# Diahn

> District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania · January 12, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11242371

## Case

- **Full name:** Trokon Morris Diahn v. Craig Lowe, in his official capacity, As Acting Warden of the Pike County Correctional Facility, et al.
- **Court:** District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania
- **Decided:** January 12, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
TROKON MORRIS DIAHN, : No. 1:24cv1936
Petitioner :
: (Judge Munley)
V. :
CRAIG LOWE, in his official capacity, :
As Acting Warden of the Pike :
County Correctional Facility, et al. :
Respondents :

MEMORANDUM
The court previously granted Petitioner Trokan Morris Diahn’s petition for
writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 in this immigration detention
matter. As a result, Diahn received a bond hearing before an immigration judge
(“IJ”). The IJ granted the petitioner’s release from detention on a $12,500
immigration bond. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) has not
accepted the IJ’s ruling.
Before the court is Diahn’s second motion to enforce the writ. (Doc. 27).
Diahn’s motion concerns ICE’s unilateral imposition of additional conditions of
release. As discussed below, the motion to enforce will be granted. ICE will be
directed to remove Diahn from electronic monitoring and lift all other
requirements that were not imposed by the IJ as the result of the court-ordered
bond hearing.

Background
Diahn was born in August 2001 to Liberian parents in an Ivorian refugee
camp.‘ Diahn’s family fled Liberia’s civil war and endured the assassination of

the petitioner's uncle. Diahn never set foot in Liberia. His family was admitted to

the United States as refugees and have lived in the Philadelphia area since then.
Diahn’s father, stepmother, and eight siblings are all United States citizens.
Diahn’s mother is a lawful permanent resident. Diahn himself, however, has
apparently never sought citizenship nor permanent residency.
Diahn is a convicted felon. At age 15, he was charged with aggravated
assault as an adult offender for a fight with other high school students. He pled
guilty and was sentenced to 23 months of confinement. Shortly after release, in
March 2020, Diahn was arrested again and charged with 15 counts related to
bank fraud and identity theft. In September 2022, he pled guilty to conspiracy to
commit bank fraud and was sentenced to time served, plus two years or
supervised release. United Stafes v. Diahn, No. 1:20cr80 (Wilson, J).
The government has been trying to deport Diahn for years. On December
16, 2022, Diahn was charged with being a removable alien pursuant to 8 U.S.C.

1 These background facts are derived, in part, from an R&R issued by Chief United States
Magistrate Judge Daryl F. Bloom on July 11, 2025. Diahn v. Lowe, No. 1:24-CV-1936, 2025
WL 2115442, at *1 (M.D. Pa. July 11, 2025), report and recommendation adopted, No.
888: 2025 WL 2112074 (M.D. Pa. July 28, 2025). Neither party objected to these

§ 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii) and (iii) based on the above offenses. Diahn, acting pro se,
eventually applied for adjustment of status, an inadmissibility waiver as to the

same, asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention
Against Torture. United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (“USCIS”)
denied Diahn’s applications on September 1, 2023. Diahn then sought
reconsideration with an IJ and with the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”).
Thereafter, Diahn was taken into ICE custody on November 1, 2023 and held at
the Pike County Correctional Facility (“Pike CCF”). In April 2024, the BIA denied
his appeal, making his removal order administratively final.
Diahn appealed his removal order. Currently, three of Diahn’s appeals
remain pending before the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, Diahn v. Bondi, 24-
2066, 24-2154, 25-1692. Those appeals appear to be fully briefed and are
pending oral argument.
Meanwhile, in November 2024, after 12 months in ICE custody, Diahn filed

a petition for writ of habeas corpus under Section 2241 in the Middle District of
Pennsylvania. (Doc. 1). On July 28, 2025, the court adopted a report and
recommendation (“R&R”) of Chief Magistrate Judge Daryl F. Bloom in its entirety.
(Doc. 21). Magistrate Judge Bloom, and subsequently the undersigned,
determined that Diahn’s detention without a bond hearing violated the petitioner’s
due process rights. By that time, Diahn had been in custody for 20 months. To

remedy the violation, the court ordered a bond hearing before an IJ within thirty
(30) days, as suggested by the R&R. Id.
Following that order, |J Leo Finston conducted a bond hearing on August
11, 2025. He determined that petitioner was neither a flight risk nor a danger to
the community, provided that Diahn post a bond of $12,500 to secure his
release. (Doc. 22-1, First Mot. to Enforce, Ex. A., ECF pp. 3-4). IJ Finston’s
bond memorandum states, in relevant part:
Although [Diahn’s] convictions are serious and [Diahn]
spent a significant time in custody, the [c]ourt does not find
that [DHS] has shown, by clear and convincing evidence,
that this respondent would pose a danger to persons or
property in the future. [DHS] does not meet their burden of
showing that the respondent poses a danger to society
simply by stating that [Diahn] has a serious criminal history,
without more.
On the contrary, [Diahn] presented evidence of
rehabilitation and has assured support from his community.
Upon release, the respondent intends to live and work with
his parents, both of whom own their own business.
Furthermore, the respondent has been in immigration
proceedings for over a decade and has been granted stays
of removal pending review of his appeal by the Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeals... This demonstrates that [Diahn]
has a clear vested interest in continuing to participate in his
immigration proceedings. Thus, the [cJourt finds that [DHS]
has not met its burden, by clear and convincing evidence,
to show that this respondent’s further detention is
necessary to prevent the respondent from posing a danger
or a flight risk.

Accordingly, the request for a change in custody status is
granted. The [cJourt hereby orders that [Diahn] be
released from custody under bond of $12,500.
(Doc. 27-1, Pet. Ex. D., Bond Memorandum at ECF p. 24-25).
ICE appealed the IJ’s decision, which triggered an automatic stay. Id., Ex.
C, ECF pp. 10. The effect kept Diahn detained at Pike CCF.
Diahn then filed a motion to enforce, his first, challenging that appeal as
unconstitutional and ultra vires. (Doc. 22). Legal counsel for ICE quickly advised
the United States Attorney’s Office that the automatic stay was withdrawn. (Doc.
24 at 1-2, see also Doc, 29-1). Diahn then posted bond on August 27, 2025.2
(Doc. 24 at 1-2). Consequently, the government filed a suggestion of mootness
with its response to the first motion to enforce. Id. The court did not take any
additional action at that time.
Diahn, however, has been subjected to other requirements by ICE beyond
those contemplated by the IJ. In his second motion to enforce, filed September
26, 2025, Diahn avers that ICE has placed him on an Intensive Supervision
Appearance Program (“ISAP”) through an Individual Service Plan. According to
that plan, he has been assigned a case specialist and is required to report face-
to-face every 8 weeks. (Doc. 27-1, ECF p. 25). Diahn has also been placed on

Diahn was permitted to post bond exactly thirty (30) days after the July 28, 2025 order
despite the IJ’s determination two weeks prior.

electronic monitoring, that is, a BI LOC8 XT location tracking and GPS
monitoring device (“ICE ankle monitor’). Id. Diahn is also subjected to home
visits every 8 weeks. Id.
Diahn further indicates that his ICE ankle monitor has malfunctioned once,
disabling the GPS. This circumstance required Diahn to report to an ICE facility
with his lawyer to have a new monitor placed in his ankle. Diahn reports that
having the monitor is “stressful” and makes him feel like he is “constantly being
watched.” The device “always bumps into things and hurts,” according to the
petitioner, and it wakes him up at night.
As for the present conditions of Diahn’s release, he has supplied an
affidavit indicating that he has been living with his father and working in his
mother’s restaurant part-time. He avers that he has checked in with his
probation officer as part of the supervised release portion of his federal criminal
sentence. He has also reported for his ISAP face-to-face visits.
To the court’s knowledge, Diahn’s has been on the ICE ankle monitor for
approximately 120 days with no issues reported. The Fourth Circuit has not yet
decided Diahn’s appeals. Additionally, there are no reports that Diahn has
violated any terms of his supervised release in his federal criminal case.

The court also notes that ICE has filed an appeal of the IJ’s bond order witt
the BIA, despite the fact that this matter remains in an administrative gray-area
based upon the habeas corpus relief issued by the court.
Jurisdiction
The court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, the federal
question statute, and 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3), which allows a court to grant a writ
of habeas corpus to an individual held “in custody in violation of the Constitution

or laws or treaties of the United States[.]” The court has no trouble concluding
that Diahn remains “in custody” due to his GPS ankle monitor and other ISAP
reporting requirements. See Maleng v. Cook, 490 U.S. 488, 492 (1989)
(acknowledging that the “in custody” requirement for purposes of federal habeas
is construed “very liberally”); see also Orellana Juarez v. Moniz, 788 F. Supp. 3d
61, 67-68 (D. Mass. 2025) (citing Hensley v. Municipal Court, 411 U.S. 345, 351
(1973); Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236, 243 (1963)); Da Silva v. LaForge,
No. 25CV17095 (EP), 2026 WL 45165, at *3 (D.N.J. Jan. 7, 2026); N- N- v.
McShane, No. CV 25-5494, 2025 WL 3143594, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 10, 2025).
Furthermore, there is no question that this court has the power to enforce
its writs of habeas corpus and may address alleged non-compliance by the
government. See Gibbs v. Frank, 500 F.3d 202, 205 (3d Cir. 2007) (citations

omitted); Santos v. Lowe, No. 1:18-CV-1553, 2020 WL 4530728, at *2 (M.D. Pa.

Aug. 6, 2020) (Rambo, J.) (citations omitted).
Analysis
With the current motion to enforce, Diahn contends that ICE’s actions
violate the prior order of court, intrude on the court’s jurisdiction, and further
infringe on his due process rights. The government asserts that DHS is legally
authorized to impose such conditions upon a detainee’s release from custody, 8
U.S.C. § 1226(a)(2), and may appeal a bond decision to the BIA under its
regulations, 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.6(c), 1003.19(i). The government also argues that
the Diahn should be required to exhaust administrative remedies prior to
returning to court.
ICE clearly imposed additional conditions on Diahn that were not
contemplated by the IJ or by the court. For that reason alone, the second motior
to enforce will be granted. The court, however, will work through the
government’s non-justification of ICE’s conduct below.
1. ICE Acted Without Statutory Authority in this Matter
The government argues that 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)(2)(A) authorizes ICE’s
conduct even if the IJ ordered release on bond. (Doc. 29, Br. in Opp. at 5-6).
The court disagrees.

First, the parties previously agreed that Diahn was held under 8 U.S.C. §
1226(c) as a “criminal alien.” (Doc. 17, R&R at 5). That finding is now the law of

the case. ° See Hayman Cash Register Co. v. Sarokin, 669 F.2d 162, 165 (3d
Cir. 1982).
Second, even if the applicable statute had not already been decided in this

matter, the government’s Section 1226(a) argument is downright Kafkaesque in
these circumstances. If Diahn was subject to Section 1226(a), he would have
received a bond hearing in the first instance and would not have had to file this
habeas action after being held in Pike CCF for many months. Diahn’s prolongec
detention is how the parties got here in the first place. As explained further:
Even once inside the United States, aliens do not have an
absolute right to remain here. For example, an alien
present in the country may still be removed if he or she falls
“within one or more ... classes of deportable aliens.” [8
U.S.C.] § 1227(a). That includes aliens who were
inadmissible at the time of entry or who have been
convicted of certain criminal offenses since admission. See
[8 U.S.C. ] §§ 1227(a)(1), (2).
Section 1226 generally governs the process of arresting
and detaining that group of aliens pending their removal.
As relevant here, § 1226 distinguishes between two
different categories of aliens.
Section 1226(a) sets out the default rule: The Attorney
General may issue a warrant for the arrest and detention
of an alien “pending a decision on whether the alien is to

3 The government failed to object to the R&R or appeal after the court adopted the R&R.

be removed from the United States.” § 1226(a). “Except as
provided in subsection (c) of this section,” the Attorney
General “may release” an alien detained under § 1226(a)
“on ...bond” or “conditional parole.” Ibid.
Section 1226(c), however, carves out a statutory category
of aliens who may not be released under § 1226(a). Under
§ 1226(c), the “Attorney General shall take into custody
any alien” who falls into one of several enumerated
categories involving criminal offenses and _ terrorist
activities. § 1226(c)(1).
Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 288-89 (2018) (footnote omitted)
(paragraphing added).
There is simply no statutory support for the government’s position in this

case. Section 1226(a) cannot be used as a fallback position when a court-
ordered bond hearing for a Section 1226(c) detainee does not end in continued
detention.
2. Diahn Need Not Exhaust Administrative Remedies
The government also argues that Diahn must exhaust his administrative
remedies prior to returning to court. However, there is no administrative
exhaustion requirement where the petitioner has been in custody under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1226(c) for an inordinate, rights-violating period of time. Rather, as the
government concedes, any exhaustion requirement would be prudential in this

case, i.e., judge-made and discretionary. (Doc. 29, Br. in Opp. at 11 (citing
Chajchic v. Rowley, No. 1:17-CV-457, 2017 WL 4401895, at *4 (M.D. Pa. July

10

25, 2017) (Carlson, M.J.), report and recommendation adopted, No. 1:17-CV-
457, 2017 WL 4387062 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 3, 2017) (Conner, J.)).
Prudential exhaustion requires the court “to balance the alien’s interest in

prompt access to the federal courts with the government’s institutional interest in
exhaustion.” United States v. Dohou, 948 F.3d 621, 628 (3d Cir. 2020) (citing
McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 140, 144 (1992)). “But even when courts might
otherwise require exhaustion, they may excuse it when, for instance, ‘waiver,
estoppel, tolling or futility’ applies.” Id. (quoting Wilson v. MVM, Inc., 475 F.3d
166, 174 (3d Cir. 2007)). Prudential exhaustion may also be excused “when the
challenged agency action presents a clear and unambiguous violation of
statutory or constitutional rights.” Id. (quoting Susquehanna Valley All. v. Three
Mile Island Nuclear Reactor, 619 F.2d 231, 245 (3d Cir. 1980)).
Here, there are at least three reasons why Diahn need not wait for any
administrative appeals to play out. First, the court has already determined that
Diahn’s detention has become unreasonably long. Second, Diahn “won” his
release on bond. Third, despite that unconditional release on bond, Diahn was
placed on the ISAP program with an ICE ankle monitor because ICE believed it
had the power to act unilaterally, not because an IJ ordered it. In any appeal to
the BIA, Diahn would not be challenging the amount of the bond or the fact that
he must pay it; he would be challenging ICE’s authority to add extra-judicial

11

conditions to his release. Consequently, in these circumstances, where
exhaustion is a flexible rule of prudence, not a jurisdiction-limiting restraint, the

court will not require exhaustion where Diahn’s due process rights continue to be
violated.
3. ICE’s Appeal to the BIA Stands on Shaky Regulatory Grounds
On one final note, Diahn challenges the BIA’s authority over ICE’s efforts tc

reverse the IJ’s bond order. The government counters that ICE appropriately
appealed the IJ’s order to the BIA under the regulations. (Doc. 29 at 7-8 (citing 4
C.F.R. §§ 1236.1(d)(1), 1236.1(d)(3)(i)).4 The court is not convinced that any
promulgated regulations apply to Diahn, an immigration detainee who has spent
an unreasonable amount of time in custody and was granted habeas relief in the
form of a bond hearing with an lJ.
As observed by the United States Supreme Court, the regulations relied

upon by the government, “provide that aliens detained under § 1226(a) receive
bond hearings at the outset of detention.” Jennings, 583 U.S. at 306 (citing 8
C.F.R. §§ 236.1(d)(1), 1236.1(d)(1)) (emphasis added). At the outset of this
controversy, Diahn was to be held in detention without the ability to seek a bond
hearing under the INA.

4 The court believes the government miscited 8 C.F.R. § 1236.1(d)(3)(i) as “8 C.F.R. §
1236.1(d)(i)” on Page 8 of their response to Diahn’s second motion to enforce.
12

Nonetheless, the court need only rule on the most pressing portions of
Diahn’s second motion to enforce, the ICE ankle monitor and other ISAP
reporting requirements, which went beyond the lJ’s order. Should the decision o
the IJ be reversed by the BIA, the courts remain open to hear Diahn’s arguments
that the BIA lacked jurisdiction.
Conclusion
When the IJ set a $12,500 bond, he determined that Diahn was not a
danger to society. Further, the bond amount set by the IJ represented the
specific condition that the IJ deemed sufficient to ensure that Diahn would not
flee — nothing more, nothing less. By imposing additional conditions, ICE acted
without legal authority. Consequently, the court will grant Diahn’s second motior
to enforce and release him from the ICE ankle monitor and all ISAP reporting
requirements. An appropriate order O

nited States District

13

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11242371. Public record. Not legal advice.