# Amaya-Velis

> District Court, N.D. Ohio · January 14, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11242967

## Case

- **Full name:** Carlos Rene Amaya-Velis v. Kevin Raycraft, Director of the Detroit Field Office, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, et al.
- **Court:** District Court, N.D. Ohio
- **Decided:** January 14, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11242967

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- recognizing the serious constitutional concerns of indefinite detention following a final order of removal
- finding no statutory right to periodic bond hearings for aliens detained during the pendency of removal proceedings

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION
CARLOS RENE AMAYA-VELIS, ) Case No. 4:26-cv-73
)
Petitioner, )
) Judge J. Philip Calabrese
v. )
) Magistrate Judge
KEVIN RAYCRAFT, Director of the ) Jennifer Dowdell Armstrong
Detroit Field Office, U.S. )
Immigration and Customs )
Enforcement, et al., )
)
Respondents. )
)
OPINION AND ORDER
Petitioner Carlos Amaya-Velis, a nearly 21-year-old native and citizen of
El Salvador illegally present in the United States since arriving as an unaccompanied
minor in 2022, has been in immigration detention since August 6, 2025. He petitions
for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. For the following reasons,
the Court DISMISSES the petition WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
According to Petitioner, Mr. Amaya-Velis, who will turn 21 years old next
month, entered the United States as an unaccompanied minor on February 19, 2022
when he was 17. (ECF No. 1, ¶ 19, PageID #5–6.) In February 2024, U.S. Citizenship
and Immigration Services granted Mr. Amaya-Velis special immigrant juvenile
status and deferred action, which allowed him to obtain work authorization and
delayed his removal until 2028. (Id., ¶¶ 3, 28 & 45, PageID #2, #7 & #13; ECF No. 1-1,
PageID #51.) After graduating from high school in New Jersey (ECF No. 1, ¶ 29,
PageID #7), Mr. Amaya-Velis moved to Ohio where he lived with family while
working (ECF No. 1-1, PageID #84). In connection with a raid on AZZ Galvanizing

in Canton, Ohio on August 6, 2025, Mr. Amaya-Velis was arrested and has been held
in immigration custody since at a jail in Youngstown, Ohio. (Id., ¶¶ 2, 4 & 20, PageID
#2 & #6.) He has no criminal history. (Id., ¶ 30, PageID #8.)
After Immigration and Customs Enforcement initiated removal proceedings,
Mr. Amaya-Velis applied for asylum and withholding of removal. (Id., ¶¶ 33 & 34,
PageID #9.) On December 11, 2025, he sought a bond redetermination hearing before

an immigration judge who, on January 8, 2026, determined that he lacked
jurisdiction to conduct the hearing because Mr. Amaya-Velis is subject to mandatory
detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). (Id., ¶ 35; ECF No. 1-1, PageID #153.)
Then, Petitioner sought habeas relief in federal court, arguing that an appeal to the
Board of Immigration Appeals would be futile. (Id., ¶ 36, PageID #9–10.) Petitioner
bases this argument on the Board’s decision in Matter of Yajure Hurtado, 29 I&N
Dec. 216 (BIA 2025). (Id., ¶¶ 36 & 64, PageID #9–10 & 17.)

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On January 13, 2026, Petitioner filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. (ECF No. 1.) He alleges that his detention violates:
(1) the Immigration and Nationality Act; (2) the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment; and (3) the ruling of the U.S. District Court for the Central District of
California, which certified a nationwide class of individuals who, like Mr. Amaya-
Velis, are held without bond pending determinations of removal then granted partial
summary judgment in favor of the class. (Id., ¶¶ 103–18, PageID #33–35.)
ANALYSIS

Under 28 U.S.C. § 2243, a court shall forthwith issue a writ or order the
respondent to show cause why a writ should not issue, “unless it appears from the
application that the applicant or person detained is not entitled” to a writ of habeas
corpus. This statute requires an initial screening of a petition. See Alexander v.
Northern Bureau of Prisons, 419 F. App’x 544, 545 (6th Cir. 2011). At this stage of
the proceedings, a court accepts as true the allegations in the petition and construes

them in favor of the petitioner. Id. “If it plainly appears from the petition and any
attached exhibits that the petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court, the
judge must dismiss the petition.” Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases
(applicable to petitions under Section 2241 through Rule 1(b)).
I. Jurisdiction
Section 2241(c)(3) extends the availability of the writ of habeas corpus to
persons “in custody in violation of the Constitution or law or treaties of the United

States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2) provides that no court has jurisdiction to review any
immigration matter except as provided by statute: “Notwithstanding any other
provision of law (statutory or nonstatutory), including section 2241 of title 28, or any
other habeas corpus provision, and sections 1361 and 1651 of such title, no court shall
have jurisdiction to review” immigration cases.
As relevant here, judicial review is available in two circumstances. First, a
final order of removal is subject to judicial review by “the court of appeals for the
judicial circuit in which the immigration judge completed the proceedings,” not the
district court. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(2); see also id. § 1252(b)(9). This provision does not
apply here.

Second, 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D) preserves the ability to petition for a writ of
habeas corpus to raise a constitutional issue. In such a case, however, Congress
significantly limited judicial review and the ability of courts to engage in fact-finding:
no court shall have jurisdiction, by habeas corpus under section 2241 of
title 28 or any other habeas corpus provision, . . . or by any other
provision of law (statutory or nonstatutory), to review such an order [a
final order of removal] or such questions of law or fact [those involving
interpretation and application of statutory provisions, arising from any
action taken or proceeding brought to remove an alien from the United
States].
Id. § 1252(b)(9). This statute encompasses challenges to the decision to seek removal
and the decision to detain an alien in the first place. See Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583
U.S. 281, 294 (2018); see also Nielsen v. Preap, 586 U.S. 392, 402 (2019). Significantly,
Congress specifically divested courts of jurisdiction to review bond determinations
and other discretionary determinations pending removal. See 8 U.S.C.
§ 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii).
As Petitioner notes (ECF No. 1, ¶ 51, PageID #14–15), determinations of bond
or detention are discretionary, even under administrative policy in effect until the
middle of 2025. See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). For this reason, the Court finds that Congress
has not conferred jurisdiction on federal district courts to interpret or apply Section
1225 or Section 1226 of the INA. Divesting federal district courts of jurisdiction over
such determinations makes sense. After all, Congress created an administrative
process intended to act quickly (though in practice its actions have been anything
but) in a field requiring specialized knowledge generally outside the experience of the
inferior federal courts.
I.A. Split of Authority in the Inferior Courts

Notwithstanding the sharp jurisdictional limits in Section 1252, federal
district courts have scarcely noticed that the statute exists. That is odd. In every
other civil case, federal judges routinely invoke the maxim that federal courts are
courts of limited jurisdiction possessing only the jurisdiction that Congress gives
them pursuant to the Constitution.
Whatever the reason judges in the inferior courts have skirted analysis of the
jurisdictional limits of Section 1252, they have taken competing approaches to

whether petitioners are entitled to a bond hearing pending removal. The majority of
courts agree with Petitioner that such a hearing is warranted. See, e.g., Rodriguez v.
Bostock, 779 F. Supp. 3d 1239, 1263 (W.D. Wash. 2025); Gomes v. Hyde, No. 1:25-cv-
11571, 2025 WL 1869299, at *9 (D. Mass. July 7, 2025); Paredes Padillia v. Galovich,
et al., No. 25-cv-863, 2025 WL 3251446, at *6 (W.D. Wis. Nov. 21, 2025); Diaz-
Villatoro v. Larose, et al., No. 25-cv-3087, 2025 WL 3251377, at *4 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 21,

2025). However, at least three courts have taken a contrary position, agreeing with
the Administration’s reading of the statute. See, e.g., Mejia Olalde v. Noem, No. 1:25-
cv-00168, 2025 WL 3131942, at *2 (E.D. Mo. Nov. 10, 2025); Vargas Lopez v. Trump,
No. 8:25CV526, 2025 WL 2780351, at *9 (D. Neb. Sept. 30, 2025); Chavez v. Noem,
No. 3:25-cv-02325, 2025 WL 2730228, at *4 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 24, 2025).
In the Court’s view, both approaches are mistaken. The statutory framework
provides a limited role for district courts to review a habeas petition in the
immigration context not concerning a final order of removal. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D).
That is, Section 1252 preserves the ability of district courts to review a petition for a
writ of habeas corpus regarding a constitutional issue. Id. For example, such claims

might challenge the conditions of confinement or what amounts to indefinite
detention. See, e.g., Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 682 (2001) (recognizing the
serious constitutional concerns of indefinite detention following a final order of
removal); but see Jennings, 583 U.S. at 297 (finding no statutory right to periodic
bond hearings for aliens detained during the pendency of removal proceedings).
Outside of such limited and narrow constitutional claims, which Petitioner

does not raise, other constitutional challenges quickly implicate and often become
entwined with interpretation and implementation of the statutory framework and its
associated procedures. Such is the case with Petitioner’s claims here. Indeed, his
first cause of action asserts a violation of the Immigration and Nationality Act. And,
taken as a whole, his petition pursues that issue to a far greater degree than it
outlines a claimed due-process violation. There might well be good reason for that.
In the immigration context, Congress has broad discretion to determine what process

is due. See, e.g. Department of Homeland Sec. v. Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. 103, 107
(2020); Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 309 (1993). Put another way, a constitutional
challenge to detention pending removal and entitlement to a bond hearing collapse
into analysis of the statutory and regulatory regime—whether, for example, Section
1226(a) entitles an alien to bond pending removal or whether Section 1225(b)
authorizes the government to detain an alien. Congress has made clear that district
courts lack the jurisdiction to make such determinations, even on a habeas petition
under Section 2241. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9). As the Supreme Court has long
recognized, these statutory provisions aim “at protecting the Executive’s discretion

from the courts—indeed, that can fairly be said to be the[ir] theme.” Reno v.
American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 486 (1999).
Nonetheless, the federal district courts that have considered the issues raised
in the petition have not hesitated to wade into interpretation of a statutory scheme
where Congress has made clear they have little, if any, place. The Court fails to see
how it has jurisdiction to consider the petition.

I.B. Exhaustion
Out of an abundance of caution, if the Court is mistaken in its read of the
interplay between Section 1252 and Section 2241, the Court proceeds. If vested with
jurisdiction, the familiar principles of habeas practice and procedure apply. In light
of the congressional limitations on jurisdiction, prudential principles of exhaustion
counsel that a petitioner pursue his administrative remedies to a final judgment from
the Board of Immigration Appeals before seeking a writ of habeas corpus. Because

of the expertise that the Board of Immigration Appeals and the immigration courts
more generally have in the statutory and administrative regime governing the
admission and removal of foreigners, “‘many of the purposes for requiring exhaustion’
may be served by permitting agency review in the first instance.” Ba v. Director of
Detroit Field Off., No. 4:25-cv-02208, 2025 WL 2977712, at *3 (N.D. Ohio Oct. 22,
2025) (quoting Hernandez Torrealba v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 1:25-cv-
01621, 2025 WL 2444114, at *11 (N.D. Ohio Aug. 25, 2025)); see also Beharry v.
Ashcroft, 329 F.3d 51, 62 (2d Cir. 2003) (discussing the benefits of limiting judicial
interference in agency affairs in the immigration context).
I.B.1. Prudential Exhaustion

“When a petitioner does not exhaust administrative remedies, a district court
ordinarily should either dismiss the [habeas] petition without prejudice or stay the
proceedings until the petitioner has exhausted remedies, unless exhaustion is
excused.” Leonardo v. Crawford, 646 F.3d 1157, 1160 (9th Cir. 2011) (citations
omitted). In Leonardo, the petitioner pursued habeas review of the Immigration
Court’s adverse bond determination before he appealed to the Board of Immigration
Appeals. Id. The Ninth Circuit determined that filing a habeas petition in federal

district court was improper because the petitioner “should have exhausted
administrative remedies by appealing to the BIA before asking the federal district
court to review the IJ’s decision.” Id. (citing Rojas-Garcia v. Ashcroft, 339 F.3d 814,
819 (9th Cir. 2003)).
The Sixth Circuit has endorsed this procedure for challenging bond
determinations, albeit in a short, unpublished order. See Rabi v. Sessions, No. 19-

3249, 2018 U.S. App. LEXIS 19661, at *1–2 (6th Cir. July 16, 2018) (citing Leonardo,
646 F.3d at 1160); see also Hernandez Torrealba, 2025 WL 2444114, at *8 (applying
the Ninth Circuit’s test for prudential exhaustion). Previously, the Court has done
so as well. See Tecum Pastor v. Director of Detroit Field Off., U.S. Immigr. & Customs
Enf’t, ___ F. Supp. 3d ___, No. 4: 25-cv-2761, 2025 WL 3746495, at *3 (N.D. Ohio
2025); Monroy Villalta v. Greene, 794 F. Supp. 3d 528, 530 (N.D. Ohio 2025); Laguna
Espinoza v. Director of Detroit Field Off., U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enf’t, No. 4:25-cv-
02107, 2025 WL 2878173, at *2 (N.D. Ohio Oct. 9, 2025); Ba, 2025 WL 2977712, at *2.
In this case, Mr. Amaya-Velis has available to him an appeal to the Board of

Immigration Appeals. As in Leonardo, 646 F.3d at 1160, prudential principles of
exhaustion counsel that Petitioner pursue his administrative remedies to a final
judgment from the Board of Immigration Appeals before seeking a writ of habeas
corpus. In his petition, count one alleges violation of the Immigration and Nationality
Act. Though styled as a Fifth Amendment due process claim, count two also invites
review of process due under the statute and its associated procedures. Further,

Petitioner seeks review of the application and interpretation of Matter of Yajure
Hurtado, 29 I&N Dec. 216 (BIA 2025). In other words, any determination regarding
detention here turns on interpretation and application of the governing removal
regime.
In the first instance, such review should proceed before the Board of
Immigration Appeals to “apply its experience and expertise without judicial
interference.” Khalili v. Holder, 557 F.3d 429, 435 (6th Cir. 2009) (abrogated on other

grounds); see also Rojas-Garcia , 39 F.3d at 819 (acknowledging that a “petitioner
must exhaust administrative remedies before raising the constitutional claims in a
habeas petition when those claims are reviewable by the BIA on appeal”); Monroy
Villalta, 794 F. Supp. 3d at 531; Laguna Espinoza, 2025 WL 2878173, at *2; Ba, 2025
WL 2977712, at *2.
I.B.2. Futility
Petitioner argues that an appeal to the Board of Immigration Appeals would
be time consuming and futile in light of Matter of Yajure Hurtado. But courts in this

Circuit have determined that even where there is a “high probability of denial” of a
petitioner’s appeal of an Immigration Judge’s bond decision, such a probability “does
not weigh in favor of waiving exhaustion.” Hernandez Torrealba, 2025 WL 2444114,
at *11. Indeed, the Attorney General remains free to exercise her discretion to use
an appeal to the Board of Immigration Appeals to change or modify the policy about
which Petitioner complains.
In Hernandez Torrealba, the petitioner sought relief from the exhaustion

requirement based on a decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals affirming the
denial of bond. But the court was “not certain how the BIA will rule on Petitioner’s
appeal given the particular circumstances of her case, and it would be presumptuous
of this Court to simply assume that the BIA will rule against Petitioner.” Id. So too
here. Petitioner presents relevant background of Mr. Amaya-Velis that appears
particularly sympathetic. For this reason, his case might well prove to be one in

which the agency changes or refines its policy announced in Matter of Yajure Hurtado
through agency adjudication. That prerogative belongs in the first instance to the
agency, which also has the knowledge and ability and to adopt policies that are more
tailored to the statutory scheme it is tasked with implementing in a way that courts
are not. For example, it might decide that special immigrant juvenile status or
deferred action might implicate bond considerations that other classes of cases do not.
“[M]many of the purposes for requiring exhaustion’ may be served by
permitting agency review in the first instance.’” Hernandez Torrealba, 2025 WL
2444114, at *11 (quoting Beharry, 329 F.3d at 62). Indeed, courts outside this Circuit

acknowledge that the purposes of requiring exhaustion in the immigration context
“include protecting the authority of administrative agencies, limiting interference in
agency affairs, developing the factual record to make judicial review more efficient,
and resolving issues to render judicial review unnecessary.” Beharry, 329 F.3d at 62
(citing McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 140, 145 (1992); McKart v. United States, 395
U.S. 185, 193–95 (1969)). In any event, the Court has no jurisdiction to review the

decisions of the Board of Immigration Appeals in Hurtado. That authority rests, if
anywhere, with the Sixth Circuit. For these reasons, the Court cannot say that
exhaustion is futile or a waste of time or that prudential reasons apply for excusing
it. Nor does requiring prudential exhaustion “create[] hardship for hardship’s sake,”
as Petitioner suggests. (ECF No. 1, ¶ 100, PageID #32.) To the contrary, it promotes
judicial restraint, separates the powers and proper roles of the agency and the courts
in the administrative regime Congress created, and reserves judicial review from

decisions of the agency for the Sixth Circuit (something that no petitioner, to the
Court’s knowledge, has yet availed himself of).
II. Nationwide Class
Finally, Petitioner argues that Respondents hold Petitioner without a bond
hearing although he is a member of a certified class in which another district court
granted relief. (ECF No. 1, ¶ 81, PageID #22–23.) Specifically, Petitioner maintains
that “Petitioner’s custody decisions are bound by the class-wide declaratory relief
entered” in a class action in the Central District of California. (Id.) In Bautista v.
Santacruz, No. 5:25-cv-01873, 2025 WL 3288403 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 25, 2025), the
Central District of California granted declaratory relief to a nationwide class of

noncitizens, holding that Matter of Yajure Hurtado unlawfully violates the INA.
(ECF No. 1, ¶ 101, PageID #32.) Based on this ruling, Petitioner alleges that
immigration judges are in violation of the INA and that the ruling applies to
Mr. Amaya-Velis, entitling him to a bond hearing. (Id.; ECF No. 1-1, PageID #153.)
Importantly, the ruling in the Central District of California began with the filing of a
habeas petition. See Bautista v. Santacruz, No. 5:25-cv-01873, 2025 WL 2670875, at

*1 (C.D. Cal. July 28, 2025).
“[I]t is doubtful that class relief may be obtained in a habeas proceeding.”
A.A.R.P. v. Trump, 606 U.S. 91, 107 (2025) (Alito, J., dissenting). The Supreme Court
has “never so held, and it is highly questionable whether it is permitted.” Id. “[T]he
class action device is uniquely ‘ill-suited’ for habeas proceedings . . . which often turn
on individualized and fact specific determinations regarding the confinement of a
specific prisoner.” Id. at 109 (quoting Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 296 (1969)).

Although the Supreme Court has addressed class challenges to “vindicate notice
rights” under the Alien Enemies Act seeking habeas relief, it has not determined
whether such relief is appropriate in any other context. Id. at 97 n.1. The Court
doubts it is and fails to see how the Central District of California can issue relief to a
nationwide class of habeas petitioners under Rule 23(b)(2). After all, courts issue
writs of habeas corpus to the person having custody over a petitioner. 28 U.S.C.
§ 2242. And the warden having custody over Mr. Amaya-Velis was not before the
Central District of California.
In any event, the Court is not bound by the Central District of California’s

ruling, and it declines to honor its approach or afford it any persuasive authority. “A
decision of a federal district court judge is not binding precedent in either a different
judicial district, the same judicial district, or even upon the same judge in a different
case.” Camreta v. Greene, 563 U.S. 692, 709 n.7 (2011) (quoting 18 J. Moore et al.,
Moore’s Federal Practice § 134.02[1][d] (3d ed. 2011)). In count three, Petitioner
requests relief pursuant to the Central District of California’s ruling (ECF No. 1,

¶ 112–18, PageID #34–35), but that ruling offers him no relief and does not bind the
Court in any event. Even Petitioner does not believe his own argument. If he did,
then his remedy lies in the Central District of California, and he would have sought
relief there. His decision not to do so speaks volumes about the legal validity of that
class certification order.
CONCLUSION
For these reasons, the Court lacks jurisdiction over the petition but if it had

jurisdiction would require exhaustion as a prudential matter. Accordingly, the Court
DISMISSES the petition for a writ of habeas corpus WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
SO ORDERED.
Dated: January 14, 2026

J. Philip Calabrese
United States District Judge
Northern District of Ohio

14

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11242967. Public record. Not legal advice.