# Burgess

> District Court, M.D. Tennessee · January 22, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11245145

## Case

- **Full name:** Monsieur Shawnellias Burgess v. Doji, Inc. et al.
- **Court:** District Court, M.D. Tennessee
- **Decided:** January 22, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11245145

## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
NASHVILLE DIVISION

MONSIEUR SHAWNELLIAS )
BURGESS, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) Case No. 3:25-cv-00495
) Judge Aleta A. Trauger
DOJI, INC. et al., )
)
Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM & ORDER
Before the court are (1) plaintiff Monsieur Shawnellias Burgess’s “Objections to the
Magistrate Judge’s Order Filed on 10/23/25 (Docket #46)” (Doc. No. 49), which seeks review of
a nondispositive Order (Doc. No. 46) entered by the Magistrate Judge, ruling on several
miscellaneous motions filed by Burgess; and (2) Burgess’s Objections (Doc. No. 50) to the
Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation (“R&R”) filed on October 27, 2025 (Doc. No.
48). The defendants filed Responses to both sets of Objections (Doc. Nos. 52, 56), and the plaintiff
seeks permission to file Reply briefs in further support of his Objections (Doc. Nos. 54, 57).
For the reasons set forth herein, the plaintiff’s Objections (Doc. Nos. 49 and 50) will both
be OVERRULED. The court will also GRANT the plaintiff’s motions for leave to file reply briefs
(Doc. Nos. 54, 57).
In addition, the court hereby WITHDRAWS the referral to the Magistrate Judge of several
pending motions (Doc. Nos. 51, 64, 66, 73, 71, and 76) and will rule directly on those motions.
I. STANDARD OF REVIEW
A. Nondispositive Orders
Within fourteen days after being served with a magistrate judge’s order on a matter not
dispositive of a party’s claim or defense, any party “may serve and file objections” to the order.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a).1 The district judge “must consider timely objections and modify or set aside
any part of the order that is clearly erroneous or is contrary to law.” Id.; see also 28 U.S.C. §

636(b)(1)(A) (“A judge of the court may reconsider any [nondispositive] pretrial matter . . . where
it has been shown that the magistrate judge’s order is clearly erroneous or contrary to law.”).
“This standard requires the District Court to review findings of fact for clear error and to
review matters of law de novo.” Bisig v. Time Warner Cable, Inc., 940 F.3d 205, 219 (6th Cir.
2019). A legal conclusion is contrary to law if it “fails to apply or misapplies relevant statutes, case
law, or rules of procedure.” Id. “A [factual] finding is ‘clearly erroneous’ when[,] although there
is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and
firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” Id. (citation omitted).
Review under the “clearly erroneous” standard “provides considerable deference to the

determinations of magistrates.” Bonasera v. Penn. Nat’l Mut. Cas. Ins. Co., No. 2:19-CV-3817,
2021 WL 1785618, at *1 (S.D. Ohio May 5, 2021) (quoting Langenfeld v. Armstrong World Indus.,
Inc., 299 F.R.D. 547, 550 (S.D. Ohio 2014)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Magistrate judges
“have broad discretion to regulate nondispositive matters.” Sherrod v. Enigma Software Grp. USA,
LLC, No. 2:13-CV-36, 2014 WL 309948, at *2 (S.D. Ohio Jan. 28, 2014) (quoting Carmona v.

1 Although Rule 72(a) directs parties to file and serve “objections” to a magistrate judge’s
order on a non-dispositive matter, this court’s Local Rules, for docket-management reasons, directs
parties objecting to a non-dispositive magistrate judge order to file a “motion for review.” L.R.
72.01(a).
Wright, 233 F.R.D. 270, 276 (N.D.N.Y. 2006)). Reversal is typically warranted only if that
discretion is abused. Id.; see also 12 Fed. Prac. & Proc. Civ. § 3069 (3d ed.) (“In sum, it is
extremely difficult to justify alteration of the magistrate judge’s nondispositive actions by the
district judge.”).

B. Report and Recommendation on Dispositive Motion
Rule 72(b)(2) provides for the filing of objections to a Magistrate Judge’s report and
recommendation on a dispositive matter. The district court must review de novo any portion of the
report and recommendation “that has been properly objected to.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3). In
conducting its review, the district court “may accept, reject, or modify the recommended
disposition; receive further evidence; or return the matter to the magistrate judge with
instructions.” Id.
However, the district court is not required to review—under a de novo or any other
standard—those aspects of the report and recommendation to which no objection is made. Thomas
v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 150 (1985). The district court should adopt the magistrate judge’s findings
and rulings to which no specific objection is filed. Id. at 151. “The filing of vague, general, or

conclusory objections does not meet the requirement of specific objections and is tantamount to a
complete failure to object.” Cole v. Yukins, 7 F. App’x 354, 356 (6th Cir. 2001); see also Langley
v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 502 F.3d 475, 483 (6th Cir. 2007) (issues raised in a “perfunctory
manner, unaccompanied by some effort at developed argumentation,” are waived (quoting Indeck
Energy Servs., Inc. v. Consumers Energy Co., 250 F.3d 972, 979 (6th Cir. 2000))). Likewise, “[a]
general objection to the entirety” of a magistrate judge’s report and recommendation has the same
effect as a complete failure to object. Howard v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 932 F.2d 505,
509 (6th Cir. 1991). Finally, arguments made in an objection to a magistrate judge’s report and
recommendation that were not first presented to the magistrate judge for consideration are deemed
waived. Murr v. United States, 200 F.3d 895, 902 n.1 (6th Cir. 2000).
Although pro se pleadings and filings are held to less stringent standards than those drafted
by lawyers, see, e.g., Williams v. Curtin, 631 F.3d 380, 383 (6th Cir. 2011), pro se litigants are not
entirely exempt from the requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See, e.g., Wells v.

Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 1989).
II. BACKGROUND
Burgess, an “African American/Native American,” filed his pro se Complaint initiating
this case on May 1, 2025 and his First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) on June 2, 2025, asserting
claims against defendants DOJI, Inc. (“DOJI”), Brandy Worman, and Jane Doe. (Doc. No. 16 at
1.) He alleges generally that DOJI operates a restaurant in Murfreesboro, Tennessee, that Worman
is the general manager of the restaurant, and that Jane Doe was a server at the restaurant. On April
17, 2025, the plaintiff, who was a regular at the restaurant, was asked by Worman to leave and told
that he would not be served, because his “last server complained regarding his behavior.” (Id. at
6.) Worman would not tell him which server had complained about him or provide additional
details, but she “alluded to sexual harassment” and threatened to call the police if the plaintiff did

not leave. (Id.) The plaintiff collected his belongings and advised Worman that he “would have to
sue for this behavior.” (Id.) Worman responded by calling the plaintiff “the ‘N’ word” and
demanding that he leave. (Id.) The plaintiff asserts that the allegations of harassment and sexual
harassment are false and that his ejection and banishment from the restaurant were based on his
race.
Based on these allegations, the plaintiff asserts claims against all three defendants under
42 U.S.C. § 1981 and Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, asserted that the defendants refused
to serve him based on race. He also asserts claims for discrimination and “aiding and abetting”
under the Tennessee Human Rights Act (“THRA”), Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-21-101 et seq., and state
common law claims for defamation, negligence, and fraudulent misrepresentation. He seeks
injunctive relief and damages.
III. MOTION FOR REVIEW OF NON-DISPOSITIVE ORDER
Both before and after filing the FAC, the plaintiff filed numerous motions. The Magistrate
Judge’s non-dispositive Order dated October 23, 2025 (“nondispositive Order”) ruled on several

of these, specifically (1) denying as moot the plaintiff’s motion for a jury demand (Doc. No. 6),
because the original Complaint and civil cover sheet already contained a jury demand; (2) denying
as premature the plaintiff’s Motion to Compel (Doc. No. 8), which seeks to compel Worman to
disclose Jane Doe’s identity; (3) denying for lack of standing the plaintiff’s Motion to Disqualify
[opposing] Counsel (Doc. No. 17); (4) denying as improper, premature, and unnecessary plaintiff’s
Motion to Join Jane Doe (Doc. No. 21); (5) construing the plaintiff’s Motion to Strike (Doc. No.
36) the defendants’ two Motions to Strike (Doc. Nos. 28 and 31) as a response to the defendants’
Motions to Strike, which the Magistrate Judge denied by separate Order (see Doc. No. 45) and
denying the plaintiff’s Motion to Strike as unnecessary; and (6) denying as improper the plaintiff’s
two duplicative Motions for Sanctions (Doc. Nos. 41 and 42), which are based on the defendants’

purportedly purposeful concealment of Jane Doe’s identity. (Doc. No. 46.)
The plaintiff objects to many of these rulings.2 He contends that (1) the Magistrate Judge
abused his discretion in denying the Motion to Compel; (2) the denial of his Motion to Disqualify
Counsel was erroneous because the “fairness and integrity of the proceedings are affected” by the
defendants’ being represented by the same counsel; (3) his Motion to Join Jane Doe is an example

2 The plaintiff also objects to the Magistrate Judge’s purported failure to rule on the
plaintiff’s Motion for Extension of Time to Serve Jane Doe (Doc. No. 29). (See Doc. No. 49 at 2.)
In fact, the Magistrate Judge granted the plaintiff’s motion the same day the plaintiff filed his
Objections. (Doc. No. 47.)
of his diligence in seeking to identify and serve her in a timely fashion; and (4) his Motions for
Sanctions should be granted, because the defendants are “us[ing] procedural tactics to frustrate
serve or evade the plaintiff’s rights under Rule 4(m)” by “withholding [Jane Doe’s] identity until
written discovery while representing multiple defendants jointly with the intent to later represent

the unnamed defendant” (Doc. No. 49 at 6, 12). The plaintiff also states that he does not know
“why the Magistrate [Judge] is upset with him” and asks that the case be reassigned to a different
Magistrate Judge, since the current Magistrate Judge has indicated that he has “reached his limit
on ‘lenient treatment.’” (Id. at 15; see also Doc. No. 46 at 3 (“The ‘lenient treatment generally
accorded to pro se litigants has limits.’ The undersigned is fast approaching those limits.” (quoting
Pilgrim v. Littlefield, 92 F. 3d 413, 416 (6th Cir. 1996)).)
The plaintiff’s Objections fail to show that the nondispositive Order contains a clear error
of law or that the Magistrate Judge abused his discretion. The Objections, therefore, are
OVERRULED, and the nondispositive Order is AFFIRMED.
The plaintiff’s request for the assignment of a different Magistrate Judge is DENIED. The

Magistrate Judge clearly stated that he was frustrated by the plaintiff’s failure to comply with the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in the filing of multiple unnecessary and non-meritorious
motions. The plaintiff has not shown that he will be or has been treated unfairly, but his continuous
filing of unnecessary motions is hindering rather than furthering his case.
IV. OBJECTIONS TO THE R&R
Defendants DOJI and Worman (the “moving defendants”)3 filed an initial motion for
partial dismissal (Doc. No. 13) that was rendered moot by the filing of the FAC. Following the

3 Defendant Jane Doe, who has not been identified or served, has obviously not yet entered
an appearance in this lawsuit and therefore does not join in the moving defendants’ motion.
However, the rulings herein also pertain to the claims against her.
FAC, the moving defendants filed the Partial Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s First Amended
Complaint and Memorandum of Law in Support (Doc. No. 22), invoking Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) and arguing that: (1) the plaintiff’s discrimination claim under the
THRA should be dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction; (2) the “aiding and abetting”

claim under the THRA should be dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and failure to
state a claim; (3) the defamation, conspiracy to defame, negligence, and fraudulent
misrepresentation claims should all be dismissed for failure to state a claim. (See generally Doc.
No. 22.) The moving defendants do not seek the dismissal of the plaintiff’s discrimination claims
under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and Title II.
The R&R recommends that the moving defendants’ motion be granted in part and denied
in part. Specifically, the R&R finds that the moving defendants’ argument that the federal courts
lack jurisdiction to consider the plaintiff’s THRA discrimination claim to be without merit and
recommends that that portion of their motion be denied. However, the Magistrate Judge also finds
that the plaintiff’s “aiding and abetting” claim, through which he seeks to bring THRA

discrimination claims against Worman and Jane Doe individually, are barred by clearly established
Tennessee law.
The R&R also finds that the plaintiff’s defamation claim is subject to dismissal based on
the plaintiff’s failure to plead the publication element and that his conspiracy claim fails because
the underlying defamation claim must be dismissed. It recommends dismissal of the negligence
claim based on the plaintiff’s inability to plausibly plead the existence of a duty of investigation
on the part of the DOJI or Worman and recommends that his fraudulent misrepresentation claim
be dismissed because the plaintiff does not allege that he relied on any alleged misrepresentation.
The plaintiff has filed Objections to the R&R, which the court rules on as follows.
C. THRA Aiding and Abetting Claim
The plaintiff does not object to the dismissal of his aiding and abetting claim against
Worman and Doe, effectively conceding that “individual liability for aiding and abetting under the
THRA is no longer available for actions accruing after July 1, 2014.” (Doc. No. 50 at 2.) However,
he believes that the aiding and abetting claim against DOJI should be permitted to proceed. He is

incorrect. Aiding and abetting provided a basis for individual liability only. DOJI cannot be
charged with aiding and abetting itself, and, in any event, after July 1, 2014, the statute itself no
longer contains language pertaining to aiding and abetting. The plaintiff’s objection to the
dismissal of the “aiding and abetting” claim is OVERRULED.
D. Defamation
Under Tennessee law, the tort of defamation encompasses both libel and slander. Brown v.
Christian Bros. Univ., 428 S.W.3d 38, 50 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2013). Only slander is at issue in this
case. “Slander is ‘the speaking of base and defamatory words which tend to prejudice another in
his reputation, office, trade, business, or means of livelihood.’” Id. (quoting Little Stores v.
Isenberg, 172 S.W.2d 13, 16 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1943)).

The elements of a slander claim are that: “(1) a party published a statement; (2) with
knowledge that the statement was false and defaming to the other; or (3) with reckless disregard
for the truth of the statement or with negligence in failing to ascertain the truth of the statement.”
Id. (citations omitted). Publication, meaning the communication of defamatory matter to a third
person, is an essential element of a slander claim. Id. “It is an ‘elementary rule’ in Tennessee that
‘publication’ is “an essential element of a [defamation] action without which a complaint must be
dismissed.’” Z.J. v. Vanderbilt Univ., 355 F. Supp. 3d 646, 687 (M.D. Tenn. 2018) (Crenshaw,
C.J.) (quoting Woods v. Helmi, M.D.A., 758 S.W.2d 219, 222–23 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1988)).
The R&R finds that the FAC alleges only that Worman and/or Jane Doe communicated
“the fabricated claim of sexual harassment” to DOJI’s president, Peter Demos, and that DOJI
further defamed the plaintiff when it “advise[d] its employees of the fabricated claim of sexual
harassment and ban[ned] Plaintiff from the restaurant.” (Doc. No. 48 at 6 (quoting Doc. No. 16 at

9.) The R&R concludes that the “alleged discussion amongst the company and its employees does
not satisfy the publication requirement.” (Id. at 7 (citation omitted).)
The R&R also finds that the plaintiff’s allegations that Worman’s false statement in the
middle of a busy restaurant in front of customers and employees does not, contrary to the plaintiff’s
argument, satisfy the publication element, because the plaintiff does not plead facts showing that
any customers heard or understood the statements allegedly made by the defendants, and he does
not attempt to identify any of the bystanders who might have overheard the accusation. (Id.)
The plaintiff objects, arguing that the R&R is clearly erroneous because his allegations are
sufficient to give rise to a plausible inference that customers overheard the statement, simply given
the “public setting, presence of others, and the nature of the accusation.” (Doc. No. 50 at 3.) The

court, in short, is not persuaded. The FAC in this case alleges in very vague terms that the
defamatory statement that the plaintiff had engaged in sexual harassment was made “in front of
employees and customers” (Doc. No. 16 at 9), but the plaintiff does not actually allege that any
customers overheard the statement. He does not allege that the statement was uttered loudly or
repeatedly. He does not allege any facts giving rise to an inference that other customers overheard
or understood Worman’s accusation.
Moreover, the Tennessee Court of Appeals has noted that allegations that a slanderous
statement “may have been overheard by others . . . may not constitute ‘publication’ for purposes
of the tort,” particularly where those who allegedly overheard the statement were “unidentified”
“customers who wandered in and out of the store.” Brown v. Christian Bros., 428 S.W.3d at 52
(quoting Brown v. Mapco Express, 393 S.W.3d 696, 709 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2012)). Here, the plaintiff
does not adequately allege that customers overheard the purported defamation, for purposes of
publication. The FAC fails to plausibly allege the publication element of the plaintiff’s slander

claim. The plaintiff’s objections to the dismissal of this claim are, therefore, OVERRULED.
E. Conspiracy to Defame
Finding that the defamation claim was inadequately pleaded, the Magistrate Judge also
concluded that the conspiracy to defame claim must be dismissed because, under Tennessee law,
a civil conspiracy “is not an independent cause of action[;] rather, it requires an underlying
predicate tort allegedly committed pursuant to the conspiracy.” (Doc. No. 48 at 8.) If there is no
actionable underlying tort, the civil conspiracy claim also fails. (Id. (citing Morgan v. Brush
Wellman, Inc., 165 F. Supp. 2d 704, 721 (E.D. Tenn. 2001)).)
The plaintiff’s only objection to this recommendation is that, because the R&R erred in
dismissing his defamation claim, the court should reject the recommendation that his conspiracy
claim be dismissed as well. The court, finding that the FAC fails to adequately allege the

publication element of a defamation claim, also OVERRULES the plaintiff’s objection to the
recommended dismissal of his conspiracy claim.
F. Negligence
The R&R construes the plaintiff’s negligence claim as based on DOJI’s negligent failure
to adequately investigate and verify Jane Doe’s harassment allegations before banning him from
the restaurant based solely on those allegations. (See Doc. No. 48 at 8; see also Doc. No. 16 at 12
(“Restaurants have a duty of care to ensure a safe and respectful environment for their
customers. . . . If a restaurant bases its actions (like banning a customer) on the claims of an
employee, there’s a duty to verify those claims before taking action.”).) The R&R finds that the
plaintiff failed to show that a place of public accommodation owes a duty to its customers to
investigate employee harassment claims before taking action, under Tennessee law. (Id. at 9 (citing
Washington v. Riverview Hotel, Inc., No. 3:19-CV-00097, 2021 WL1165935, at *6 (M.D. Tenn.
Mar. 26, 2021) (Crenshaw, C.J.) (granting judgment as a matter of law on the plaintiff’s negligence

claim, because the plaintiff had “offered no authority to show that Tennessee courts have found a
common-law duty from a place of public accommodation to its customers” created by 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981 or Title II)).)
The plaintiff argued in response to the dismissal motion that the defendants clearly had a
duty not to discriminate. (See Doc. No. 23 at 5–7.) He reiterates that argument here, professing to
be confused by the Magistrate Judge’s finding that he failed to adequately allege the existence of
a duty, since the THRA, Section 1981, and Title II all create a duty not to discriminate. (Doc. No.
50 at 6.) The plaintiff, of course, is correct that the referenced statutes prohibit intentional
discrimination and give rise to a civil cause of action for violations of that prohibition. Regardless,
the duty the plaintiff pleads in support of his negligence claim is a duty to investigate, not a duty

not to discriminate. He has failed to establish the existence of such a duty under Tennessee law,
and the Magistrate Judge did not err as a matter of law in recommending that the plaintiff’s
negligence claim be dismissed. This objection, too, is OVERRULED.
G. Fraudulent Misrepresentation
The plaintiff alleges in support of his fraudulent misrepresentation claim that Jane Doe
and/or Worman made false representations to the president of DOJI about harassment by the
plaintiff, that the president relied on those misrepresentations to ban the plaintiff from the
restaurant, and that this action (the banning) harmed the plaintiff. (Doc. No. 16 at 13–14.) The
R&R finds that this claim fails as a matter of law because, under Tennessee law, the tort of
fraudulent misrepresentation requires that the plaintiff rely on the false statement and, as a result
of such reliance, suffer damage. (See Doc. No. 48 at 10 (citations omitted).) See also Davis v.
McGuigan, 325 S.W.3d 149, 154 (Tenn. 2010) (outlining the six elements of a fraudulent
misrepresentation claim, among them the requirement that plaintiffs “reasonably relied on the
representation” and “were damaged by relying on the representation”).

The plaintiff now objects to that recommendation on the basis of facts not alleged in the
FAC—namely that the defendants invented the existence of Jane Doe, who the plaintiff believes
does not exist, and the false allegations of harassment, with the intention of inducing the plaintiff
to rely on those inventions. (See Doc. No. 50 at 6–7.) Aside from the plaintiff’s failure to allege
these facts in the FAC, the plaintiff even now does not purport to have relied on any purported
misrepresentation as to the alleged misrepresentation or the existence of Jane Doe. He has known
in his own mind all along that he did not engage in any harassment and, therefore, that Jane Doe
either did not exist or was lying. (See id. at 7 (“Plaintiff contends that he has been steadfast and
clear that he didn’t commit any sexual harassment which is also saying that there can’t be any such
person as a Jane Doe. . . .”).) He claims that he “had to rely” on the manager’s “false claim” “or

else be arrested for trespassing, but, in fact, he clearly did not rely on the truth of the manager’s
statement about Jane Doe’s allegations because, as he says, he knew it was false. He relied instead
on the manager’s representation that he would be arrested if he did not leave the restaurant. He
does not allege that this representation was false when made.
The plaintiff’s objections to the recommended dismissal of his fraudulent
misrepresentation claim is OVERRULED.
V. CONCLUSION AND ORDER
For the reasons set forth herein, the court rules as follows:
1. The Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint (Doc. No. 13), aimed at the original
Complaint, is DENIED AS MOOT.
2. The plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Reply to Defendants’ Response to Plaintiff’s
Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Order Filed on 10/23/2025 (Doc. No. 54) is GRANTED.
3. The plaintiff’s Objections (Doc. No. 49) to the Magistrate Judge’s nondispositive
Order (Doc. No. 46) are OVERRULED, and the underlying Order is AFFIRMED.

4. In addition, the plaintiff’s Motion to Reconsider/Renewed Motion to Compel
Brandy Worman/DOJI, Inc. to Identify Jane Doe (Doc. No. 51) is DENIED as redundant of the
plaintiff’s Objections to the nondispositive Order and mooted by this court’s overruling of the
plaintiff’s Objections to that part of the nondispositive Order denying the Motion to Compel (Doc.
No. 8).
5. The plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Reply to Defendants’ Response to Plaintiff’s
Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Order Filed on 10/27/2025 (Doc. No. 57) is GRANTED.
6. The plaintiff’s Objections (Doc. No. 50) to the Magistrate Judge’s R&R (Doc. No.
48) are OVERRULED in their entirety.
7. The R&R (Doc. No. 48) is ACCEPTED in its entirety, and, consistent therewith,

the moving defendants’ Partial Motion for Dismissal (Doc. No. 22) is GRANTED IN PART AND
DENIED IN PART. Specifically, the motion is DENIED, insofar as it seeks dismissal of the
THRA claim against DOJI for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The motion is GRANTED,
insofar as it seeks dismissal of the THRA claim against the individual defendants, Jane Doe and
Worman, and the THRA “aiding and abetting” claim against the individual defendants is
DISMISSED. The motion is GRANTED with respect to the plaintiff’s state common law claims
for defamation, conspiracy to defame, negligence, and fraudulent misrepresentation, and these
claims are DISMISSED as to all defendants.
14

8. The plaintiff's Motion in Limine to Exclude Evidence (Doc. No. 64) is DENIED
WITHOUT PREJUDICE, as premature, as this case is nowhere near going to trial. All associated
motions (Doc. Nos. 66, 73) are DENIED AS MOOT.
9. The plaintiff's Motion for Sanctions (Doc. No. 71) and related Motion for Leave to
File Supplemental Reply in Support of Motion for Sanctions (Doc. No. 76) are both DENIED.

The plaintiff's Motion for Leave for Early Discovery and his Motion for an Order to Clarify
Whether this Case Is Exempt from Rule 12(f) (Doc. Nos. 53, 55) remain pending and remain on
referral to the Magistrate Judge, as does this case.
The plaintiff needs to stop filing unnecessary and premature motions, and this case needs
to proceed to discovery. The court recommends that the plaintiff review the court’s Pro se
Handbook for Nonprisoner Federal Civil Actions and, in particular, those portions pertaining to
discovery. The Handbook is available online at https://www.tnmd.uscourts.gov/content/pro-se-
handbook-non-prisoner-federal-civil-actions. The plaintiff should also familiarize himself with the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, as well as this court’s Local Rules, particularly Rules 16.01 and
33.01. The Local Rules are available at https://www.tnmd.uscourts.gov/court-info/local-rules-and-
orders/local-rules.
While this case is exempt from a mandatory initial case management conference, the
plaintiff may move for an initial case management conference before the Magistrate Judge, and
the Magistrate Judge may sua sponte set a case management conference. L.R. 16.01(b)(2), (c).
It is so ORDERED.
United States District Judge

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11245145. Public record. Not legal advice.