# Gongliewski

> District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania · January 14, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11242796

## Case

- **Full name:** Ryan Michael Gongliewski v. Sgt. Wildenstein, et al.
- **Court:** District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania
- **Decided:** January 14, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11242796

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- explaining requirements for supervisory liability in section 1983 claim and describing “two general ways in which a supervisor-defendant may be liable for unconstitutional acts undertaken by subordinates”
- affirming summary judgment in favor of defendant on plaintiff’s claim that he was retaliated against by a defendant who was not the target of his protected activity
- explaining that only “available” remedies must be exhausted

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
RYAN MICHAEL GONGLIEWSKI,

Plaintiff CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:24-CV-01935

v. (MEHALCHICK, J.)

SGT. WILDENSTEIN, et al.

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM
Pending before the Court are a series of motions and pleadings including a motion to
dismiss the original complaint (Doc. 32), a motion to amend the complaint (Doc. 50), a
proposed amended complaint (Doc. 36), a motion to serve defendants the proposed amended
complaint (Doc. 49), a motion to dismiss the proposed amended complaint (Doc. 39), a
motion for electronic filing to constitute service (Doc. 55), and a motion to subpoena
documents (Doc. 57). The Court will deny the pending motion to dismiss the original
complaint as moot, grant the motion to amend the complaint, and screen the amended
complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). Only the Eighth
Amendment use of excessive force claim against three Defendants and a First Amendment
retaliation claim against one defendant will survive screening. The Court will deny
Defendants’ motion to dismiss the amended complaint and deny Plaintiff’s motions for
electronic filing to constitute service and to subpoena documents.
I. BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On November 12, 2024, the Court received and docketed a complaint filed by Plaintiff
Ryan Michael Gongliewski (“Gongliewski”), an inmate currently housed in the State
Correctional Institution Mahanoy (“SCI-Mahanoy”) in Frackville, Pennsylvania. (Doc. 1).
The complaint named the following eight defendants: (1) Sgt. Wildenstein (“Wildenstein”),
Wyoming County Correctional Facility; (2) Corrections Officer Callahan (“Callahan”),
Wyoming County Correctional Facility; (3) Corrections Officer Camaja (“Camaja”); (4)
Corrections Officer Flynn, Wyoming County Correctional Facility; (5) W. Repsher

(“Repsher”), Warden Wyoming County Correctional Facility; (6) H. Schmidt, Deputy
Warden Wyoming County Correctional Facility; (7) Tom Henry (“Henry”), Wyoming
County Commissioner; and (8) Jessica Hostaling, Head Nurse LPN Wyoming County
Correctional Facility. (Doc. 1). Accompanying the complaint was Gongliewski’s motion to
proceed in forma pauperis and certified prisoner trust fund account statement. (Doc. 2; Doc. 3).
On December 9, 2025, the Court screened the complaint and dismissed all claims and
defendants except the First Amendment claims against Defendants Camaja, Wildenstein, and
Flynn and the Eighth Amendment claims against Defendants Camaja, Callahan, and Flynn.
(Doc. 9). The Court granted Gongliewski the opportunity to amend his complaint by January

10, 2025. (Doc. 9.) The Court did not receive any amended complaint by the deadline and
forwarded waiver of service forms to Defendants Camaja, Wildenstein, Callahan, and Flynn
on January 21, 2025. (Doc. 16; Doc. 17). On February 7, 2025, these four Defendants waived
service. (Doc. 21).
On March 5, 2025, Gongliewski filed a motion to amend his complaint. (Doc. 26).
However, this motion was deemed withdrawn as there was no brief in support and no
proposed amended pleading accompanied the motion as required by local rules. (Doc. 31).
On March 24, 2025, Defendants Camaja, Wildenstein, Callahan, and Flynn filed a
motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). (Doc. 32). On April 4,
2025, Defendants requested additional time to file their brief in support of the motion to
dismiss, which was granted by the Court. (Doc. 33; Doc. 34.) On April 7, 2025, before
Defendants filed their brief in support of their motion to dismiss, Gongliewski filed a brief in
opposition of the motion to dismiss. (Doc. 35). Defendants then filed their brief in support of
their motion to dismiss on April 14, 2025. (Doc. 38). That same day, Gongliewski filed a

proposed amended complaint and several attachments. (Doc. 36). Defendants then filed a
reply brief regarding their motion to dismiss the complaint. (Doc. 40).
Defendants Camaja, Wildenstein, Callahan, and Flynn filed a motion to dismiss the
proposed amended complaint on April 25, 2025. (Doc. 39). On May 9, 2025, the Court
received and docketed both the brief in support and the brief in opposition of the motion to
dismiss. (Doc. 41; Doc. 42). Gongliewski filed a second brief in opposition to the motion to
dismiss on May 23, 2025. (Doc. 45). That same day, Defendants filed their reply brief
regarding their motion to dismiss the proposed amended complaint. (Doc. 46).
On May 29, 2025, Gongliewski filed a motion for service of the proposed amended

complaint on the remaining four Defendants named in the proposed amended complaint.
(Doc. 49).
On June 2, 2025, Gongliewski filed a motion to amend the complaint requesting that
the Court accept the proposed amended complaint filed on April 14, 2025 as an amended
complaint. (Doc. 50). On June 23, 2025, Gongliewski filed his brief in support of this motion.
(Doc. 56.) Defendants Camaja, Wildenstein, Callahan, and Flynn have not filed any
opposition to this motion.
On June 16, 2025, Gongliewski filed a motion for the Court to consider electronic
filing as serving the required notice on Defendants. (Doc. 55).
On July 3, 2025, Gongliewski filed a motion for subpoena duces tecum seeking the
production of documents and footage from the Wyoming County Correctional Facility along
with a brief in support. (Doc. 57; Doc. 58).
The Court will now summarize the proposed amended complaint and address all the
pending motions in this action.

II. THE PROPOSED AMENDED COMPLAINT
Gongliewski names the same eight Defendants in the proposed amended complaint as
he named in the original complaint. (Doc. 26,at 2-3). Gongliewski alleges that all events took
place at the Wyoming County Correctional Facility from May 16, 2024 through August 21,
2024. (Doc. 36, at 6). Several of Gongliewski’s allegations are not simply a summary of
events, but a series of legal conclusions associated with minimal facts. Therefore, the Court
presents the following summary of the allegations made in Gongliewski’s proposed amended
complaint in chronological order.
On May 20, 2024, Wildenstein allegedly took all Gongliewski’s hygiene and clothing

to cause unhygienic, cruel conditions. (Doc. 36, at 6).
On June 2, 2024, Wildenstein allegedly watched Gongliewski masturbate stating,
“nice cock,” which Gongliewski states violates the Prisoner Rape Elimination Act (“PREA”).
Gongliewski also states that Wildenstein violated his Sixth Amendment right that same day
by restricting him access to the law library. (Doc. 36, at 6).
On June 11, 2024, Wildenstein wrote Gongliewski up for a misconduct for protected
speech, which Gongliewski states violated his First Amendment right to free speech and
demonstrated retaliation. (Doc. 36, at 6).
On June 17, 2024, Gongliewski was told in a grievance that it is not a violation of the
First Amendment “to have the cell door window closed to see clock to see times to do prayer,”
which he alleges is a violation of 37 Pa.C.S. § 95.237 and the First Amendment. He further
states that by his First Amendment rights being violated, the action amounted to cruel and
unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment. (Doc. 36, at 6-7).

On June 19, 2024, Gongliewski allegedly received grievance retaliation by
Wildenstein. (Doc. 36, at 6).
On June 23, 2024, Camaja allegedly violated the PREA, 28 C.F.R. § 115, 34 U.S.C. §
30301, and DC-ADM-008 by allowing Gongliewski to walk around naked while on suicide
watch. Gongliewski alleges this amounted to sexual assault “in the form of sexual
harassment.” His grievance was denied, “which alone is a violation of plaintiff’s 1st
amendment US. Const through censorship of free speech as well as Article I § 7 Pa Const.
freedom on speech, and violating 37 PaCS § 95.223.” (Doc. 36, at 7; Doc. 36-10).
On July 26, 2024, Gongliewski allegedly completed a grievance that showed violations

of the First Amendment, Fourth Amendment, 37 Pa.C.S. § 95.223(4), and the Pennsylvania
Constitution. (Doc. 36, at 7; Doc. 36-11.)
On July 27, 2024, Gongliewski alleged completed a grievance that showed the women
at Wyoming Cunty Correctional Facility suffered violations of the Fourth Amendment, the
PREA, 34 U.S.C. § 30301, 28 C.F.R. § 115(11). “For context only as plaintiff suffered no
injury in incident just brining to honorable courts attention. As plaintiff is pro se and unable
to litigate matter.” (Doc. 36, at 7).
On July 27, 2024, Camaja allegedly filed a false misconduct “as no guard was on block
when incident occurred.” Gongliewski sates that Camaja was located in the bubble walk-way
with his back to the window and came in after the alleged incident, yet in his report he stated
that he witnessed the incident. Gongliewski further states that Wildenstein and Flynn came
in shortly after and made threats to spray his penis with O.C. spray, which he alleges is a
violation of the PREA and DC-AMD-001 and was done to taunt him because he had been
sprayed by a non-party on June 23, 2024. He alleges no misconduct hearing took place, which

he states is a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment and 37 Pa.C.S. § 240. He further states
that the “[i]ncident should also be viewed as a malicious sadistic threat in a sexually harassing
nature to be deemed a violation of plaintiff’s 8th amendment US. Const. to be free of cruel and
unusual punishment.” (Doc. 36, at 8.)
On August 6, 2024, Gongliewski was allegedly allowed out of his cell to made a phone
call to the victims resource center and he reported the alleged sexual abuse and harassment
against him and the female inmates. The man on the phone told him he was unable to report
anything and could only send resource materials, which never arrived. (Doc. 36, at 8.)
On August 7, 2024, Gongliewski allegedly requested to move to a cell with cold water

in the sink, as the housing unit he was in did not have cold water and he had to rely on other
inmates to get cold drinking water because officers refused. He states that he should have been
segregated due to watch requirements in 37 PaCS § 95.2226(2). Gongliewski further alleges
that this “shows cruel unusual conditions under 8th amendment US. Const and Article I § 13
Pa Const.” (Doc. 36, at 8.)
On August 8, 2024, Gongliewski allegedly requested a copy of his account statement,
and the answer by Warden Repsher showed the jail violating his Fourteenth Amendment
right to due process by restricting access to the court and 37 PaCS § 95.236 because the
“account statement required to declare in forma pauperis.” (Doc. 36, at 9.)
On August 10, 2024, Gongliewski allegedly filed a request “showing false suicide
watch violating 37 PaCS § 95.243(7) along with housing of mentally ill 37 PaCS § 95.226(2)
written by guard violating 1st amendment US. Const. to free speech as well as Article I § 7 Pa
Const. free speech.” Gongliewski alleges that this shows a “sadistic malicious way to create
cruel and unusual punishment” violating the Eighth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution

and Article I § 13 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. (Doc. 36, at 9.)
On August 11, 2024, Gongliewski allegedly filed a grievance to show violations of 37
PaCS §§ 95.238(1) and 95.231(1) and the inmate handbook “done malicious and sadistically
to cause psychological and emotional distress at the hands of state officials while on a false
suicide watch to violate plaintiffs 8th amendment right US. Const. to be free of cruel and
unusual punishment as well as Article I § 13 Pa Const.” (Doc. 36, at 9.)
On August 12, 2024, at 4:00 p.m., Camaja allegedly “refused ball at yard as a way to
be malicious and sadistic. Plaintiff experienced an excited utterance from all the psychological
torment and emotional distress caused by the officer and called him a ‘spic’.” Yard was then

allegedly cut short. Wildenstein and Callahan allegedly entered the yard, and Wildenstein
allegedly told Gongliewski to cuff up. Gongliewski was cuffed, and Wildenstein instructed
Camaja to perform the pat search. Gongliewski allegedly “verbally attested” to the search
alleging that Camaja and him should be separated after the verbal sexual assault set forth in
Exhibit 141. Camaja was allegedly instructed to perform the pat search anyway, and he
instructed Gongliewski to turn his head towards the wall. Gongliewski denied this request

1 Exhibit 14 is a grievance in which Gongliewski alleges that Camaja harassed him
based on his body mass and his genitalia. He also alleges that that Camaja made inappropriate
comments about his married sister. (Doc. 36-10).
and “had excited utterance to have this ‘spic get his hands off me’.” The search was allegedly
completed without incident, and Gongliewski was shackled behind his back and began the
process of being transported. While in the isolation hallway , Gongliewski allegedly informed
Wildenstein of the August 6, 2024 phone call he made above the PREA violations by
Wildenstein and other officers. Wildenstein’s face allegedly “blankened and anger overtook

him.” Gongliewski alleges that upon entering the block and passing a stairwell, Wildenstein
attempted to “check” or shove him into the stairwell, “to no avail.” Gongliewski states that
he entered cell B147 without incident and stopped inside the gate to have the shackles
removed. Wildenstein then allegedly threw Gongliewski into a corner of the metal bunk.
Callahan and Camaja then allegedly grabbed each of Gongliewski’s legs and Wildenstein
grabbed Gongliewski’s upper body “an forcibly threw plaintiff to the ground.” Callahan and
Camaja allegedly held Gongliewski’s legs as Wildenstein held his chest and drew his hand
back in a fist, stating “if you ever talk to one of my officers like that again I will beat your
f*cking head into the concrete.” Flynn then radioed “code Red at this time to which Sgt.

Wildenstein immediately had her clear.” Gongliewski states that Callahan, Camaja, and
Flynn made threatening faces and menacing comments and he responded with “do it pussy
beat my head into the concrete only time you want to get tough is when I’m cuffed.”
Gongliewski alleges he was then rolled on his back, his pants down around his buttocks, and
uncuffed. Defendants then left the cell. (Doc. 36, at 9-10).
Gongliewski alleges that this incident resulted in large lacerations/abrasions on his
chest and right elbow. He states that he “yelled for medical to no avail.” (Doc. 36, at 11.) He
seeks to charge Wildenstein, Callahan, and Camaja with violations under 18 U.S.C. §§ 242
and 351(e) and 37 Pa.C.S. § 95.241(2)(i). (Doc. 36, at 11.)
Gongliewski alleges that at 4:41 p.m., Camaja entered the block and threatened
Plaintiff “to catch him in the streets and see what happens.” Gongliewski alleges that at 4:59
p.m. his breathing “became increasingly exacerbated” and he fell to the floor. Non-party
Dennis Smith yelled “code blue” and four officers and Hostaling responded. Hostaling
allegedly examined Gongliewski with a stethoscope, a pulse monitor, and a blood pressure

cuff. Hostaling examined Gongliewski’s chest wound, but she denied his request that pictures
of the wound be taken. Gongliewski states that Hostaling then went to office to get saline
solution and gauze to clean blood from his chest and elbow. Gongliewski states that Flynn
documented the incident in a misconduct report stating that Gongliewski was faking an
illness. (Doc. 36, at 11; Doc. 36-3).
On August 13, 2024, Gongliewski alleges that at 8:30 a.m. he left cell B147 for yard
and lifted his shirt to show his wound to the camera in the center of the day room. He then
proceeded to outside yard and lifted his shirt to show the wound to Repsher, who “made a
comment along the lines of tell someone who cares and made a crying gesture to mock

plaintiff.” Gongliewski also states that 9:00 a.m. he showed non-party Nurse Kelsey his
wound and at 9:23 a.m. he showed non-party Captain Turner his bleeding toe caused by
“inadequate footwear.” He alleges that at1:46 p.m. he showed his chest wound to non-party
Captain Rodgers. Gongliewski states that at 3:20 p.m., he showed Henry the wound to his
chest, informed him about the PREA violation occurring, and informed him about the cells
having only hot water. Gongliewski alleges that Henry responded with “that sounds
expensive write me,” and Gongliewski told him that guards had refused him paper and
envelopes, and that his suicide pen had died and guards claimed they had no more pens to
give him. Henry then allegedly pointed at a stack of grievances on the bottom bunk written
by guards and said, “looks like you have plenty [of] paper.” Gongliewski alleges that Camaja
then mocked him with a crying gesture and walked away. (Doc. 36, at 11-12.)
Gongliewski alleges that the was “illegally transferred” on August 21, 2024 SCI-
Smithfield for the last 85 days of his county sentence in an attempt to cover up the incident in
violation of the Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments. Gongliewski states that the

transfer occurred at 6:00 am and he was shackled behind his back with a torn shoulder muscle
from the August 9, 2024 incident with flip flops that broke during transport. So, he arrived at
SCI-Smithfield barefoot with no underwear. (Doc. 36, at 13.)
The Court will grant Gongliewski’s motion to amend his complaint and deem the
proposed amended complaint (Doc. 36), summarized above, as the operative complaint in
this matter. Since this is a new pleading before the Court, it will initially screen the complaint
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A and See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) prior to addressing the pending
motion to dismiss.
III. STANDARD

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the Court is obligated, prior to service of process, to screen
a civil complaint in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or
employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a); James v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 230 Fed.
App’x 195, 197 (3d Cir. 2007) (not precedential). The Court must dismiss the complaint if it
fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1); Mitchell v.
Dodrill, 696 F. Supp. 2d 454, 471 (M.D. Pa. 2010). The Court has a similar obligation with
respect to actions brought in forma pauperis. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). In this case, because
Huff is a prisoner suing governmental employees and brings his suit in forma pauperis, both
provisions apply. In performing this mandatory screening function, a district court applies the
same standard applied to motions to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. Mitchell, 696 F. Supp. 2d at 471; Banks v. Cty. of Allegheny, 568 F. Supp. 2d 579,
588 (W.D. Pa. 2008).
Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes a defendant to move

to dismiss for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(6). To assess the sufficiency of a complaint on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a court must first
take note of the elements a plaintiff must plead to state a claim, then identify mere conclusions
which are not entitled to the assumption of truth, and finally determine whether the
complaint’s factual allegations, taken as true, could plausibly satisfy the elements of the legal
claim. Burtch v. Milberg Factors, Inc., 662 F.3d 212, 221 (3d Cir. 2011). In deciding a Rule
12(b)(6) motion, the court may consider the facts alleged on the face of the complaint, as well
as “documents incorporated into the complaint by reference, and matters of which a court
may take judicial notice.” Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322 (2007).

After recognizing the required elements which make up the legal claim, a court should
“begin by identifying pleadings that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not
entitled to the assumption of truth.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). The plaintiff
must provide some factual ground for relief, which “requires more than labels and
conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Bell
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). “[T]hreadbare recitals of the elements of
a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S.
at 678. Thus, courts “need not credit a complaint’s ‘bald assertions’ or ‘legal
conclusions’ . . . .” Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997) (quoting

In re Burlington Coat Factory Securities Litigation, 114 F.3d 1410, 1429-30 (3d Cir. 1997)). Nor
need the court assume that a plaintiff can prove facts that the plaintiff has not alleged.
Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal. v. California State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526
(1983).
A court must then determine whether the well-pleaded factual allegations give rise to

a plausible claim for relief. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual
content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for
the misconduct alleged.” Palakovic v. Wetzel, 854 F.3d 209, 219-20 (3d Cir. 2017) (quoting
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Sheridan v. NGK Metals
Corp., 609 F.3d 239, 262 n.27 (3d Cir. 2010). The court must accept as true all allegations in
the complaint, and any reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom are to be construed
in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Jordan v. Fox, Rothschild, O’Brien & Frankel, 20 F.3d
1250, 1261 (3d Cir. 1994). This “presumption of truth attaches only to those allegations for
which there is sufficient factual matter to render them plausible on their face.” Schuchardt v.

President of the United States, 839 F.3d 336, 347 (3d Cir. 2016) (internal quotation and citation
omitted). The plausibility determination is context-specific and does not impose a heightened
pleading requirement. Schuchardt, 839 F.3d at 347.
Additionally, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires “a short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Thus, a well-pleaded
complaint must recite factual allegations sufficient to raise the plaintiff’s claimed right to relief
beyond the level of mere speculation, set forth in a “short and plain” statement of a cause of
action. There is no requirement that the pleading be specific or probable. Schuchardt, 839 F.3d
at 347 (citing Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d at 224, 233-234 (3d Cir. 2008). Rule 8(a)

requires a “showing that ‘the pleader is entitled to relief, in order to give the defendant fair
notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Erickson v. Pardus, 551
U.S. 89, 93-94 (2007) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)); see also Phillips, 515 F.3d at 233 (citing
Iqbal, 550 U.S. at 545).
With the aforementioned standards in mind, a document filed pro se is “to be liberally

construed.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976). A pro se complaint, “however inartfully
pleaded,” must be held to “less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers”
and can only be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it appears beyond doubt that the
plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.
Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520–21 (1972). Further, the Third Circuit has instructed that if
a complaint is vulnerable to dismissal for failure to state a claim, the district court must permit
a curative amendment, unless an amendment would be inequitable or futile. Grayson v.
Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 2002).
IV. SCREENING DISCUSSION
A. FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM

Several of the allegations inn the amended complaint fall into one or more of three
categories: (1) legal conclusions; (2) Gongliewski filing a grievance; or (3) failure to allege any
actions of an individual.
First, the Court finds that Gongliewski’s legal conclusions without sufficient alleged
facts in support of these conclusions do not state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
As set forth above, a court must determine whether the complaint’s factual allegations, taken
as true, could plausibly satisfy the elements of the alleged legal claim. Burtch, 662 F.3d at 221.
Therefore, when Gongliewski does not provide alleged facts, the Court must dismiss the
claims. This is the case in the allegations from June 2, 2024, June 11, 2024, June 19, 2024,
and June 23, 2024.
Second, in several instances, Gongliewski states that he filed a grievance or a request
that establishes or demonstrates a violation of federal statute or a constitutional right. Stating
that he filed a grievance does not allege the factual contents of the grievance nor does it

sufficiently allege facts necessary to state a claim upon which relief may be granted and must
be dismissed. This is the case in the allegations from July 26, 2024, July 27, 20242, August 10,
2024, and August 11, 2024.
Third, Gongliewski will make allegations concerning an event, and not name a single
Defendant as an actor or party to that event. (Doc. 36.) To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. §
1983, a plaintiff must meet two threshold requirements. He must allege: 1) that the alleged
misconduct was committed by a person acting under color of state law; and 2) that as a result,
he was deprived of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the
United States. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). It is also well established that “[a]

defendant in a civil rights action must have personal involvement in the alleged wrongs to be
liable, and cannot be held responsible for a constitutional violation which he or she neither
participated in nor approved.” See Baraka v. McGreevey, 481 F.3d 187, 210 (3d Cir. 2007).
Thus, events alleged without the personal involvement of a Defendant fail to state a claim
upon which relief may be granted and must be dismissed. This is the case with the allegations
from June 17, 2024, August 6, 2024, August 7, 2024, August 10, 2024, August 11, 2024, and
August 21, 2024 transfer to SCI-Smithfield.

2 Specifically, the claims surrounding the violations of the rights of the female prisoners
(Doc. 36, at 7) will be dismissed.
Additionally, the Court highlights that Schmidt is not named throughout the factual
allegations. (Doc. 36.) Therefore, all claims against him will be dismissed without prejudice
for failing to allege any personal involvement by Schmidt.
Furthermore, Gongliewski makes multiple allegations regarding the violation of
Department of Corrections (“DOC”) policy. (Doc. 36). However, as the Court stated in its

memorandum screening the original complaint, DOC policy does not have the force of law
and does not rise to the level of a regulation. Atwell v. Lavan, 557 F.Supp.2d 532, 556, n. 24
(M.D. Pa. Mar. 26, 2008) citing Mercy Catholic Medical Center v. Thompson, 380 F.3d 142, 154
(3d Cir. 2004). Therefore, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider any such claims. These
claims were dismissed with prejudice back in December of 2024. (Doc. 9). To the extend that
the amended complaint raises new, unaddressed claims concerning the violation of DOC
policy, such claims are dismissed with prejudice.
Additionally, Gongliewski makes multiple allegations that Defendants’ actions
violated the PREA, which he sometimes refers to as 34 U.S.C. § 30301 and 28 C.F.R. § 115.

The PREA does not provide a private right of action, and Gongliewski is, therefore,
prohibited from asserting a claim pursuant to PREA. Harris v. Ferguson, 3:16-cv-1965, 2017
WL 3611752, at *5 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 22, 2017) citing Washington v. Folino, 2013 WL 998013, at
*4 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 28, 2013) (holding that violations of the Prison Rape Elimination Act do
not create a private cause of action) and Nestor v. Dir. of NE. Region Bureau of Prisons, 2012 WL
6691791, at *3 (D.N.J. Dec. 20, 2012) (granting summary judgment to defendants on the
plaintiff’s attempt to recover under PREA). Consequently, any claim Gongliewski may be
attempting to bring under the PREA in the amended complaint will be dismissed with
prejudice.
Similarly, Gongliewski seeks to bring criminal charges against Defendants by citing 18
U.S.C. §§ 242, 351. However, private citizens lack standing to initiate criminal proceedings.
United States v. Wegeler, 941 F.3d 665, 668 (3d Cir. 2019) (citing Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410
U.S. 614, 619 (1973). Therefore, any attempts to raise criminal actions against Defendants in

this civil complaint will be dismissed with prejudice.
Gongliewski also makes several allegations that Defendants violated Title 37, Chapter
95 of Pennsylvania Code. (Doc. 36). Such regulations do not create a private cause of action,
nor are a violation of these regulations the proper subject of a civil rights action brought under
Section 1983. See Roman v. County of Chester, No. 23-1662-KSM, 2024 WL 4844792, *13 n. 5
(E.D. Pa. Nov. 20, 2024) citing Yunik v. McVey, Civil Action No. 08-1706, 2010 WL 4777623,
at *5 (W.D. Pa. Nov. 16, 2010) (“To the extent that Plaintiff seeks to sue Mr. Mangino for
violations of state laws and rules, we find that such fails to state a claim under Section 1983
because in order to state a claim under Section 1983, the Plaintiff must allege a violation of

his federal rights and not merely a violation of state law.”).
The only claims that remain are Gongliewski’s claims from May 20, 2024, July 27,
2024, August 8, 2024, August 12, 2024, and August 13, 2025. The Court will now address
each of these dates individually.
B. MAY 20, 2024
In the amended complaint, Gongliewski alleges that on May 20, 2024, Wildenstein
took his hygiene and clothing to cause unhygienic and cruel conditions. (Doc. 36, at 6). The
Court liberally construes this as an Eighth Amendment claim.
The Eighth Amendment prohibits cruel and unusual punishment. U.S. Const. Amend.
VIII. Prison conditions constitute cruel and unusual punishment if they result in a serious
deprivation of the prisoner’s basic human needs. See Tillman v. Lebanon Cnty. Corr. Facility,
221 F.3d 410, 418 (3d Cir. 2000). Only conditions that are so reprehensible as to be deemed
inhumane under contemporary standards or deprive an inmate of minimal civilized measures
of the necessities of life violate the Eighth Amendment. See Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1,

8–9 (1992); Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991). “A claim of inhumane prison conditions
may rise to the level of an Eighth Amendment violation where the prison official ‘deprived
the prisoner of the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities’ and ‘acted with deliberate
indifference in doing so, thereby exposing the inmate to a substantial risk of serious damage
to [his] future health.’” Palakovic , 854 F.3d at 225 (quoting Parkell v. Danberg, 833 F.3d 313,
335 (3d Cir. 2016)). Such a claim contains two requirements: an objective and subjective
component. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994). A prisoner asserting a claim that the
conditions of confinement violate the Eighth Amendment must allege: (1) that objectively,
they were “incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm;” and (2)

that the defendant prison official personally knew of the substantial risk to the inmate’s health
or safety and failed to “respond [ ] reasonably to the risk.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834, 844–45.
Here, the Court acknowledges that the deprivation of clothing and hygiene materials may be
viewed as a deprivation of life’s necessities, but Gongliewski has failed to allege that the
depravation exposed him to a substantial risk of serious damage to his future health. In fact,
the amended complaint makes multiple references to Gongliewski being placed on suicide
watch (Doc. 36), in which the deprivation of some items of clothing and hygienic tools would
be considered the appropriate means to protect his health. Therefore, this Eighth Amendment
claim will be dismissed without prejudice.
C. JULY 27, 2024
In the amended complaint, Gongliewski alleges that Camaja filed a false misconduct
report against him and no misconduct hearing took place in violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment. (Doc. 36, at 8). The Fourteenth Amendment provides, in pertinent part, that no
State shall “deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law[.]” See

U.S. Const. amend. XIV. A Fourteenth Amendment due process claim requires that a liberty
interest be at stake:
Procedural due process rights are [only] triggered by deprivation of a legally
cognizable liberty interest. For a prisoner, such a deprivation occurs when the
prison “imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to
the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484, 115
S.Ct. 2293, 132 L.E.2d 418 (1995). In determining whether a protected liberty
interest exists, the court must consider: (1) the duration of the disciplinary
confinement; and (2) whether the conditions of confinement were significantly
more restrictive than those imposed upon other inmates in solitary
confinement. See id. at 468, 115 S.Ct. 2293; Shoats v. Horn, 213 F.3d 140, 144
(3d Cir. 2000).

Huertas v. Sec'y of Pa. Dep't of Corr., 533 F. App'x 64, 66 (3d Cir. 2013). Here, Gongliewski has
not alleged the deprivation of any legally cognizable liberty interest. He simply alleges that a
false misconduct report was filed and there was no hearing. Without some loss of a liberty
interest resulting from the filing of the misconduct, the Fourteenth Amendment claim must
be dismissed. This dismissal will be without prejudice.
Gongliewski also alleged that Wildenstein and Flynn made threats to spray his penis
with O.C. spray, which he alleges violates the Eighth Amendment. (Doc. 36, at 8). It is well-
settled that the use of words, no matter how violent, is not actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
See Lewis v. Wetzel, 153 F.Supp.3d 678, 699 (M.D. Pa Dec. 21, 2015); see also Harris, 2017 WL
3611752, at *4-5 (granting summary judgment to defendants on § 1983 claims regarding
verbal sexual harassment because the record did not show that plaintiff suffered injury or
damage); Maclean v. Secor, 876 F. Supp. 695, 698-99 (E.D. Pa. 1995) (“It is well established
that verbal harassment or threats will not . . . without some reinforcing act accompanying
them, state a constitutional claim.”). Therefore, any claims concerning verbal threats will be
dismissed with prejudice.

D. AUGUST 8, 2024
In the amended complaint, Gongliewski alleges that his request for an account
statement was denied by Repsher which restricted his access to the courts because the account
statement was required to proceed in forma pauperis. (Doc. 36, at 9.) The Court construes this
as a First Amendment claim.
Asserting an actionable claim for denial of access to the courts requires a prisoner to
allege that (1) they “lost a chance to pursue a ‘nonfrivolous’ or ‘arguable’ underlying claim”
and (2) they have no available remedy for the lost claim other than the present denial of access
action. Rivera v. Monko, 37 F.4th 909, 915 (3rd Cir. 2022) (citing Monroe v. Beard, 536 F.3d
198, 205 (3rd Cir. 2008)). Most significant is the nonfrivolous nature of the claim allegedly

lost. The lost claim must be “more than hope” in order to be deemed nonfrivolous. Christopher
v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 416 (2002).
Gongliewski has not alleged that he lost the opportunity to pursue his claim based on
Repsher’s denial. Therefore, the First Amendment claim will be dismissed without prejudice.
E. AUGUST 12, 2024
The alleged events of August 12, 2024 appear to be the crux of Gongliewski’s amended
complaint. In it, Gongliewski alleges excessive use of force, retaliation, deliberate indifference
to a serious medical need, and a violation due process. (Doc. 36, at 9-11).
1. Excessive Use of Force
The Eighth Amendment’s protection against cruel and unusual punishment is the
“primary source of substantive protection in cases . . . where the deliberate use of force is
challenged as excessive and unjustified.” See Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 327 (1986). The
question is “whether force was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline,

or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.” Hudson, 503 U.S. at 6–7 (citing Whitley, 475
U.S. 312).
Gongliewski alleges that Wildenstein, Callahan, and Camaja used force against him
that was not associated with maintaining or restoring discipline, as he alleges the use of force
took place once he was returned to his cell and turned around for restraints to be removed.
(Doc. 36, at 9-10). Therefore, this Eighth Amendment claim will survive screening.
To the extend that the allegations that Callahan, Camaja, and Flynn made threatening
faces and menacing comments or threats, such actions are not actionable under Section 1983
and will be dismissed with prejudice. See Maclean, 876 F. Supp. at 698-99.

2. Retaliation
Gongliewski brings a retaliation claim in relation to the August 12, 2024 events. (Doc.
36, at 9-11). Such claims are addressed under the First Amendment.
It is well-settled that prison officials may not retaliate against an inmate because he
exercises his right of access to the courts. Fantone v. Latini, 780 F.3d 184, 191 (3d Cir. 215). A
prisoner asserting a retaliation claim must allege the following elements: (1) he engaged in
constitutionally protected conduct; (2) he suffered an adverse action sufficient to deter a
person of ordinary firmness from exercising his constitutional rights; and (3) the
constitutionally protected conduct was “a substantial or motivating factor” for the adverse
action. See Rauser v. Horn, 241 F.3d 330, 333 (3d Cir. 2001); see also Mitchell v. Horn, 318 F.3d
523, 530 (3d Cir. 2003). The filing of a lawsuit or a prison grievance constitutes protected
activity under the First Amendment. Fantone, 780 F.3d at 191.
Here, Gongliewski alleges in the amended complaint the use of force was preceded by

him telling Wildenstein “and other officers” that he had reported him on the abuse hotline
for alleged violations under the PREA. (Doc. 36). Therefore, Gongliewski has properly
alleged a retaliation claim against Wildenstein.
However, Gongliewski did not properly state a claim of retaliation against any other
Defendant who took part in the use of force on August 12, 2024 as he did not identify any
other Defendants as the individuals he reported on the August 6, 2024 call. (Doc. 36). This
Court has repeatedly refused to find a causal connection when the alleged perpetrator of the
retaliatory activity was not the subject of the constitutionally protected activity. See Calloway
v. Bauman, No. 2:20-cv-2337, 2022 WL 4357468, at *9 (M.D. Pa. Sep. 20, 2022) citing Victor

v. Lawler, 2010 WL 5014555, at *5 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 3, 2010), aff'd, 565 F. App’x 126 (3d Cir.
2014); also citing Evans v. Rozum, 2009 WL 5064490, at *22 (W.D. Pa. Dec. 17, 2009) (“There
is no apparent reason why [the moving defendants] would want to retaliate against Plaintiff
for filing a lawsuit against others.”); also citing Royster v. Beard, 308 F. App’x 576, 579 (3d Cir.
2009) (affirming summary judgment in favor of defendant on plaintiff’s claim that he was
retaliated against by a defendant who was not the target of his protected activity). Therefore,
the retaliation claims against Camaja, Callahan, Flynn, and Hostaling will be dismissed
without prejudice.
The Court acknowledges that Gongliewski named Camaja in grievances he filed prior

to August 12, 2024 (Doc. 36-10; Doc. 36-13; Doc. 36;14), but he does not allege that these
grievances were was “a substantial or motivating factor” for the adverse action against him.
Instead, the complaint clearly alleges that the “a substantial or motivating factor” was
information Wildenstein that he had named him in a call to the abuse hotline. (Doc. 36, at 9-
10). Therefore, Camaja being named in grievances does not result in any First Amendment
liability.

3. Deliberate Indifferent to Serious Medical Need
The amended complaint can be liberally construed as raising a denial of medical
treatment claim under the Eighth Amendment against Hostaling. (Doc. 36, at 11.)
Prison officials violate the Eighth Amendment when they act with deliberate
indifference to a prisoner’s serious medical needs. See Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104-05. To sustain a
constitutional claim under the Eighth Amendment for inadequate medical treatment, a
plaintiff must make (1) an objective showing that his medical needs were serious, and (2) a
subjective showing that the defendants were deliberately indifferent to those medical needs.
See Pearson v. Prison Health Serv., 850 F.3d 526, 534 (3d Cir. 2017). A serious medical need is

“one that has been diagnosed by a physician as requiring treatment or is so obvious that a lay
person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor’s attention.” Monmouth Cty. Corr.
Inst'l Inmates v. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d 326, 346–47 (3d Cir. 1987) (citation omitted). A prison
official is deliberately indifferent when he or she “knows of and disregards an excessive risk
to inmate health or safety.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837.
However, “[p]rison medical authorities are given considerable latitude in the diagnosis
and treatment of medical problems of inmates and courts will ‘disavow any attempt to second
guess the propriety or adequacy of a particular course of treatment . . . which remains a
question of sound professional judgment.’” Byrd v. Shannon, No. 1:09-CV-1551, 2010 WL
5889519, at *4 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 24, 2010) (quoting Inmates of Allegheny County Jail v. Pierce, 612
F.2d 754, 762 (3d Cir. 1979)). Mere disagreement over proper treatment does not state a claim
upon which relief can be granted. White v. Napoleon, 897 F.2d 103, 110 (3d Cir. 1990);
Monmouth Cty. Corr. Inst'l Inmates, 834 F.2d at 346 (“Courts, determining what constitutes

deliberate indifference, have consistently held that mere allegations of malpractice do not raise
issues of constitutional import. . . Nor does mere disagreement as to the proper medical
treatment support a claim of an eighth amendment violation.”).
Here, Gongliewski alleges that Hostaling provided medical treatment:
Nurse Hostaling used a stethoscope to examine plaintiff breathing. A pulse
monitor applied to plaintiffs index finger which was elevated. A blood pressure
cuff applied to plaintiffs arm to determine higher than average blood pressure.
Chest wound examined with a gentle touch. Plaintiff requested pictures to be
taken to satisfy DC-ADM-457 to which she said she has no camera and the
guards won’t allow it. She then left to go to her office and get saline solution
and gauze to clean blood from chest and elbow.

(Doc. 36, at 11). Nothing in the amended complaint amounts to an allegation that Hostaling
denied treatment. To the extent that Gongliewski disagreed with the treatment provided, such
disagreement does not constitute an Eighth Amendment violation. Therefore, the claim of
deliberate indifferent to Gongliewski’s serious medical need will be dismissed without
prejudice.
The Court acknowledges that Gongliewski made a plea for medical assistance in his
cell directly following the use of force, but it was after he alleged that any named Defendants
left the cell, and he does not allege any named Defendants heard his plea and failed to assist
in getting medical care. Therefore, these facts, as alleged, do not create liability under the
Eighth Amendment.
4. Due Process
In the amended complaint, Gongliewski mentions that Flynn document his fall in the
cell as a misconduct by stating that Gongliewski was feigning illness. (Doc. 36, at 11; Doc.
36-3). To the extent that Gongliewski is attempting bring a Fourteenth Amendment due
process claim for the misconduct report that Flynn filed, without some allegation that the

misconduct report resulted in the deprivation of a liberty interest, see Huertas 533 F. App'x at
66, his claim will be denied without prejudice.
F. AUGUST 13, 2024
The only parties to this action that Gongliewski alleges he interacted with on August
13, 2024 were Henry and Camaja. (Doc. 36, at 11-12). However, none of these interactions
resulted in a constitutional violation.
He alleges that both Henry and Camaja mocked him with a crying gesture. (Doc. 36,
at 11-12). However, as discussed above, harassment or verbal threats to not constitute an
Eighth Amendment claim. Maclean, 876 F. Supp. at 698-99. Therefore, nonverbal mocking
does not amount to a claim under Section 1983

Gongliewski also alleges that he showed Henry the wound to his chest and informed
him about the alleged PREA violations, and the lack of cold water in the cells. Gongliewski
alleges that Henry told Gongliewski to write him about the water and when Gongliewski told
Henry that guards had allegedly not provided him writing materials, Henry pointed to a stack
of grievances on the bottom bunk and said, “Looks like you have plenty [of] paper.” (Doc.
36, at 11-12). While Gongliewski does not allege Henry had any personal involvement in the
alleged problems he reported to Henry on August 13, 2024, it appears that Gongliewski is
attempting to establish Henry’s liability based on his role as the County Commissioner and
that he had notice of the alleged constitutional violations.
If a plaintiff seeks to hold a supervisory official liable for unconstitutional acts by their
subordinates, the plaintiff’s allegations must satisfy one of two theories of supervisory liability:
(1) “[i]ndividual defendants who are policymakers may be liable under § 1983 if it is shown

that such defendants, with deliberate indifference to the consequences, established and
maintained a policy, practice or custom which directly caused [the] constitutional harm[;]”
and (2), “a supervisor may be personally liable under § 1983 if he or she participated in
violating the plaintiff's rights, directed others to violate them, or, as the person in charge, had
knowledge of and acquiesced in his subordinates’ violations.” See A.M. ex rel. J.M.K. v. Luzerne
Cnty. Juv. Det. Ctr., 372 F.3d 572, 586 (3d Cir. 2004) (citation omitted); Barkes v. First Corr.
Med., Inc., 766 F.3d 307, 316 (3d Cir. 2014) (explaining requirements for supervisory liability
in section 1983 claim and describing “two general ways in which a supervisor-defendant may

be liable for unconstitutional acts undertaken by subordinates”), rev’d on other grounds sub
nom., Taylor v. Barkes, 575 U.S. 822 (2015).
To allege a plausible claim for supervisory liability under the first theory, a plaintiff
must “identify the specific supervisory practice or procedure that the supervisor failed to
employ.” See Chavarriaga v. New Jersy Dept. of Corrections, 806 F.3d 210, 227 (3d Cir. 2015)
(quoting Brown v. Muhlenberg Twp., 269 F.3d 205, 216 (3d Cir. 2001)). The plaintiff must also
show that:
[(1)] the existing custom and practice without the identified, absent custom or
procedure created an unreasonable risk of the ultimate injury, [(2)] the
supervisor was aware that this unreasonable risk existed, [(3)] the supervisor
was indifferent to the risk[,] and [(4)] the underling's violation resulted from the
supervisor's failure to employ that supervisory practice or procedure. Put
another way, the inmate must identify the supervisor's specific acts or
omissions demonstrating the supervisor's deliberate indifference to the inmate's
risk of injury and must establish a link between the supervisor, the act, and the
injury.

Chavarriaga, 806 F.3d at 227 (quoting Brown, 269 F.3d at 216).
For the second theory of supervisory liability, generalized allegations that a
supervisory defendant is “in charge of” or “responsible for” an office or facility are insufficient
to allege personal involvement in an underlying constitutional violation. See Saisi v. Murray,
822 F. App'x 47, 48 (3d Cir. 2020) (unpublished) (“Saisi asserted that some defendants were
in charge of agencies that allowed this to happen, and that liability stemmed merely from
defendants’ ‘belief’ that their conduct would be ‘tolerated.’ However, a director cannot be
held liable ‘simply because of [their] position as the head of the [agency].’” (quoting Evancho
v. Fisher, 423 F.3d 347, 354 (3d Cir. 2005))); Zigler v. Warren, No. 21-cv-19474, 2022 WL
903383, at *2 (D.N.J. Mar. 28, 2022) (“In simpler terms, a supervisor is not liable for the
unconstitutional conduct of his employees solely because he is a supervisor.”). Additionally,
“[a]lthough a court can infer that a defendant had contemporaneous knowledge of wrongful
conduct from the circumstances surrounding a case, the knowledge must be actual, not
constructive.” See Chavarriaga, 806 F.3d at 222 (citing Baker v. Monroe Twp., 50 F.3d 1186,
1194 (3d Cir. 1995).
Gongliewski’s alleged facts concerning Henry on August 13, 2024 are not sufficient to
meet the requirements of a supervisor liability claim under the first theory as there are no
allegations concerning the failed supervision on the part of Henry in his role as County
Commissioner. Likewise, Gongliewski’s allegations do not meet the requirements of the
second theory because he does not allege that Henry acquiesced to the alleged violations.
Instead, Gongliewski alleges that Henry told him to file a grievance, Gongliewski responded
that he did not have the means to file the grievance, and Henry pointed to paper in
Gongliewski’s cell indicating that he did have the necessary tools to file such a grievance.
Gongliewski makes no allegations that the violations continued after the notice he provide to
Henry.
Therefore, any Eighth Amendment claim against Henry and Camaja for their actions

on August 13, 2024 will be dismissed without prejudice.
G. GONGLIEWSKI’S MOTION FOR SERVICE
Following screening of the amended complaint, the only remaining claims are the
Eighth Amendment use of excessive force claim against Wildenstein, Callahan, and Camaja
and the First Amendment retaliation claim against Wildenstein. These three Defendants have
already waived service. (Doc. 21). Since the claims against the named Defendants who did
not receive waiver of service forms did not survive screening, Gongliewski’s motion for
service by the U.S. Marshal (Doc. 49) will be denied as moot.
H. DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS
As stated above, following screening of the amended complaint, the only remaining

claims are the Eighth Amendment use of excessive force claim against Wildenstein, Callahan,
and Camaja and the First Amendment retaliation claim against Wildenstein all stemming
from the alleged actions of August 12, 2024.
In their motion to dismiss, Wildenstein, Callahan, and Camaja raise the defense of
exhaustion and qualified immunity.
1. Administrative Exhaustion
The Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PLRA), 42 U.S.C. § 1997e et seq.,
requires prisoners to exhaust available administrative remedies before suing prison officials
for alleged constitutional violations. See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a); Ross v. Blake, 578 U.S. 632,
639, 642 (2016) (explaining that only “available” remedies must be exhausted). Proper
exhaustion is mandatory, even if the inmate is seeking relief—like monetary damages—that
cannot be granted by the administrative system. See Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 85 (2006).
However, there are situations in which a grievance procedure may be rendered

“unavailable” to an inmate, such as when a prison official thwarts an inmate’s ability to use
it, Ross, 578 U.S. at 643–44, when intimidation by means of “serious threats of retaliation
and bodily harm” prevent an inmate from filing, Rinaldi v. United States, 904 F.3d 257, 266-
67 (3rd Cir. 2018), or when a prison has “rendered its administrative remedies unavailable .
. . when it failed to timely (by its own procedural rules) respond to [an inmate’s] grievance
and then repeatedly ignored his follow-up requests for a decision on his claim,” Robinson v.
Superintendent Rockview SCI, 831 F.3d 148, 154 (3d Cir. 2016).
Gongliewski’s amended complaint includes multiple assertions that he filed
grievances and some of these grievances and their corresponding responses are attached to

the complaint. However, Gongliewski’s amended complaint does not allege that he
appealed any of these grievance determinations. Regardless, exhaustion is not a pleading
requirement, but an affirmative defense. Jones v. Beck, 549 U.S. 199, 216 (2007). While it
appears that Defendants are raising the lack of exhaustion as an affirmative defense, they
put the burden on Gongliewski to plead exhaustion: “[h]is amended Complaint is devoid of
any allegation that he attempted to internally report any Defendant for the conduct at issue
or otherwise follow the correctional facility’s grievance procedure.” (Doc. 42, at 8). Instead,
the burden is on Defendants to establish that Gongliewski did not exhaust his administrative
remedies. Therefore, Gongliewski’s amended complaint survives the exhaustion defense at
this stage in the litigation. Defendants may raise the defense in any subsequent dispersive
motions.
2. Qualified Immunity
Defendants also raise the affirmative defense of qualified immunity. (Doc. 42, at 8-
10). The Court notes that Gongliewski fails to allege whether he is bringing the claims against

Defendants in their official or individual capacity. (Doc. 36). However, the Third Circuit
requires a nonspecific complaint such as this to be liberally construed as if the claims were
brought against Defendants both their in their individual capacities and official capacities.
Gregory v. Chehi, 843 F.2d 111, 119–20 (3rd Cir. 1988) (“[R]esolving doubts in favor of
plaintiff, we will assume he is suing the individuals in their personal capacities as well.”).
Therefore, the Court will now address the qualified immunity defense.
“The doctrine of qualified immunity shields officials from civil liability so long as their
conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a
reasonable person would have known.” Peroza-Benitez v. Smith, 994 F.3d 157, 165 (3d Cir. 2021)

(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 11 (2015)) (per
curiam). In assessing whether qualified immunity applies, the court engages in a two-part
analysis: (1) whether the plaintiff sufficiently alleged a right had been violated; and (2)
whether that right was clearly established when it was allegedly violated to the extent “that it
would have been clear to a reasonable person that his conduct was unlawful.” Williams v.
Secretary, Pennsylvania Department of Corrections, 848 F.3d 549, 557 (3d Cir. 2017).
As addressed above, Gongliewski has sufficiently alleged that his Eighth and First
Amendment rights were violated by Wildenstein, Callahan, and Camaja. Therefore, the
Court must assess the second part of the qualified immunity analysis. “A Government
official’s conduct violates clearly established law when, at the time of the challenged conduct,
the contours of a right are sufficiently clear that every reasonable official would have
understood that what he is doing violates that right.” L.R. v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., 836 F.3d 235,
248 (3d Cir. 2016) (quoting Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011)) (internal quotation

marks omitted). “The ultimate question is whether the state of the law when the offense
occurred” gave the prison officials “fair warning” that their conduct violated Gongliewski’s
Eighth Amendment right. L.R., 836 F.3d 235 at 247 (quoting Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 741
(2002)). To determine whether such “fair warning” existed, the court must look for “factually
analogous” precedential cases. Clark v. Coupe, No. 21-2310, 2022 WL 17246324, at *8 (3d Cir.
Nov. 28, 2022) citing Peroza-Benitez, 994 F.3d at 165.
Here, the right of Gongliewski was to be free of the use of force that rises to the level
of cruel and unusual punishment. “The Supreme Court has made clear that officers may not
expose inmates to gratuitous force divorced from any legitimate penological purpose.” Jacobs

v. Cumberland County, 8 F.4th 187, 197 (3d Cir, 2021) citing Hope, 536 U.S. at 738. This alone
would provide officers with at least some notice that the alleged conduct against Gongliewski,
which allegedly included the continued use of force after he was subdued, was unlawful.
Therefore, Gongliewski’s amended complaint survives the qualified immunity defense at this
stage in the litigation.
The remaining argument in Defendants’ motion to dismiss concerns whether
Gongliewski stated a claim pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), which was addressed at
length in the screening process. Therefore, the motion to dismiss will be denied without
further analysis.
V. LEAVE TO AMEND
The Third Circuit has instructed that if a complaint is vulnerable to dismissal for failure
to state a claim, the district court must permit a curative amendment, unless an amendment
would be inequitable or futile. See Grayson, 293 F.3d at 108. The Third Circuit has also
acknowledged that a district court has “substantial leeway in deciding whether to grant leave

to amend.” Lake v. Arnold, 232 F.3d 360, 373 (3d Cir. 2000).
The Court will not grant Gongliewski further leave to amend his complaint prior to
the answer of the complaint. He was already granted this opportunity and failed to file an
amended pleading within the deadline provide by the Court. Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 15
and Local Rule 15.1, if Gongliewski wishes to further amend his pleading, he may do so by
filing a motion to amend with a brief in support and a proposed amended pleading.
VI. MOTION FOR CLERK’S ELECTRONIC FILING TO CONSTITUTE SERVICE
On June 16, 2025, the Court received and docketed Gongliewski’s motion for the
Clerk’s electronic filing to constitute service. (Doc. 55). Essentially, Gongliewski seeks to be
relieved of the requirement to make copies of his filings and forward them to Defendants.

Pursuant to Local Rule 5.7, documents served through the Court’s electronic filing
system results in a Notice of Electronic Filing which constitutes service of the filed document
upon each party in the case who is registered as a Filing User. Here, Defendants’ counsel is a
Filing User and is receiving Notice of Electronic Filing of Gongliewski’s submissions to the
Court. Therefore, Gongliewski’s motion is denied as moot.
VII. MOTION FOR SUBPOENA DUCES TECUM
On July 3, 2025, the Court received and docketed Gongliewski’s motion for
subpoena duces tecum seeking he production of documents, electronic files, and video
footage relating to the claims raised in the amended complaint. (Doc. 57). He also filed a
brief in support. (Doc. 58).
The Court has the inherent authority to review subpoena requests by an
unrepresented party proceeding in forma pauperis before issuing the subpoenas. Brown v.

Monsalud, No. 1:20-CV-00849, 2023 WL 8115984, at *1 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 12, 2023) (citing
Jackson v. Brinker, No. IP 91-471-C at 1992 WL 404537, at *4–5 (D. Ind. Dec. 21, 1992)).
The decision whether to allow an unrepresented litigant to subpoena a witness’s testimony
at trial is subject to the court’s discretion. Gay v. Petsock, 917 F.2d 768, 772–73 (3d Cir.
1990).
A request for a subpoena is properly denied where the requesting party fails to state
the relevance of the witness’s testimony to the trial. Brown v. Dep’t of Corrs., No. 1:15-CV-
918, 2021 WL 1969442, at *2–3 (M.D. Pa. May 17, 2021); Bakhtiari v. Madrigal, No. 3:18-
CV-00038, 2019 WL 13255457, at *2 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 16, 2019).

Additionally, when a plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis, he is still responsible for
paying his own litigation costs, see Tabron v. Grace, 6 F.3d 147, 159 (3d Cir. 1993), including
the costs of serving a subpoena and having a witness comply with the subpoena, see Jacobs v.
Heck, 364 F. App’x 744, 748 (3d Cir. 2010), and any compensation to witnesses required by
28 U.S.C. § 1821. Thus, before a subpoena may be issued, a plaintiff proceeding in forma
pauperis must demonstrate that he can pay the costs associated with the subpoena. Davis v.
Wetzel, No. 1:18-CV-00804, 2022 WL 22905385, at *2 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 24, 2022); Badman v.
Stark, 139 F.R.D. 601, 605 (M.D. Pa. 1991).
Here, Gongliewski is proceeding in forma pauperis (Doc. 9) and his motion and brief in

support do not provide any information concerning how he intends to cover the cost of the
subpoena. Therefore, the Court will deny the motion without prejudice to Gongliewski
renewing his motion with the required information. Additionally, Gongliewski is limited to
seeking the production of evidence relevant to the claims that have survived screening.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The Court will grant Gongliewski’s motion to amend the complaint, treat the proposed

amended complaint as the operative complaint in this mater, deny Defendants’ motion to
dismiss the original complaint as moot, dismiss all claims raised in the amended complaint
except the Eighth Amendment use of excessive force claim against Wildenstein, Callahan,
and Camaja and the First Amendment retaliation claim against Wildenstein from August 12,
2024, deny Defendants’ motion to dismiss the amended complaint, deny Gongliewski’s
motion for service, and deny Gongliewski’s motion for subpoena duces tecum.
An appropriate order follows.

Dated: January 14, 2026 s/ Karoline Mehalchick
KAROLINE MEHALCHICK
United States District Judge

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11242796. Public record. Not legal advice.