# Cruz

> District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania · January 15, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11242983

## Case

- **Full name:** John Antonio Cruz v. Ulli Klemm, et al.
- **Court:** District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania
- **Decided:** January 15, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
JOHN ANTONIO CRUZ, :
Plaintiff : CIV. ACTION NO. 3:25-CV-665

V. : (JUDGE MANNION)
ULL! KLEMM, et al., :
Defendants :
MEMORANDUM
Presently before the court in this prisoner civil rights case is
defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiff's complaint. For the reasons set forth
below, the motion will be granted in part and denied in part.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff, John Antonio Cruz, filed this case on April 8, 2025, and the
court received and docketed his complaint on April 15, 2025. (Doc. 1).
According to the complaint, Cruz is a member of the Jewish faith who follows

a Kosher diet. (/d. 98-9). He was committed to the custody of the
Pennsylvania Department of Corrections (“DOC”) in 2016 and is currently
housed in SCl-Benner Township. (/d.)
Cruz was scheduled to observe Passover in April 2023 on the DOC’s
roster of inmates observing the holiday. (/d. 911). On April 2, 2023, Cruz met
with SCl-Benner Township’s chaplain, Chaplain Hansard, who purportedly

instructed him that no food for the ceremonial meal would be made available
for purchase and that only food from the regular institutional menu would be
available. (/d. 911). The complaint alleges that the food available on the
institutional menu is not Kosher and therefore would violate the tenets of
Cruz’s faith. (/d.) Cruz sent a request to Hansard requesting that Kosher food
be provided for the observance of Passover. (/d.)
On April 13, 2023, Cruz and other members of the Jewish faith met
with defendant Ulli Klemm, the DOC’s religious services aaiministrator, to
discuss recent policy changes regarding meals for religious observances.
(Id. 9/4, 12). Klemm stated that he was aware that the Jewish religion
required adherents to eat certain foods during certain holidays, but allegecily
stated that he would not arrange for these foods to be mace available. (/d.
4/13). Klemm purportedly stated that denying Jewish inméte:s’ request for
food on certain holidays was necessary because other religious groups
would likely request specific meals for specific religious holidays if their
request was granted. (/d.) Kiemm also allegedly told Cruz thiat his lawyers
were “better” than Cruz’s lawyers and that Cruz should sue him if he disliked
the policy. (/d.) The complaint alleges that the DOC’s polcie2s concerning
religious meals have been changed multiple times since this conversation,

but that none of the changes have provided the meals necessary for Jewish
inmates to practice their religious holidays. (/d. ]14).
The complaint alleges violations of the Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”) and the First Amendment. (/d. 116).
Cruz names as defendants Klemm and Laurel Harry, the DOC’s secretary.
(Id. at 1-2). He sues both defendants in both their individual and official
capacities. (/d.) Cruz seeks an injunction requiring the DOC to provide
Jewish inmates religious meals on six specific holidays: Shabbath, Pesach,
Shabu’oth, Yom Te’Urah, the evening after Yom Kippur, and Sukkoth. (/d.
4/17). He also seeks punitive damages and declaratory relief. (/d. 918-19).
Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint along with a
supporting brief on August 19, 2025. (Docs. 15-16). Defendants assert six
arguments for dismissal: (1) that all official capacity claims against them
should be dismissed on the basis of sovereign immunity; (2) that all official
capacity claims for money damages should be dismissed on the basis of
qualified immunity; (3) that all individual capacity claims should be dismissed
for failure to allege personal involvement; (4) that all individual capacity
claims should be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may
be granted; (5) that all claims for monetary damages should be dismissed
because Cruz has not alleged any physical injury; and (6) that all individual

capacity claims for damages under RLUIPA should be dismissed because
RLUIPA does not permit such claims. (Doc. 16). Cruz filed an opposition brief

on November 30, 2025, which the court received and docketed on December
10, 2025. (Doc. 19). Defendants have not filed a reply brief. The motion to
dismiss is accordingly ripe for judicial review.
ll. © LEGAL STANDARDS
A. Motions to Dismiss
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) authorizes dismissal of a
complaint for “failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.”
Under Rule 12(b)(6), the court must “accept all factual allegations as true,
construe the complaint in the light most favorable to tre plaintiff, and
determine whether, under any reasonable reading of the complaint, the
plaintiff may be entitled to relief.” Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203,
210 (3d Cir. 2009 (quoting Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 FF.3d 224, 231
(3d Cir. 2008)). While a complaint need only contain “a short and plain
statement of the claim, Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), and dettailed factual
allegations are not required, Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 55) U.S. 544, 555
(2007), a complaint must plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.” /d. at 570. “The plausibility standard is not akin to a
‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer dosssibility that a

defendant has acted unlawfully.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009)
(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “[L]abels and conclusions” are not
enough, Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, and a court “is not bound to accept as
true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.” /d.
In resolving a motion to dismiss, the court thus conducts “a two-part
analysis.” Fowler, 578 F.3d at 210. First, the court separates the factual
elements from the legal elements and disregards the legal conclusions. /d.
at 210-11. Second, the court determines “whether the facts alleged in the
complaint are sufficient to show that the plaintiff has a plausible claim for
relief.” /d. at 211 (quotations omitted).
Courts must liberally construe complaints brought by pro se litigants.
Sause v. Bauer, 585 U.S. 957, 960 (2018). Pro se complaints, “however
inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal
pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007)
(quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)).
B. Constitutional Claims
Cruz’s constitutional claims are filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983.
Section 1983 authorizes redress for violations of constitutional rights and
provides in relevant part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory .. .

subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United
States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an
action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for
redress....
42 U.S.C. §1983. Thus, to establish a successful claim under Section 1983,
a plaintiff must demonstrate that the challenged conduct was committed by
a person acting under color of state law and deprived the plaintiff of rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United
States. Lake v. Arnold, 112 F.3d 682, 689 (3d Cir. 1997). Section 1983 does
not create a substantive right, but merely provides a method for vindicating
federal rights conferred by the United States Constitution and the federal
statutes that it describes. Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137 (19779).
Ill. Discussion
A. Official Capacity Claims
Defendants first seek dismissal of all claims brougtt agiainst them in
their official capacity on the basis of sovereign immunity. (Dor. 16 at 4-5).
Cruz argues that defendants are not entitled to sovereign imrnunity to the
extent he seeks injunctive relief ordering defendants to cease ongoing
violations of his constitutional rights. (Doc. 19 at 6-8). He atnitronally argues
that his suit is allowed because the government has waiwed sovereign
immunity under RLUIPA. (/d.)

To the extent Cruz seeks damages for his constitutional claims from
defendants in their official capacities, these claims are barred by sovereign
immunity. DOC employees sued in their official capacities are entitled to
sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment from claims for
damages brought pursuant to Section 1983. Downey v. Pa. Dep’t of Corrs.,
968 F.3d 299, 310-11 (3d Cir. 2020).
Defendants are also entitled to sovereign immunity to the extent Cruz
seeks damages for violation of RLUIPA. States retain their sovereign
immunity from claims for damages under RLUIPA. Sossaman v. Texas, 563
U.S. 277, 293 (2011). The official capacity and RLUIPA damages claims will
accordingly be dismissed.
Cruz’s claims for injunctive and declaratory relief, however, are not
barred by sovereign immunity. “[T]he Ex Parte Young doctrine allows suits

... for declaratory or injunctive relief against state officers in their official
capacities.” Reed v. Goertz, 598 U.S. 230, 234 (2023) (citing Ex Parte
Young, 209 U.S. 123 159-61 (1908)).
B. Official Capacity Damages Claims
Defendants also argue that they are entitled to qualified immunity from
Cruz’s official capacity damages claims. This argument is meritless. “[T]he
doctrine of qualified immunity shields officials acting only in their individual

capacities” and does not apply to official capacity claims.’ W.B. Matula, 67
F.3d 484, 499 (3d Cir. 1995) (citing Brandon v. Holt, 469 U.S. 464, 472-73
(1985)), abrogated in nonrelevant part by A.W. v. Jersey City Public Schs.,
486 F.3d 791, 795-99 (3d Cir. 2007).?
C. Individual Capacity Claims — Personal Involvement
Defendants next seek dismissal of Cruz’s individual capacity claims for
failure to allege personal involvement. (Doc. 16 at 6-8). A defendant cannot
be liable for a violation of a plaintiff's civil rights unless the defendant was
personally involved in the violation. Jutrowski v. Twp. of Riverdale, 904 F.3d
280, 289 (3d Cir. 2018). The defendant’s personal involvement cannot be
based solely on a theory of respondeat superior. Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845
F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988). Rather, for a supervisor to be liable for the
actions of a subordinate, there must be allegations of personal direction or
actual knowledge and acquiescence. /d.

1 As noted above, defendants are entitled to sovereign immunity from
the official capacity damages claims.
2 Although defendants’ argument might be charitably read as asserting
qualified immunity with respect to Cruz’s individual capacity claims if the
invocation of the official capacity claims is viewed as a typographical error,
the court will not grant defendants this liberal construction in light of Cruz’s
status as a pro se litigant. An argument that defendants are entitled to
qualified immunity from official capacity claims simply does not give a pro se
litigant sufficient notice that qualified immunity with respect to individual
capacity claims may also be at issue.

Personal involvement may also be pleaded through allegations that a
supervisory defendant “established and maintained a policy, practice or
custom which directly caused [the] constitutional harm.” Santiago v.
Warminster Twp., 629 F.3d 121, 129 n.5 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting A.M. ex rel.
J.M.K. v. Luzerne Cnty. Juvenile Detention Ctr., 372 F.3d 572, 586 (3d Cir.
2004)). To state such a claim, a plaintiff must allege the existence of a policy
or practice and allege that: “(1) the existing policy or practice created an
unreasonable risk of . . . injury; (2) the supervisor was aware that the
unreasonable risk was created; (3) the supervisor was indifferent to that risk;
and (4) the injury resulted from the policy or practice.” Beers-Capitol v.
Wheizel, 256 F.3d 120, 134 (3d Cir. 2001) (citing Sample v. Diecks, 885 F.2d
1099, 1118 (3d Cir. 1989)).
In this case, Cruz alleges that defendants have promulgated and
enforced various religious meals policies that have disallowed the religious
meals necessary for him to practice his Jewish faith. (Doc. 1). The court finds
this sufficient to allege personal involvement. See Santiago, 629 F.3d at 129
n.5; Beers-Capitol, 256 F.3d at 134. Although the allegations against
defendant Harry in this respect are sparse, Cruz alleges that as the secretary
of the DOC, Harry “is charged with the final word in the policy making
process” and “approved the policy concerning the religious food items

9g

necessary for the ceremonial and ritual observance of the Plaintiff's Hebrew
religion.” (Doc. 1 at 2). Liberally construed, this is sufficient to allege Harry’s
personal involvement in the alleged civil rights violations.
D. Individual Capacity Claims — Merits
Defendants also seek dismissal of Cruz’s individual capacity claims for
failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. (Doc. 16 at 8-10).
Cruz's claims are grounded in the First Amendment and RLUIPA. The
First Amendment states that “Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.” U.S.
CONST. amend. I. It offers protection for a wide variety of expressive
activities, which are lessened, but not extinguished, in the prison context,
where legitimate penological interests must be considered in assessing the
constitutionality of official conduct. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987).
Although prisoners must be afforded “reasonable opportunities” to exercise
the religious freedoms guaranteed by the First Amendment, Cruz v. Beto,
405 U.S. 319, 322 n.2 (1972) (per curiam), imprisonment necessarily results
in restrictions on some constitutional rights, including the First Amendment
right to the free exercise of religion. O’Lone v. Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 348-
49 (1987). Only beliefs which are both sincerely held and religious in nature

10

are entitled to constitutional protection. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205,
215-19 (1972); Dehart v. Horn, 227 F.3d 47, 51 (3d Cir. 2000).
Once it is established that the individual has a belief that is “both
sincerely held and religious in nature,” the Turner test must be applied to
determine whether the curtailment at issue is reasonably related to
penological interests. DeHart, 227 F.3d at 51. Specifically, Turner instructs
courts to weigh the following four factors in determining the reasonableness
of a challenged prison regulation: (1) whether there is “a valid, rational
connection between the prison regulation and the legitimate governmental
interest put forward to justify it”; (2) whether there are alternative means of
exercising the right that remain open to prison inmates; (3) the impact that
accommodation of the asserted constitutional right will have on guards and
other inmates, and on the allocation of prison resources generally; and (4)
whether there are “ready alternatives” available “that fully accommodate the
prisoner's right at de minimis cost to valid penological interests.” Turner, 482
U.S. at 89-91; O’Lone, 482 U.S. at 350-52.
The most important prong of the Turner analysis requires a rational
connection between the policy and the legitimate governmental interest that
justifies it. Nasir v. Morgan, 350 F.3d 366, 372 (3d Cir. 2003). “According to
Turner, a regulation will be sustained unless, ‘the logical connection between

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the regulation and the asserted goal is so remote as to render the policy
arbitrary or irrational.” /d. (citing Turner, 482 U.S. at 89-90).
RLUIPA provides additional protection for the religious rights of
incarcerated individuals beyond that provided by the First Amendment. Holt

v. Hobbs, 574 U.S. 352, 361 (2015). Under RLUIPA, “[n]o government shall
impose a substantial burden on the religious exercise of a person residing in

or confined to an institution, ... even if the burden results from a rule of
general applicability, unless the government demonstrates that imposition of
the burden on that person (1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental
interest; and (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling
governmental interest.” 42 U.S.C. §2000cc-1(a). “A plaintiff bears the initial
burden of proving that a prison policy ‘implicates his religious exercise.”
Ramirez v. Collier, 595 U.S. 411, 425 (2022) (quoting Holt, 574 U.S. at 360).
If the plaintiff makes such a showing, “the burden flips and the government
must ‘demonstrate that imposition of the burden on that person’ is the least
restrictive means of furthering a compelling governmental interest.” /d.
(quoting 42 U.S.C. §2000cc-1(a)).
In this case, the court finds Cruz’s allegations that defendants have
promulgated religious meals policies that directly bar him from obtaining the
meals necessary to practice his religion sufficient to allege violations of both

12

the First Amendment and RLUIPA. Whether the policies ultimately comply
with the First Amendment and RLUIPA are fact questions that cannot be
resolved without a developed record. The court will accordingly deny the
motion to dismiss the individual capacity claims.
E. Damages
Finally, defendants argue that Cruz may not recover damages under
the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) because he has not alleged a
physical injury. (Doc. 16 at 10-11). Although defendants are correct that the
PLRA bars compensatory damages in a prisoner civil rights case unless the
plaintiff has suffered a physical injury, see 42 U.S.C. §1997e(e), Cruz seeks
only punitive damages in this case and does not reques: c:‘ompensatory
damages. (Doc. 1 at 5). Punitive damages are not barred by the PLRA’s
physical injury rule. Allah v. Al-Hafeez, 226 F.3d 247, 251 (Sd ‘Cir. 2000).°
F. Leave to Amend
Before dismissing a civil rights complaint for failure to state a claim

upon which relief may be granted, a district court must perrnit a curative
amendment unless the amendment would be inequitable or {futile. Phillips,

3 Defendants also seek to bar Cruz from recovering damiages for his
RLUIPA claims. (Doc. 16 at 11). The court need not address t his argument
because, as noted above, defendants are entitled to sovereigr’ immunity
from Cruz's RLUIPA damages claims.

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515 F.3d at 245. The court will deny leave to amend as futile because the
dismissed claims fail as a matter of law. The case will accordingly proceed
to discovery on plaintiffs original complaint.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the court will grant in part and deny in part
defendants’ motion to dismiss, dismiss plaintiff's complaint to the extent it
seeks damages from defendants in their official capacities or for violation of
RLUIPA, require defendants to answer plaintiff's complaint with respect to all
other claims, and impose a case management schedule to govern this case.
An appropriate order shall issue.

oe Mannion
United es District Judge
Deon foe

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11242983. Public record. Not legal advice.