# Khachikian

> District Court, S.D. California · January 8, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11242364

## Case

- **Full name:** Zhilbert Khachikian v. Jeremy Casey, Warden, Imperial Regional Detention Facility; Joseph Freden, Acting Field Office Director, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement; Todd M. Lyons, Acting Director, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement; Kristi Noem, Secretary, U.S. Department of Homeland Security; and Pamela
- **Court:** District Court, S.D. California
- **Decided:** January 8, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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11 ZHILBERT KHACHIKIAN, Case No.: 25cv3737-GPC(JLB)

12 Petitioner,
ORDER GRANTING PETITION
13 v. FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
14 JEREMY CASEY, Warden, Imperial
Regional Detention Facility; JOSEPH
15
FREDEN, Acting Field Office Director,
16 U.S. Immigration and Customs
Enforcement; TODD M. LYONS,
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Acting Director, U.S. Immigration and
18 Customs Enforcement; KRISTI NOEM,
Secretary, U.S. Department of
19
Homeland Security; and PAMELA
20 BONDI, Attorney General of the
United States,
21

22
23 Respondents.
24
25 On December 23, 2025, Zhilbert Khachikian (“Petitioner”) filed a petition for writ
26 of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 seeking to be released from his unlawful
27 detention at the Imperial Regional Detention Facility in Calexico, California. (Dkt. No.
28 1, Pet.) Respondents file a return on January 2, 2026, and Petitioner filed a traverse on
1 January 6, 2026. (Dkt. Nos. 8, 9.) Based on the reasoning below, the Court GRANTS
2 the petition for writ of habeas corpus.
3 Background
4 Petitioner, a 72 year old Iranian man of Armenian ethnicity, entered the United
5 States at or near San Ysidro, California without being admitted or paroled after inspection
6 by an Immigration Officer around February 3, 1999 and has been residing in the U.S.
7 continuously since that time. (Dkt. No. 1, Pet. ¶ 28; Dkt. No. 8-2, Perez Decl. ¶ 6.) On
8 June 24, 1999, Petitioner was issued a notice to appear for removal proceedings under the
9 Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) § 240 charging him with being inadmissible
10 and subject to removal pursuant to INA § 212(a)(6)(A)(i), as an alien present in the
11 United States without being admitted or paroled or who has arrived in the United States
12 at any time or place other than as designated by the Attorney General. (Dkt. No. 8-2,
13 Perez Decl. ¶ 7.)
14 On October 25, 1999, an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) in Los Angeles, California,
15 entered a removal order against Petitioner, in part due to lack of sufficient evidence.
16 (Dkt. No. 1, Pet. ¶ 32; Dkt. No. 8-2, Perez Decl. ¶ 8.) The IJ stated in open court and in
17 the removal order that if Petitioner could procure additional information about
18 membership in the Bahai faith or receipt of a Bahai ID, he could file a motion to
19 reconsider the decision. (Dkt. No. 1, Pet. ¶ 32.)
20 On November 8, 1999, Petitioner appealed the IJ’s order to the Board of
21 Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) and the appeal was dismissed on April 15, 2002. (Id. ¶ 33;
22 Dkt. No. 8-2, Perez Decl. ¶¶ 10, 11.) On July 25, 2002, Petitioner filed a motion to
23 reopen with the BIA which was denied on July 22, 2003. (Dkt. No. 8-2, Perez Decl. ¶¶
24 12, 13.) On August 20, 2003, Petitioner filed a motion to reconsider the denial of the
25 motion to reopen with the BIA which was denied on October 2, 2003. (Id. ¶¶ 14, 15.)
26 On August 20, 2003, Petitioner petitioned for review with the Ninth Circuit Court
27 of Appeals, and while the Ninth Circuit issued a stay of removal throughout the duration
28
1 of proceedings, the petition was denied on February 11, 2005 and a mandate issued on
2 April 5, 2005. (Dkt. No. 1, Pet. ¶ 35; Dkt. No. 8-2, Perez Decl. ¶¶ 16, 17.)
3 On or about August 25, 2008, ICE detained Petitioner on the final order of removal
4 and released him under an Order of Supervision and Unsupervised Parole (“OSUP”)
5 program. (Dkt. No. 1, Pet. ¶ 37; Dkt. No. 1-2, Pet., Ex. A1; Dkt. No. 8-2, Perez Decl. ¶
6 18.) The OSUP program required periodic check-ins with ICE, but otherwise allowed
7 Petitioner to live freely and move about, engage in gainful employment, and participate
8 as a contributing member to society, as long as he continued to update ICE of any
9 permanent changes in address or phone number. (Dkt. No. 1, Pet. ¶ 37.) Petitioner
10 continued to live a full life became a contributing member of society, and raised a family
11 which now includes U.S. citizen grandchildren. (Id. ¶ 36.)
12 In 2025, ICE placed Petitioner under an additional Intensive Supervision
13 Appearance Program (“ISAP”), requiring additional check-ins using apps, phone calls
14 and other requirements. (Id. ¶ 38.) ISAP initially placed a GPS ankle bracelet on
15 Petitioner, but due to medical reasons ISAP agreed to remove the ankle bracelet. (Id.)
16 Petitioner was still allowed to live freely and move about, engage in gainful employment,
17 and participate as a contributing member to society, as long as he continued to update
18 ICE of any permanent changes in address or phone number. (Id.) For the past 17 years,
19 Petitioner has complied with all OSUP and ISAP requirements without any issue. (Id. ¶
20 39.)
21 On November 16, 2025, while Petitioner was at the home of his in-laws in Los
22 Angeles, ISAP employees asked him to come out of the home so they could verify some
23 information. (Id. ¶ 42.) The statement was a mere pretext to detain him because once
24 Petitioner stepped outside the gated community, multiple ISAP employees were waiting
25
26

27
1 The Order of Supervision attached is dated May 21, 2012, no August 25, 2008. (Dkt. No. 1-2, Pet, Ex.
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1 for Petitioner, and they arrested him without any further explanation and took him to an
2 ICE detention facility. (Id.)
3 On the following day, November 17, 2025, Petitioner was served with a Notice of
4 Revocation of Release (“Notice”) while in ICE custody at 300 N. Los Angeles Street.
5 (Id. ¶ 43.) The document stated, “ICE has determined that you can be removed from the
6 United States pursuant to the outstanding order of removal against you. On July 22,
7 2003, you were ordered removed to IRAN by an Immigration Judge and you are subject
8 to an administrative final order of removal. You were released on an order of supervision
9 on or about August 25, 2008. ICE has determined the purpose of your release has been
10 served and it is appropriate to enforce the removal order.” (Dkt. No. 1-3, Pet., Ex. B at 2
11 (emphasis removed).2) The Notice advised Petitioner that he would promptly be given an
12 informal interview during which he could respond to the reasons for revocation and
13 provide relevant evidence that removal is unlikely. (Id.)
14 On November 17, 2025, DHS conducted an informal interview where Petitioner
15 was offered an opportunity to make a statement concerning the revocation of the order of
16 supervision but he did not; instead, he orally stated that he would wait for his attorney.
17 (Dkt. No. 8-2, Perez Decl. ¶ 20; Dkt. No. 8-3, Respts’ Table of Exs., Ex. A at 4.) In the
18 traverse, Petitioner, through counsel, states that Petitioner was not afforded an interview
19 with a meaningful opportunity to discuss or respond to the Notice and was never
20 provided the factual or legal reasons for the revocation of his release. (Dkt. No. 9-1,
21 Darbinian Decl. ¶¶ 4-6.) According to Petitioner’s counsel, Petitioner did not refuse to
22 response or waive his right to be heard when he stated, “I will wait for my lawyer”;
23 rather, Petitioner invoked his right to counsel. (Id. ¶ 7.)
24 On information and belief, prior to his detention, Petitioner was given no
25 notice of ICE’s or ISAP’s intention to detain him, and he was not provided with any
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1 reasonable information about why his OSUP was revoked. (Dkt. No. 1, Pet. ¶ 44.) On
2 information and belief, Petitioner was arrested and detained without any warrant, and any
3 documentation and the Notice was only prepared after his detention. (Id. ¶ 45.) On
4 information and belief, ICE had no particularized evidence that Petitioner can be
5 repatriated or deported to Iran at the time he was detained and continue to have no
6 particularized evidence that Petitioner can be removed at this time. (Id. ¶ 46.) On
7 information and belief, Petitioner has not received an individualized hearing before a
8 neutral decisionmaker to assess whether his recent detention is warranted due to danger
9 or flight risk. (Id. ¶ 47.)
10 On November 17, 2025, Petitioner’s counsel reached out to ICE and requested to
11 speak with anyone who could speak on the matter, in particular the ICE deportation
12 officer or supervisor assigned to Petitioner’s case. (Id. ¶ 48.) Nobody from ICE
13 responded. (Id.) On November 18, 2025, Petitioner’s counsel visited the detention
14 center at 300 N. Los Angeles Street, Los Angeles, CA 90012 where Petitioner was being
15 detained at the time, and managed to speak with Supervisory Deportation Officer
16 Casillas. (Id. ¶ 49.)
17 Supervisor Casillas advised Petitioner’s counsel that they were unaware why
18 Petitioner was detained, that the ISAP team was the one who brought Petitioner to their
19 facility, that the Los Angeles facility was a temporary holding facility, that Petitioner
20 would soon be transferred to a larger detention center, and that counsel would need to
21 follow up with the deportation officer assigned to his case. (Id.) Around November 20,
22 2025, Petitioner was transferred by ICE to the Imperial Regional Detention Facility,
23 where he remains to date. (Id. ¶ 50; Dkt. No. 1-4, Pet., Ex. C.) Petitioner’s counsel
24 repeatedly contacted ICE for an update, and ICE continued to remain nonresponsive until
25 November 24, 2025 when counsel learned that the ICE ERO employee assigned to
26 Petitioner’s case was Deportation Officer Salvador Perez (“DO Perez”). (Dkt. No. 1, Pet.
27 ¶ 51.) Petitioner’s counsel spoke with DO Perez on November 24, 2025 who told her by
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1 phone that there was an outstanding order of deportation to remove Petitioner to Iran, and
2 he will be contacting the country of Iran for necessary paperwork. (Id. ¶ 52.)
3 Petitioner’s counsel advised DO Perez that the U.S. does not have diplomatic
4 relations with Iran, and requested a reconsideration of release as he cannot be removed to
5 Iran. (Id. ¶¶ 53, 54.) Petitioner’s counsel provided additional information about
6 Petitioner’s mature age and medical issues, his fear of removal to Iran, and further
7 explained why ICE lacked authority to detain Petitioner as the removal period had ended
8 long ago and no event had made his removal reasonably foreseeable. (Id. ¶ 54.) In
9 addition, Petitioner’s counsel explained that Petitioner planned to file a new motion to
10 reopen his removal proceedings with new evidence of changed circumstances and
11 persecution on account of his Bahai faith, including but not limited to his acquisition of a
12 Bahai ID as referenced on the IJ’s removal order in 1999. (Id.)
13 Petitioner’s counsel also requested that ICE reconsider Petitioner’s detention,
14 especially in light of his medical issues. (Id. ¶ 55.) Further, ICE could continue to
15 process any request for travel authorization without Petitioner in detention because ICE
16 was already constantly aware of Petitioner’s whereabouts under the concurrent OSUP
17 and ISAP programs and GPS monitoring through Petitioner’s phone. (Id.) DO Perez
18 said he would raise this request with his supervisor, but for now his job was to continue
19 procuring documents from Iran, and Petitioner would remain in custody. (Id. ¶ 56.) DO
20 Perez advised counsel that that he does not know how long the process will take, but
21 Petitioner’s removal was not immediate nor imminent because he still needed to obtain
22 paperwork and travel documentation for Petitioner. (Id.)
23 On December 8, 2025, the Enforcement and Removal Operations (“ERO”)
24 requested that Petitioner complete Form I-217, Information for Travel Document or
25 Passport, related with a travel document request to the Iran Interests Section of the
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1 Embassy of Pakistan but he refused to comply. (Dkt. No. 8-2, Perez Decl. ¶ 21.)
2 Despite his refusal, ERO completed the form using information available to it in DHS
3 records and databases. (Id. ¶ 22.) On December 22, 2025, ERO forwarded a finalized
4 travel document request to the Iran Interests Section in Washington D.C. which is
5 currently pending. (Id. ¶ 23.) DHS has been successful in effectuating final orders of
6 removal to Iran via charter flight; in Fiscal Year 2025, DHS removed 135 Iranian
7 nationals to Iran.4 (Id. ¶ 26.) DHS believes there is a significant likelihood of
8 Petitioner’s removal to Iran in the reasonably foreseeable future. (Id. ¶ 27.)
9 The petition challenges the legality of Petitioner’s immigration detention on the
10 following grounds: (1) that his revocation of release was unlawful because Respondents
11 did not provide evidence that he can be immediately removed to Iran in the reasonably
12 foreseeable future; (2) that his revocation of release violated 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i)(3) for
13 failing to provide notice and reasons for his detention and to conduct an initial interview;
14 (3) that his detention is unlawful because his removal is not reasonably foreseeable as
15 contemplated by Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001); (4) that his detention violates
16 his due process rights because he was not provided with an individualized determination
17 of danger or flight risk; (5) that his removal is unlawful to a third country;5 and (6)
18 declaratory judgment. (Dkt. No. 1, Pet. ¶¶ 65-105.) Respondents argue Petitioner’s
19

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21 3 Due to the lack of formal diplomatic relations between the United State and Iran since 1980, the Iran
Interests Section of the Pakistan Embassy manages the diplomatic and consular affairs of Iran in the
22 United States. (Dkt. No. 8-2, Perez Decl. ¶ 21 n. 1.)
4 See ICE Annual Report Fiscal Year 2024, at p. 99,
23 https://www.ice.gov/doclib/eoy/iceAnnualReportFY2024.pdf (last visited Jan. 5, 2026) (reporting that
removals to Iran ranged from 10 to 27 per fiscal year during fiscal years 2019–2024).
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5 Respondents argue Petitioner’s fifth claim that his removal to a third country is unlawful does not raise
25 a case or controversy and should be denied as moot because they are not seeking to remove him to a
third country and are instead working to remove him to Iran, his home country. (Dkt. No. 8 at 4-5.) In
26 response, Petitioner maintains that Respondents have not affirmatively denied any intent to remove
Petitioner to a third country; however, if they do not intend to remove petitioner to a third country,
27 Petitioner agrees the claim is moot. (Dkt. No. 9 at 2-3.) Because Respondents have submitted travel
documents to the Iran Interests Section of the Pakistan Embassy to have him removed to Iran rather than
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1 detention is lawful because he has not established there is no significant likelihood of
2 removal in the reasonably foreseeable future under the ruling in Zadvydas. (Dkt. No. 8 at
3 6-10.6) They also contend that ICE complied with 8 U.S.C. § 241.13(i) by serving
4 Petitioner with a Notice of Revocation of Release on November 16, 2025, and conducting
5 an informal interview which Petitioner declined to participate in. (Id. at 12-16.) They
6 also maintain that Petitioner’s refusal to cooperate with ICE’s efforts to obtain a travel
7 document authorizes his continued detention. (Id. at 10-11.)
8 Discussion
9 A. Legal Standard
10 Under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, a writ of habeas corpus may be granted to any petitioner
11 who demonstrates that she is “in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or
12 treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3); see Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466,
13 473 (2004). The writ of habeas corpus is “available to every individual detained within
14 the United States.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004).
15 As explained by the Supreme Court, “the essence of habeas corpus is an attack by
16 a person in custody upon the legality of that custody, and . . . the traditional function of
17 the writ is to secure release from illegal custody.” Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475,
18 484 (1973); Pinson v. Carvajal, 69 F.4th 1059, 1067 (9th Cir. 2023) (habeas actions
19 limited to challenges of the legality or duration of confinement). A prisoner bears the
20 burden of demonstrating that “[h]e is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws
21 or treaties of the United States.” See Espinoza v. Sabol, 558 F.3d 83, 89 (1st Cir. 2009).
22 B. Subject Matter Jurisdiction
23 Respondents maintain that this Court lacks jurisdiction over Petitioner’s claims
24 under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g) because Petitioner’s claims necessarily arise “from the decision
25 or action by the Attorney General to . . . execute removal orders.” (Dkt. No. 8 at 5-6.)
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1 Petitioner replies he is not challenging either the validity of his removal order of 1999 or
2 whether Respondents can execute on the removal order; instead, he is challenging the
3 legality of his unlawful detention. (Dkt. No. 9 at 3.)
4 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g) states that, with limited exceptions, “no court shall have
5 jurisdiction to hear any cause or claim by or on behalf of any alien arising from the
6 decision or action by the Attorney General to commence proceedings, adjudicate cases,
7 or execute removal orders against any alien[.]” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g) (emphasis added);
8 Reno v. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 482 (1999). In that light, §
9 1252(g) is a narrow statutory provision that concentrates on those three discrete actions.
10 Reno, 525 U.S. at 482. Section 1252(g) “does not prohibit challenges to unlawful
11 practices merely because they are in some fashion connected to removal orders.” Ibarra-
12 Perez v. United States, 154 F.4th 989, 997 (9th Cir. 2025). This section does not apply to
13 “general collateral challenges to unconstitutional practices and policies used by the
14 agency.” Id. (internal quotation mark and citation omitted).
15 Here, Petitioner contests his detention resulting from violations of the
16 government’s mandatory duties under certain statutes, regulations, and the Constitution;
17 therefore, the Court has jurisdiction to determine the lawfulness of Petitioner's detention.
18 See Dearinger ex re. Volkova v. Reno, 232 F.3d 1042, 1044 (9th Cir. 2000) (§ 1252(g)
19 restricts judicial review of deportation orders but “28 U.S.C. § 2241 remains an available
20 remedy to those challenging executive detention.”) Thus, § 1252(g) does not present a
21 jurisdictional bar to the instant petition.
22 C. Failure to Comply with 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i)
23 In Counts 1 and 2, Petitioner argues that ICE unlawfully revoked his release in
24 violation of 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i)(2). Respondents contend they complied with § 241.13
25 by providing Petitioner with a Notice of Revocation of Release one day after he was
26 detained, and provided him with an informal interview. (Dkt. No. 8 at 13-14.) They also
27 argue there are changed circumstances with ICE’s recent ability to schedule removal
28 flights to Iran. (Id. at 14.)
1 It is recognized that government agencies are required to follow their own
2 regulations. See United States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260, 268 (1954);
3 United States v. Ramos, 623 F.3d 672, 683 (9th Cir. 2010) (“It is a well-known maxim
4 that agencies must comply with their own regulations.”) (quoting Ramon–Sepulveda v.
5 INS, 743 F.2d 1307, 1310 (9th Cir. 1984)). Where an immigration “regulation is
6 promulgated to protect a fundamental right derived from the Constitution or a federal
7 statute,” like the opportunity to be heard, “and [ICE] fails to adhere to it, the challenged
8 [action] is invalid . . . .” Rombot v. Souza, 296 F. Supp. 3d 383, 388 (D. Mass. 2017)
9 (quoting Waldron v. I.N.S., 17 F.3d 511, 518 (2d Cir. 1993) (quotation marks omitted)).
10 Courts “have found that when ICE fails to follow its own regulations in revoking release,
11 the detention is unlawful, and the petitioner's release must be ordered.” Truong v. Noem,
12 No. 25-cv-2597-JES-MMP, 2025 WL 2988357, at *6 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 22, 2025)
13 (collecting cases).
14 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a) governs the detention of individuals with a final order of
15 removal and provides that a noncitizen must be removed within 90 days. 8 U.S.C. §
16 1231(a)(1)(A). Once the removal period passes and the “alien does not leave or is not
17 removed . . . the alien, pending removal, shall be subject to supervision under regulations
18 prescribed by the Attorney General.” Id. § 1231(a)(3).
19 In Zadvydas, the Supreme Court determined that it is “presumptively reasonable”
20 for DHS to detain a noncitizen for six months following entry of a final removal order
21 while it works to remove the individual from the United States. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at
22 701. Section 1231(a)(6), however, implicitly limits a noncitizen’s detention to a period
23 reasonably necessary to bring about that individual’s removal from the United States, and
24 does not permit “indefinite” detention. Id. at 688. Detention is indefinite if there is “no
25 significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future.” Id. at 701. When
26 detention becomes indefinite, the noncitizen must be released on supervision. Id. at 699-
27 700.
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1 Both parties discuss the application of Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001) in
2 this case. Petitioner argues that he has made the initial showing that his removal is not
3 significantly likely, (Dkt. No. 1, Pet. 83), while Respondents contend that Petitioner has
4 failed to establish “that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably
5 foreseeable future.” (Dkt. No. 8 at 8.) However, the burden-shifting framework and
6 presumptive reasonableness under Zadvydas do not apply to Petitioner’s situation of re-
7 detainment after he was issued a final order of removal, detained and subsequently
8 released on conditions. See Phouvieng K. v. Andrews, No. 1:25-cv-01512-KES-SAB
9 (HC), 2025 WL 3265504, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 24, 2025) (“Zadvydas does not apply
10 when a noncitizen has been ordered removed, is subsequently released on an order of
11 supervision because the removal order could not be executed, and is then re-detained
12 later.”) (citing Nguyen v. Hyde, 788 F. Supp. 3d 144, 150 (D. Mass. 2025) and Escalante
13 v. Noem, No. 9:25-CV-00182-MJT, 2025 WL 2206113, at *3 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 2, 2025));
14 Tadros v. Noem, No. 25-cv-4108, 2025 WL 1678501, at *3 (D.N.J. June 13, 2025)
15 (same); Kazemi v. Casey, Case No.: 25cv1926 DMS (DEB), 2025 WL 3179746, at *2
16 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 7, 2025) (Zadvydas presumption of reasonable detention does not apply to
17 re-detention; instead, the government bears the burden that the petitioner “may be
18 removed in the reasonably foreseeable future.”)
19 Zadvydas involved the initial detainment of a noncitizen awaiting removal and was
20 never released following a final order of removal. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 701. In that
21 context, the Supreme Court held that once an alien has been detained for six months and
22 “provides good reason to believe that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the
23 reasonably foreseeable future, the Government must respond with evidence sufficient to
24 rebut that showing.” Id.
25 Here, Petitioner’s 90-day removal period expired years ago in 2002 when the order
26 of removal became final, (Dkt. No. 1, Pet 79), and in 2008, he was released with
27 conditions under OSUP and later ISAP. See 8 C.F.R. 241.13(h). Therefore, the
28 applicable provision for the revocation of Petitioner’s release is 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i).
1 8 C.F.R. § 241.13 governs the release and revocation of release for noncitizens
2 subject to a final removal order who are indefinitely detained. As to revocation of
3 release, 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i)(2) provides that a noncitizen’s supervised release may be
4 revoked and may be returned to custody “if, on account of changed circumstances, the
5 Service determines that there is a significant likelihood that the alien may be removed in
6 the reasonably foreseeable future.” 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i)(2); Sun v. Noem, No. 3:25-cv-
7 02433-CAB-MMP, 2025 WL 2800037, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 30, 2025) (“ICE's own
8 regulations thus place the burden on ICE to show changed circumstances that make
9 removal significantly likely in the reasonably foreseeable future.”). The procedures
10 mandated by the regulations provide:
11 (3) Revocation procedures. Upon revocation, [1] the alien will be notified of
the reasons for revocation of his or her release. [2] The Service will conduct
12
an initial informal interview promptly after his or her return to Service
13 custody to afford the alien an opportunity to respond to the reasons for
revocation stated in the notification. [3] The alien may submit any evidence
14
or information that he or she believes shows there is no significant
15 likelihood he or she be removed in the reasonably foreseeable future, or that
he or she has not violated the order of supervision. [4] The revocation
16
custody review will include an evaluation of any contested facts relevant to
17 the revocation and a determination whether the facts as determined warrant
revocation and further denial of release.
18

19
8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i)(3).
20
According to § 241.13(i)(2), ICE must first determine that “on account of changed
21
circumstances,” the noncitizen is likely to be removed in the foreseeable future. See 8
22
C.F.R. § 241.13(i)(2). Here, the Notice of Revocation of Release served on Petitioner
23
states his release was revoked pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 241.13 because “ICE has
24
determined that you can be removed from the United States pursuant to the outstanding
25
order of removal against you. On July 22, 2003, you were ordered removed to IRAN by
26

27
7 8 C.F.R. § 241.13 codified how Zadvydas should apply. See Continued Detention of Aliens Subject to
28
1 an Immigration Judge and you are subject to an administrative final order of removal.
2 You were released on an order of supervision on or about August 25, 2008. ICE has
3 determined the purpose of your release has been served and it is appropriate to enforce
4 the removal order.” (Dkt. No. 1-3, Pet., Ex. B at 2.) This Notice does not assert or
5 explain that Petitioner is likely to be removed in the foreseeable future in violation of §
6 241.13(i)(2).8
7 Further, § 241.13(i)(2) requires that the re-detention determination that there is a
8 significant likelihood that Petitioner may be removed in the reasonably foreseeable future
9 must be made before his release is revoked. See Tran v. Noem, No. 3:25-cv-02391-BTM-
10 BLM, 2025 WL 3005347, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 27, 2025) (explaining that ICE's
11 determination regarding the foreseeability of removability must be “made before the
12 removable alien has had his release revoked”). Here, the re-detention was not “on
13 account of” changed circumstances, given that Respondents concede that no travel
14 document for Petitioner has been obtained at the time of detention and ERO sent final
15 travel documents to the Iran Interests Section on December 22, 2025, five weeks after
16 being detained on November 16, 2025. See Duong v. Charles, No. 1:25-cv-01375-SKO,
17 2025 WL 3187313, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 14, 2025) (finding no evidence of changed
18 circumstances where the government “did not even submit a request to Vietnam for travel
19

20
21 8 To the extent that Respondents may argue, in the event Petitioner is released under this order and re-
detained, that there is a significant likelihood that Petitioner may be removed in the reasonably
22 foreseeable future because they have submitted final travel documents to the Iran Interests Section at the
Pakistan Embassy on December 22, 2025 and that they have been successfully able to remove Iranian
23 citizens for several years, Respondents have not provided data as to how long the deportation process
takes, how many pending Iranian citizens are currently waiting to be removed, and what type of
24
deportations are given priority. In reply, Petitioner relies on a number of news articles concerning the
25 number and method of repatriation of Iranian nationals to Iran, the fragility of the relationship between
the U.S. and Iran, and a statement by Mr. Abolfazl Mehrabadi, Director of Iran’s Interest Section in
26 Washington D.C., arguing that his case is not a priority for imminent removal and there is not a
significant likelihood that he will be removed in the reasonably foreseeable future. (Dkt. No. 9 at 4-7.)
27 Therefore, in the event of re-detention upon release, Respondents must establish “there is a significant
likelihood that the alien may be removed in the reasonably foreseeable future” as such a showing has not
28
1 documents” until a month after re-detaining petitioner); Sphabmixay v. Noem, No. 25-cv-
2 2648-LL-VET, 2025 WL 3034071, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 30, 2025) (finding no evidence
3 of changed circumstances where the government “did not even submit a request to Laos
4 for travel documents” until a week after re-detaining petitioner).
5 Next, in violation of § 241.13(i)(3), the Notice did not inform Petitioner of the
6 reasons for the revocation of his release. Merely stating that the “purpose of your release
7 has been served” does not inform Petitioner of the “changed circumstances” that created
8 a “significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future.” See 8 C.F.R. §
9 241.13(i)(2), (3); Phakeokoth v. Noem, Case No.: 3:25-cv-02817-RBM-SBC, 2025 WL
10 3124341, at *4 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 7, 2025) (quoting Sarail A. v. Bondi, 25-cv-2144
11 (ECT/JFD), 2025 WL 2533673, at *10 (D. Minn. 2025) (“[s]imply [stating] that
12 circumstances had changed or there was a significant likelihood of removal in the
13 foreseeable future is not enough.”)) Petitioner must be told “what circumstances had
14 changed or why there was now a significant likelihood of removal in order to
15 meaningfully respond to the reasons and submit evidence in opposition.” Phakeokoth,
16 2025 WL 3124341, at *4 (quoting Sarail A., 2025 WL 2533673, at *10).
17 In addition, ICE's conclusory explanation for revoking Petitioner’s release “did not
18 offer him adequate notice of the basis for the revocation decision such that he could
19 meaningfully respond at [any] post-detention informal interview,” as required under §
20 241.13. See Diaz v. Wofford, Case No. 1:25-CV-01079 JLT-EPG, 2025 WL 2581575, at
21 *8 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 5, 2025) (citation and quotation marks omitted); see also McSweeney
22 v. Warden of Otay Mesa Det. Facility, Case No.: 3:25-cv-02488-RBM-DEB, 2025 WL
23 2998376, at *6 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 24, 2025) (granting habeas petition because “Petitioner
24 could not have meaningfully responded to the proffered reasons for revocation when he
25 had not yet even been informed of those reasons”). Therefore, while the parties dispute
26 whether an informal interview took place, if one had occurred, Petitioner would not have
27 been able to respond meaningfully to the reasons for his revocation of his release without
28 being provided reasons for the revocation. Further, because Petitioner was not provided
1 with the reasons for his release, he did not an opportunity to submit evidence and
2 subsequently was not afforded an evaluation and determination of contested facts. See 8
3 C.F.R. § 241.13(i)(3).9
4 Petitioner has therefore shown that ICE violated its own rule under § 241.13(i)(2)
5 and (3) given the lack of any evidence of a changed circumstance prior to Petitioner's re-
6 detainment.10 As such, the Court GRANTS the petition for writ of habeas corpus and that
7 Petitioner be released subject to the conditions in his previous order of supervision. See
8 Constantinovici v. Bondi, -- F. Supp. 3d --, 2025 WL 2898985, at *6 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 10,
9 2025) (citing Rokhfirooz v. Larose, Case No.: 25-cv-2053-RSH-VET, 2025 WL 2646165,
10 at *4 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 15, 2025) (granting a habeas petition and ordering the petitioner's
11 release where the Government failed to comply with § 241.13); Hoac v. Becerra, No.
12 2:25-cv-01740-DC-JDP, 2025 WL 1993771, at *4 (E.D. Cal. July 16, 2025) (finding
13 petitioner was likely to succeed on his unlawful re-detention claim because “there is no
14 indication that an informal interview was provided”); Ceesay, 781 F. Supp. 3d at 164
15

16
17 9 The government also argues that Petitioner’s refusal to cooperate with ICE’s efforts to obtain travel
documents authorizes his continued detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(C). (Dkt. No. 8 at 10-12.)
18 Petitioner replies that he has not refused cooperation but has informed ICE officers that he has an
attorney and for ICE officers to communicate to his counsel. (Dkt. No. 9 at 7.) In fact, on November
19 24, 2025, Petitioner’s counsel informed DO Perez that she represented Petitioner and to forward any
communication to her as Petitioner’s counsel. (Dkt. No. 9-2, Darbinian Decl. ¶¶ 2-3.) However, no
20
documents, including the Form I-217 that ICE provided to Petitioner to fill out on December 8, 2025
21 was provided to his counsel. (Id. ¶ 4.) Nonetheless, Petitioner argues that the alleged refusal to
cooperate is now moot because Respondents were able to complete and submit final travel documents
22 using its own resources. (Dkt. No. 9 at 7.)
8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(C) provides, that “[t]he removal period shall be extended beyond a period of 90
23 days and the alien may remain in detention during such extended period if the alien fails or refuses to
make timely application in good faith for travel or other documents necessary to the alien's departure or
24
conspires or acts to prevent the alien's removal subject to an order of removal.” Here, because
25 Respondents were able to submit final travel documents on December 22, 2025, their argument is moot.
10 In the Traverse, for the first time, Petitioner argues that the Notice of Revocation of Release is not
26 valid because it was signed by Deportation Officer R. Romero and Supervisory Detention Deportation
Officer T. Gaeta in violation of 8 C.F.R. § 241.4(l)(2) which requires that a decision to revoke a
27 noncitizen’s release must be made either by an “Executive Associate Commissioner” or by a “district
director. (Dkt. No. 9 at 9; Dkt. No. 1-3, Pet., Ex. B.) However, because the government has not had an
28
1 || (“[B]ecause ICE did not follow its own regulations in deciding to redetain [the
2 || petitioner], his due process rights were violated, and he is entitled to release.’’))."!
3 Conclusion
4 Based on the above, the Court GRANTS the petition for writ of habeas corpus.
5 || The Government shall immediately release Petitioner from custody on the November 16,
6 revocation of release and arrest. Petitioner shall comply with all conditions that
7 || were in effect before his November 16, 2025 re-detainment. The parties must also file a
8 || joint status report to confirm that Petitioner has been released on or before January 12,
9 2026. The Clerk of Court shall close the case.
10 IT IS SO ORDERED.
11 ||Dated: January 8, 2026
12 Hon. athe Cae
13 United States District Judge
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27 || ———___—_—_—-
28 In light of the Court’s ruling, the Court need not address the fourth and sixth claims.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11242364. Public record. Not legal advice.