# United States v. Gail Russ

> Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit · January 16, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11241985

## Case

- **Court:** Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
- **Decided:** January 16, 2026
- **Precedential status:** Unpublished
- **Opinion:** Opinion
- **Nature of suit:** NEW
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11241985

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- explaining this often involves a “lie about the characteristics of the good (e.g., if he promises that a gemstone is a diamond when it is in fact a cu- bic zirconium)”
- stating the touchstone is whether those acts were “a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the . . . conspiracy alleged in the indictment”
- applying to the mail fraud context

## Opinion text

USCA11 Case: 24-11086 Document: 78-1 Date Filed: 01/16/2026 Page: 1 of 17

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 24-11086
Non-Argument Calendar
____________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus

GAIL RUSS,
VILAIRE DUROSEAU,
CASSANDRE JEAN,
Defendants-Appellants.
____________________
Appeals from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
D.C. Docket No. 0:23-cr-60007-AHS-1
____________________

Before JILL PRYOR, BRANCH, and BLACK, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
USCA11 Case: 24-11086 Document: 78-1 Date Filed: 01/16/2026 Page: 2 of 17

2 Opinion of the Court 24-11086

Gail Russ, Vilaire Duroseau, and Cassandre Jean (collectively,
Appellants) appeal their convictions and sentences for wire fraud
and conspiracy to commit wire fraud. They bring several issues on
appeal, which we address in turn. After review, we affirm the Ap-
pellants’ convictions and sentences.
I. BACKGROUND
We include a brief background to put the issues presented
into context. In January 2023, Russ, Duroseau, and Jean were
charged in a 14-defendant grand jury indictment with conspiracy
to commit wire fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1349 (Count 1),
and substantive wire fraud counts, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1343
(Counts 2-25). The indictment alleged that, from about April of
2016 through July of 2021, the co-conspirators issued fraudulent
nursing diplomas and transcripts to “unlawfully enrich them-
selves.” The indictment explained that, to be a licensed Registered
Nurse (RN) or a Licensed Practical/Vocational Nurse (LPN/VN),
an individual must graduate “from an approved pre-licensure nurs-
ing program” and take the licensing exam. The indictment identi-
fied seven co-conspirators, who obtained the fraudulent transcripts
and diplomas utilizing them to work for health care employers, and
seven different health care employer victims, who hired fraudu-
lently qualified nurses.
The indictment alleged the purpose of the conspiracy as fol-
lows:
It was the purpose of the conspiracy for the defend-
ants and their co-conspirators to unlawfully enrich
USCA11 Case: 24-11086 Document: 78-1 Date Filed: 01/16/2026 Page: 3 of 17

24-11086 Opinion of the Court 3

themselves by, among other things: (a) soliciting and
recruiting co-conspirators, via interstate wire com-
munications, seeking nursing credentials to obtain
employment as an RN or LPN/VN in the health care
field; (b) creating and distributing, via interstate wire
communications, false and fraudulent diplomas and
transcripts for co-conspirators seeking RN or
LPN/VN licensure and employment in the health
care field; (c) using the false and fraudulent docu-
ments to obtain employment, pay, and other benefits
in the health care field; (d) concealing the use of
fraudulent documents used to obtain employment in
the health care field; and (e) using proceeds of the
conspiracy for their personal use and benefit, and the
use and benefit of others, and to further the conspir-
acy.
The indictment alleged that Duroseau, Jean, and other co-
conspirators used interstate wire communications to recruit “co-
conspirators . . . seeking nursing credentials and employments as
an RN or LPN/VN in the health care field.” The indictment al-
leged that Russ, Duroseau, Jean, and other co-conspirators:
caused others to send, via interstate wire communi-
cations, information used to create false and fraudu-
lent official transcripts and diplomas . . . falsely and
fraudulently representing that the co-conspirators at-
tended . . . and completed the necessary courses
and/or clinicals to obtain RN or LPN/VN diplomas,
when in fact the co-conspirators had never actually
completed the necessary courses and/or clinicals.
USCA11 Case: 24-11086 Document: 78-1 Date Filed: 01/16/2026 Page: 4 of 17

4 Opinion of the Court 24-11086

Additionally, “[i]n furtherance of the conspiracy, co-conspirators”
used the fraudulent diplomas and transcripts, “to obtain licensure
as an RN or LPN/VN in various states” and “to fraudulently obtain
employment benefits as an RN or LPN/VN at various unwitting
health care providers throughout the country . . . [that] hired and
paid salaries, wages, and other benefits to the RNS and LPN/VNs
based on their fraudulent credentials.” Co-conspirators used the
proceeds “for their personal use and benefit, and to further the con-
spiracy.”
Appellants went to trial, where many employers who hired
individuals based on fraudulent qualifications testified that, had
they known the individual was not actually a qualified nurse, they
would not have hired, or promoted the individual, nor paid or in-
creased their pay. After a 13-day trial, the jury returned a verdict
on December 15, 2023, finding Russ guilty of Counts 1, 12-18, 20-
22, and 24-25, and not guilty of Counts 3-6 and 19. The jury found
Duroseau guilty of all counts charged: Counts 1, 10, 14, and 23.
The jury also found Jean guilty of all counts charged: Counts 1, 12,
17, 20, and 25.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Convictions
First, Appellants contend the district court improperly de-
nied their various motions to dismiss the indictment, for acquittal,
USCA11 Case: 24-11086 Document: 78-1 Date Filed: 01/16/2026 Page: 5 of 17

24-11086 Opinion of the Court 5

and for a new trial, 1 because it erred in its determinations that:
(1) the Government proceeded under a traditional theory of prop-
erty fraud, rather than the right to control theory rejected by the
Supreme Court; and (2) the salaries paid to the Appellants’ co-con-
spirators—based on fraudulent nursing credentials the Appellants’
aided in distributing—constituted “money or property” under the
wire fraud statute.
1. Property Fraud
“The wire fraud statute criminalizes schemes or artifices to
defraud, or for obtaining money or property by means of false or
fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises.’” Ciminelli v.
United States, 598 U.S. 306, 312 (2023) (quoting 18 U.S.C.
§ 1343) (quotation marks and alterations omitted). To obtain a
conviction for wire fraud under § 1343, the government must
prove: (1) a defendant’s “intentional participation in a scheme to
defraud, and (2) the use of the interstate wires in furtherance of
that scheme.” United States v. Estepa, 998 F.3d 898, 908 (11th Cir.
2021) (quotation marks and alterations omitted). “And, to prevail

1 We generally review a district court’s denial of a motion to dismiss a charging

document for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Noriega, 117 F.3d 1206,
1211 (11th Cir. 1997). However, “[t]o the extent [an appellant’s] assignments
of error on these matters implicate the district court’s resolution of questions
of law,” we apply a de novo standard of review. Id. We review a challenge to
the denial of a Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29 motion for judgment of
acquittal de novo. United States v. Chafin, 808 F.3d 1263, 1268 (11th Cir.
2015). We review the district court’s ruling on a defendant’s Federal Rule of
Criminal Procedure 33 motion for a new trial for an abuse of discre-
tion. United States v. Brown, 934 F.3d 1278, 1294, 1297 (11th Cir. 2019).
USCA11 Case: 24-11086 Document: 78-1 Date Filed: 01/16/2026 Page: 6 of 17

6 Opinion of the Court 24-11086

on the conspiracy charge, the government must additionally prove
three things: (1) agreement between two or more persons to
achieve an unlawful objective; (2) knowing and voluntary partici-
pation in that agreement by the defendant; and (3) an overt act in
furtherance of the agreement.” Id. at 908-09 (quotation marks
omitted).
Because the federal fraud statutes “protect property rights
only,” “the Government must prove not only that wire fraud de-
fendants engaged in deception, but also that money or property
was an object of their fraud.” Ciminelli, 598 U.S. at 312 (quotation
marks and alteration omitted). For example, because the federal
fraud statutes only protect “traditional concepts of property,” state
and municipal licenses are not “property,” as that term is used
in § 1343. See Cleveland v. United States, 531 U.S. 12, 15, 24, 26-27
(2000) (applying to the mail fraud context); see also Ciminelli, 598
U.S. at 312 n.2 (explaining that cases involving the federal mail
fraud statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1341, are applicable to cases involving the
federal wire fraud statute because the two statutes contain identi-
cal language). A wire fraud prosecution may not rely solely on de-
priving an entity of its right to control its own assets. Ciminelli, 598
U.S. at 311-12. “The right to valuable economic information
needed to make discretionary economic decisions is not a tradi-
tional property interest. Accordingly, the right-to-control theory
cannot form the basis for a conviction under the federal fraud stat-
utes.” Id. at 316.
USCA11 Case: 24-11086 Document: 78-1 Date Filed: 01/16/2026 Page: 7 of 17

24-11086 Opinion of the Court 7

The Supreme Court has also held to support a § 1343 con-
viction, it does not matter if “the defendant provides something—
be it money, property, or services—of equal value in return,” as
long as the defendant “schem[ed] to ‘obtain’ the victim’s ‘money or
property,’ regardless of whether he seeks to leave the victim eco-
nomically worse off.” Kousisis v. United States, 605 U.S. 114, 123-24
(2025). Further, the Supreme Court clarified “the fraudulent-in-
ducement theory is not a repackaging of the right-to-control the-
ory,” as the fraudulent-inducement theory “protects money and
property,” while the “right-to-control theory” protects mere infor-
mation. Id. at 1398 (quotation marks and alteration omitted). Our
precedent holds a defendant is only guilty of fraud where the de-
fendant lies “about the nature of the bargain” itself. See United
States v. Takhalov, 827 F.3d 1307, 1313-14 (11th Cir. 2016) (explaining
this often involves a “lie about the characteristics of the good (e.g.,
if he promises that a gemstone is a diamond when it is in fact a cu-
bic zirconium)”), overruled in part by Kousisis, 605 U.S. at 124 (hold-
ing “a defendant violates § 1343 by scheming to ‘obtain’ the victim’s
‘money or property’ regardless of whether he seeks to leave the
victim economically worse off”).
We conclude the district court did not err in its determina-
tion that the Government proceeded under a traditional theory of
property fraud rather than the right-to-control theory. While the
Appellants rely on Ciminelli, that case is not applicable. In Ciminelli,
the government’s theory was “that the defendant schemed to de-
prive a victim of potentially valuable economic information neces-
sary to make discretionary economic decisions.” 598 U.S. at 310.
USCA11 Case: 24-11086 Document: 78-1 Date Filed: 01/16/2026 Page: 8 of 17

8 Opinion of the Court 24-11086

Ultimately, the victim in Ciminelli received the contract it bargained
for, and the fact it might have bargained for something else if not
for the defendant’s conspiracy was insufficient to state a property
interest that could support a wire-fraud conviction. See id. at 309-
10, 314-17.
In Appellants’ case, however, the Government’s theory was,
beginning with the indictment, that the Appellants helped to de-
prive the victim health care providers of the “employment, pay, and
other benefits” paid to the Appellants’ co-conspirators based on the
fraudulent credentials they distributed. Throughout the trial, the
Government presented numerous health care employers of the co-
conspirators who testified they paid additional salaries and benefits
they otherwise would not have paid without the fraudulent
scheme. Notably, the Government did not seek any instructions
relating to the right-to-control theory in relation to the jury instruc-
tions. It repeatedly stated in its responses to the Appellants’ mo-
tions and special jury instructions that it was not prosecuting this
case under the right-to-control theory, but under a traditional the-
ory that money, in the form of pay to health care employers, was
the object of the scheme. Additionally, in presenting its case to the
jury in closing arguments, the Government completed calculations
to show the amount of money lost by health care employers via
the salaries of fraudulently qualified nurses, and the Government
specifically stated it was “not alleging that the employers were de-
frauded out of a nursing license,” as “they were defrauded out of
cold hard cash, money, not property,” via the money “paid by the
employers to the nurses,” which “is sufficient under the wire fraud
USCA11 Case: 24-11086 Document: 78-1 Date Filed: 01/16/2026 Page: 9 of 17

24-11086 Opinion of the Court 9

statute.” Furthermore, Jean’s renewed motions and motion for
new trial, adopted by both Duroseau and Russ, acknowledged the
trial evidence “[a]t best” established “co-conspirators used fraudu-
lent diplomas and transcripts to obtain nursing licenses and utilized
the needed licenses to secure employment and benefits at various
unwitting health care providers,” who then “paid salaries, wages,
and other benefits to the RNs and LPN/VNs based on their fraud-
ulent credentials,” meaning that even the Appellants admit the
Government proved that employers paid money due to the fraud-
ulent credentials.
Thus, unlike Ciminelli, the Appellant’s scheme involved
more than the deprivation of “valuable economic information nec-
essary to make discretionary economic decisions.” Rather, it in-
volved a classic case of fraud—as the qualifications and credentials
of Appellants’ co-conspirator nurses went to the very nature of the
bargain with the victim employers and led the co-conspirators to
obtain money from the victim employers. Indeed—much like re-
ceiving cubic zirconium when a diamond was promised—here, the
employers received counterfeit nurses in exchange for salaries. Ta-
khalov, 827 F.3d at 1313-14. Furthermore, like Kousisis received a
contract, and subsequent pay, based on his promise to use a disad-
vantaged supplier, when in fact that supplier was a fraudulent com-
pany made up to obtain the contract, here, the co-conspirator
nurses received their contracts, and subsequent pay, based on false
credentials they presented to obtain the employment contract and
pay. Kousisis, 605 U.S. at 118-19, 123-24. Just like the Supreme
Court found in Kousisis, the fraudulent inducement theory differs
USCA11 Case: 24-11086 Document: 78-1 Date Filed: 01/16/2026 Page: 10 of 17

10 Opinion of the Court 24-11086

from the right to control theory, and as long as the individuals ob-
tained the contract through fraudulent means, it does not matter
that services were provided because wire fraud still occurred as the
money was obtained fraudulently. Id. at 123-24, 134. Further, it
would not even matter if those services were adequate, as the
nurses fraudulently induced the health care providers into provid-
ing them salaries, or at least higher salaries, based on the fake qual-
ifications. Id. at 123-24.
Accordingly, because this theory was sufficiently alleged in
the Appellants’ indictment and the Government repeatedly stated
it was prosecuting the Appellants based on a theory that their
scheme was meant to defraud health care employers of money, the
district court did not err in rejecting the Appellants’ various mo-
tions based on its legal determination that the Government pro-
ceeded under a traditional theory of property fraud rather than the
right to control theory rejected in Ciminelli.
2. Salaries of Nurses
Nor was it error to allow the salaries paid to the co-conspira-
tor nurses to be considered as money under the wire fraud statute.
The Supreme Court has held that wages paid by a third party in the
course of a defendant’s dishonesty do not satisfy the money or
property element of fraud statutes where those wages are merely
incidental to—and not the object of—the scheme to defraud. Kelly
v. United States, 590 U.S. 391, 393-94, 400 (2020). However, the Ap-
pellants’ reliance on Kelly is misplaced, as there, the salaries paid to
Port Authority employees were merely the “incidental cost” of
USCA11 Case: 24-11086 Document: 78-1 Date Filed: 01/16/2026 Page: 11 of 17

24-11086 Opinion of the Court 11

implementing the defendants’ scheme to punish a mayor for refus-
ing to support the governor’s reelection bid by exercising regula-
tory power to close toll lanes during rush hour traffic. See id. Here,
in contrast, the indictment alleged—and evidence sufficiently es-
tablished—that a purpose of the scheme was to obtain pay and ben-
efits for Appellants’ co-conspirators to which they were not quali-
fied or entitled. The point, and not a mere byproduct, of having a
fraudulent nursing diploma is to use it to eventually obtain nursing
employment. Thus, unlike Kelly, far from being incidental to the
overarching purpose of the scheme, obtaining the salaries in a
fraudulent manner was a purpose of the Appellants’ conspiracy.
Russ and Duroseau argue the Government did not prove
they personally “ever interacted with, deceived, or deprived any of
the healthcare employers of money or property as required by the
wire fraud statute,” and further, that the healthcare employers
were not deprived as they received services from the “nurses.” Kou-
sisis held that wire fraud can still occur, even when the victim re-
ceives services, if they were defrauded into that agreement by a
defendant who seeks to obtain money or property, as was the case
with the co-conspirator nurses here. 605 U.S. at 123-24. Second, it
does not matter if Russ or Duroseau personally engaged with the
health care providers as the co-conspirator nurses’ receipt of sala-
ries based on the fraudulent credentials was not only “ a reasonably
foreseeable consequence of the . . . conspiracy alleged” in the in-
dictment, but rather, the indictment expressly alleged this was a
purpose of the conspiracy. See Smith v. United States, 568 U.S. 106,
111 (2013) (“Since conspiracy is a continuing offense, a defendant
USCA11 Case: 24-11086 Document: 78-1 Date Filed: 01/16/2026 Page: 12 of 17

12 Opinion of the Court 24-11086

who has joined a conspiracy continues to violate the law through
every moment of the conspiracy’s existence, and he becomes re-
sponsible for the acts of his co-conspirators in pursuit of their com-
mon plot.”(alteration and internal citations omitted)); United States
v. Alvarez, 755 F.2d 830, 848 (11th Cir. 1985) (stating the touchstone
is whether those acts were “a reasonably foreseeable consequence
of the . . . conspiracy alleged in the indictment”).
Accordingly, the district court did not err by denying the Ap-
pellants various motions to dismiss the indictment, for acquittal,
and for new trial, and we affirm as to this issue.
B. Juror Replacement
Second, Russ and Duroseau assert the district court abused
its discretion by dismissing a black juror unilaterally without ques-
tioning, or allowing the other parties to question, the juror on the
record in violation of their Sixth Amendment rights. Duroseau
also contends the unilateral dismissal of the juror violated his Fifth
Amendment due process rights. 2
The court may excuse a juror and replace him with an alter-
nate if, prior to deliberations, the juror is found to be “unable” or
“disqualified” to perform his duties. Fed. R. Crim. P. 24(c); United
States v. Fajardo, 787 F.2d 1523, 1525 (11th Cir. 1986). Absent a

2 We generally review a district court’s decision to replace a juror for an abuse

of discretion and constitutional questions de novo. United States v. Augus-
tin, 661 F.3d 1105, 1129 (11th Cir. 2011) (defining the standard for replacing a
juror); United States v. Brown, 364 F.3d 1266, 1268 (11th Cir. 2004) (defining the
standard for constitutional questions).
USCA11 Case: 24-11086 Document: 78-1 Date Filed: 01/16/2026 Page: 13 of 17

24-11086 Opinion of the Court 13

showing of bias or prejudice to the defendant, we will not disturb
the district court’s decision. Fajardo, 787 F.2d at 1525. Prejudice or
bias can include the discharge of a “juror without factual support,
or for a legally irrelevant reason.” United States v. Puche, 350 F.3d
1137, 1152 (11th Cir. 2003) (quotation marks omitted). We have
found the district court did not abuse its discretion by removing
two jurors who “napped regularly throughout the trial” as they
could not perform their duties as jurors. United States v. Smith, 550
F.2d 277, 285-86 (5th Cir. 1977). 3
The district court may excuse a juror without holding a sep-
arate hearing where a juror is clearly unable to continue to serve,
such as where a juror suffers a heart attack or sleeps in open court.
Fajardo, 787 F.2d at 1525. A hearing or other investigation is an ap-
propriate use of the court’s discretion, however, “[w]here the ju-
ror’s disability is less certain or obvious.” Id. (quotation marks
omitted). The trial judge “does not need a defendant’s consent to
replace a juror with an alternate before the jury retires; all that is
required is a reasonable cause for the replacement.” Id. at 1526.
The Sixth Amendment requires that, “[i]n all criminal pros-
ecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public
trial, by an impartial jury.” U.S. Const. amend. VI. We have found
a violation of a criminal defendant’s Sixth Amendment right “to a
unanimous jury verdict” when the district court abused its

3 In Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc),

this Court adopted as binding precedent all decisions of the former Fifth Cir-
cuit handed down prior to close of business on September 30, 1981.
USCA11 Case: 24-11086 Document: 78-1 Date Filed: 01/16/2026 Page: 14 of 17

14 Opinion of the Court 24-11086

discretion by dismissing a juror, “after the start of deliberations,”
when the record did “not unambiguously show that [the j]uror”
engaged in misconduct. United States v. Brown, 996 F.3d 1171, 1175,
1194 (11th Cir. 2021) (en banc). The Fifth Amendment requires
that “[n]o person shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law.” U.S. Const. amend. V.
The district court did not abuse its discretion by removing
the juror, as the juror’s inability to stay awake, alone, provides a
strong factual basis that he was unable to perform his duties as a
juror. Fed. R. Crim. P. 24(c); Fajardo, 787 F.2d at 1525; Puche, 350
F.3d at 1152; Smith, 550 F.2d at 285-86; Brown, 996 F.3d at 1175, 1194.
The record includes additional factual bases for the juror’s removal,
including the distraction he was causing to other jurors and the
court, via efforts to keep him awake and his smell. Russ and Du-
roseau claim their Sixth Amendment rights to “a unanimous ver-
dict by a jury of ordinary citizens” was violated, in part because the
juror was the only black juror; however, the record shows the par-
ties agreed to another black juror during voir dire. The dismissal
was not prejudicial as the record shows sufficient factual support
for the district court determining the juror’s inability to continue,
and there was no Sixth Amendment violation.
The district court also did not abuse its discretion when it
did not hold a separate hearing which could have included ques-
tioning the juror, because when a juror is clearly unable to continue
as a juror based on actions such as sleeping in open court, a hearing
is not necessary. Fajardo, 787 F.2d at 1525. Additionally, even
USCA11 Case: 24-11086 Document: 78-1 Date Filed: 01/16/2026 Page: 15 of 17

24-11086 Opinion of the Court 15

though the district court did not hold a hearing with the juror and
the parties on the record, the district court discussed his concerns
about the juror’s attentiveness and distractions numerous times
with the parties prior to the juror’s dismissal, and despite these nu-
merous opportunities, the parties did not ask for a chance to ques-
tion the juror until after he was excused. We have stated a district
court “does not need a defendant’s consent to replace a juror with
an alternate before the jury retires . . . [as long as there] is a reason-
able cause for the replacement,” so Duroseau’s Fifth Amendment
due process rights were not violated, as the juror’s sleeping and dis-
tractions were cause for replacement. See id. at 1526. Accordingly,
we affirm as to this issue.
C. Loss Amount
Third, Russ and Duroseau assert that, because the co-con-
spirator “nurses’” wages do not constitute “money or property”
under the wire fraud statute, the district court erred in its loss cal-
culations pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(1).
The Guidelines provide general principles as to how the
court should calculate the loss amount, but the appropriate
method for calculating loss is highly fact-dependent, and thus, “dis-
trict judges are entitled to considerable leeway in choosing how to
go about this task.” United States v. Campbell, 765 F.3d 1291, 1301
(11th Cir. 2014). The Guidelines only require the district court to
make a reasonable estimate of loss. Id. Where an estimate of loss
is not feasible, a court may use a gain calculation in place of a loss
calculation. See United States v. Bracciale, 374 F.3d 998, 1003-04 (11th
USCA11 Case: 24-11086 Document: 78-1 Date Filed: 01/16/2026 Page: 16 of 17

16 Opinion of the Court 24-11086

Cir. 2004). However, a court should not use a gain calculation in
place of a loss calculation where there is “a reasonable estimate of
the victims’ loss based on existing information.” Id. at 1004 (quota-
tion marks omitted).
A review of the record reveals the district court did not base
the U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1 enhancements on the lost wages from the
healthcare employers, but instead utilized the gain method. The
gain method is a proper way to calculate loss under the Guidelines,
and no party objects to the use of the gain method nor the under-
lying factual basis for the calculations made by the district court.
See United States v. Campbell, 26 F.4th 860, 873 (11th Cir. 2022) (en
banc) (clarifying a party abandons an issue through forfeiture by
failing to raise the issue in an initial brief on direct appeal and hold-
ing that forfeited issues will not be addressed absent extraordinary
circumstances). Accordingly, we affirm as to this issue.
III. CONCLUSION
We affirm the Appellants’ convictions because the record
shows the Government’s theory of the case was that Appellants
helped defraud health care providers out of salaries and benefits
paid to their falsely credentialed nurse co-conspirators rather than
merely defrauding the employers of the right to control their dis-
cretionary economic decisions. Additionally, the salaries and bene-
fits paid the employers were a purpose of the scheme, and thus,
were an object of the conspiracy’s fraud, rather than merely inci-
dental to the scheme, such that they constituted “money or prop-
erty” under the wire fraud statute. Second, the district court did
USCA11 Case: 24-11086 Document: 78-1 Date Filed: 01/16/2026 Page: 17 of 17

24-11086 Opinion of the Court 17

not abuse its discretion, nor violate the parties’ Fifth or Sixth
Amendment rights, by dismissing the juror without a separate
hearing, as the court had a valid factual basis for dismissal. Third,
the district court utilized the amount gained by Russ and Duroseau
to determine their enhancements, and no one challenged the use
of the gain method or the calculation on appeal. Accordingly, we
affirm Appellants’ convictions and sentences.
AFFIRMED.

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11241985. Public record. Not legal advice.