# MCCREARY

> District Court, M.D. North Carolina · January 20, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11243672

## Case

- **Full name:** Amanda M. v. Frank J. Bisignano, Commissioner of Social Security
- **Court:** District Court, M.D. North Carolina
- **Decided:** January 20, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11243672

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- observing that “[n]Jo principle of administrative law or common sense requires us to remand a case in quest of a perfect opinion unless there is reason to believe that the remand might lead to a different result”
- observing that “[n]o principle of administrative law or common sense requires us to remand a case in quest of a 30 perfect opinion unless there is reason to believe that the remand might lead to a different result”
- finding jobs with “not significant” levels of social interaction under the DOT compatible with ALJ’s limitation to “brief superficial type of contact with co-workers and supervisors and members of the public” (emphasis added)

## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
AMANDA M., )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) 1:25CV57
)
FRANK J. BISIGNANO, )
Commissioner of Social Security, )
)
Defendant.1 )
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND RECOMMENDATION
OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Plaintiff, Amanda M., brought this action pursuant to the
Social Security Act (the “Act”) to obtain judicial review of a
final decision of Defendant, the Commissioner of Social Security
(the “Commissioner”), denying Plaintiff’s claim for Supplemental
Security Income (“SSI”). (Docket Entry 1.) The Commissioner has
filed the certified administrative record (Docket Entry 6 (cited
herein as “Tr. __”)), and both parties have submitted dispositive
briefs in accordance with Rule 5 of the Supplemental Rules for
Social Security Actions under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (Docket Entry 9
(Plaintiff’s Brief); Docket Entry 11 (Commissioner’s Brief); see
also Docket Entry 12 (Plaintiff’s Reply)). For the reasons that
follow, the Court should enter judgment for the Commissioner.
1 The United States Senate confirmed Frank J. Bisignano as the Commissioner
of the Social Security Administration on May 6, 2025, and he took the oath of
office on May 7, 2025. Pursuant to Rule 25(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, Frank J. Bisignano should substitute for Leland C. Dudek as the
defendant in this suit. No further action need be taken to continue this suit
by reason of the last sentence of Section 205(g) of the Social Security Act, 42
U.S.C. § 405(g).
I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Plaintiff applied for SSI on October 20, 2021 (Tr. 194-202),
alleging a disability onset date of February 1, 2020 (see Tr. 196).
Upon denial of that application initially (Tr. 77-87, 103-07) and
on reconsideration (Tr. 88-98, 116-18), Plaintiff requested a
hearing de novo before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”)
(Tr. 119). Plaintiff, her attorney, and a vocational expert (“VE”)
attended the hearing. (Tr. 56-76.) The ALJ subsequently ruled
that Plaintiff did not qualify as disabled under the Act. (Tr. 38-
55.) The Appeals Council thereafter denied Plaintiff’s request for
review (Tr. 1-7, 193, 303-13), thereby making the ALJ’s ruling the
Commissioner’s final decision for purposes of judicial review.
In rendering that disability determination, the ALJ made the
following findings later adopted by the Commissioner:
1. [Plaintiff] has not engaged in substantial gainful
activity since October 20, 2021, the application date.
2. [Plaintiff] has the following severe impairments:
asthma, depression/bipolar, anxiety, and substance
addiction disorder.
. . .
3. [Plaintiff] does not have an impairment or
combination of impairments that meets or medically equals
the severity of one of the listed impairments in 20 CFR
Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1.
. . .
4. . . . [Plaintiff] has the residual functional
capacity to perform medium work . . . except
lifting/carrying 25 pounds occasionally and 10 pounds
frequently; occasional crawling; no climbing
2
ladders/ropes/scaffolds; occasional exposure to humidity
and extreme heat; occasional exposure to pulmonary
irritants including fumes, odors, dust, and gas;
occasional exposure to hazardous conditions including
unprotected heights and moving machinery; simple, routine
tasks; occasional interaction with the pubic; occasional
workplace changes; and occasional independent decision
making.
. . .
5. [Plaintiff] has no past relevant work.
. . .
9. Considering [Plaintiff]’s age, education, work
experience, and residual functional capacity, there are
jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national
economy that [she] can perform.
. . .
10. . . . [Plaintiff] has not been under a disability,
as defined in the [] Act, since October 20, 2021, the
date the application was filed.
(Tr. 43-51 (bold font and internal parenthetical citations
omitted).)
II. DISCUSSION
Federal law “authorizes judicial review of the Social Security
Commissioner’s denial of social security benefits.” Hines v.
Barnhart, 453 F.3d 559, 561 (4th Cir. 2006). However, “the scope
of [the Court’s] review of [such a] decision . . . is extremely
limited.” Frady v. Harris, 646 F.2d 143, 144 (4th Cir. 1981).
Plaintiff has not established entitlement to relief under the
extremely limited review standard.

3
A. Standard of Review
“[C]ourts are not to try [a Social Security] case de novo.”
Oppenheim v. Finch, 495 F.2d 396, 397 (4th Cir. 1974). Instead,
the Court “must uphold the factual findings of the ALJ if they are
supported by substantial evidence and were reached through
application of the correct legal standard.” Hines, 453 F.3d at 561
(internal brackets and quotation marks omitted). “Substantial
evidence means ‘such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to support a conclusion.’” Hunter v. Sullivan,
993 F.2d 31, 34 (4th Cir. 1992) (quoting Richardson v. Perales, 402
U.S. 389, 401 (1971)). “It consists of more than a mere scintilla
of evidence but may be somewhat less than a preponderance.” Mastro
v. Apfel, 270 F.3d 171, 176 (4th Cir. 2001) (brackets and internal
quotation marks omitted). “If there is evidence to justify a
refusal to direct a verdict were the case before a jury, then there
is substantial evidence.” Hunter, 993 F.2d at 34 (internal
quotation marks omitted).

“In reviewing for substantial evidence, the [C]ourt should not
undertake to re-weigh conflicting evidence, make credibility
determinations, or substitute its judgment for that of the [ALJ, as
adopted by the Commissioner].” Mastro, 270 F.3d at 176 (internal
brackets and quotation marks omitted). “Where conflicting evidence
allows reasonable minds to differ as to whether a claimant is
disabled, the responsibility for that decision falls on the
4
[Commissioner] (or the ALJ).” Id. at 179 (internal quotation marks
omitted). “The issue before [the Court], therefore, is not whether
[the claimant] is disabled, but whether the ALJ’s finding that [the
claimant] is not disabled is supported by substantial evidence and
was reached based upon a correct application of the relevant law.”
Craig v. Chater, 76 F.3d 585, 589 (4th Cir. 1996).
When confronting that issue, the Court must take note that
“[a] claimant for disability benefits bears the burden of proving
a disability,” Hall v. Harris, 658 F.2d 260, 264 (4th Cir. 1981),
and that, in this context, “disability” means the “‘inability to
engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any
medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be
expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected
to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months,’” id.
(quoting 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A)).2 “To regularize the
adjudicative process, the Social Security Administration [(‘SSA’)]
has . . . detailed regulations incorporating longstanding medical-
vocational evaluation policies that take into account a claimant’s
age, education, and work experience in addition to [the claimant’s]

medical condition.” Id. “These regulations establish a

2 The Act “comprises two disability benefits programs. The Disability
Insurance Benefits Program provides benefits to disabled persons who have
contributed to the program while employed. [SSI] provides benefits to indigent
disabled persons. The statutory definitions and the regulations . . . for
determining disability governing these two programs are, in all aspects relevant
here, substantively identical.” Craig, 76 F.3d at 589 n.1 (internal citations
omitted).
5
‘sequential evaluation process’ to determine whether a claimant is
disabled.” Id.
This sequential evaluation process (“SEP”) has up to five
steps: “The claimant (1) must not be engaged in ‘substantial
gainful activity,’ i.e., currently working; and (2) must have a
‘severe’ impairment that (3) meets or exceeds the ‘listings’ of
specified impairments, or is otherwise incapacitating to the extent
that the claimant does not possess the residual functional capacity
[(‘RFC’)] to (4) perform [the claimant’s] past work or (5) any
other work.” Albright v. Commissioner of the Soc. Sec. Admin., 174
F.3d 473, 475 n.2 (4th Cir. 1999).3 A finding adverse to the
claimant at any of several points in the SEP forecloses an award
and ends the inquiry. For example, “[t]he first step determines
whether the claimant is engaged in ‘substantial gainful activity.’
If the claimant is working, benefits are denied. The second step
determines if the claimant is ‘severely’ disabled. If not,
benefits are denied.” Bennett v. Sullivan, 917 F.2d 157, 159 (4th
Cir. 1990).

On the other hand, if a claimant carries his or her burden at
each of the first three steps, “the claimant is disabled.” Mastro,
270 F.3d at 177. Alternatively, if a claimant clears steps one and
two, but falters at step three, i.e., “[i]f a claimant’s impairment

3 “Through the fourth step, the burden of production and proof is on the
claimant. If the claimant reaches step five, the burden shifts to the
[Commissioner] . . . .” Hunter, 993 F.2d at 35 (internal citations omitted).
6
is not sufficiently severe to equal or exceed a listed impairment,
the ALJ must assess the claimant’s [RFC].” Id. at 179.* Step four
then requires the ALJ to assess whether, based on that RFC, the
claimant can perform past relevant work; if so, the claimant does
not qualify as disabled. See id. at 179-80. However, if the
claimant establishes an inability to return to prior work, the
analysis proceeds to the fifth step, whereupon the ALJ must decide
“whether the claimant is able to perform other work considering
both [the claimant’s RFC] and [the claimant’s] vocational
capabilities (age, education, and past work experience) to adjust
to a new job.” Hall, 658 F.2d at 264-65. If, at this step, the
Commissioner cannot carry its “evidentiary burden of proving that
[the claimant] remains able to work other jobs available in the
community,” the claimant qualifies as disabled. Hines, 453 F.3d at
567.°

4 “RFC is a measurement of the most a claimant can do despite [the
claimant’s] limitations.” Hines, 453 F.3d at 562 (noting that administrative
regulations require RFC to reflect claimant’s “ability to do sustained work-
related physical and mental activities in a work setting on a regular and
continuing basis . . . [which] means 8 hours a day, for 5 days a week, or an
equivalent work schedule” (internal emphasis and quotation marks omitted)). The
RFC includes both a “physical exertional or strength limitation” that assesses
the claimant’s “ability to do sedentary, light, medium, heavy, or very heavy
work,” as well as ‘“nonexertional limitations (mental, sensory, or skin
impairments).” Hall, 658 F.2d at 265. “RFC is to be determined by the ALJ only
after [the ALJ] considers all relevant evidence of a claimant’s impairments and
any related symptoms (é.g., pain).” Hines, 453 F.3d at 562-63.
° A claimant thus can establish disability via two paths through the SEP.
The first path requires resolution of the questions at steps one, two, and three
in the claimant’s favor, whereas, on the second path, the claimant must prevail
at steps one, two, four, and five. Some short-hand judicial characterizations
of the SEP appear to gloss over the fact that an adverse finding against a
claimant on step three does not terminate the analysis. See, ¢.g., Hunter, 993
F.2d at 35 (“If the ALJ finds that a claimant has not satisfied any step of the
(continued...)

B. Assignments of Error
Plaintiff argues that the Court should overturn the ALJ’s
finding of no disability on these grounds:
1) “[t]he ALJ did not build an accurate and logical bridge
regarding [Plaintiff]’s degenerative disc disease [(‘DDD’)] of the
lumbar spine and spondylosis of the cervical spine” (Docket Entry
9 at 4 (bold font and block formatting omitted); see also Docket
Entry 12 at 1-4);
2) “[t]he ALJ did not build an accurate and logical bridge
regarding [Plaintiff]’s migraines” (Docket Entry 9 at 13 (bold font
and block formatting omitted); see also Docket Entry 12 at 4-5);
and
3) “[t]he ALJ did not build an accurate and logical bridge
regarding social interaction limitations with coworkers and
supervisors” (Docket Entry 9 at 16; see also Docket Entry 12 at 5-
11).
Defendant contends otherwise and seeks affirmance of the ALJ’s

decision. (Docket Entry 11 at 3-15.)
1. Lumbar DDD and Cervical Spondylosis
In Plaintiff’s first issue on review, she asserts that “[t]he
ALJ did not “build an accurate and logical bridge regarding
[Plaintiff]’s [DDD] of the lumbar spine and spondylosis of the

5 (...continued)
process, review does not proceed to the next step.”).
8
cervical spine.” (Docket Entry 9 at 4 (bold font and block
formatting omitted); see also Docket Entry 12 at 1-4.) More
specifically, Plaintiff maintains that “[t]he ALJ’s [] analysis [at
step two of the SEP] improperly focused only on [Plaintiff]’s
scoliosis,” and “did not mention [DDD] of the lumbar spine or
spondylosis of the cervical spine, or any evidence relating to
th[o]se impairments, e.g., the MRIs [sic] and clinical findings of
tenderness and reduced range of motion.” (Docket Entry 9 at 10
(referencing Tr. 43, 420, 423, 426, 429, 432-34).)6 Plaintiff
additionally argues that “the ALJ did not acknowledge probative
evidence when evaluating [Plaintiff]’s subjective complaints and
formulating the RFC assessment” (id. at 11), in that “[t]he ALJ did
not acknowledge or mention that (1) [Plaintiff] received treatment
from [] board-certified orthopedic surgeon [Dr. Chason S. Hayes]
for back, neck, and radicular pain; (2) diagnostic testing
confirmed [DDD] of the lumbar spine and spondylosis of the cervical
spine; (3) physical examinations of [Plaintiff] showed tenderness
and reduced range of motion in the lumbar and cervical spine; (4)
Dr. Hayes prescribed various treatment, including [g]abapentin and

[m]eloxicam; (5) Dr. Hayes referred [Plaintiff] to a pain physician
for injections; and (6) [Plaintiff] stopped going to the pain
clinic due to insurance” (id. at 11-12). According to Plaintiff,
“[t]he ALJ’s errors preclude reliance on the [VE]’s testimony
6 The record reflects only one MRI of Plaintiff’s lumbar spine. (See Tr.
432.)
9
because the Court cannot meaningfully review whether [Plaintiff]’s
[DDD] of the lumbar spine and spondylosis of the cervical spine
would allow her to perform the occupations identified by the [VE].”
(Id. at 12.)
“At step 2 of the [SEP], [the ALJ] determine[s] whether an
individual has a severe medically determinable physical or mental
impairment or combination of impairments that has lasted or can be
expected to last for a continuous period of at least 12 months or
end in death.” Social Security Ruling 16-3p, Titles II and XVI:
Evaluation of Symptoms in Disability Claims, 2017 WL 5180304, at
*11 (Oct. 25, 2017) (“SSR 16-3p”) (emphasis added). The
Commissioner’s regulations provide that a medically determinable
impairment “must result from anatomical[ or] physiological . . .
abnormalities that can be shown by medically acceptable clinical
and laboratory diagnostic techniques[ and] . . . must be
established by objective medical evidence from an acceptable
medical source.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.921 (emphasis added).7
Furthermore, an ALJ cannot rely on a claimant’s own “statement of
symptoms, a diagnosis, or a medical opinion to establish the

7 The regulations define “objective medical evidence” as “laboratory
findings” and/or “signs,” i.e., “abnormalities that can be observed, apart from
[a claimant’s] statements (symptoms).” 20 C.F.R. § 416.902(f), (g).
10
existence of a[ medically determinable] impairment[ ].” Id.
(emphasis added) .®
“After [the ALJ] establish[es] that [a claimant] hal[s] a
medically determinable impairment[], then [the ALJ] determine[s]
whether [that] impairment is severe.” Id. An impairment fails to
qualify as “severe” if it constitutes “only a slight abnormality
. . which would have no more than a minimal effect on an
individual’s ability . . . to perform basic work activities.”
Social Security Ruling 85-28, Titles IT and XVI: Medical
Impairments that Are Not Severe, 1985 WL 56856, at *3 (1985) (“SSR
85-28"). Applicable regulations further identify physical “basic
work activities” as including “walking, standing, sitting, lifting,
pushing, pulling, reaching, carrying, [and] handling.” 20 C.F.R.
§ 416.922(b). Plaintiff bears the burden of proving severity at
step two. Hunter, 993 F.2d at 35; see also Kirby v. Astrue, 500

8 Applicable to benefits claims filed on or after March 27, 2017 (such as
Plaintiff’s SSI claim (see Tr. 194)), the SSA amended the section governing the
establishment of medically determinable impairments. See Revisions to Rules
Regarding the Evaluation of Medical Evidence, 82 F.R. 5844-01, 5868-69, 2017 WL
168819 (Jan. 18, 2017). Prior to those amendments, an ALJ considered medical
signs, laboratory findings, and a claimant’s own statements to determine the
presence of a medically determinable impairment. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.908
(version effective prior to Jan. 18, 2017). The amendments recodified the rule
at Section 416.921 and now preclude ALJs from considering a claimant’s “statement
of symptoms, a diagnosis, or a medical opinion to establish the existence of a[
medically determinable] impairment[].” 20 C.F.R. § 416.921; see also SB v.
Commissioner of Soc. Sec. Admin., No. CV-20-1842, 2021 WL 5150092, at *4 (D.
Ariz. Nov. 5, 2021) (unpublished) (“To the extent that [prior district court and
appellate cases within the Ninth Circuit] hold that medical opinions and
diagnoses are relevant to determine an impairment at step two, that has been
expressly foreclosed by the text of § 4[16.9]21. Instead, as discussed above,
the [clourt finds that only the objective medical evidence in [the p]laintiff’s
medical records can be relevant to whether she had a medically determinable
impairment . . . .” (internal citation omitted)).

11

F.3d 705, 708 (8th Cir. 2007) (“Severity is not an onerous
requirement for the claimant to meet, but it is also not a
toothless standard . . . .” (internal citation omitted)).
Here, at step two of the SEP, the ALJ found Plaintiff’s
scoliosis a non-severe medically determinable impairment, but
identified neither lumbar DDD nor cervical spondylosis as medically
determinable impairments. (See Tr. 43.) The record contains
objective medical evidence substantiating that Plaintiff had both
lumbar DDD (see Tr. 432 (MRI of lumbar spine dated 11/14/22
reflecting mild disc height loss and small disc bulge causing mild
bilateral neuroforaminal stenosis at L5-S1); see also Tr. 433 (x-
ray of lumbar spine dated 9/12/22 documenting mild disc space
narrowing at L5-S1 and facet degenerative changes in the lower
spine)) and cervical spondylosis (see Tr. 434 (x-ray of cervical
spine dated 9/12/22 recording disc space narrowing and spurring at
C4-5, characterized as “moderate spondylosis”)), as well as that
she sought treatment for back and neck pain during the relevant
period in this case (see Tr. 419-30 (containing treatment records
from Dr. Hayes for complaints of back and neck pain from August to

December 2022)). Thus, the ALJ erred by failing to find
Plaintiff’s lumbar DDD and cervical spondylosis as medically
determinable impairments at step two of the SEP. For the reasons
explained in more detail below, however, that error by the ALJ
remains harmless under the circumstances presented here, as the
12
record demonstrates neither that the ALJ should have found
Plaintiff’s lumbar DDD or cervical spondylosis severe impairments,
nor that the ALJ should have included greater limitations in the
RFC on account of those impairments. see generally Fisher v.
Bowen, 869 F.2d 1055, 1057 (7th Cir. 1989) (observing that “[n]Jo
principle of administrative law or common sense requires us to
remand a case in quest of a perfect opinion unless there is reason
to believe that the remand might lead to a different result”).
As to step two of the SEP, the record here would not have
compelled the ALJ to find Plaintiff’s lumbar DDD and cervical
spondylosis severe impairments. Most significantly, Plaintiff
herself failed to identify either lumbar DDD or cervical
spondylosis as disabling impairments on her Disability Report form.
(See Tr. 218 (listing “[s]coliosis,” “[b]Jipolar,” “[a]nxiety,”
“[d]lepression,” “[chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (*‘COPD’)],”
and “[v]Jision - wear glasses” as “all physical or mental
conditions . . . that limit[ed her] ability to work” (emphasis
added)); see also Tr. 252, 260 (denying that she had “any NEW
physical or mental conditions on her Disability Report - Appeals
forms, despite the fact that her hearing-level counsel completed
both Appeals forms (see Tr. 251, 259))})). Furthermore, at the
hearing, Plaintiff’s counsel failed to mention either lumbar DDD or
cervical spondylosis as disabling impairments in her opening
statement (see Tr. 62 (identifying “depression, bipolar related

13

disorder, asthma, anxiety,” “[obsessive-compulsive disorder
(‘OCD’)],” “scoliosis,” and “COPD” as disabling impairments)), and
Plaintiff did not identify lumbar DDD or cervical spondylosis in
her testimony regarding her disabling physical conditions:
[ATTY:] . . . [I]f you would please tell me in your own
words . . . what physical conditions have you been
diagnosed with that would prevent you from working?
[PLAINTIFF:] Well, I have the scoliosis, and then I got,
now that I’m older I guess my problem [is] I can’t see
that well. The COPD and the asthma, the anxiety,
bipolar.
[ATTY:] . . . So right now we’re just going to deal with
your physical conditions. And you mentioned scoliosis,
low vision and COPD. Are there any other physical
conditions that you have been diagnosed with?
[PLAINTIFF:] No.
(Tr. 63 (emphasis added); see also Tr. 70 (denying that “any other
conditions” existed that “[sh]e ha[d]n’t mentioned
that . . . stop[ped her] from being able to work”).)
Plaintiff’s failure to even mention lumbar DDD and cervical
spondylosis in her application materials and testimony in support
of her claim, despite the assistance of counsel, significantly
undercuts her contention that the ALJ should have found those
impairments severe. See Walterman v. Colvin, No. 15CV3860, 2016 WL
8199313, at *7 (D. Minn. June 24, 2016) (unpublished) (finding no
error in ALJ’s determination that the plaintiff’s borderline
intellectual functioning rated as non-severe, where the plaintiff’s
“cognitive impairments were not even listed in [his] current
14
application for disability benefits”); O’Brien v. Colvin, No.
1:15CV536, 2016 WL 2755459, at *7 (M.D.N.C. May 11, 2016)
(unpublished) (“To the extent [the p]laintiff contends the ALJ
committed a step two error by failing to identify [the p]laintiff’s
auditory impairments as severe, [his] failure to list those
conditions in his Disability Report [] defeats that claim.”),
recommendation adopted, 2016 WL 5660296 (M.D.N.C. Sept. 30, 2016)
(unpublished) (Tilley, S.J.); Ramsey v. Colvin, No. 1:10CV618, 2014
WL 639562, at *7 (M.D.N.C. Feb. 18, 2014) (unpublished) (holding
that “[s]ubstantial evidence [] support[ed] the ALJ’s omission
of . . . [gastroesophageal reflux disease (‘GERD’)] from the list
of severe impairments” because, among other things, “[the
p]laintiff did not even mention GERD as an impairment on her
Disability Report or at her hearing” (internal parenthetical
citations omitted)), recommendation adopted, slip op. (M.D.N.C.
Mar. 27, 2014) (Tilley, S.J.); Abdullahi v. Colvin, No. 4:12CV3185,
2013 WL 6239385, at *11 (D. Neb. Dec. 2, 2013) (unpublished)
(deciding that “ALJ properly excluded [the plaintiff’s] hearing
loss from [the] list of severe impairments” because, inter alia,

the plaintiff “failed to raise it in her application for
benefits”); see also Frederick v. Commissioner of Soc. Sec., Civ.
No. 10–11349, 2011 WL 1518966, at *9 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 25, 2011)
(unpublished) (“[T]he courts frown upon ‘sandbagging’
administrative decisions by presenting . . . issues for the first
15
time upon judicial review which could have been raised before the
ALJ.”), recommendation adopted, 2011 WL 1518913 (E.D. Mich. Apr.
20, 2011) (unpublished). However, even if the ALJ should have
found Plaintiff’s lumbar DDD and cervical spondylosis severe
impairments, for the following reasons, Plaintiff cannot show that
such an error prejudiced her. See generally Fisher, 869 F.2d at
1057.
First, and most importantly, where an ALJ has already
determined that a plaintiff suffers from at least one severe
impairment, any failure to categorize an additional impairment as
severe generally cannot constitute reversible error, because, “upon
determining that a claimant has one severe impairment, the [ALJ]
must continue with the remaining steps in his [or her] disability
evaluation.” Maziarz v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs., 837
F.2d 240, 244 (6th Cir. 1987); accord Oldham v. Astrue, 509 F.3d
1254, 1256-57 (10th Cir. 2007); Lewis v. Astrue, 498 F.3d 909, 911
(9th Cir. 2007); Lauver v. Astrue, No. 2:08CV87, 2010 WL 1404767,
at *4 (N.D.W. Va. Mar. 31, 2010) (unpublished); Washington v.
Astrue, 698 F. Supp. 2d 562, 579 (D.S.C. 2010); Jones v. Astrue,
No. 5:07CV452, 2009 WL 455414, at *2 (E.D.N.C. Feb. 23, 2009)
(unpublished). In this case, the ALJ found four severe impairments
and two non-severe impairments (including scoliosis) (see Tr. 43)
and proceeded with the remaining steps of the SEP (see Tr. 44-51).
Moreover, the ALJ’s RFC includes limitations to 25 pounds of

16

occasional lifting/carrying, 10 pounds of frequent
lifting/carrying, occasional crawling, and no climbing of ladders,
ropes, and scaffolds (see Tr. 46), and Plaintiff has not identified
any additional limitations the ALJ should have included in the RFC
to account for her lumbar DDD and cervical spondylosis (see Docket
Entries 9, 12). Under such circumstances, any alleged improper
application of law by the ALJ at step two caused Plaintiff no
prejudice. See Ely v. Colvin, No. 1:12CV75, 2014 WL 2967913, at
*12 (M.D.N.C. July 1, 2014) (unpublished) (“[A]lthough [the
p]aintiff claims the ALJ failed to address [the plaintiff’s left
foot cold weather injury and/or degenerative disc disease] in
devising the RFC, [he] has not identified a single restriction the
ALJ should have included to account for them.” (internal
parenthetical citation omitted)), recommendation adopted, slip op.
(M.D.N.C. Mar. 11, 2015) (Tilley, S.J.); Cook v. Colvin, No.
1:11CV87, 2014 WL 317847, at *3 (M.D.N.C. Jan. 29, 2014)
(unpublished) (Eagles, J.) (“[T]he ALJ’s failure to expressly
discuss [the plaintiff’s] obesity (whether classified as severe or
not) in conjunction with [the ALJ’s] RFC assessment constitutes

harmless error. In [the plaintiff’s] arguments to the Court, [he]
does not identify any unaddressed limitations that he believes his
obesity causes. As such, no basis exists for a remand.” (citing
Rutherford v. Barnhart, 399 F.3d 546, 552–53 (3d Cir. 2005) (ruling
remand for express consideration of obesity unnecessary where [the]
17
plaintiff failed to specify how her obesity would impact the ALJ’s
analysis))).
Second, the record evidence relating to Plaintiff’s lumbar DDD
and cervical spondylosis would not have compelled the ALJ to
include greater limitations in the RFC. The ALJ expressly
acknowledged “[Plaintiff’s] testi[mony] that her scoliosis hurt[]
her back and legs[ and] cause[d] burning and stinging, [] she d[id]
not sleep a lot because of it, . . . she had pain in her legs from
the right side of her leg to the kneecap and into her shoulder and
ear, . . . she fe[lt] pain four or five times a day, and she t[ook]
over the counter medicine” (Tr. 46), but found her “statements
concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of
th[o]se symptoms [] not entirely consistent with the medical
evidence and other evidence in the record” (Tr. 47). Plaintiff
notes that the ALJ discounted the severity of Plaintiff’s back and
neck pain because that pain “‘ha[d] not required significant
medical treatment and ha[d] not resulted in any continuous
exertional or nonexertional functional limitations’” (Docket Entry
11 at 9 (referencing Tr. 43) (quotation marks and brackets added)),

but “did not acknowledge or mention that [Plaintiff] stopped going
to the pain clinic due to insurance and, thus, penalized her for
not being able to afford treatment” (id.)
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has
held that “[a] claimant may not be penalized for failing to seek
18
treatment she cannot afford,” because “‘[i]lt flies in the face of
the patent purposes of the . . . Act to deny benefits to someone
. . . too poor to obtain medical treatment that may help h[er].’”
Lovejoy v. Heckler, 790 F.2d 1114, 1117 (4th Cir. 1986) (quoting
Gordon _v. Schweiker, 725 F.2d 231, 237 (4th Cir. 1984)). An
administrative ruling further expounds on an ALJ’s duties when a
claimant alleges an inability to afford treatment as follows:
. . . [I]f the frequency or extent of the treatment
sought by an individual is not comparable with the degree
of the individual’s subjective complaints, . . . [the
ALJ] may find the alleged intensity and persistence of an
individual’s symptoms are inconsistent with the overall
evidence of record. [The ALJ] will not find an
individual’s symptoms inconsistent with the evidence in
the record on this basis without considering possible
reasons he or she may not... seek treatment consistent
with the degree of his or her complaints. [The ALJ] may
need to contact the individual regarding the lack of
treatment or, at an administrative proceeding, ask why he
or she has not. . . sought treatment in a manner
consistent with his or her complaints. When [the ALJ]
consider[s] the individual’s treatment history, [the ALJ]
may consider (but [is] not limited to) one or more of the
following:

An individual may not be able to afford treatment and may
not have access to free or low-cost medical services.

[An ALJ] will consider and address reasons for not
pursuing treatment that are pertinent to an individual’s
case. [The ALJ] will review the case record to determine
whether there are explanations for inconsistencies in the
individual’s statements about symptoms and their effects,
and whether the evidence of record supports any of the
individual’s statements at the time he or she made them.
[The ALJ] will explain how [he or she] considered the

19

individual’s reasons in [the ALJ’s] evaluation of the
individual’s symptoms.
SSR 16-3p, 2017 WL 5180304, at *9-10 (emphasis added) (bullet
omitted).
The record here indeed reflects both that Plaintiff’s
orthopedist Dr. Hayes referred Plaintiff to a pain clinic for
injections (see Tr. 430), and that Plaintiff reported to her
primary care provider that Plaintiff could not continue treating at
the pain clinic due to lack of insurance coverage (see Tr. 445).
Notably, however, Plaintiff remained financially able to continue
obtaining treatment for other conditions with her primary care
provider after Dr. Hayes’s December 2022 referral to the pain
clinic, but did not complain about or seek treatment for back and
neck pain. (See Tr. 440-49.) Moreover, Plaintiff’s alleged
inability to afford injections at the pain clinic does not explain
why she could not have sought relief of her back and neck pain at
additional visits with Dr. Hayes (or another orthopedist) or at
free or low-cost providers, and does not explain the absence of
treatment for back and neck pain from her alleged onset date of
October 20, 2021, to the date of her first treatment of record for
back and/or neck pain on June 23, 2022 (see Tr. 470-74). Under
such circumstances, the ALJ did not err by discounting Plaintiff’s
subjective complaints of back and neck pain based in part on her
limited treatment for those conditions. See Byers v. Berryhill,
No. 1:17CV103, 2018 WL 318466, at *9 (M.D.N.C. Jan. 5, 2018)
20
(unpublished) (finding no error in ALJ’s rejection of the
plaintiff’s alleged inability to afford treatment, where “there
[wa]s no indication that [the p]laintiff ha[d] explored the
availability of free or reduced cost medical services,” and “it
[wa]s incumbent on [the p]laintiff to explore such availability
rather than simply concluding that he c[ould] not pay for any
medical care” (emphasis and internal quotation marks omitted)),
recommendation adopted, slip op. (M.D.N.C. Apr. 4, 2018) (Tilley,
S.J.); Hawley v. Colvin, No. 5:12CV260, 2013 WL 6184954, at *8
(E.D.N.C. Nov. 25, 2013) (unpublished) (finding no error in ALJ’s
consideration of the plaintiff’s lack of treatment for back pain,
where “[the plaintiff] testified that he [went] to the free clinic
twice a week for counseling and for medical treatment for
hypertension and asthma, but not for his back pain” (emphasis
added)).
The remainder of the record evidence relating to Plaintiff’s
lumbar DDD and cervical spondylosis would not have compelled the
ALJ to include greater limitations in the RFC. Those records
reflect an approximately six-month course of treatment from June

23, 2022, to December 16, 2022 (see Tr. 419-30, 470-74), which
documented spinal tenderness and/or reduced range of motion but
intact gait, strength, reflexes, pulses and sensation, and negative
straight leg raising tests (see Tr. 420, 423, 426, 429, 472).
Treatment consisted of anti-inflammatory and nerve pain medication
21
(see Tr. 421, 424, 427, 473), and imaging reflected mainly mild
findings (see Tr. 432-34).° Moreover, as addressed earlier,
Plaintiff failed to include lumbar DDD or cervical spondylosis
among her allegedly disabling impairments in her application
materials (see Tr. 218, 252, 260) or to testify as to those
impairments at her hearing (see Tr. 56-76), which undermines her
contention on judicial review that the ALJ failed to account for
those impairments in the RFC, see Allison v. Kijakazi, No.
1:21cCV890, 2023 WL 143201, at *5 &€ n.6 (M.D.N.C. Jan. 10, 2023)
(unpublished) (holding that “[the p]laintiff simply ha[d] not shown
that the medical evidence should have compelled the ALJ to adopt
limitations . . . in the RFC to account for [the p]laintiff’s
headaches,” where “[the plaintiff] did not list headaches among her
allegedly disabling conditions on any of her Disability Reports”),
recommendation adopted, 2023 WL 7924175 (M.D.N.C. Feb. 3, 2023)
(unpublished) (Eagles, J.); O’Brien, 2016 WL 2755459, at *7 (“[T]he
ALJ did not err by failing to include any limitations in the RFC

° Plaintiff faults the ALJ for not expressly discussing Dr. Hayes’s
treatment records and the lumbar and cervical imaging he ordered. (See Docket
Entry 9 at 11-12.) The ALJ did cite that evidence generally but did not discuss
it in any detail. (See Tr. 43.) However, given the brevity of Plaintiff’s
treatment for back and neck pain (see Tr. 419-30, 470-74), and her failure to
allege lumbar DDD and cervical spondylosis as disabling impairments (see Tr. 56-
76, 218, 252, 260), the ALJ did not commit legal error in failing to specifically
discuss that evidence, see McNeil v. Saul, No. 1:19CV213, 2020 WL 5111246, at *5
(M.D.N.C. Aug. 31, 2020) (unpublished) (declining to find error arising out of
ALJ’s failure to discuss left knee MRI in RFC discussion, where “[the p]laintift
did not include any left knee conditions among his allegedly disabling
impairments on his Disability Report and [] did not testify at either his
original or the supplemental hearing about any problems with his left knee”
(internal parenthetical citation omitted)), recommendation adopted, 2020 WL
5821076 (M.D.N.C. Sept. 30, 2020) (unpublished) (Osteen, J.).
22

related to [the p]laintiff’s hearing loss and
tinnitus[,] . . . [because] Plaintiff did not include hearing loss
or tinnitus in the list of disabling impairments on his Disability
Report[, and t]hat fact undermine[d] his suggestion [] that such
conditions may have caused functional limitations”); Thomas v.
Colvin, Civ. No. 1:13–1294, 2014 WL 2611720, at *1–2, 13 (D.S.C.
June 11, 2014) (unpublished) (rejecting argument that “ALJ erred by
failing to discuss [the p]laintiff’s obesity in the RFC analysis”
because, inter alia, the plaintiff “did not allege obesity as an
impairment in his Disability Reports”).
Put simply, Plaintiff’s first issue on review fails as a
matter of law.
2. Migraine Headaches
Plaintiff’s second assignment of error asserts that “[t]he ALJ
did not build an accurate and logical bridge regarding
[Plaintiff]’s migraines.” (Docket Entry 9 at 13 (bold font and
block formatting omitted); see also Docket Entry 12 at 4-5.) In

particular, Plaintiff contends that, “[d]espite treatment records
and other evidence showing a diagnosis and treatment for migraines,
the ALJ never acknowledged migraines in the step-two analysis or
elsewhere in the decision” (Docket Entry 9 at 15), “and the ALJ’s
broad reference that all other alleged impairments were not severe
precludes meaningful judicial review” (id. (referencing Tr. 43)).
Plaintiff additionally argues that, “[d]espite treatment records
23
showing [Plaintiff] was sensitive to light and sound, the RFC
assessment contained no limitation on light or sound nor an
explanation for their absence,” and, despite “treatment records
show[ing] that migraines could last for days, [] the ALJ never
explained whether [Plaintiff]’s migraines would result in absences
or limitations on task performance.” (Id.) In Plaintiff’s view,
the ALJ’s failure to “ma[k]e any specific findings regarding the
frequency, severity, duration, and work-related effects of
[Plaintiff]’s migraines[ violated ] Woody [v. Kijakazi, No. 22-
1437, 2023 WL 5745359, at *1 (4th Cir. Sept. 6, 2023)
(unpublished)] and Darlene A.[ v. Colvin, No. 1:23CV976, 2024 WL
5262869, at *4-6 (M.D.N.C. Dec. 21, 2024) (unpublished)].” (Id.)
For the reasons that follow, the ALJ here did not err by failing to
make findings regarding the frequency, severity, and duration of
Plaintiff’s alleged migraine headaches or by failing to include in
the RFC limitations relating to exposure to light and sound or off-
task time and absence, because Plaintiff did not provide evidence

establishing that migraine headaches even qualified as a medically
determinable impairment, let alone a severe impairment.
Social Security Ruling 19-4p, Titles II & XVI: Evaluating
Cases Involving Primary Headache Disorders, 2019 WL 4169635 (Aug.
26, 2019) (“SSR 19-4p”), provides that a claimant must present

24
evidence of the following criteria to establish migraine headaches
as a medically determinable impairment:
[H]eadaches not better accounted for by another []
diagnosis [recognized by the third edition of the
International Classification of Headache Disorders
(“ICHD-3”)] and at least five headache attacks satisfying
the following criteria:
· Lasting 4 to 72 hours (untreated or unsuccessfully
treated); and
· At least two of the following four characteristics:
· Unilateral location;
· Pulsating quality;
· Moderate or severe pain intensity; or
· Aggravation by or causing avoidance of
routine physical activity (for example,
walking or climbing stairs); and
· During headache, at least one of the
following:
· Nausea or vomiting, or
· Photophobia and phonophobia.
SSR 19-4p, 2019 WL 4169635, at *5 (emphasis added) (footnotes
omitted).
Here, the record, which contains treatment notes spanning
nearly three years from May 29, 2020 (see Tr. 326-33), to March 22,
2023 (see Tr. 440-44), reflects only one occasion on which
Plaintiff complained of a migraine headache (see Tr. 460-63). On
July 27, 2022, Plaintiff reported to her primary care provider that
she had a “migraine on the left side of her head that started a few
25
days [earlier],” with “sensitivity to light and sound,” and “nausea
but no vomiting.” (Tr. 460.) The provider described Plaintiff as
“ill-appearing, sitting in a dark exam room” (Tr. 462) and
administered a promethazine injection for Plaintiff’s nausea (see
Tr. 463). That sole report of a migraine headache falls far below
the “at least five headache attacks” required by SSR 19-4p to
establish migraine headaches as a medically determinable
impairment, SSR 19-4p, 2019 WL 4169635, at *5 (emphasis added).
The other record evidence Plaintiff highlights similarly fails
to meet SSR 19-4p’s criteria to qualify Plaintiff’s migraine
headaches as a medically determinable impairment. Plaintiff notes
that, “[i]n disability paperwork, [she] stated she took Excedrin
Migraine and Goody’s powder as needed for headaches” (Docket Entry
9 at 13 (citing Tr. 290)), but fails to explain how medication
taken “as needed” (Tr. 290) demonstrates that she experienced “at
least five headache attacks,” SSR 19-4p, 2019 WL 4169635, at *5
(emphasis added). Plaintiff further relies upon “[t]reatment
records in October 2022 and March 2023 [that] reported an active
problem of migraines.” (Docket Entry 9 at 14 (citing Tr. 445,

450).) Although treatment notes from both primary care visits
listed “Classic Migraine (With Aura)” (Tr. 445, 450) among
Plaintiff’s “Active Problems [and C]onditions” (id. (all caps font
omitted)), at both visits, Plaintiff denied current headache (see
Tr. 446, 451), and the provider neither assessed migraine headaches
26
(see Tr. 448, 452), nor prescribed any treatment for them (see Tr.
449, 454). Plaintiff additionally points out that “Dr. Hayes’s
treatment records from August 2022 to December 2022 noted a past
medical history of migraines” (Docket Entry 9 at 14 (emphasis
added) (citing Tr. 419, 422, 425, 428)), but does not explain how
a “past” history of migraines would have any tendency to show that
Plaintiff experienced migraines at the frequency required by SSR
19-4p during the relevant period in this case (see id.).
Because Plaintiff has clearly not presented the evidence
required by SSR 19-4p to establish migraine headaches as a
medically determinable impairment, she has failed to show any error
by the ALJ relating to migraine headaches, and Plaintiff’s second
assignment of error thus provides no basis for relief.
3. Interaction with Coworkers and Supervisors
In Plaintiff’s third and final assignment of error, she
maintains that “[t]he ALJ did not build an accurate and logical
bridge regarding social interaction limitations with coworkers and

supervisors.” (Docket Entry 9 at 16; see also Docket Entry 12 at
5-11.) More specifically, Plaintiff notes that “[t]he sole basis
for the [ALJ’s RFC] limitation of occasional interaction with the
public was [Plaintiff]’s continued prescription of medication for
her mental impairments” (Docket Entry 9 at 18 (referencing Tr.
49)), and argues that “the ALJ did not explain why th[at]
evidence . . . would not extend to social interaction with
27
coworkers and supervisors” (id.). In that regard, Plaintiff points
out that “the ALJ noted earlier in the decision[ that Plaintiff]
reported problems getting along with everyone, which would include
coworkers and supervisors.” (Id. (referencing Tr. 45 (in turn
referencing Tr. 229)).) According to Plaintiff, “[t]he ALJ’s
consideration of social interaction limitations with only the
public is contrary to the guidance in Social Security Ruling 85-
15[, Titles II and XVI: Capability to Do Other Work - The Medical-
Vocational Rules as a Framework for Evaluating Solely Nonexertional
Impairments, 1985 WL 56857 (1985) (‘SSR 85-15’),] because that
ruling emphasizes that interaction with coworkers and supervisors,
not the public, is a basic demand of unskilled work.” (Id.
(referencing SSR 85-15, 1985 WL 56857, at *4).) As explained more
fully below, Plaintiff’s contentions ultimately miss the mark.
The ALJ’s decision did not sufficiently explain why she
limited Plaintiff’s interaction with the public but not with
supervisors and coworkers. At step three of the SEP, the ALJ
expressly acknowledged that “[Plaintiff] stated that she has
problems getting along with family, friends, neighbors, or others

because she does not like people” (Tr. 45 (referencing Tr. 229)) in
finding Plaintiff moderately limited in interacting with others
(see id.). That statement by Plaintiff, which the ALJ did not
expressly discount (see Tr. 45-47), would support limitations on
interaction with coworkers, supervisors, and the public. In the
28
ALJ’s discussion of the mental RFC, she provided the following
rationale for the RFC’s mental limitations:
Turning to [Plaintiff]’s severe mental impairments
including depression/bipolar, anxiety, and substance
addition disorder, her treatment notes reveal these
conditions are stable with current treatment.
Specifically, other than [Plaintiff]’s report that she
was bothered by feeling down, depressed, or hopeless and
bothered by little interest or pleasure doing things
during an emergency room follow-up by her primary care
provider in July 2022, [Plaintiff] was alert, oriented
times three, well-appearing, with normal appearance and
no depression alternating with periods of elation; no
racing thoughts; and was not bothered by feeling down,
depressed, or hopeless during primary care provider
visits during examinations. [Plaintiff]’s treatment has
consisted of the prescription of Abilify and
Buspar. [Plaintiff] has not participated in individual
or group counseling and has not required intensive
therapy, inpatient therapy or hospitalization for her
severe mental impairments. Nonetheless, the [ALJ] has
limited [Plaintiff] to simple, routine tasks; occasional
interaction with the public; occasional workplace
changes; and occasional independent decision making
because of her depression/bipolar, anxiety, and substance
addiction disorder.
(Tr. 48 (emphasis added) (internal parenthetical citations
omitted).) That discussion entirely fails to explain why
Plaintiff’s mental symptoms warranted a limitation on interaction
with the public but not with coworkers and supervisors.
The ALJ’s discussion of the opinion evidence similarly fails
to shed any light on her omission from the RFC of interaction
limitations involving coworkers and supervisors. The state agency
psychological consultants did not include any interaction
limitations in their mental RFCs, opining only that Plaintiff
remained able to perform “simple routine tasks” (Tr. 81, 85) and
29
“simple and unskilled work” (Tr. 91). The ALJ deemed those
administrative findings “persuasive” and stated that “[t]he medical
evidence of record also support[ed] additional limitations.” (Tr.
49 (emphasis added).) In that regard, the ALJ found that “the
continued prescription of Abilify and Buspar for anxiety disorder
and bipolar disorder support[ed] limitations including occasional
interaction with the public and occasional workplace changes.”
(Id. (emphasis added).) Again, that explanation wholly fails to
explain why the “continued prescription of Abilify and Buspar”
(id.) would not also warrant limiting Plaintiff’s interaction with
coworkers and supervisors. Consultative psychological examiner Dr.
Carol S. McCleary opined that Plaintiff would have “[m]oderate”
limitation in her “[a]bility to interact with coworkers and with
the public,” further defined as “[s]ome problems that might be
successfully dealt with through modifications or accommodations.”
(Tr. 417.) The ALJ found that opinion “persuasive” and “supported
by and consistent with the medical evidence of record” (Tr. 49),
but then inexplicably included only a limitation in the RFC to
interaction with the public (see Tr. 46). The ALJ’s failure of

explanation regarding limitations on interaction with coworkers and
supervisors precludes meaningful judicial review.
That error by the ALJ remains harmless, see generally Fisher,
869 F.2d at 1057 (observing that “[n]o principle of administrative
law or common sense requires us to remand a case in quest of a
30
perfect opinion unless there is reason to believe that the remand
might lead to a different result”), because, as the Commissioner
argues, “the jobs identified [by the VE and adopted] at step five
[of the SEP by the ALJ] could be performed even if Plaintiff had
more restricted social interaction limitations” (Docket Entry 11 at
14). The Dictionary of Occupational Titles (“DOT”) codes for all
three of the jobs the ALJ ultimately found Plaintiff able to
perform (see Tr. 50) contain a fifth digit (or “People” rating) of
“8,” DOT, No. 318.687-010 (“Kitchen Helper”), 1991 WL 672755
(G.P.O. 4th ed. rev. 1991); DOT, No. 920.587-018 (“Hand Packager”),
1991 WL 687916; DOT, No. 317.687-010 (“Cook Helper”), 1991 WL
672752, which means that the jobs’ interaction-related tasks
primarily entail “Taking Instructions - Helping,” further defined
in the DOT as “[a]ttending to the work assignment instructions or
orders of [a] supervisor[ with njlo immediate response required
unless clarification of instructions or orders is needed,” see DOT,
App’ B, (“Explanation of Data, People, and Things”), 1991 WL
688701 (emphasis added). Moreover, each job rates the degree of
“Taking Instructions - Helping” as “Not Significant,” DOT, No.
318.687-010 (“Kitchen Helper”), 1991 WL 672755; DOT, No.
920.587-018 (“Hand Packager”), 1991 WL 687916; DOT, No. 317.687-010
(“Cook Helper”), 1991 WL 672752 (emphasis added), which “reflect[s]
the lowest possible level of human interaction that exists in the
labor force,” Fletcher v. Colvin, No. 1:15CV166, 2016 WL 915196, at

31

*10 (M.D.N.C. Mar. 4, 2016) (unpublished), recommendation adopted,
slip op. (M.D.N.C. Mar. 28, 2016) (Osteen, C.J.). Furthermore, all
three jobs identify the task of “Talking” as “Not Present -
Activity or condition does not exist.” DOT, No. 318.687-010
(“Kitchen Helper”), 1991 WL 672755; DOT, No. 920.587-018
(“Packager, Hand”), 1991 WL 687916; DOT, No. 317.687-010 (“Cook
Helper”), 1991 WL 672752.
Consequently, Plaintiff has not shown that remand for the ALJ
to include limitations in the RFC on interaction with coworkers and
supervisors would result in a different outcome in her case, see
Ridley G. v. Commissioner of Soc. Sec., No. 1:20CV773, 2021 WL
4307507, at *8, *13 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 22, 2021) (unpublished)
(deciding that RFC restriction to no interaction or tandem tasks
with coworkers harmonizes with jobs with DOT level 8 interaction);
Scott C. v. Commissioner of Soc. Sec., No. 2:20CV109, 2021 WL
2682276, at *4-5 (D. Vt. June 30, 2021) (unpublished) (deeming
“level 8 interaction [] compatible with an RFC limiting a claimant
to only superficial contact with coworkers, supervisors, and the
public” (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis
added)); Wilson v. Saul, No. 1:19CV1089, 2020 WL 6293132, at *4
(M.D.N.C. Oct. 27, 2020) (unpublished) (Webster, M.J.) (finding any
error arising out of “[t]he ALJ’s decision to omit any limitation
in [the pJlaintiff’s ability to interact with co-workers and
supervisors .. . harmless because the jobs the ALJ concluded that

32

[the p]laintiff could perform d[id] not require significant social
interactions,” and “the [DOT] descriptions of the jobs ... list
interaction with ‘People’ as being ‘Not Significant’”),
recommendation adopted, slip op. (M.D.N.C. Nov. 24, 2020) (Biggs,
J.); Eldridge v. Berryhill, No. CV 16-5289, 2018 WL 1092025, at *2
(W.D. Ark. Feb. 28, 2018) (unpublished) (holding jobs categorized
by DOT as involving level 8 interaction consistent with restriction
to “limited contact with the general public” and “incidental
contact with co-workers” (emphasis added)); Alie v. Berryhill, No.
4:16CV1353, 2017 WL 2572287, *16 (B.D. Mo. June 14, 2017)
(unpublished) (ruling that “[l]level 8 interaction is compatible
with a[n] RFC limiting a claimant to only superficial contact with
coworkers, supervisors, and the public” (emphasis added)); Shorey
v. Astrue, No. 1:11CV414, 2012 WL 3475790, at *6 (D. Me. July 13,
2012) (unpublished) (holding that “inclusion of a limitation to
occasional, brief, and superficial contact with coworkers and
supervisors in the [ALJ]’s hypothetical question would not have
excluded” jobs with DOT “People” rating of 8), recommendation
adopted, 2012 WL 3477707 (D. Me. Aug. 14, 2012) (unpublished);
Flaherty v. Halter, 182 F. Supp. 2d 824, 851 (D. Minn. 2001)
(finding jobs with “not significant” levels of social interaction
under the DOT compatible with ALJ’s limitation to “brief
superficial type of contact with co-workers and supervisors and
members of the public” (emphasis added)).

33

In Plaintiff’s Reply, she raises two arguments why the ALJ’s
failure to include in the RFC limitations on interaction with
coworkers and supervisors does not qualify as harmless error. (See
Docket Entry 12 at 6-11.) First, Plaintiff contests the relevance
of the DOT’s rating of “Talking” for all three jobs as “Not
Present,” because “[t]he ability of talking . . . refers to
‘[e]xpressing or exchanging ideas by means of the spoken word to
impart oral information to clients or to the public and to convey
detailed spoken instructions to other workers accurately, loudly,
or quickly.’” (Id. at 7 n.28. (quoting Selected Characteristics of
Occupations Defined in the Revised Dictionary of Occupational
Titles (“SCO”), App’x C (“Physical Demands”), § 12 (U.S. Dep’t of
Labor 1993)).) According to Plaintiff, “[t]h[at] definition shows
that the ability of talking relates to when that ability is part of
the fundamental duties of the job, not the interaction when an
individual is taking instructions or helping.” (Id. ) Even if,
arguendo, the definition of “Talking” pertains to speaking as an
essential function of the job, rather than the speaking involved in
taking instructions and/or helping, Plaintiff has glossed over the
fact that the DOT rates the degree of “Taking Instructions -
Helping” as “Not Significant” for all three jobs in question, and
indicates that “[nlo immediate response [to a supervisor is]
required unless clarification of instructions or orders is needed,”
DOT, App’x B, 1991 WL 688701 (emphasis added).

34

Second, Plaintiff contends that “[t]he Commissioner takes
administrative notice of reliable job information from various
governmental and other publications” (Docket Entry 12 at 8 (citing
20 C.F.R. § 416.966(d))), and that “the United States Department of
Labor’s The Revised Handbook for Analyzing Jobs (Revised Handbook)
provide[s] reliable job information” (id. (stray comma omitted)
(second italics added)). According to Plaintiff, “[t]he Revised
Handbook confirms that ‘[e]very job involves a relationship to a
supervisor or to a set of instructions . . . [and] wherever such a
relationship is occupationally significant, the analyst must
provide an indication of that relationship.’” (Id. at 9 (first
italics added) (second italics in original) (quoting Revised
Handbook, Ch. 13 - “Writing Job Summaries and Descriptions of

Tasks,” at 13-7 (U.S. Dep’t of Labor 1991)).) Plaintiff further
notes that “[e]xamples in the worker function related to [P]eople
include: instructs students, supervises workers, and serves
customers.” Id. (citing Revised Handbook, Ch. 13, at 13-7).)
Plaintiff thus argues that “the reliable job information shows that
the tasks for the [P]eople worker function relate to the nature of
the interaction, not the frequency of interaction” (id. at 10
(emphasis added)), and that “the assessment of “[N]ot
[S]ignificant” in the [P]eople worker function is not relevant to
a specific frequency of social interaction” (id. (emphasis added)).

35
Plaintiff’s argument overlooks the fact that the DOT, for each
of the three jobs, rates the worker’s relationship to “Things” as
“Significant” but his or her relationship to “People” as “Not
Significant.” DOT, No. 318.687-010 (“Kitchen Helper”), 1991 WL
672755; DOT, No. 920.587-018 (“Packager, Hand”), 1991 WL 687916;
DOT, No. 317.687-010 (“Cook Helper”), 1991 WL 672752 (emphasis
added). Thus, although “every job involves a relationship to a
supervisor,” the job analyst that prepared the DOT’s job
descriptions for Kitchen Helper, Hand Packager, and Cook Helper
clearly indicated that, for those jobs, the relationship did not
qualify as “occupationally significant.” Revised Handbook, Ch. 13,
at 13-7.
Furthermore, the DOT’s descriptions of the duties of each job
make clear that interaction with coworkers and supervisors would
not rise to the level of “occupationally significant,” id. See
DOT, No. 318.687-010 (“Kitchen Helper”), 1991 WL 672755 (“Performs
any combination of following duties to maintain kitchen work areas
and restaurant equipment and utensils in clean and orderly
condition: Sweeps and mops floors. Washes worktables, walls,
refrigerators, and meat blocks. Segregates and removes trash and
garbage and places it in designated containers. Steam-cleans or
hoses-out garbage cans. Sorts bottles, and breaks disposable ones
in bottle-crushing machine. Washes pots, pans, and trays by hand.
Scrapes food from dirty dishes and washes them by hand or places

36

them in racks or on conveyor to dishwashing machine. Polishes
silver, using burnishing-machine tumbler, chemical dip, buffing
wheel, and hand cloth. Holds inverted glasses over revolving
brushes to clean inside surfaces. Transfers supplies and equipment
between storage and work areas by hand or by use of handtruck.
Sets up banquet tables. Washes and peels vegetables, using knife
or peeling machine. Loads or unloads trucks picking up or
delivering supplies and food.”); DOT, No. 920.587-018 (“Packager,
Hand”), 1991 WL 687916 (“Packages materials and products manually,
performing any combination of following duties: Cleans packaging
containers. Lines and pads crates and assembles cartons. Obtains
and sorts product. Wraps protective material around product.
Starts, stops, and regulates speed of conveyor. Inserts or pours
product into containers or fills containers from spout or chute.
Weighs containers and adjusts quantity. Nails, glues, or closes
and seals containers. Labels containers, container tags, or
products. Sorts bundles or filled containers. Packs special

arrangements or selections of product. Inspects materials,
products, and containers at each step of packaging process.
Records information, such as weight, time, and date packaged.”);
DOT, No. 317.687-010 (“Cook Helper”), 1991 WL 672752 (“Assists
workers engaged in preparing foods for hotels, restaurants, or
ready-to-serve packages by performing any combination of following
duties: Washes, peels, cuts, and seeds vegetables and fruits.
37
Cleans, cuts, and grinds meats, poultry, and seafood. Dips food
items in crumbs, flour, and batter to bread them. Stirs and
strains soups and sauces. Weighs and measures designated
ingredients. Carries pans, kettles, and trays of food to and from
work stations, stove, and refrigerator. Stores foods in designated
areas, utilizing knowledge of temperature requirements and food
spoilage. Cleans work areas, equipment and utensils, segregates
and removes garbage, and steam-cleans or hoses garbage containers.
Distributes supplies, utensils, and portable equipment, using
handtruck.” (internal parenthetical material omitted)).
In sum, Plaintiff’s third and final issue on review fails to
demonstrate any grounds for remand.
III. CONCLUSION
Plaintiff has not established an error warranting remand.
IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that the Commissioner’s decision

finding no disability be affirmed, and that this action be
dismissed with prejudice.

/s/ L. Patrick Auld
L. Patrick Auld
United States Magistrate Judge
January 20, 2026

38

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11243672. Public record. Not legal advice.