’s contacts with New Jersey.
See Hasson v. FullStory, Inc., 114 F.4th 181, 193 (3d Cir. 2024).
Here, Franchisee Defendant purposefully availed itself of this forum by entering a
franchising relationship with Franchisor Defendants. See Burger King, 471 U.S. at 480–82
(holding that a restaurant franchisee in Michigan purposefully availed himself of the forum state
of Florida by “negotiat[ing] with a Florida corporation for the purchase of a long-term franchise”).

However, Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to establish that her TVPRA violation claim proceeding under
a beneficiary theory of liability as to Franchisee Defendant arises out of or relates to Franchisee
Defendant’s activities in this forum. Prong two requires “a strong ‘relationship among the
defendant, the forum, and the litigation.’” Hepp v. Facebook, 14 F.4th 204, 208 (3d Cir. 2021)
(emphasis added) (quoting Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 414). In assessing the strength of the
relatedness of Plaintiff’s claims to this forum, Bristol-Myers is particularly instructive.
In Bristol-Myers, a group of plaintiffs consisting of both California and non-California
residents filed suit in California alleging that the defendant Bristol-Myers Squibb Company’s
(“BMS”) drug, Plavix, “had damaged their health.” Bristol-Myers, 582 U.S. at 259. BMS,
although incorporated in Delaware and headquartered in New York, also engaged in business
activities in California—maintaining five research and laboratory facilities and employing around
one-hundred-sixty employees. Id. at 258–59. Despite such business activities, the Supreme Court
found California courts lacked specific jurisdiction over the non-California residents’ claims

because “a connection between the forum and the specific claims at issue” was missing. Id. at
265. The Court noted that the nonresidents were not prescribed, did not purchase, did not ingest,
and were not injured by Plavix in California. Id. at 264.
Here, Plaintiff relies on the fact that the franchise agreement between the parties was
governed by New Jersey law and that said agreement’s requirements as to making reservations,
processing payments, collecting and reviewing feedback, and creating and reviewing property-
management, guest, and revenue data meant Franchisee Defendant was continuously interacting
with Franchisor Defendants, essentially amounting to a “venture” under the TVPRA. (Opp. Br. at
8–10.) As an example, Plaintiff notes that Franchisee used New Jersey-based systems to process
payments and the day-to-day operations at the Subject Ramada occurred under detailed policies

and directives created and enforced by Wyndham from New Jersey (Id.)
As in Bristol-Myers, where the non-California residents did not purchase and were not
injured by Plavix in California, this Court similarly finds that the connection between the conduct
underlying Plaintiff’s claim and this forum is too attenuated to find specific personal jurisdiction.
Although Franchisee Defendant may have used Franchisor Defendants’ systems in carrying out
certain actions, the conduct “at the core of the alleged ventures,” namely, “the rental of rooms to
sex traffickers,” occurred in Florida. Plaintiff’s reliance on Franchisee Defendant’s routine
interactions with Franchisor Defendants by virtue of their ongoing business relationship also does
not constitute a strong connection to Plaintiff’s venture claim. Jurisdiction must be established on
the basis of each defendant’s own contact with a given forum. See Walden v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277,
286 (2014) (“To be sure, a defendant’s contacts with the forum State may be intertwined with his
transactions or interactions with the plaintiff or other parties. But a defendant’s relationship with
a plaintiff or third party, standing alone, is an insufficient basis for jurisdiction.”).

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to establish that her claim arises out of or is related
to Franchisee Defendant’s activities in New Jersey. Thus, this Court concludes Plaintiff has not
made a prima facie case of personal jurisdiction as it relates to Franchisee Defendant.
B. Appropriate Remedy
Having concluded that this Court lacks personal jurisdiction over Franchisee Defendant,
the next question is the appropriate disposition of the case. “[A] district court that lacks personal
jurisdiction must at least consider a transfer.” Danziger & De Llano, LLP v. Morgan Verkamp
LLC, 948 F.3d 124, 132 (3d Cir. 2020). When a civil action is filed in a court that lacks jurisdiction,
“the court shall, if it is in the interests of justice, transfer such action . . . to any other such court in
which the action . . . could have been brought at the time it was filed.” 28 U.S.C. § 1631. Section

1404(a) permits a court to sua sponte transfer a civil action from one proper venue to another
proper venue. Jumara v. State Farm Ins. Co., 55 F.3d 873, 878 (3d Cir. 1995). Conversely,
Section 1406 applies when the original venue is improper. Id. at 878.
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b), a civil action may be brought in:
(1) a judicial district in which any defendant resides, if all
defendants are residents of the State in which the district is
located;
(2) a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or
omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or a substantial part
of property that is the subject of the action is situated; or

(3) if there is no district in which an action may otherwise be
brought as provided in this section, any judicial district in
which any defendant is subject to the court's personal
jurisdiction with respect to such action.
Here, Franchisee Defendant argues that venue is improper because Franchisee Defendant is not
domiciled in New Jersey and is not subject to this Court’s personal jurisdiction. (Mov. Br. at 22.)
Further, Franchisee Defendant notes that a substantial part of the events giving rise to Plaintiff’s
claims occurred in Florida, not New Jersey. (Id.) Plaintiff counters that venue is proper because
this Court has specific jurisdiction over Franchisee Defendant. However, as previously mentioned,
this Court lacks personal jurisdiction over Franchisee Defendant, thus venue is not proper pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(3). This Court also finds that venue is not proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1391(b)(1) or (2) because Franchisee Defendant is not a resident of New Jersey and a substantial

part of Plaintiff’s sex trafficking claims occurred in Florida, not New Jersey.
Given that venue is improper in the District of New Jersey, this Court will proceed pursuant
to Section 1406. Jumara, 55 F.3d at 878. Section 1406(a) reads: “The district court of a district
in which is filed a case laying venue in the wrong division or district shall dismiss, or if it be in the
interest of justice, transfer such case to any district or division in which it could have been
brought.” Section 1406(a) is intended to preserve claims that might otherwise be barred by the
rigid application of dismissal rules. Lafferty v. St. Riel, 495 F.3d 72, 79 (3d Cir. 2007) (citation
omitted). “Transfer is generally more in the interest of justice than dismissal.” Binks v. U.S. Tech
Solutions, No. 20-02969, 2020 WL 6701470, at *3 (D.N.J. Nov. 12, 2020) (citations omitted); see
also Bockman v. First Am. Mktg. Corp., 459 F. App'x 157, 162 n.11 (3d Cir. 2012) (citation

omitted) (“Transfer in lieu of dismissal is generally appropriate to avoid penalizing plaintiffs by
‘time-consuming and justice-defeating technicalities.’”).
This Court finds that interests of justice favor transferring this matter to Florida. Franchisee
Defendant is a Florida LLC with its principal place of business in Florida as well. (Compl. ¶ 17.)
The vast majority of facts underlying this case occurred in Florida. Presumably, witnesses—such
as hotel staff—and evidence are also in Florida. Additionally, considering judicial economy and
the TVPRA’s purposes of combatting trafficking, ensuring “just and effective punishment of
traffickers,” and victim protection, this Court deems the transfer of this case to the United States

District Court for the Middle District of Florida proper. H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 106-939, at 3 (2000);
see Doe v. Choice Hotels Int’l, Inc., No. 24-1598, 2025 WL 2108792, at *12 (D. Md. July 28,
2025) (“[T[he [c]ourt finds that its lack of personal jurisdiction over [franchisee] GP4, a key party
in this litigation, strongly counsels in favor of transferring this case to the Middle District of
Florida, a proper venue where, as acknowledged at the hearing by Defendants, personal
jurisdiction would exist over both GP4 and [franchisor] Choice.”); Doe v. Choice Hotels Int’l, Inc.,
No. 24-2836, 2025 WL 2430024, at *6–7 (D. Md. Aug. 22, 2025) (affording minimal weight to
the plaintiff’s choice of venue where the alleged trafficking occurred in Wisconsin, the same state
as Plaintiff’s domicile, and transferring the case to Wisconsin).
CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, Defendant Quest Airport Hotel LLC’s Motion to Dismiss is
GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART in that this Court finds it lacks personal
jurisdiction over Quest but will transfer the claims against it to the United States District Court for
the Middle District of Florida.3 This Court also transfers the case against the Franchisor
Defendants to the Middle District of Florida. This Court does not address the merits of
Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). An appropriate order follows.

/s/ Susan D. Wigenton
SUSAN D. WIGENTON, U.S.D.J.

3 This Court declines to address the parties’ arguments concerning jurisdictional discovery in light of its
finding that transferring the case is the appropriate remedy.
Orig: Clerk
cc: Jessica S. Allen, U.S.M.J.
Parties

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11245597. Public record. Not legal advice.