# Opinion

> District Court, N.D. Illinois · January 15, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11242894

## Case

- **Full name:** Dante Smith v. The City of Chicago, et al.
- **Court:** District Court, N.D. Illinois
- **Decided:** January 15, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11242894

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- finding a “2– to 3–hour detention in handcuffs” for the duration of a search was not unreasonable

## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

DANTE SMITH,

Plaintiff, Case No. 21-cv-890

v.

THE CITY OF CHICAGO, et al., Judge John Robert Blakey

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Dante Smith brings claims against the City of Chicago and Chicago
Police Officers Marvin Bonnstetter, Michael Bertini, Wayne Frano, Jr., Nicholas
Hertko, Ivan Ramos, Kevin Garcia, Michael Napoli, and Salvatore Reina (collectively,
the “Officer Defendants”) under § 1983 for violations of his Fourth Amendment rights
during the execution of a search warrant. He asserts a Monell claim against the City
(Count I) and sues the Officer Defendants for unlawful search (Count II), false arrest
(Count III), and excessive force (Count IV). The Officer Defendants now seek
summary judgment on the false arrest and excessive force claims (Counts III and IV),
[105]. For the reasons explained below, the Court grants in part, and denies in part,
Defendants’ motion.
I. Background1
On July 1, 2017, Defendant Bonnstetter procured a search warrant for
Plaintiff’s apartment on the second floor of the building located at 3910 W. Van Buren

in Chicago. [143] ¶ 5. The search warrant targeted an individual named Kevin
Stewart a/k/a “Kevo” and identified items to be seized, including heroin, drug
paraphernalia, records involving drug transactions, and residency documents. Id. ¶
6.
There were seven occupants in the apartment on the evening of July 1,
including Plaintiff. Id. ¶ 9. Plaintiff, who was in his bedroom at the time, heard a
loud noise and moved to the rear of the apartment to look out the window, where he

observed a police officer and police cars. Id. ¶ 10. Plaintiff then moved to the front
of the apartment where he encountered Officer Bonnstetter, the first officer to enter
Plaintiff’s apartment. Id. ¶¶ 11–12. As each of the Defendant Officers entered
Plaintiff’s apartment, they were approximately two to three feet from Plaintiff, and
Plaintiff testified that each Officer Defendant pointed his firearm at Plaintiff for a
few seconds upon entry. Id. ¶ 17; [107-6] at 126:21–127:6; 163:24–165:19. Plaintiff

also testified that Defendant Frano carried a long, black rifle, which he also pointed
at Plaintiff’s chest and head for several seconds. [147] ¶ 33. Defendants dispute that
any officer pointed a firearm at Plaintiff or any other occupant of the apartment.
[147] ¶¶ 24, 30–32.

1 The Court draws these facts from the parties’ statements of material facts, responses thereto, and
cited exhibits. [107], [143], [147].
Plaintiff testified that, as the Defendant Officers entered the apartment, they
shouted, “get down, don’t move,” [107-6] at 94:5–6, and that Defendant Garcia
grabbed Plaintiff’s arm, twisted it behind his back, and handcuffed him. Id. at 94:7–

9. Defendant Garcia then pushed Plaintiff into the dining room and put him on the
floor. [143] ¶ 38; [147] ¶ 36; [107-6] at 94:9–14.2
Plaintiff testified that Officer Garcia placed the handcuffs on Plaintiff’s wrists
so tightly that they caused pain, broke the skin, and gave Plaintiff abrasions on his
wrists. [147] ¶ 36. Plaintiff remained handcuffed while the Defendant Officers
finished searching the apartment. Id. ¶ 37. Officer Garcia had no recollection of

handcuffing Plaintiff or anyone else during the execution of the search warrant. Id.
¶ 39. None of the Defendant Officers recall whether Plaintiff remained handcuffed
throughout the entire time they searched his apartment or who, if any of them,
handcuffed Plaintiff. Id. ¶ 16.
During execution of the search warrant, Plaintiff complied with the Defendant
Officers’ orders, did not resist the Defendant Officers, and presented no safety threat
to the officers on the scene. [147] ¶ 28. Plaintiff testified that, at one point, while he

was seated on the floor by the wall, Defendant Napoli put his firearm to Plaintiff’s
head and said, “if you want to keep hooping, don’t f***ing move or I’ll blow your brains

2 In the Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleged that Defendant Ramos twisted Plaintiff’s arm
and handcuffed him. [143] ¶ 35; [90] ¶ 64. In response to Defendants’ interrogatories, Plaintiff
represented that Defendant Napoli twisted his arm and handcuffed him. [143] ¶ 37; [107-14] ¶ 11.
But in his more recent March 9, 2023 deposition, Plaintiff testified that Defendant Garcia twisted his
arm and handcuffed him. [107-6] at 93:17–94:14.
out.” Id. ¶ 41; [107-6] at 103:5–15.3 Plaintiff testified that Officer Napoli continued
to stand next to him with his pistol pointed at Plaintiff’s chest, torso, and legs from
approximately two to three feet away for approximately 10 to 15 minutes. [147] ¶ 42;

[107-6] at 118:2–5. According to Plaintiff, Defendant Ramos witnessed his encounter
with Defendant Napoli, [107-6] at 117:13–22, 118:14–20, but no other Defendant
touched him with a firearm or verbally threatened him. Id. at 119:4–120:21. Officer
Napoli denied touching Plaintiff with his firearm and threatening him. [147] ¶ 42.
Plaintiff remained handcuffed for approximately one to two hours, throughout
the officers’ search of the apartment. [143] ¶ 46. Plaintiff did not tell the officers at

the time that his handcuffs were too tight or otherwise uncomfortable; nor did he
complain of injury or request medical attention during the incident. Id. ¶¶ 48–49;
[107-6] at 135:4–11, 159:21–160:6. Plaintiff’s left arm and wrist were sore for several
days following the incident. Id. ¶ 47. After the search of Plaintiff’s residence, the
Defendant Officers recovered various types of firearm ammunition and bags
containing a substance the officers suspected to be heroin. Id. ¶ 50.
On February 17, 2021, Plaintiff filed a complaint against the City of Chicago

and the Officer Defendants, [1], which he amended on June 4, 2021, [28], and
September 16, 2022, [90]. In the operative complaint, Plaintiff asserts a § 1983 claim
against the City of Chicago under Monell (Count I) and § 1983 claims against the
Officer Defendants for unlawful search (Count II), false arrest and imprisonment

3 In the Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleged that, on information and belief, Defendant
Ramos touched Plaintiff with his firearm and threatened him. [90] ¶ 65. In his response to
Defendants’ discovery requests and at his deposition, Plaintiff clarified that it was Defendant Napoli,
not Defendant Ramos, who interacted with Plaintiff. [143] ¶¶ 36–37; [107-6] at 103:5–15.
(Count III), and excessive force (Count IV). On July 21, 2022, the Court granted the
City of Chicago’s motion to bifurcate the Monell claim and stay the case as to that
claim while the case proceeds against the Officer Defendants. [87]. This Court also

previously granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss Count II without prejudice, which
Plaintiff has re-pled (making no substantive changes) in the Second Amended
Complaint, purportedly to preserve the issue on appeal. [90] at 33 n.6. The parties
agree the Court dismissed this claim in its prior order, [67], and it is no longer at
issue; thus, the Court dismisses Count II with prejudice for the reasons stated in its
March 25, 2022 order, [67].

Defendants move for summary judgment on Counts III and IV. [105].
II. Legal Standard
A motion for summary judgment can be granted only when there are no
genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The party seeking summary judgment has the
burden of establishing that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact. See
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). To withstand a motion for summary
judgment, the nonmovant must “set forth specific facts showing that there is a

genuine issue for trial.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986).
The Court must construe the record “in the light most favorable to the nonmovant”
and avoid the “temptation to decide which party’s version of the facts is more likely
true.” Payne v. Pauley, 337 F.3d 767, 770 (7th Cir. 2003).
In resolving a motion for summary judgment, this Court has “one task and one
task only: to decide, based on the evidence of record, whether there is any material
dispute of fact that requires a trial.” Waldridge v. Am. Hoechst Corp., 24 F.3d 918,
920 (7th Cir. 1994) (citations omitted). The nonmovant, though, “must do more than
raise a metaphysical doubt as to the materials facts. Rather, she must come forward

with specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Miller v. American
Family Mut. Ins. Co., 203 F.3d 997, 1003 (7th Cir. 2000) (citation omitted).
III. Analysis
The Officer Defendants move for summary judgment on Plaintiff’s false arrest
claim on the grounds that the officers detained Plaintiff pursuant to a valid search
warrant. Further, Defendants argue that the undisputed facts demonstrate that the
Officer Defendants did not use excessive force against Plaintiff during the execution
of the search warrant, and the doctrine of qualified immunity shields the Officer

Defendants from liability. The Court considers Defendants’ arguments, in turn,
below.
A. False Arrest / False Imprisonment (Count III)
Plaintiff claims that the Defendant Officers subjected him to a false arrest by
placing him in handcuffs while they executed a search warrant of his residence.
While the Fourth Amendment requires searches and seizures to be reasonable,

officers executing a search warrant may “take reasonable action to secure the
premises and ensure their own safety and the efficacy of the search.” United States
v. Jennings, 544 F.3d 815, 818 (7th Cir. 2008) (quoting Los Angeles Cnty., Cal v.
Rettele, 550 U.S. 609 (2007)). Thus, the Fourth Amendment grants officers
“categorical authority to detain any occupant of the subject premises during the
search,” id. (citing Muehler v. Mena, 544 U.S. 93, 98 (2005)), to minimize “the risk of
violence that may erupt when an occupant realizes that a search is underway,” id.
(citing Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692 (1981)). Further, the Fourth Amendment
permits such detentions during the execution of a valid search warrant “because the

character of the additional intrusion caused by detention is slight and because the
justifications for detention are substantial.” Mena, 544 U.S. at 98 (citing Summers,
452 U.S. at 701–05). Thus, an individual’s detention for the duration of a search is
reasonable if officers possessed a valid search warrant for the premises and the
individual occupied those premises at the time of the search. Id.
The undisputed facts in this case mirror those in Mena. As in Mena, the

Defendant Officers here executed a valid warrant to search Plaintiff’s apartment, and
because Plaintiff resided at that address at the time of the search, the Officer
Defendants acted reasonably when they detained Plaintiff for the duration of that
search. See id. (“Mena’s detention for the duration of the search was reasonable
under Summers because a warrant existed to search 1363 Patricia Avenue and she
was an occupant of that address at the time of the search.”).
Plaintiff argues that such detention became unreasonable because it lasted

longer than necessary and that, because the warrant did not identify Plaintiff as a
suspect, there was no reason for officers to handcuff him. But, when the warrant
identifies a premises, not an individual, “the connection of an occupant to a home
alone justifies a detention of that occupant.” Id. (citing Summers, 452 U.S. at 703–
04). Further, the Officer Defendants detained Plaintiff only for the duration of the
search, which the parties agree lasted approximately 1.5 to 2 hours. [143] ¶ 46; see
id. (finding a “2– to 3–hour detention in handcuffs” for the duration of a search was
not unreasonable).
Plaintiff’s remaining arguments, which include that the handcuffs caused

Plaintiff injury because they were too tight and that the Defendant Officers placed
guns in Plaintiff’s face and physically assaulted and threatened him, support his
excessive force claim, not his unreasonable arrest claim. As the Seventh Circuit
noted, false arrest “and excessive force are unrelated except in forming a sequence”;
valid detention “does not justify beating him up, and the beating does not invalidate
the arrest.” Lenard v. Argento, 808 F.2d 1242, 1246 (7th Cir. 1987). Thus, it “is

possible for a police officer to use excessive force to make what is otherwise a
legitimate arrest.” Holmes v. Vill. of Hoffman Estates, 511 F.3d 673, 681 (7th Cir.
2007).
The Court grants Defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to Count III.
The Court addresses Plaintiff’s arguments supporting his excessive force claim below.
B. Excessive Force
Plaintiff brings an excessive force claim on the grounds that: (1) Officer Garcia

handcuffed Plaintiff with such force that he sustained injury; (2) each of the Officer
Defendants pointed his firearm at Plaintiff upon entry to the premises; and (3) Officer
Napoli touched his firearm to Plaintiff’s head and threatened to shoot him while
Plaintiff was in handcuffs.
The Court analyzes claims that law enforcement officers used excessive force
in the course of a seizure or detention “under the Fourth Amendment and its
‘reasonableness’ standard.” Abdullahi v. City of Madison, 423 F.3d 763, 768 (7th Cir.
2005) (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989)). The reasonableness
standard is an objective one from “the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene,

rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.” Payne v. Pauley, 337 F.3d 767, 778
(7th Cir. 2003) (quoting Graham, 490 U.S. at 396–97). And the Court must allow “for
the fact that police officers are often forced to make split-second judgments—in
circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving—about the amount of
force that is necessary in a particular situation.” Abdullahi, 423 F.3d at 768 (quoting
Graham, 490 U.S. at 396–97).

The Court must consider whether, based upon the “totality of circumstances at
the time of the arrest, the officer used greater force than was reasonably necessary to
make the arrest.” Payne, 337 F.3d at 778 (quoting Lester v. City of Chicago, 830 F.2d
706, 713 (7th Cir. 1987)). This inquiry is fact specific and must balance “the intrusion
of the individual against the governmental interests at stake.” Id. Thus, the Court
must consider “the severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an
immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and whether the suspect is

actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.” Id. (citing Graham,
490 U.S. at 396).
1. Plaintiff’s Handcuffs and Resulting Injuries
Plaintiff first argues that, when Defendant Garcia placed him in handcuffs, he
tightened them to the point they broke Plaintiff’s skin and caused him pain for several
days after the incident.
Like any excessive force claim, the Court analyzes Plaintiff’s argument under
“the Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness standard,” which considers a particular
use of force “from the perspective of a reasonable officer on a scene…in light of the

facts and circumstances confronting them, without regard to their underlying intent
or motivation.” Tibbs v. City of Chicago, 469 F.3d 661, 665 (7th Cir. 2006) (citing
Graham, 490 U.S. at 396–97).
While the Seventh Circuit has “recognized excessive force claims based upon
overly tight handcuffs,” id., those cases each had particular facts and circumstances
markedly different from the circumstances described by Plaintiff. For example, in

Payne v. Pauley, the plaintiff complained to officers that her handcuffs were too tight,
experienced numbness in her wrist and fingers, sought treatment at the emergency
room, and underwent two surgical procedures due to the arrest, which left her unable
to work for years. 337 F.3d 767, 774–75 (7th Cir. 2003); see also Lester v. City of
Chicago, 830 F.2d 706 (officers kneed plaintiff in the back, dragged her down the
hallway, and handcuffed her tightly causing scratches and bruises); Herzog v. Village
of Winnetka, Ill., 309 F.3d 1041, 1043 (7th Cir. 2002) (officers forced a breath

screening device in plaintiff’s mouth, cracking her tooth, and laughed when she
complained her handcuffs were too tight); Brown v. Village of Evergreen Park, 2002
WL 31844991, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 18, 2002) (officers jammed plaintiff’s head against
hood of car and handcuffed him so tightly it caused nerve damage).
In contrast, the court in Tibbs affirmed summary judgment against a plaintiff
who complained “only once” to the officers on the scene that his handcuffs were too
tight “without elaborating on any injury, numbness, or degree of pain.” 469 F.3d at
666. Further, the plaintiff remained in handcuffs for only twenty-five to thirty
minutes, and his only symptoms included redness on his wrists for which he never

sought medical care. Id. The Seventh Circuit noted that in cases denying summary
judgment, such as Herzog and Lester, “plaintiffs presented evidence they had suffered
numerous additional injuries,” and plaintiff cited “no cases in which any court has
permitted a plaintiff to reach a jury based on such mild allegations.” Id.; see also Sow
v. Fortville Police Dept., 636 F.2d 293, 304 (7th Cir. 2011) (plaintiff only complained
the handcuffs were too tight once, never complained of injury at the scene, and sought

no treatment for injury).
Plaintiff’s testimony describes circumstances more similar to Tibbs and Sow
than the other Seventh Circuit excessive force cases. Like the plaintiff in Tibbs,
Plaintiff never complained to officers that his handcuffs were too tight or that they
caused him any injury. [143] ¶ 48–49; [107-6] at 135:4–11. He testified that he
suffered abrasions, and his wrists were sore for several days, [147] ¶ 36; [107-6] at
134:2–23, but he identified no other injuries and testified that he never sought

medical care after the incident, [107-6] at 96:16–20, 143:6–8.
Based upon these “mild allegations,” no reasonable jury could find that the
force employed by the Defendant Officers to handcuff Plaintiff violated his Fourth
Amendment rights.
2. Officers’ Guns Pointed at Plaintiff’s Face
Defendants also argue that the Defendant Officers’ briefly pointing their
firearms at Plaintiff when they first entered his apartment to effectuate a search

warrant cannot constitute excessive force.
The Supreme Court has acknowledged that officers do not violate the Fourth
Amendment when they “execute a valid warrant and act in a reasonable manner to
protect themselves from harm.” Los Angeles Cnty., California v. Rettele, 550 U.S. 609,
615 (2007). If there is “reason to fear danger, based on factors like the nature of the
crime, the threat to safety, and the resistance of the suspect, police officers may have

cause to point their guns at citizens.” Johnson v. Gullickson, No. 22-1016, 2022 WL
2387350, at *2 (7th Cir. July 1, 2022) (citing Baird v. Renbarger, 576 F.3d 340, 346–
47 (7th Cir. 2009)). Thus, “the action of a police officer in pointing a gun at a person
is not in and of itself, actionable.” Wilkins v. May, 872 F.2d 190, 194 (7th Cir. 1989);
see also Simmons v. City of Chicago, Illinois, 2017 WL 635144, at *7 (N.D. Ill. Feb.
16, 2017) (police may detain an individual found at search warrant premises,
including by “entering the residence with guns drawn, forcing a show of hands, and

detaining him”).
While Defendants dispute that any Defendant Officer pointed his firearm at
Plaintiff, [147] ¶¶ 24, 30, 32–36, 43–44, Plaintiff testified that the Officer Defendants
had their guns drawn upon entry and, as each Defendant Officer entered the
apartment, he pointed his firearm at Plaintiff. [107-6] at 126:21–127:6 (“They came
in. They aimed their weapons at us. All the cops, they all aimed them at us.”). But
Plaintiff also testified that each Defendant Officer only pointed his gun at Plaintiff
for “a few seconds” and that each encounter was “quick.” See [107-6] at 163:10–19
(Officer Bonstetter); 163:15–19 (Officer Frano); 163:20–24 (Officer Ramos); 164:5–9

(Officer Garcia); 163:8–18 (Officer Bertini). Further, Plaintiff testified that each of
the Defendant Officers only continued pointing their firearms at Plaintiff until they
handcuffed the individuals at the scene. See [107-6] at 175:8–15 (“Q: And for about
how long did the other officers point their firearms at you, each one of them? A: It
was fast…A few seconds. A few seconds and then they started to, like, handcuff
everybody.”).

Based upon Plaintiff’s testimony, the Officer Defendants acted reasonably by
drawing their firearms to enter a residence in search of evidence related to drug
crimes. See Johnson, 2022 WL 2387350, at *2 (citing Baird, 576 F.3d at 344) (“Drug
trafficking is a crime often associated with violence.”). Further, like the officers in
Johnson, the Defendants only pointed their guns at Plaintiff briefly (and, based upon
Plaintiff’s testimony, for a period of time much shorter than the five minutes in
Johnson) and only until the individuals on the premises had been secured in

handcuffs.4 Id. And, with the exception of the interaction with Defendant Napoli,
which the Court addresses below, none of the Officer Defendants’ firearms made

4 Plaintiff’s mother, Melvina Smtih, who resided at the apartment at the time of the search, testified
that it could have been up to five minutes that the officers pointed their weapons at Plaintiff. See
[143] ¶¶ 12–16, 18–26, 44–45; [143-1] at 104:16–22. Even if the Court, drawing all reasonable
inferences in Plaintiff’s favor, credits Ms. Smith’s testimony over Plaintiff’s, pointing a firearm at an
individual for five minutes while securing a premises during a search warrant is not, on its own,
sufficient to support a claim for excessive force. See Johnson, 2022 WL 2387350, at *2 (affirming
summary judgment where “two officers pointed guns at Johnson for about five minutes—only from the
time they arrived until he was secured in handcuffs”).
contact with Plaintiff. [143] ¶ 17; see also Walker v. Weatherspoon, No. 12-cv-08571,
2017 WL 3521417, at *7 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 15, 2017) (“Once it was established that
Walker was going to come out of the room and cooperate with the search, none of the

Defendant Officers pointed any weapons at her, and at no time did any of the weapons
make physical contact with Walker. Considering all of the circumstances present—
and the brief amount of time during which the gun may have been pointed at
Walker—the evidence before the Court is not sufficient to create a genuine issue of
material fact as to whether excessive force was used.”).
Thus, based upon Plaintiff’s own testimony, the Officer Defendants pointed

their firearms at him when they first entered the apartment from approximately two
to three feet away from Plaintiff for only a “few seconds” and, as soon as Plaintiff and
the other individuals in the apartment had been secured, the officers no longer
pointed their firearms at Plaintiff. Drawing all inferences in Plaintiff’s favor,
Plaintiff has failed to identify a genuine issue of material fact that would support a
finding of excessive force based upon the officers’ pointing their guns at Plaintiff upon
entry into his apartment.

3. Officer Napoli’s Gun Pointed at Plaintiff while Handcuffed
Plaintiff also brings an excessive force claim based upon his interaction with
Officer Napoli during the execution of the search warrant.
Plaintiff testified that, when he was seated on the floor of the dining room,
Officer Napoli walked over to Plaintiff, put his gun to Plaintiff’s head and told him,
“If you want to keep hooping, don’t f***ing move [or] I blow your brains out.” [107-6]
at 103:5–15. Plaintiff, who was 16 at the time, was handcuffed when Officer Napoli
approached him, and Officer Napoli continued pointing his gun at Plaintiff for
approximately 10 to 15 minutes after he threatened to shoot Plaintiff. Id. at 118:2–

5. Officer Napoli denies that he touched Plaintiff with his firearm and denies that he
threatened to shoot Plaintiff. [107-9] at 255:2–12.
Although Defendant Napoli denies threatening Plaintiff with his firearm, at
this stage, the Court must draw all reasonable inferences in Plaintiff’s favor, and
holding a firearm to a minor’s head for 10–15 minutes, while the minor is handcuffed
and secured, and threatening to pull the trigger, constitutes conduct that a

reasonable jury could find “shocks the conscience” in support of a sufficient excessive
force claim. McDonald v. Haskins, 966 F.2d 292, 294 (7th Cir. 1992) (quoting Black
v. Stephens, 662 F.2d 181, 189 (3d Cir. 1981)).
In McDonald, the officer held a gun to the plaintiff’s head and threatened to
pull the trigger despite the plaintiff (a nine-year-old child) posing no risk or threat to
the officer or anyone else at the scene. Id. Finding that such facts “are the very
ingredients relevant to an excessive force inquiry,” the Seventh Circuit agreed that

“it would be objectively unreasonable” for the officer, “in the alleged absence of any
danger, to place his gun to the head of a young child and threaten to shoot.” Id.
Similarly, in Jacobs v. City of Chicago, the Seventh Circuit found it “clearly
unreasonable for the Defendant Officers to have pointed a loaded weapon at Jacobs
for an extended period of time when they allegedly had no reason to suspect that he
was a dangerous criminal, or indeed that he had committed any crime at all, Jacobs
was unarmed, and when Jacobs had done nothing either to attempt to evade the
officers or interfere with the execution of their duties.” 215 F.3d 758, 774 (7th Cir.
2000).

So too here. Plaintiff, a minor at the time of the search who remained
handcuffed and secured for its duration, posed no risk to officers at that time,
cooperated with their orders, and made no attempt to evade the officers or interfere
with the search. [147] ¶¶ 27–28. The Officer Defendants executed a valid search
warrant for the premises, not for Plaintiff, and had no other reason to suspect
Plaintiff posed a danger while handcuffed. [147] ¶ 5. Thus, considering the “(1)

severity of the crime at issue; (2) whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to
the safety of the officers or others; and (3) whether he is actively resisting arrest or
attempting to evade arrest by flight,” Baird, 576 F.3d at 344 (quoting Graham, 490
U.S. at 396), a material dispute of fact exists as to whether Officer Napoli employed
excessive force by pointing his gun at Plaintiff’s head and threatening to shoot him
under the circumstances presented.
Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s excessive force claim against Defendant

Napoli must fail because he alleged, in the Second Amended Complaint, that it was
Defendant Ramos who held the gun to his head and told him he would pull the trigger.
[106] at 10–11. According to Defendants, this allegation constitutes a binding judicial
admission, and Plaintiff is now prohibited from arguing that a different Defendant
(Officer Napoli) held the gun to his head.
While Defendants are correct that factual statements made in the pleadings

can constitute judicial admissions, such statements must be “deliberate, clear and
unambiguous.” Wells v. Coker, 707 F.3d 756, 760 (7th Cir. 2013) (quoting Robinson
v. McNeil Consumer Healthcare, 615 F.3d 861, 872 (7th Cir. 2010)); see also Medcom
Holdings Co. v. Baxter Travenol Labs., Inc., 106 F.3d 1388, 1404 (7th Cir. 1997)
(quoting In re Lefkas Gen. Partners No. 1017, 153 B.R. 804)) (“Binding judicial
admissions are ‘any deliberate, clear and unequivocal statement, either written or

oral, made in the course of judicial proceedings.’”).
In the Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that “An officer, on
information and belief Defendant officer Ramos, grabbed” Plaintiff, handcuffed him
and ordered him to sit down in the dining room. [90] ¶ 64. Plaintiff continues to
allege that, “Before sitting him down, officer Ramos physically threatened 16-year-
old Dante by holding a gun to his cheek and touching it, telling him, “If you want to
keep playing basketball, don’t F------ move or I’ll blow your brains out!” Id. ¶ 65. Read

in context, especially in light of the preceding statement that the allegation is made
“on information and belief,” Plaintiff’s statement that Officer Ramos physically
threatened him remains ambiguous. Footnote 2 of the Second Amended Complaint
provides additional context for the allegations, explicitly acknowledging that Plaintiff
still needed discovery regarding the incident. Id. at 4 n.2.5

5 Footnote 2 states: “Plaintiff needs discovery regarding the incident and all parties in order to name
all who have liability. CPD did not provide plaintiff with full identifying information in response to
Based upon the equivocal nature of the statement, the Court declines to find
that Plaintiff’s identification of Defendant Officer Ramos constitutes a binding
judicial admission and denies summary judgment on this ground.6

C. Qualified Immunity
Defendants also argue that, even if such facts give rise to an excessive force
claim, Officer Napoli remains protected by the doctrine of qualified immunity. When
a defendant raises the issue of qualified immunity, “the plaintiff bears the burden of
showing the existence of the allegedly clearly established constitutional right.” Clash
v. Beatty, 77 F.3d 1045, 1047 (7th Cir. 1996). The plaintiff may “do so by (1) pointing

to a closely analogous case that established a right to be free from the type of force
the police officers used on him, or (2) showing that the force was so plainly excessive

plaintiff’s pre-suit FOIA request. Moreover, officers on the scene were not wearing body cameras,
badges and nameplates, refused to provide plaintiff with their names and badge numbers when asked,
and the incident occurred nearly four years ago. While defendants provided plaintiff with official CPD
file photographs of the officers who executed the search warrant, plaintiff does not have height and
weight information for these officers. Moreover, to date plaintiff also cannot discern the identity of the
lieutenant who approved the search warrant (because the signature on plaintiff’s copy of the warrant
is unreadable).”

6 Even if the allegation were a judicial admission, it is within this Court’s discretion to relieve a party
of such admission. See Wilda v. JLG Indus., Inc., 470 F.Supp.3d 770, 792 (N.D. Ill. 2020) (noting a
district court “has the discretion to relieve a party of a judicial admission”); Solon v. Gary Community
School Corp., 180 F.3d 844, 858 (7th Cir. 1999) (“A judicial admission is conclusive, unless the court
allows it to be withdrawn.”). Defendants were on notice at least as of September 19, 2022 that Plaintiff
had identified Officer Napoli as the Defendant who threatened him, nearly a year before filing the
present motion, and Defendants’ own filings make it clear they conducted discovery on the issue. Thus,
they have suffered no prejudice, and even if this were a binding judicial admission, the Court,
exercising its discretion, would decline to hold Plaintiff to the statement.
that, as an objective matter, the police officers would have been on notice that they
were violating the Fourth Amendment.” Id. at 1048.
For purposes of this motion, Plaintiff has met his burden. First, as explained

above, Plaintiff’s case is closely analogous to McDonald, a case in which officers
placed a gun to the head of a minor and threatened to shoot, despite there being no
risk to the officers’ safety or threat of violence from the minor. 966 F.2d at 294.
Regardless, as in Jacobs, “it was clearly established” at the time of the search “that
‘police officers do not have the right to shove, push, or otherwise assault innocent
citizens without any provocation whatsoever.’” 215 F.3d at 774 (quoting Clash, 77

F.3d at 1048). Because no reasonable officer would believe that he had the right to
put a gun to a handcuffed minor’s head and threaten to pull the trigger under the
circumstances presented here, the Court declines to grant summary judgment based
upon a claim of qualified immunity.
D. Failure to Intervene
Finally, Defendants move for summary judgment on any failure to intervene
claim. As an initial matter, a failure to intervene claim must “rise and fall with the

underlying constitutional violations. Rivera v. Guevara, 319 F.Supp.3d 1004, 1049
(N.D. Ill. 2018); see also Harper v. Albert, 400 F.3d 1052, 1064 (7th Cir. 2005) (citing
Fillmore v. Page, 358 F.3d 496 (7th Cir. 2004)) (“In order for there to be a failure to
intervene, it logically follows that there must exist an underlying constitutional
violation.”).
Because the only underlying constitutional claim that survives in this case is
Plaintiff’s claim against Officer Napoli for excessive force, the only basis for a claim
would be the failure to intervene in Officer Napoli’s use of force against Plaintiff. But

it is not clear that Plaintiff brings such a claim and, even if he did, Defendants argue
that Plaintiff cannot prove any Defendant Officer “was aware of or had a realistic
opportunity to intervene.” [106] at 15. Plaintiff does not respond to Defendant’s
argument and has thus waived the issue. Nichols v. Michigan City Plant Planning
Dept., 755 F.3d 594, 600 (7th Cir. 2014) (“The non-moving party waives any
arguments that were not raised in its response to the moving party’s motion for

summary judgment.”).
To the extent Plaintiff seeks to bring a failure to intervene claim against any
of the Officer Defendants, the Court grants summary judgment on that claim.
IV. Conclusion
For the reasons explained above, the Court grants in part, and denies in part,
Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, [105]. The Court grants judgment in
Defendants’ favor on Count III in its entirety and on Count IV as to Defendants
Marvin Bonnstetter, Michael Bertini, Wayne Frano, Jr., Nicholas Hertko, Ivan
Ramos, Kevin Garcia, and Salvatore Reina. Plaintiff may proceed on his excessive
force claim (Count IV) against Defendant Officer Napoli only and only with regard to
Napoli’s alleged placing his gun against Plaintiff's head and threatening to pull the
trigger. The Court dismisses Count II with prejudice.
The parties shall submit a joint status report by February 11, 2026, proposing
additional case management dates, including agreed trial dates in the second half of
2026; they shall also provide their estimate concerning the expected length of trial.

Dated: January 15, 2026

Clee
John Robert Blakey Z
United States District Judge

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11242894. Public record. Not legal advice.