# Jasso

> District Court, D. Oregon · January 20, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11243739

## Case

- **Full name:** Jody Wilson Jasso; Elena V.H. Singleton; M.M. Jasso v. Oregon Attorney General; et al.
- **Court:** District Court, D. Oregon
- **Decided:** January 20, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11243739

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- noting that while a parent may not proceed on behalf of their children without a lawyer, “dismissal with prejudice is not the appropriate response because [children] should not be prejudiced by [their parents’] failure to retain a lawyer”

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF OREGON

JODY WILSON JASSO; ELENA V.H. Case No. 6:25-cv-01855-MTK
SINGLETON; M.M. JASSO,
OPINION AND ORDER
Petitioners,
v.
OREGON ATTORNEY GENERAL; et al.,
Respondents.

KASUBHAI, United States District Judge:
Self-represented Petitioner Jody Wilson Jasso brings this action against 47 Defendants on
behalf of himself, his minor child M.M., and M.M.’s mother Elena Singleton. Before the Court is
Petitioner’s Application to Proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”). ECF No. 2. For the following
reasons, Petitioner’s Application to Proceed IFP is granted. However, the Clerk of the Court
shall not issue process because this action is dismissed.
BACKGROUND
Petitioner’s filing is captioned as a “Petition for Writ of Certiorari Demand for Jury
Trial.” Generally, Petitioner challenges judgments by the Marion County Circuit Court, alleging
that the decision or decisions were premised on fraud, mental health misdiagnoses, and other
misconduct by the various individual defendants. Pet. 10, ECF No. 1. Those judgments appear to
relate to Petitioner Jody Jasso’s custody rights, although references to a “convict[ion]” may
relate to a criminal matter as well. Pet. 14-15, 22. The Petition alleges various torts and
violations of constitutional rights, and asks that this Court grant his petition for writ of certiorari
and set aside state court judgment or judgments.
DISCUSSION
I. IFP Application
“The right to proceed in forma pauperis is not an unqualified one. It is a privilege, rather
than a right.” Jefferson v. United States, 277 F.2d 723, 725 (9th Cir. 1960) (citations omitted).
An application for IFP status is sufficient if “it alleges that the affiant cannot pay the court costs

and still afford the necessities of life.” Escobedo v. Applebees, 787 F.3d 1226, 1234 (9th Cir.
2015) (citing Adkins v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 335 U.S. 331, 339 (1948)). “A plaintiff
seeking IFP status must allege poverty ‘with some particularity, definiteness[,] and certainty.’”
Id. at 1234 (quoting U.S. v. McQuade, 647 F.2d 938, 940 (9th Cir. 1981)).
A review of Petitioner’s IFP Application indicates that he cannot afford the costs of this
litigation. Petitioner is unemployed with significant expenses including child support.
Petitioner’s IFP Application is therefore granted.
II. Mandatory Screening
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), Congress has mandated that district courts screen IFP
applications and dismiss any case that is frivolous or malicious or fails to state a claim upon

which relief may be granted. In determining the sufficiency of a self-represented party’s
complaint, the court must be mindful to construe it liberally in favor of the plaintiff. Haines v.
Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972); see also Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rts., Ltd., 551
U.S. 308, 322 (2007) (in assessing whether a complaint fails to plead a claim, the court must
accept all factual allegations as true); Cahill v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 80 F.3d 336, 337-38 (9th
Cir. 1996) (“allegations of material fact are taken as true and construed in the light most
favorable to [plaintiff]”).
In addition, a complaint must comply with the pleading requirements of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007); and Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

556 U.S. 662 (2009). Rule 8(a)(2) requires a complaint to contain “a short and plain statement of
the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” However,
[w]hile a complaint . . . does not need detailed factual allegations, a
plaintiff’s obligation to provide the “grounds” of [their]
“entitle[ment] to relief” requires more than labels and conclusions,
and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will
not do, see Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986) (on a motion
to dismiss, courts “are not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion
couched as a factual allegation”). Factual allegations must be
enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level . . . .

Bell Atl. Corp., 550 U.S. at 555 (citations altered). The Supreme Court has emphasized that,
when assessing the sufficiency of any civil complaint, a court must distinguish factual
contentions—which allege behavior on the part of the defendant that, if true, would satisfy one
or more elements of the claim asserted—from “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of
action, supported by mere conclusory statements.” Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 678. In short, “a
complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim for relief that
is plausible on its face.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
A. Analysis
The Petition here includes numerous deficiencies as addressed below.
1. “Petition for Writ of Certiorari”
The Petition is captioned as a “Petition for Writ of Certiorari Demand for Jury Trial,” and
separately cites 28 U.S.C. § 1291, which confers appellate jurisdiction on the courts of appeals to
hear appeals of final decisions of district courts. See Pet. 10 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1291). This
Court cannot hear a petition for writ of certiorari and is not a court of appeals. To the extent that
Petitioner is directly seeking an appeal through a petition for writ of certiorari or appeal to a
court of appeals, this district court is not the proper forum. However, because aspects of the
Petition are in the nature of a complaint, the Court will construe it as such and refer to Petitioner

Jody Jasso as “Plaintiff.”
1. Claims on Behalf of M.M. Jasso and Elena Singleton
As an initial matter, self-represented Plaintiff Jody Jasso brought this action on behalf of
himself as well as his minor child M.M. Jasso and M.M.’s mother Elena Singleton. However, the
Ninth Circuit prohibits a self-represented plaintiff from representing their minor children,
adopting the reasoning of other circuits which “have held that the guardian or parent cannot
bring a lawsuit on behalf of a minor in federal court without retaining a lawyer.” Johns v. Cnty.
of San Diego, 114 F.3d 874, 876 (9th Cir. 1997) (citations omitted). Likewise, Jody Jasso, a non-
lawyer, may not represent Elena Singleton. See id. (“While a non-attorney may appear pro se on
his own behalf, ‘[h]e has no authority to appear as an attorney for others than himself.’”)
(quoting C.E. Pope Equity Trust v. United States, 818 F.2d 696, 697 (9th Cir. 1987)).

Accordingly, the claims Jody Jasso brings on behalf of M.M. Jasso and Elena Singleton are
dismissed without prejudice. See Burgess v. Carmichael, 37 F. App’x 288, 294 (9th Cir.
2002) (noting that while a parent may not proceed on behalf of their children without a lawyer,
“dismissal with prejudice is not the appropriate response because [children] should not be
prejudiced by [their parents’] failure to retain a lawyer”).
2. Personal Jurisdiction
Plaintiff alleges a number of claims against individuals and entities located in Greeley,
Colorado, including Teela Abels, Dustin Abels, Daryl Wilson, Elizabeth Wilson, Greeley Police
Department, Adam Turk, Renee Doak, Michael Rourke, and Weld County Department of
Human Services (“the Colorado Defendants”). “Federal courts ordinarily follow state law in
determining the bounds of their jurisdiction over [defendants].” Picot v. Weston, 780 F.3d 1206,
1211 (9th Cir. 2015) (quoting Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 125 (2014)). Oregon law
authorizes personal jurisdiction over defendants to the full extent permitted by the United States

Constitution. See Or. R. Civ. P. 4 L; Gray & Co. v. Firstenberg Mach. Co., Inc., 913 F.2d 758,
760 (9th Cir. 1990) (“Oregon’s long-arm statute confers jurisdiction to the extent permitted by
due process.”). “Due process requires that the defendant have certain minimum contacts with the
forum state such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play
and substantial justice.” Picot, 780 F.3d at 1211 (internal quotations and citation omitted). There
are two types of personal jurisdiction that a court may exercise over a defendant: general
jurisdiction and specific jurisdiction. Boschetto v. Hansing, 539 F.3d 1011, 1016 (9th Cir. 2008).
The Court will address each in turn.
For general personal jurisdiction, a defendant is typically only subject to a court’s general
jurisdiction in the state where they are domiciled or “at home.” Daimler, 571 U.S. at 137. A

court may not assert general jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant unless the defendant’s
contacts with the forum state “are so ‘continuous and systematic’ as to render [it] essentially at
home in the forum [s]tate.” Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915,
919 (2011) (quoting Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 317 (1945)). For specific
jurisdiction, the Ninth Circuit uses a three-prong test to determine whether a court has personal
jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant: “(1) The non-resident defendant must purposefully
direct his activities or consummate some transaction with the forum or resident thereof; or
perform some act by which he purposefully avails himself of the privilege of conducting
activities in the forum, thereby invoking the benefits and protections of its laws; (2) the claim
must be one which arises out of or relates to the defendant’s forum-related activities; and (3) the
exercise of jurisdiction must comport with fair play and substantial justice.” Picot, 780 F.3d at
1211 (citing Schwarzenegger v. Fred Martin Motor Co., 374 F.3d 797, 802 (9th Cir. 2004)).
Here, to the extent Plaintiff pled any facts at all as to some of these Defendants, none of

them demonstrate the level of connection to Oregon required for this Court to exercise
jurisdiction over them. Plaintiff’s claims against these Defendants are therefore dismissed.
3. Immunity
Several of Plaintiff’s claims are directed at judges and prosecutors based on their conduct
during court proceedings. However, immunity bars Plaintiff’s claims as follows.
First, Plaintiff asserts claims against several judges—Chief Justice Meagan Flynn, Judge
Erin Lagesen, Judge Manel Perez, Judge Renee Doak, Judge Courtland Geyer, and Judge Tracy
Prall—apparently related to one or more court proceedings. However, judges are
absolutely immune from civil liability for their judicial acts. See Mullis v. U.S. Bankr. Ct. for
Dist. of Nevada, 828 F.2d 1385, 1388 (9th Cir. 1987) (citing Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13
Wall.) 335, 347 (1872) and Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967)). Judicial immunity would not

apply in two narrow circumstances: (1) for nonjudicial actions; and (2) for actions,
though judicial in nature, taken in complete absence of all jurisdiction. Mireles v. Waco, 502
U.S. 9, 11-12 (1991). Here, neither of the exceptions to judicial immunity apply under the facts
pled. In fact, there are no facts pled at all with respect to several of these judges’ roles in the
events underlying Plaintiff’s lawsuit.
Plaintiff also asserts claims against various prosecutors, presumably related to the same
court proceedings. However, absolute immunity shields prosecutors from suit if the claims are
related to conduct “intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process.” Van de
Kamp v. Goldstein, 555 U.S. 335, 343 (2009) (quoting Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430
(1976)). As pled, the claims against Defendant Acosta1 in this case, which relate to the use of
allegedly false representations during court proceedings, are barred by prosecutorial immunity.
See, e.g., Milstein v. Cooley, 257 F.3d 1004, 1008 (9th Cir. 2001) (absolute prosecutorial
immunity “covers the knowing use of false testimony at trial, the suppression of exculpatory

evidence, and malicious prosecution”). All claims against Defendant Acosta are therefore
dismissed.
4. Failure to Allege Facts Sufficient to State a Claim

Plaintiff’s Complaint also fails to allege facts sufficient to state a claim. Plaintiff’s 68-
page Complaint is difficult to parse. It names 47 separate defendants and lists hundreds of
constitutional provisions, state and federal laws, UCC provisions, torts, and “Universal Postal
Union Law.” With so many potential authorities and defendants named, the Court cannot discern
Plaintiff’s specific cause or causes of action and which Defendants they relate to. Plaintiff’s
Complaint is therefore insufficient to put each Defendant on notice of the factual basis and
nature of the claims. See Brazil v. U.S. Dep’t of Navy, 66 F.3d 193, 199 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding
even pro se pleadings “must meet some minimum threshold in providing a defendant with notice
of what it is that it allegedly did wrong.”).
Even if the Court could discern the specific causes of action and the Defendants they
applied to, the facts themselves are likewise difficult to decipher beyond the general premise that
Plaintiff believes that one or several state court decisions should be reversed due to fraud. But in
alleging fraud, “a party must state with particularity the circumstances constituting fraud or
mistake.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b). Plaintiff’s Complaint contains no such particular allegations, but

1 Although Plaintiff names several other prosecutors as defendants, there are insufficient facts pled
as to their conduct for the Court to discern whether prosecutorial immunity would bar the claims
against them.
instead conclusory statements insufficient to satisfy Rule 8(a)(2), let alone the heightened
requirements of Rule 9(b).
In sum, Plaintiff fails to allege sufficient facts to state a claim against any Defendant and
fails to satisfy the pleadings standards in Rule 8(a)(2) and Rule 9(b).

B. Leave to Amend
Ordinarily, self-represented litigants are given leave to amend. Karim-Panahi v. L.A.
Police Dep’t, 839 F.2d 621, 623 (9th Cir. 1988). But if it is “absolutely clear that the deficiencies
of the complaint could not be cured by amendment,” leave to amend need not be given. Id.
(internal quotation marks omitted).
This is Plaintiff Jody Jasso’s third filing in the past year directed at the same series of
events related to Oregon state custody proceedings and the events underlying them. See Jasso et
al. v. Abels et al., 6:25-cv-00180-MTK; Jasso v. Singleton, 6:25-cv-01712-MC. The Court has
identified many of the above-referenced deficiencies in these prior cases, and Plaintiff has failed
to cure them. Thus, Plaintiff has been given “specific notice of the complaint’s deficiencies and
an opportunity to amend.” Lucas v. Dep’t of Corr., 66 F.3d 245, 249 (9th Cir. 1995). Dismissal

with prejudice is appropriate in these circumstances. See Zavala v. Bartnik, 348 F. App’x 211,
213 (9th Cir. 2009) (“Dismissal with prejudice was proper because [the plaintiff] was given two
prior opportunities to amend his complaint in order to correct the deficiencies identified by the
district court but failed to do so.”).
/ / /
/ / /
/ / /
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CONCLUSION
For the reasons above, Plaintiff’s Application to Proceed in forma pauperis, ECF No. 2,
is GRANTED. However, this case is DISMISSED with prejudice as to Plaintiff Jody Jasso, and
without prejudice as to M.M Jasso and Elena Singleton.
DATED this 20th day of January 2026.

s/ Mustafa T. Kasubhai
MUSTAFA T. KASUBHAI (he/him)
United States District Judge

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11243739. Public record. Not legal advice.