# Ballard

> District Court, N.D. Oklahoma · January 16, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11242291

## Case

- **Full name:** United States of America v. Matthew J. Ballard; Cherokee Nation, Chickasaw Nation, and Choctaw Nation of Oklahoma, Intervenor Plaintiffs; Muscogee (Creek) Nation, Consolidated Plaintiff
- **Court:** District Court, N.D. Oklahoma
- **Decided:** January 16, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11242291

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- noting the possibility of an exception to the AIA to allow suits by Indian tribes to enjoin ongoing state court proceedings, but finding it unnecessary to reach issue due to inadequate briefing by defendants to even consider invoking the AIA

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, )
)
Plaintiff, ) Case No. 24-CV-0626-CVE-SH
) (BASE FILE)
and )
) Consolidated with:
CHEROKEE NATION, ) Case No. 25-CV-0050-CVE-SH
CHICKASAW NATION, and )
CHOCTAW NATION OF OKLAHOMA, )
)
Intervenor Plaintiffs, )
)
and )
)
MUSCOGEE (CREEK) NATION, )
)
Consolidated Plaintiff, )
v. )
)
MATTHEW J. BALLARD, )
)
Defendant. )
OPINION AND ORDER
Now before the Court are the following motions: Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s
Complaint and Brief in Support (Dkt. # 52); Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint
and Brief in Support (Dkt. # 68); and Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Intervenor Complaint and Brief
in Support (Dkt. # 89). Defendant Matthew J. Ballard is a district attorney in the state of Oklahoma
who has charged Indians for crimes committed on the Cherokee Reservation by members of the
Navajo, Chickasaw, and Choctaw Nations.1 The United States of America (United States) filed this
1 Ballard is the district attorney for the twelfth prosecutorial district in Oklahoma. The twelfth
prosecutorial district encompasses parts of Craig, Mayes, and Rogers Counties and is located
within the boundaries of the Cherokee and Muscogee (Creek) Reservations (the latter is
hereafter referred to as the Creek Reservation).
case to enjoin the ongoing prosecutions, and it also asks the Court to declare that any future state
prosecutions of Indians for crimes committed in Indian country are unlawful. The Cherokee,
Chickasaw, and Choctaw Nations obtained leave to intervene in this matter, and they contend that
the United States and the Indian tribes have exclusive jurisdiction over crimes committed by Indians

in Indian country. The Muscogee (Creek) Nation (MCN) filed its own lawsuit seeking declaratory
and injunctive relief to prevent Ballard from prosecuting Indians for conduct occurring within the
boundaries of the Creek Reservation. Ballard argues that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction
over this case, because plaintiffs lack standing to proceed with their claims. Ballard also asks the
Court to abstain from hearing plaintiffs’ claims to avoid unnecessary interference with ongoing state
criminal prosecutions. Plaintiffs respond that they have substantial and distinct sovereign interests
that will be harmed by the ongoing state criminal prosecutions, and they ask the Court to exercise

jurisdiction over this case and consider their requests for preliminary and permanent injunctive relief.
I.
On December 23, 2024, the United States filed this case against Ballard, the district attorney
for the twelfth prosecutorial district in Oklahoma, because Ballard brought criminal charges on
behalf of the state of Oklahoma against Indians who allegedly committed crimes within the
boundaries of the Cherokee Reservation. Dkt. # 2, at 12. The United States’ complaint references
three criminal cases filed by Ballard in Rogers County District Court:
• Oklahoma v. Brayden Bull, CF-2023-226 (Rogers County District Court) - Ballard

brought criminal charges against Brayden Bull, a member of the Navajo Nation, for
conduct occurring within the Cherokee Reservation.

2
• Oklahoma v. Tony Williams, CF-2023-311 (Rogers County District Court) - Ballard
filed criminal charges against Tony Williams, a member of the Chickasaw Nation,
for conduct occurring on the Cherokee Reservation.
• Oklahoma v. Eric Ashley, CF-2024-421 (Rogers County District Court) - Ballard

charged Eric Ashley, a citizen of the Choctaw Nation, with criminal charges for
conduct occurring on the Cherokee Reservation.
Id. at 12-13. The United States argues that states lack criminal jurisdiction over Indians for crimes
committed in Indian country unless Congress has expressly granted states jurisdiction over such
offenses. Id. at 4.
The United States asks the Court to enter a declaratory judgment that the state of Oklahoma
lacks criminal jurisdiction over all Indians2 who allegedly commit crimes in Indian country, and the

United States also seeks a preliminary and permanent injunction prohibiting Ballard from asserting
criminal jurisdiction over Indians for conduct occurring in Indian country without authorization from
Congress. Dkt. # 2, at 15. The Cherokee, Choctaw, and Chickasaw Nations sought and obtained
leave to intervene in the case filed by the United States, and they have also joined in the motion for
preliminary injunction filed by the United States. Dkt. ## 78, 79.
On January 29, 2025, the MCN filed a separate case in the Northern District of Oklahoma
asserting that Ballard was interfering with the MCN’s tribal sovereignty by seeking to enforce state

2 Ballard contends that this case involves a narrower jurisdictional issue than the request for
relief sought by the plaintiffs. The state prosecutions identified in the complaint were
brought against Indians who were not members of the Indian tribe on whose reservation the
alleged criminal conduct occurred. According to Ballard, the jurisdictional issue should be
limited to the consideration of whether the state of Oklahoma has concurrent jurisdiction
over offenses committed by non-member Indians of the Indian tribe with jurisdiction to
prosecute the crime.
3
criminal laws against Indians within the boundaries of the MCN’s reservation. Muscogee (Creek)
Nation v. Matthew J. Ballard, Case No. 25-CV-050-CVE-SH (N.D. Okla.). The MCN seeks
declaratory and injunctive relief preventing the state of Oklahoma from exercising criminal
jurisdiction over all Indians within the boundaries of the Creek Reservation. The MCN filed a

motion for preliminary injunction and a motion to consolidate both pending cases in the Northern
District of Oklahoma. The Court granted the motion to consolidate cases, and both cases have been
consolidated in the earlier filed case.3
II.
Ballard has moved to dismiss the case on the grounds of lack of standing, Younger
abstention,4 the Anti-Injunction Act, and Colorado River abstention,5 and each of these issues
concerns the subject matter jurisdiction of the Court to hear these consolidated cases. Motions to

dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) “generally take one of two forms. The moving party may (1) facially
attack the complaint’s allegations as to the existence of subject matter jurisdiction, or (2) go beyond
allegations contained in the complaint by presenting evidence to challenge the factual basis upon
which subject matter jurisdiction rests.” Merrill Lynch Bus. Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Nudell, 363 F.3d
1072, 1074 (10th Cir. 2004) (internal citation and quotations omitted). Where a motion to dismiss
is based on a facial attack, as here, courts “apply the same standards under Rule 12(b)(1) that are

3 This Opinion and Order will deal only with the pending motions to dismiss, and the Court
will not rule on the motions for preliminary injunction at this time.
4 Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
5 Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976).
4
applicable to a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action.” Muscogee
(Creek) Nation v. Okla. Tax Comm’n, 611 F.3d 1222, 1227 n.1 (10th Cir. 2010).
In considering a motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), a court must determine
whether the claimant has stated a claim upon which relief may be granted. A motion to dismiss is
properly granted when a complaint provides no “more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic
recitation of the elements of a cause of action.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555
(2007). A complaint must contain enough “facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face”
and the factual allegations “must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.”
Id. (citations omitted). “Once a claim has been stated adequately, it may be supported by showing
any set of facts consistent with the allegations in the complaint.” Id, at 562. Although decided
within an antitrust context, Twombly “expounded the pleading standard for all civil actions.”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 683 (2009). For the purpose of making the dismissal determination,
court must accept all the well-pleaded allegations of the complaint as true, even if doubtful in fact,
and must construe the allegations in the light most favorable to the claimant. Twombly, 550 U.S.
at 555; Alvarado v. KOB-TV, L.L.C., 493 F.3d 1210, 1215 (10" Cir. 2007); Moffett v. Halliburton
Energy Servs., Inc., 291 F.3d 1227, 1231 (10" Cir. 2002). However, a court need not accept as true
those allegations that are conclusory in nature. Erikson v. Pawnee Cnty, Bd. Of Cnty. Comm’rs, 263
1151, 1154-55 (10" Cir. 2001). “[C]Jonclusory allegations without supporting factual averments
are insufficient to state a claim upon which relief can be based.” Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106,
1109-10 (10" Cir. 1991).

III.
Ballard argues that none of the plaintiffs has suffered an injury from the prosecution of non-
member Indians in state court, and plaintiffs lack standing to proceed with their claims. Ballard
contends that granting plaintiffs’ request for declaratory or injunctive relief would improperly

interfere with ongoing state court proceedings, and the state courts provide an adequate forum to
resolve the issues of federal law asserted by plaintiffs in this case. Plaintiffs respond that Ballard’s
attempt to enforce state law against Indian defendants in Indian country significantly harms their
sovereign interests, and they argue that the Court can redress the injury caused by Ballard’s actions.
Plaintiffs argue that they are not parties in the state court proceedings, and they will have no ability
to protect their own sovereign interests unless they are permitted to proceed with this case.
A.

Ballard argues that plaintiffs have not suffered an injury from his prosecution of individual
Indians in state criminal cases, and only the individual defendants have standing to challenge the
state court’s jurisdiction over them. Dkt. # 52, at 12. Ballard also argues that the relief sought by
plaintiffs would not actually prevent the prosecution of Indians in state court, as the state has
concurrent jurisdiction with the tribes and the United States for the prosecution of crimes allegedly
committed by certain Indian defendants and the state could simply appoint another prosecutor if this
Court were to enjoin Ballard from proceeding with the prosecutions. Id. at 13-14. The United States
responds that it has suffered an injury as a prosecuting sovereign and as a trustee for the affected

Indian tribes, and Ballard’s efforts to prosecute Indians in Indian country constitutes a serious injury
to the United States’ interests. Dkt. # 70, at 12-14. The Indian tribes contend that they have alleged
that tribal and federal jurisdiction over crimes committed by Indians in Indian country is wholly
6
exclusive of state jurisdiction, and Ballard’s unlawful attempts to assert state criminal jurisdiction
in Indian country constitutes an injury for the purpose of establishing Article III standing. Dkt. # 69,
at 19-20; Dkt. # 77, at 10-13.
Article III of the United States Constitution limits federal courts to the adjudication of cases

or controversies. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. “The standing inquiry ensures that a plaintiff has
a sufficient personal stake in a dispute to ensure the existence of a live case or controversy which
renders judicial resolution appropriate.” Tandy v. City of Wichita, 380 F.3d 1277, 1283 (10th Cir.
2004). “Article III standing requires a litigant to show: (1) an injury in fact that is (a) concrete and
particularized and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical; (2) the injury is fairly
traceable to the challenged conduct; and (3) the injury can likely be redressed by a favorable
decision.” Kane Cnty. v. United States (Kane III), 928 F.3d 877, 888 (10th Cir. 2019). The standing

requirement ensures that “the legal questions presented to the court will be resolved, not in the
rarified atmosphere of a debating society, but in a concrete factual context conducive to a realistic
appreciation of the consequences of judicial action.” Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United
for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982). The primary focus for any analysis
of standing under Article III “is whether plaintiff has suffered a present or imminent injury, as
opposed to a mere possibility, or even probability, of future injury.” Morgan v. McCotter, 365 F.3d
882, 888 (10th Cir. 2004). Further, while “[t]he plaintiff must show that a favorable judgment will
relieve a discrete injury, [] it need not relieve his or her every injury.” Nova Health Sys. v. Gandy,

416 F.3d 1149, 1158 (10th Cir. 2005). The party invoking the jurisdiction of a federal court has the
burden to establish Article III standing. New England Health Care Emps. Pension Fund v.
Woodruff, 512 F.3d 1283, 1288 (10th Cir. 2008).
7
Ballard contends that the United States and the Indian tribes have not suffered an injury from
his prosecution of Indian defendants in state court, because only the individual defendants who have
been prosecuted by the state have suffered an injury. Dkt. # 52, at 12. Ballard suggests that the
remedy for plaintiffs to raise their jurisdictional dispute is an amicus curiae brief in the state court

proceedings, rather than a lawsuit asking a federal court to determine whether the courts of
Oklahoma lack jurisdiction over the individual defendants. Id. at 13. Ballard contends that separate
sovereigns have always maintained the right to bring separate prosecutions against individuals within
their jurisdiction, and the state’s prosecution of these individuals does not prevent the United States
or any Indian tribe from asserting their own criminal jurisdiction over a particular defendant. Id.
Ballard also argues that enjoining a single prosecutor from bringing criminal charges against Indians
will cause “jurisdictional chaos,” because other district attorneys in the state of Oklahoma will not

be prohibited from bringing criminal charges against Indians even if plaintiffs prevail in this case.
Id.
The Supreme Court has noted that “[c]riminal jurisdiction over offenses committed in
“Indian country . . . is governed by a complex patchwork of federal, state, and tribal law.” Negonsott
v. Samuels, 507 U.S. 99, 102 (1993). States have criminal jurisdiction over all of the territory within
their state, including Indian reservations, except to the extent that such jurisdiction is preempted by
federal law. Oklahoma v. Castro-Huerta, 597 U.S. 629, 637 (2022) (explaining that states have
concurrent jurisdiction to prosecute crimes committed by non-Indians against Indians in Indian

country). However, the Supreme Court requires a “clear expression of the intention of Congress”
before the state or federal government may prosecute crimes committed by Indians on tribal lands,

8
as the power to punish tribal members and enforce tribal laws is part of a tribe’s retained sovereignty.
United States v. Hopson, 150 F.4th 1290, 1299 (10th Cir. 2025).
Ballard’s arguments that the United States and the Indian tribes have not suffered an injury
are meritless, as the Tenth Circuit has repeatedly rejected similar arguments. The invasion of tribal

sovereignty by the illegal assertion of state jurisdiction over an Indian defendant constitutes an injury
that can be redressed by a federal court. Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah and Ouray Reservation v.
Utah, 790 F.3d 1000, 1005 (10th Cir. 2015) (Indian tribe had suffered a serious injury by the state
of Utah’s decision to disregard a binding Tenth Circuit decision concerning the boundaries of an
Indian reservation and the prosecution of a tribal member for traffic offenses committed on
reservation land); Wyandotte Nation v. Sebelius, 443 3d 1247, 1255 (10th Cir. 2006) (Tenth Circuit
explained that it had “repeatedly” found that a state’s unlawful intrusion on tribal sovereignty

constitutes an irreparable injury warranting issuance of a preliminary injunction). The state of
Oklahoma’s attempt to usurp exclusive tribal jurisdiction over Indians who allegedly commit crimes
within the boundaries of an Indian reservation would constitute a substantial injury warranting
judicial intervention.6 The Tenth Circuit has noted that circumstances occur in which the interests
of state and tribal sovereignty overlap, but this does not diminish the harm caused by a state’s
infringement on tribal sovereignty by the potentially unlawful assertion of state interests. Prairie

6 Ballard attempts to distinguish Ute Indian Tribe by arguing that the case involved the state
prosecution of a member Indian, while this case concerns only the prosecution of non-
member Indians by a state prosecutor. Dkt. # 68, at 14. Plaintiffs’ complaints clearly state
that they are seeking a ruling that the state of Oklahoma has no prosecutorial authority over
any Indian in Indian country, and the Court will rely on plaintiffs’ formulation of their claims
when ruling on the motions to dismiss. The Court may later consider narrower aspects of
state, federal, and tribal jurisdiction, but plaintiffs are clearly asserting they have exclusive
jurisdiction to prosecute all Indians for criminal offenses occurring in Indian country.
9
Band of Potawatomi Indians v. Pierce, 253 F.3d 1234, 1252 (10th Cir. 2001) (“Federal law is replete
with examples in which state law has had to accommodate tribal sovereignty, whether because of
federal preemption or because of the guardian-ward relationship between the federal government and
Indian tribes”).

The arguments asserted in Ballard’s motions to dismiss clearly seek to minimize plaintiffs’
alleged injury, but plaintiffs have shown that they have a significant interest in preventing allegedly
unlawful state intrusion on their sovereignty. Ballard’s argument that plaintiffs could file an amicus
brief in state court criminal proceedings to protect their sovereign interests is wholly unsupported
by law and ignores the significance of the tribes’ interest in protecting their own sovereignty. Courts
are not obligated to give substantial or even any consideration to arguments raised in an amicus brief,
and the filing of an amicus brief is not an adequate substitute for the filing a lawsuit. Ballard’s other

arguments fare no better. Ballard complains that enjoining one state prosecutor would lead to
“jurisdictional chaos” and would create a “hodgepodge, patchwork system” where different
Oklahoma prosecutors would be following different rules based on the decisions of a particular
federal court. Dkt. # 52, at 13. This argument would effectively deprive Indian tribes access to
federal court to protect their sovereign interests unless a critical mass of state prosecutors chose to
test the limits of the Supreme Court’s rulings in McGirt7 and Castro-Huerta.8 The tribal interest in
protecting their own sovereignty is not diminished or enhanced depending on the number of
violations that have occurred, and one prosecutor’s alleged infringement on tribal criminal

jurisdiction in even one case is a sufficient infringement on tribal sovereignty to satisfy the injury
7 McGirt v. Oklahoma, 591 U.S. 984 (2020).
8 Oklahoma v. Castro-Huerta, 597 U.S. 629 (2022).
10
in fact requirement. Ballard’s argument concerning the separate sovereigns doctrine also seeks to
minimize the sovereign interests asserted by plaintiffs in this case. The United States and the tribal
plaintiffs are alleging that they have exclusive jurisdiction over Indian defendants who commit
crimes in Indian country. Defendant’s argument wholly disregards the effect of McGirt and, if

plaintiffs are correct, there is no concurrent jurisdiction giving rise to application of the separate
sovereign doctrine.9
Ballard’s arguments concerning redressability are based on a wholesale disregard of federal
Indian law and the McGirt decision, and Ballard seems to be taking the position that the state of
Oklahoma will be able to prosecute Indians in state court even if the Court enjoins the prosecutions
listed in plaintiffs’ complaints. Plaintiffs seek a ruling that state courts lack jurisdiction over all
Indian defendants for crimes committed in Indian country. If this argument is correct, no attorney

representing the state of Oklahoma, whether a district attorney or the state attorney general, could
bring the criminal cases listed in plaintiffs’ complaints, because such crimes would be within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the United States and certain Indian tribes. A ruling by this court that state
courts lack jurisdiction over these offenses would prevent future prosecutions in violation of federal
law, and this would clearly redress the injury caused by the state’s allegedly unlawful exercise of

9 Ballard argues that the MCN lacks standing to sue, because none of the prosecutions listed
in any of the complaints involves an MCN member and the alleged crimes did not take place
on the MCN reservation. Dkt. # 68, at 6. However, Ballard has engaged in an ongoing
pattern of conduct of charging Indians with state crimes, even though the crimes were
committed by an Indian in Indian country, and his briefing in this case shows that he intends
to continue such prosecutions in the future. The risk that Ballard will bring a criminal case
involving an MCN member or that occurred within the boundaries of the MCN Reservation
is sufficiently concrete, substantial, and non-speculative to support a finding that the MCN
has suffered an injury in fact, and it is not necessary for the MCN to wait for Ballard to
engage in actions potentially infringing on the MCN’s sovereignty before bring suit.
11
criminal jurisdiction over Indian defendants. As the Supreme Court has noted, causation and
redressability are often “flip sides of the same coin,” and resolving the issue of redressability will
typically lead to the same result on the issue of causation. Food and Drug Administration v. Alliance
for Hippocratic Medicine, 602 U.S. 367, 380-81 (2024). The Court’s finding that plaintiffs have

satisfied the redressability requirement for standing is effectively a finding that Ballard’s allegedly
unlawful attempts to exercise criminal jurisdiction over Indian defendants caused an injury to the
United States and the Indian tribes. All three elements for standing have been satisfied by the United
States and the Indian tribes, and Ballard’s motions to dismiss are denied to the extent that they allege
that plaintiffs lack standing under Article III.
B.
Ballard argues that the state court criminal prosecutions are the appropriate forum for

resolution of the jurisdictional issues raised by plaintiffs concerning the limits of state criminal
jurisdiction, and he asks the Court to dismiss the case pursuant to Younger abstention to avoid
unwarranted interference with the ongoing state court proceedings. Dkt. # 52, at 16-24. Plaintiffs
respond that they are not parties to the state court prosecutions of individual Indians, that there are
no important state interests warranting abstention, and that there is no reason for this Court to decline
to exercise jurisdiction over this case. Dkt. # 70, at 24-28.
“Under the Younger abstention doctrine, federal courts should not ‘interfere with state court
proceedings by granting equitable relief–such as injunctions of important state proceedings or

declaratory judgments regarding constitutional issues in those proceedings-’ when a state forum
provides an adequate avenue for relief.” Weitzel v. Division of Occupational and Professional
Licensing of Dep’t of Commerce of the State of Utah, 240 F.3d 871, 875 (10th Cir. 2001). The
12
Supreme Court had made clear that the circumstances giving rise to Younger abstention must be
“exceptional,” and Younger abstention is triggered only by state proceedings falling into one of the
following categories: “(1) state criminal prosecutions, (2) civil enforcement proceedings [that take
on a quasi-criminal shape], and (3) civil proceedings involving certain orders that are uniquely in
furtherance of the state court’s ability to perform their judicial function.” Travelers Casualty Ins. Co.
of America v. A-Quality Auto Sales, Inc., 98 F.4th 1307, 1317 (10th Cir. 2024) (quoting Graff v.
Aberdeen Enterprizes, II, Inc., 65 F.4th 500, 522 (10th Cir. 2023)). If the state proceedings fall
within one of the enumerated categories, the district court must consider three factors to determine
whether Younger abstention is appropriate:
(1) there is an ongoing state criminal, civil, or administrative proceeding, (2) the state
court provides an adequate forum to hear the claims raised in the federal complaint,
and (3) the state proceedings involve important state interests, matters which
traditionally look to state law for their resolution or implicate separately articulated
state policies.
Chapman v, Oklahoma, 472 F.3d 747, 749 (10th Cir. 2006). These three factors are known as the
Middlesex"? factors, and the Supreme Court has clarified that these factors are not dispositive for the
application of Younger abstention. Sprint Communications, Inc. v. Jacobs, 571 U.S. 69, 80-82
(2013) (clarifying that the Middlesex factors are treated as additional factors once the party invoking
Younger abstention has shown that the proceeding to be enjoined falls within the category of
criminal or quasi-criminal proceedings appropriate for the consideration of Younger abstention).
The parties do not dispute that the state court proceedings are criminal prosecutions that
could qualify as an exceptional circumstance warranting Younger abstention. However, plaintiffs
argue that the United States and the Indian tribes are not parties in the state court proceedings, and

10 Middlesex County Ethics Committee v. Garden State Bar Association, 457 U.S. 423 (1982).
13

they will have no opportunity to litigate their federal constitutional claims in state court. Ballard
contends that Oklahoma courts provide an adequate forum to resolve issues of federal law, as shown
by a recent decision of the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals in which it considered whether state
courts have jurisdiction over non-member Indians who commit crimes in Indian country.11 Dkt. #
89, at 19 (citing City of Tulsa v. O’Brien, ___ P.3d ___, 2024 WL 5001684 (Okla. Crim. App. Dec.

5, 2024)). Ballard argues that the United States and the Indian tribes have conceded that the state
courts of Oklahoma are an appropriate forum, because they have filed amicus briefs in state court
with the “expectation” that issues raised in the case will be considered in the state court proceedings.
Dkt. # 52, at 20; Dkt. # 89, at 20. Finally, Ballard claims that state courts have proven to be an
adequate forum for consideration of disputes concerning state and tribal jurisdiction, because both
McGirt and Castro-Huerta originated in state court and arose out of decisions by the Oklahoma Court
of Criminal Appeals.
None of the arguments asserted by Ballard shows that the state courts provide an adequate

forum for the issues raised in plaintiffs’ complaints. Neither the United States nor the tribal
plaintiffs are parties in the state court criminal prosecutions, and state courts do not provide any
forum for them to challenge the state’s allegedly unlawful exercise of criminal jurisdiction. Ballard

11 Ballard goes so far as to call this case a collateral attack on a state court ruling, and Ballard
implies that a ruling by the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals on a matter of federal law
is binding on the parties in these proceedings. Dkt. # 52, at 5; Dkt. # 89, at 7. Ballard is free
to rely on the reasoning employed by state courts when reviewing issues of federal law, but
state court decisions on matters of federal law are not binding on this Court. Dutcher v.
Matheson, 840 F.3d 1183, 1195 (10th Cir. 2016); TMJ Implants, Inc. v. Aetna, Inc., 498 F.3d
1175, 1181 (10th Cir. 2007). The Court does not find that plaintiffs’ decision to litigate
matters of federal statutory and constitutional law in federal court constitutes an
impermissible collateral attack on a state court decision, and state court decisions on issues
of federal law relevant to this case will be treated as persuasive authority only.
14
argues that plaintiffs have filed amicus briefs in various state court proceedings, but Ballard has cited
no authority even suggesting that filing an amicus brief gives them any stake in the litigation or even
that the state courts have any obligation to consider arguments raised in an amicus brief. Ballard
appears to be arguing that the interests of the individual defendants being prosecuted are sufficiently
aligned with plaintiffs’ interests in this case that the parties are in privity for the purpose of Younger

abstention. However, “Younger abstention is inappropriate when a federal plaintiff cannot pursue
its federal contentions in the ongoing state proceedings.” D.L. v. Unified Sch. Dist. No. 497, 392
F.3d 1223, 1229 (10th Cir. 2004). The interests of criminal defendants seeking to avoid punishment
from a criminal charge and the interests of sovereign entities seeking to prevent unwarranted
intrusion on their authority over their citizens have no obvious similarity. The United States notes
that it has separate sovereign interests as a trustee for Indian tribes and as a prosecuting authority in
its own right, and Ballard has made no attempt to show that an individual criminal defendant is likely
to assert claims protecting either of these interests. There is also a further layer of separation from

the individual criminal defendants and the Indian tribes, as none of the criminal defendants is a
member of the tribe seeking to assert criminal jurisdiction over them.
Ballard also argues that state courts have a proven history of considering the types of federal
claims that the plaintiffs seek to litigate in this case, and they cite McGirt and Castro-Huerta in
support of this proposition. In Murphy v. Royal, 875 F.3d 896 (10th Cir. 2017),12 the Tenth Circuit
found that the significant procedural hurdles to even considering whether federal habeas relief was
warranted were satisfied due to Oklahoma’s practice of ignoring binding Supreme Court precedent

12 Murphy was the Tenth Circuit decision in which the issue of the continued existence of the
Creek Reservation was litigated, although the Supreme Court later issued its substantive
decision on this issue in McGirt.
15
concerning the alleged disestablishment of the Muscogee Creek Nation’s reservation. Id. at 928
(“Mr. Murphy put the issue of whether the Creek Reservation had been disestablished squarely
before the OCCA, but the court decided the claim by ignoring and contradicting [Solem v. Bartlett,
465 U.S. 463 (1984)”]). As in this case, Oklahoma argued that it has a long standing history of
prosecuting criminal cases in Indian country, and its exercise of concurrent state jurisdiction will not

harm the United States or the Indian tribes. Dkt. # 52, at 13; McGirt, 581 U.S. at 918. The Supreme
Court noted “[b]y Oklahoma’s own admission, then, for decades its historical practice in the area in
question didn’t even try to conform to the [Major Crimes Act], all of which makes the State’s past
prosecutions a meaningless guide for determining what counted as Indian country.” Id. at 918-19.
The Supreme Court explained that Oklahoma was not the only state to overstep its authority to
prosecute crimes in Indian country, and Oklahoma’s long-standing practice of ignoring jurisdictional
limitations created by the MCA “only underscores the danger of relying on state practices to
determine the meaning of the federal MCA.” Id. at 919. The proceedings leading up to the McGirt

decision wholly fail to support Ballard’s argument that courts of Oklahoma are vigorously
adjudicating federal claims concerning limitations of state authority in Indian country.
The parties also dispute whether the state court proceedings involve an important state
interest. Ballard argues that states have a strong interest in administering their systems of criminal
justice, and federal courts have refrained from interfering with ongoing criminal prosecutions to
avoid infringing on this significant state interest. Dkt. # 52, at 21-22. The United States argues that
the state of Oklahoma has no little or no interest in the issue raised by this case, because the exercise

of tribal jurisdiction and the application of federal statutes governing this matter purely arises under
federal law. Dkt. # 70, at 25-26. The parties’ arguments on this issue simply illustrate that all of the
16
sovereign entities involved in this case have important and equally significant interests in
determining the scope of state, federal, and tribal jurisdiction within Indian country. Although the
state has an important interest in prosecuting crimes within its jurisdiction, this does not minimize
the significant federal and tribal interests in correctly determining relevant jurisdictional limitations
applicable to each sovereign, and the state interest in this case does not independently show that

Younger abstention is appropriate.
Ballard has shown that there are ongoing state court criminal prosecutions that could support
the application of Younger abstention. However, he has failed to show that the state criminal
prosecutions provide an adequate forum for the plaintiffs in this case to litigate their federal claims.
Ballard’s interest in bringing criminal prosecutions on behalf of the state of Oklahoma is not in itself
a sufficient basis to invoke Younger abstention, and the Court does not find that abstention is
required to avoid interfering with an ongoing state court case.
C.

Ballard argues that the Anti-Injunction Act (AIA), 28 U.S.C. § 2283, prevents the Court from
entering an injunction to stay the pending state criminal prosecutions. Dkt. # 52, at 16; Dkt. # 68,
at 16; Dkt. # 89, at 13-14. The AIA provides that “[a] court of the United States may not grant an
injunction to stay proceedings in a State court except as expressly authorized by Act of Congress,
or where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its judgments.” 28 U.S.C. §
2283. The purpose of the statute is to promote comity between state and federal courts and prevent
unnecessary interference with the operation of state courts. Smith v. Bayer Corp., 564 U.S. 299, 306

(2011). “By generally barring such intervention, the [AIA] forestalls ‘the inevitable friction between
the state and federal courts that ensues from the injunction of state judicial proceedings by a federal
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court.’” Chick Kam Choo v. Exxon Corp., 486 U.S. 140, 146 (1988) (quoting Vendo Co. v. Lektro-
Vend Corp., 433 U.S. 623, 630-31 (1977)). The AIA is not jurisdictional statute limiting the power
of a federal court to hear a case, but “[i]t merely limits [the district court’s] general equity powers
in respect to the granting of a particular form of equitable relief.” Sac and Fox Nation v. Hanson,
47 F.3d 1061, 1063 (10th Cir. 1995). The Supreme Court has noted the policy of preventing

conflicts between state and federal courts is “much more compelling when it is the litigation of
private parties which threatens to draw the two judicial systems into conflict than when it is the
United States which seeks a stay to prevent threatened irreparable injury to a national interest.”
NLRB v. Nash-Finch Co.,, 404 U.S. 138, 145 (1971) (quoting Leiter Minerals, Inc. v. United States,
352 U.S. 220 (1957)); see also Arkansas v. Farm Credit Servs. of Cent. Arkansas, 520 U.S. 821, 829
(1997) (“Just as the Tax Injunction Act is inapplicable where the United States is a party, a parallel
rule prevails under § 2283”).
Plaintiffs argue that the AIA is inapplicable to actions brought by the United States to protect

its own jurisdiction and the jurisdiction of tribal courts. Defendant has done little more than cite the
AIA and quote the text of the statute, and he has made no attempt to offer an analysis that the AIA
actually bars the Court from hearing any aspect of any plaintiffs’ claims. The Supreme Court has
noted that the AIA is a somewhat ambiguous statute with “meager” language for statutory
construction, “but the interpretation excluding the United States from the coverage of the statute
seems to us preferable in the context of healthy federal-state relations.” Leiter Minerals, 352 U.S.
at 226. In this case, it would make little sense to find that the AIA bars the claims of the tribal

plaintiffs, because the United States is bringing the same claims on behalf of the tribes in its capacity
as a trustee. The Tenth Circuit has left open the question of whether there is an exemption to the
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AIA that would generally allow Indian tribes to sue to enjoin state court proceedings without the
presence of the United States in the same lawsuit. See Ute Indian Tribe of Uintah and Ouray
Reservation v. Lawrence, 22 F.4th 892, 910 n.22 (10th Cir. 2022) (noting the possibility of an
exception to the AIA to allow suits by Indian tribes to enjoin ongoing state court proceedings, but
finding it unnecessary to reach issue due to inadequate briefing by defendants to even consider

invoking the AIA). The Court does not need to reach the issue of whether there is a general
exception under the AIA allowing Indian tribes to sue to enjoin, because this case presents a
circumstance in which the interests of the United States and the Indian tribes are aligned and the
United States chose to bring its own lawsuit that is exempt from the AIA. The Court does not find
that the AIA bars the Court from considering the claims of the United States or the Indian tribes to
the extent that these parties seek injunctive relief.
D.
Ballard asks the Court to dismiss the case under the Colorado River doctrine, because there

are parallel suits involving the same issues in state and federal courts and the state proceeding will
completely resolve the parties’ dispute. Dkt. # 52, at 25-27; Dkt. # 68, at 24-26; Dkt. # 89, at 25-27.
Plaintiffs respond that Colorado River abstention is inapplicable in the absence of parallel
proceedings in state and federal courts and, even if there were parallel proceedings, there are no
exceptional circumstances caused by the separate proceedings that would warrant abstention. Dkt.
# 69, at 29-30; Dkt. # 70, at 30-32; Dkt. # 77, at 29-31.
“As a general rule, ‘the pendency of an action in the state court is no bar to proceedings

concerning the same matter in the Federal court having jurisdiction . . . .’” D.A. Osguthorpe Family
P’ship v. ASC Utah, Inc., 705 F.3d 1223, 1233 (10th Cir. 2013) (quoting Colorado River, 424 U.S.
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at 817). However, under Colorado River, a district court may dismiss a federal suit in favor of a
pending state proceeding for “reasons of wise judicial administration” such as “conservation of
Judicial resources and comprehensive disposition of litigation.” Id. at 817-18. Because the federal
courts have a “virtually unflagging obligation. .. to exercise the jurisdiction given them,” dismissing
a case under Colorado River is appropriate only in “exceptional” circumstances. Fox v. Maulding,
16 F.3d 1079, 1081 (10th Cir. 1994) (quoting Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 817-18); see also
Rienhardt v. Kelly, 164 F.3d 1296, 1303 (10th Cir. 1999) (“[B]Jecause the Colorado River Doctrine
is an exception to our jurisdictional mandate from Congress, the Doctrine may only be used when
‘the clearest of justifications .. . warrant[s] dismissal’”’).
Determining whether a federal court may decline to exercise jurisdiction under Colorado
River is a two step process. First, the court must determine whether the state and federal proceedings
are parallel. Fox, 16 F.3d at 1081. Ifthe proceedings are parallel, the court then considers a number
of factors the Supreme Court has set out to determine whether “exceptional circumstances” exist.
Id. “Suits are parallel if substantially the same parties litigate substantially the same issues in
different forums.” Id, (quoting New Beckley Mining Corp. v. Int’] Union, UMWA, 946 F.2d 1072,
1073 (4th Cir. 1991)). In determining whether proceedings are parallel, courts should not “consider
how the state proceedings could have been brought, i.e., what claims and parties could have been
included had the federal plaintiff made a timely application to do so.” Id. Instead, courts should
“examine the state proceedings as they actually exist to determine whether they are parallel to the
federal proceedings.” Id. It is “a serious abuse of discretion” to stay or dismiss a case under
Colorado River if the state court proceedings will not completely and promptly resolve the issue
between the parties. Id.

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Ballard has not shown that the state court prosecutions can be considered parallel cases for
the purpose of Colorado River abstention, and it is unnecessary for the Court to consider any
additional factors to determine whether abstention is warranted. Neither the United States nor any
Indian tribes is a party in the state court proceedings, and plaintiffs have no ability to litigate the
issues raised in this case before the state court. Ballard contends that Colorado River abstention can

apply without exactly the same parties in state and federal court, but there is no similarity between
the identity of the parties, let alone substantial similarity, that would be sufficient to consider the
state court criminal prosecutions as parallel to this case.13 Dkt. # 85, at 17. There is also no
substantial similarity in the issues being litigated in the state and federal proceedings. The state court
criminal proceedings arise under state criminal law, and it is possible that the criminal defendants
may seek to avoid prosecution by arguing that the state court lacks jurisdiction. However, the
defendants in the state court proceedings are not obligated to raise a jurisdictional challenge, and the
focus of the state court proceedings will be the application of state criminal law to the circumstances

of the individual cases. The criminal defendants have no interest in seeking to protect the
sovereignty of the United States or the Indian tribes, even if their interests could possibly overlap to
the extent it would help the criminal defendants avoid prosecution in state court. This case certainly
does not present an exceptional circumstance warranting abstention under the Colorado River

13 Ballard again argues that some of the plaintiffs have filed amicus briefs in certain state court
proceedings and, therefore, they can be considered as parties in the state court proceedings.
Dkt. # 52, at 26; Dkt. # 68, at 25; Dkt. # 89, at 26. The Court has rejected Ballard’s
argument that the filing of an amicus brief gives the plaintiffs in this case any interest in the
state court proceedings that is sufficient to consider them as parties or something equivalent
to protect their interests against the state of Oklahoma’s allegedly unlawful intrusion on the
sovereignty of the United States and the Indian tribes.
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doctrine in light of the lack of parallel cases in state and federal court, as the plaintiffs in this case
will have no ability to litigate their jurisdictional arguments in the state court proceeding.
IV.
The Court finds no basis to dismiss plaintiffs’ claims or abstain from hearing this case in light
of the state court criminal prosecutions, and Ballard’s motions to dismiss (Dkt. ## 52, 68, 89) are

denied. The parties shall submit a joint status report concerning the entry of a scheduling order and
any stipulations the parties have reached to streamline the resolution of this matter. The Court notes
that plaintiffs’ claims concern primarily legal disputes, as opposed to factual disputes, and it is
unclear whether the parties need to conduct a substantial amount of discovery to fully brief the
jurisdictional issues at the heart of the case. The Court also notes that plaintiffs have filed motions
for preliminary injunction but, due to the apparent lack of factual disputes, it may be more
expeditious for the parties to stipulate that the Court can treat the pending motions as motions for
permanent injunction to fully resolve this case.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint
and Brief in Support (Dkt. # 52), Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint and Brief in
Support (Dkt. # 68), Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Intervenor Complaint and Brief in Support
(Dkt. # 89) are denied.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the motions for preliminary injunction (Dkt. ## 5, 67)
remain pending.

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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the parties shall submit a joint status report concerning
the entry of a scheduling order, and any stipulations the parties have reached to expedite resolution
of this matter, no later than February 17, 2026.
DATED this 16th day of January, 2026.
By lee
CLAIRE V.EAGAN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11242291. Public record. Not legal advice.