# In Re Juanita M.

> Court of Appeals of Tennessee · January 16, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11241973

## Case

- **Court:** Court of Appeals of Tennessee
- **Decided:** January 16, 2026
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Opinion of the court by Judge Thomas R. Frierson, II
- **Judges:** Judge Thomas R. Frierson, II
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11241973

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- recognizing that a decision terminating parental rights is “final and irrevocable”
- discussing the due process right of parents to fundamentally fair procedures

## Opinion text

01/16/2026
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
AT JACKSON
Assigned on Briefs October 1, 2025

IN RE JUANITA M.

Appeal from the Juvenile Court for Dyer County
No. 23-JV-249 Jason L. Hudson, Judge

No. W2025-00822-COA-R3-PT

In this action to terminate parental rights, the mother, father, and child all tested positive
for methamphetamine. Accordingly, the Tennessee Department of Children’s Services
(“DCS”) took the child into protective custody, and the child was adjudicated dependent
and neglected. Despite completing many of DCS’s requirements, the mother and father
continued to fail drug tests. DCS filed a petition for termination of parental rights, and the
trial court determined that three grounds supported termination as to both parents: (1)
persistence of the conditions that led to the child’s removal, (2) severe child abuse, and (3)
failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume physical custody of or financial
responsibility for the child. The trial court also concluded that termination of both parents’
rights was in the child’s best interest. Both parents have appealed. Discerning no
reversible error, we affirm

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Juvenile Court
Affirmed; Case Remanded

THOMAS R. FRIERSON, II, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which CARMA DENNIS
MCGEE, J., joined. ANDY D. BENNETT, J., filed a separate dissenting opinion.

Angela W. Mueller, Trenton, Tennessee, for the appellant, Angela M.C.

Mark D. Johnston, Dyersburg, Tennessee, for the appellant, Hector M.C.

Jonathan Skrmetti, Attorney General and Reporter, and Jason R. Trautwein, Assistant
Attorney General, for the appellee, Tennessee Department of Children’s Services.

OPINION

I. Factual and Procedural Background
This case involves a November 20, 2024 petition to terminate parental rights (“the
Termination Petition”) filed by DCS in the Dyer County Juvenile Court (“trial court”)
seeking to terminate the parental rights of Angela M.C. (“Mother”) and Hector M.C.
(“Father”) to their child, Juanita M.C. (“the Child”).1 The Child had been born in October
2020. In the Termination Petition, DCS alleged that clear and convincing evidence
supported the following grounds for termination as to both parents: (1) persistence of the
conditions that led to the Child’s removal, (2) severe child abuse, and (3) failure to manifest
an ability and willingness to care for the Child. DCS also alleged that termination as to
both parents was in the Child’s best interest.

The facts that led to the filing of the Termination Petition are largely undisputed. In
November 2023, DCS filed a petition seeking temporary custody of the Child and
requesting that the trial court adjudicate the Child dependent and neglected. DCS alleged
that caseworker Shimeka Foster had visited the parents’ home in response to a “referral of
domestic violence, drug exposed child, and environmental neglect.” Ms. Foster had
“observed the home to be unclean” with “trash, food, and other items covering the living
room and kitchen areas.” Ms. Foster had also observed that the “stove was pulled out from
the wall allowing access for the [C]hild to get behind the stove.”

DCS further alleged that both parents had initially refused to submit to drug screens.
According to DCS, Mother had been enrolled in Sparo Health, a “suboxone” clinic, and
personnel at the clinic had informed DCS that Mother had tested positive for
methamphetamine, methadone, and suboxone in August 2023. Mother subsequently tested
negative for all substances on October 2, 2023. Father tested positive for amphetamine
and methamphetamine on October 6 and 19, 2023. The Child underwent a hair follicle
drug screen which returned positive for methamphetamine on October 24, 2023. The
parents were each indicted for criminal child neglect in the Dyer County Circuit Court by
reason of the Child’s exposure to methamphetamine.

On November 3, 2023, the trial court entered an ex parte order granting temporary
custody of the Child to DCS after finding probable cause that the Child was dependent and
neglected based upon the facts alleged in the petition. DCS then placed the Child into the
care of the foster mother (“Foster Mother”) and her husband (collectively, “Foster
Parents”). The Child resided with Foster Parents continuously thereafter. On the date of
removal, both parents signed a Criteria and Procedures for Termination of Parental Rights
(“Criteria and Procedures”) document indicating that they had received a copy of the
document and that its contents had been explained to them. The Criteria and Procedures
document is a standard form created by DCS that is given to parents whose children have

1
In the Termination Petition and many of the pleadings before the trial court, the Child’s name was
incorrectly spelled, “Junita.” This appeal was also filed using the incorrect spelling of the Child’s name.
However, the Child’s name appears as “Juanita” on her birth certificate, and we have accordingly amended
the style of the appeal to reflect the correct spelling.
-2-
been placed in foster care. The document was provided to Mother and Father in English,
and testimony at trial revealed that DCS did not provide Father, whose primary language
is Spanish, with an interpreter to explain the document.

On November 15, 2023, the trial court entered an order appointing counsel for
Mother and Father. On November 27, 2023, DCS conducted a meeting with Mother and
Father for the purpose of creating and agreeing to a permanency plan with the stated goal
of reunification. The permanency plan required Mother to participate in “homemaker
services” provided by DCS, to participate in an alcohol and drug assessment (“A&D
Assessment”), to follow recommendations from the A&D Assessment, to submit to drug
screens and consistently test negative, and to attend “weekly outpatient therapy” as needed.
The plan required Father to also complete an A&D Assessment, to follow its
recommendations, and to submit to drug screens and test negative each time. DCS did not
provide Father with a Spanish interpreter to explain the goals of the permanency plan or
Father’s responsibilities thereunder.

On February 5, 2024, Father tested positive on a hair follicle drug screen for
methamphetamine, and Mother tested negative for all substances. On February 23, 2024,
the Dyer County Juvenile Court Foster Care Review Board (“the Board”) reviewed the
parents’ progress on the permanency plan and determined that Mother and Father had each
complied with his or her respective “significant responsibilities” and that DCS had made
“reasonable efforts” toward reunification. The trial court subsequently conducted a hearing
on February 29, 2024, during which the court ratified the November 27, 2023 permanency
plan and set a child support obligation for each parent at $100.00 per month.

On May 1, 2024, following a hearing, the trial court entered an order adjudicating
the Child dependent and neglected. The order included the following relevant findings:

Upon hearing the evidence presented on this date, the Court finds that
there is clear and convincing evidence that the minor child is dependent and
neglected due to drug exposure by the parents; the Court specifically finds
that [Mother, Father, and the Child] were all 3 positive for methamphetamine
and that the child was under the care and control of the parents during the
time she tested positive for methamphetamine.

[DCS] requested to reserve the issue of severe abuse in this matter due
to the progress of the parents with services at this time, but the Court would
note that it specifically finds the child was positive for methamphetamine
while in the care and control of the parents who were also positive for
methamphetamine.

(Paragraph numbering omitted.) The trial court set the matter for dispositional hearing on
June 14, 2024.

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On June 26, 2024, the trial court entered an order determining that the Child should
remain in DCS custody and setting a hearing date in August 2024 for ratification of a
second permanency plan. DCS implemented the second permanency plan on July 25,
2024, setting forth continued responsibilities for both Mother and Father, including
completion of A&D assessments, submission to random drug screens, and participation in
recommended programs. The record indicates that Father, Mother, and counsel for Mother
were present during the creation of the permanency plan. DCS did not provide Father with
a Spanish interpreter to assist in Father’s understanding of the second permanency plan.

On August 20, 2024, the Board conducted a second review of the parents’ progress
relative to the permanency plan. Mother and Father were represented by counsel via Zoom
during the Board review. The Board noted that Mother and Father had both completed
“intensive out-patient counseling,” A&D assessments, and parenting classes. The Board
concluded that Mother had complied with her responsibilities under the permanency plan
but that Father had not. Specifically, the Board observed that Mother was “actively
participating” in the drug screen requirement but that Father was “not compliant” with the
drug screening. The Board expressed “major concerns with [Father’s] continued failure of
drug screens” and additionally noted that there had been “no forward movement” toward
reuniting the Child with the parents due to “[Father’s] failure to comply with passing drug
screens.” The Board found that DCS had made reasonable efforts to assist the parents in
reaching the goals set forth in the permanency plan and recommended that DCS “look for
relative placement, move toward [Termination of Parental Rights] and adoption.” The trial
court ratified the permanency plan in an order entered on October 2, 2024.

On September 13, 2024, Mother tested positive for methamphetamine on a hair
follicle drug test. On December 10, 2024, Mother pled guilty to criminal child neglect
based on the indictment that had been brought against her shortly after the Child’s removal.
Father’s criminal charges of child neglect remained pending. DCS filed the Termination
Petition on November 20, 2024. The Board conducted another review of the parents’
progress relative to the second permanency plan on February 27, 2025. Mother and counsel
for Father attended the Board review meeting via Zoom. The Board again concluded that
Mother had complied with her most significant responsibilities in the permanency plan, but
that Father had not complied with the drug screening requirements. The Board also noted
that DCS had made reasonable efforts to assist the parents in reaching the goals set forth
in the permanency plan. The Board recommended that DCS “move forward” in seeking
termination of parental rights and adoption.

On May 9, 2025, the trial court conducted a hearing relative to the Termination
Petition. The trial court heard testimony from Mother; Father; Foster Mother; and DCS
caseworkers, Shimeka Foster and Loretta O’Neill. On May 23, 2025, the trial court entered
an order terminating Mother’s and Father’s parental rights to the Child. The trial court
determined, by clear and convincing evidence, that three statutory grounds supported

-4-
termination as to both parents: (1) persistence of the conditions that led to the Child’s
removal, (2) severe child abuse, and (3) failure to manifest an ability and willingness to
assume physical custody of or financial responsibility for the Child. The trial court also
determined that termination of Mother’s and Father’s parental rights was in the Child’s
best interest. Mother and Father timely appealed.

II. Issues Presented

Mother has raised the following issues on appeal, which we have restated and
reordered as follows:

1. Whether the trial court erred in finding, by clear and convincing
evidence, that the conditions leading to the removal of the Child from
Mother’s custody persisted.

2. Whether the trial court erred in finding, by clear and convincing
evidence, that Mother had failed to manifest an ability and willingness
to assume physical custody of or financial responsibility for the Child.

3. Whether the trial court erred in finding, by clear and convincing
evidence, that termination of Mother’s parental rights was in the
Child’s best interest.

Father has raised the following additional issues, which we have also restated and reordered
as follows:

4. Whether the trial court erred in finding, by clear and convincing
evidence, that the ground of severe child abuse had been established
as to Father.

5. Whether the trial court erred in determining, by clear and convincing
evidence, that the grounds of persistent conditions and failure to
manifest an ability and willingness to care for the Child had been
established in support of termination of Father’s parental rights when
DCS had purportedly failed to make reasonable efforts to assist Father
relative to these grounds.

6. Whether the trial court failed to properly consider the failure of DCS
to make reasonable efforts to provide translators or other reasonable
methods of communication to Father when Father’s primary language
was Spanish and he had limited communication skills in English.

-5-
7. Whether the trial court erred in failing to properly consider all relevant
and child-centered factors applicable to this case in its best interest
analysis.

III. Standard of Review

In a termination of parental rights case, this Court has a duty to determine “whether
the trial court’s findings, made under a clear and convincing standard, are supported by a
preponderance of the evidence.” In re F.R.R., III, 193 S.W.3d 528, 530 (Tenn. 2006). The
trial court’s findings of fact are reviewed de novo upon the record, accompanied by a
presumption of correctness unless the evidence preponderates against those findings. See
Tenn. R. App. P. 13(d); see also In re Carrington H., 483 S.W.3d 507, 523-24 (Tenn.
2016); In re F.R.R., III, 193 S.W.3d at 530. Questions of law, however, are reviewed de
novo with no presumption of correctness. See In re Carrington H., 483 S.W.3d at 524
(citing In re M.L.P., 281 S.W.3d 387, 393 (Tenn. 2009)). The trial court’s determinations
regarding witness credibility are entitled to great weight on appeal and shall not be
disturbed absent clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. See Jones v. Garrett, 92
S.W.3d 835, 838 (Tenn. 2002).

“Parents have a fundamental constitutional interest in the care and custody of their
children under both the United States and Tennessee constitutions.” Keisling v. Keisling,
92 S.W.3d 374, 378 (Tenn. 2002). It is well established, however, that “this right is not
absolute and parental rights may be terminated if there is clear and convincing evidence
justifying such termination under the applicable statute.” In re Drinnon, 776 S.W.2d 96,
97 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1988) (citing Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982)). As our
Supreme Court has explained:

The parental rights at stake are “far more precious than any property right.”
Santosky [v. Kramer], 455 U.S. [745,] 758-59 [(1982)]. Termination of
parental rights has the legal effect of reducing the parent to the role of a
complete stranger and of [“]severing forever all legal rights and obligations
of the parent or guardian of the child.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(l)(1);
see also Santosky, 455 U.S. at 759 (recognizing that a decision terminating
parental rights is “final and irrevocable”). In light of the interests and
consequences at stake, parents are constitutionally entitled to “fundamentally
fair procedures” in termination proceedings. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 754; see
also Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of Durham Cnty, N.C., 452 U.S. 18, 27
(1981) (discussing the due process right of parents to fundamentally fair
procedures).

Among the constitutionally mandated “fundamentally fair
procedures” is a heightened standard of proof—clear and convincing
evidence. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 769. This standard minimizes the risk of

-6-
unnecessary or erroneous governmental interference with fundamental
parental rights. Id.; In re Bernard T., 319 S.W.3d 586, 596 (Tenn. 2010).
“Clear and convincing evidence enables the fact-finder to form a firm belief
or conviction regarding the truth of the facts, and eliminates any serious or
substantial doubt about the correctness of these factual findings.” In re
Bernard T., 319 S.W.3d at 596 (citations omitted). The clear-and-
convincing-evidence standard ensures that the facts are established as highly
probable, rather than as simply more probable than not. In re Audrey S., 182
S.W.3d 838, 861 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005); In re M.A.R., 183 S.W.3d 652, 660
(Tenn. Ct. App. 2005).

***

In light of the heightened burden of proof in termination proceedings,
however, the reviewing court must make its own determination as to whether
the facts, either as found by the trial court or as supported by a preponderance
of the evidence, amount to clear and convincing evidence of the elements
necessary to terminate parental rights. In re Bernard T., 319 S.W.3d at 596-
97.

In re Carrington H., 483 S.W.3d at 522-24. “[P]ersons seeking to terminate [parental]
rights must prove all the elements of their case by clear and convincing evidence,”
including statutory grounds and the best interest of the child. See In re Bernard T., 319
S.W.3d 586, 596 (Tenn. 2010).

IV. Statutory Grounds for Termination of Parental Rights

Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1-113 (West July 1, 2021, to current)2 lists the
statutory requirements for termination of parental rights, providing in relevant part:

(a) The chancery and circuit courts shall have concurrent jurisdiction with
the juvenile court to terminate parental or guardianship rights to a
child in a separate proceeding, or as a part of the adoption proceeding
by utilizing any grounds for termination of parental or guardianship
rights permitted in this part or in title 37, chapter 1, part 1 and title 37,
chapter 2, part 4.

2
Unless otherwise noted, throughout this Opinion, all citations to any section within Tennessee Code
Annotated §§ 36-1-113 and 36-1-102 shall be made in reference to the version that was effective on the
date the Termination Petition was filed and not to any other version of the statute. See, e.g., In re Zakary
O., No. E2022-01062-COA-R3-PT, 2023 WL 5215385, at *4, n.6 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 5, 2023). In some
instances, such as this one, the section that was in effect at the time the Termination Petition was filed has
not changed and therefore remains current.
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***

(c) Termination of parental or guardianship rights must be based upon:

(1) A finding by the court by clear and convincing evidence that
the grounds for termination of parental or guardianship rights
have been established; and

(2) That termination of the parent’s or guardian’s rights is in the
best interests of the child.

As delineated above, the trial court concluded that the evidence clearly and convincingly
supported three statutory grounds to terminate Mother’s and Father’s parental rights: (1)
persistence of the conditions that led to the Child’s removal from the parents’ custody, (2)
severe child abuse, and (3) failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume physical
custody of or financial responsibility for the Child. We will address each statutory ground
in turn.

A. Persistence of Conditions

Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1-113(g)(3) provides for termination of parental
rights when:

(A) The child has been removed from the home or the physical or legal
custody of a parent or guardian for a period of six (6) months by a
court order entered at any stage of proceedings in which a petition has
been filed in the juvenile court alleging that a child is a dependent and
neglected child, and:

(i) The conditions that led to the child’s removal still persist,
preventing the child’s safe return to the care of the parent or
guardian, or other conditions exist that, in all reasonable
probability, would cause the child to be subjected to further
abuse or neglect, preventing the child’s safe return to the care
of the parent or guardian;

(ii) There is little likelihood that these conditions will be remedied
at an early date so that the child can be safely returned to the
parent or guardian in the near future; and

(iii) The continuation of the parent or guardian and child
relationship greatly diminishes the child’s chances of early
integration into a safe, stable, and permanent home;

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(B) The six (6) months must accrue on or before the first date the
termination of parental rights petition is set to be heard[.]

To terminate parental rights under this ground, a court must find that each of the foregoing
elements was proven by clear and convincing evidence. In re B.A.C., 317 S.W.3d 718, 725
(Tenn. Ct. App. 2009).

In the instant case, the trial court summarized its findings regarding persistence of
conditions as follows:

[C]lear and convincing evidence established that [Mother] and [Father] failed
to remedy the persistent conditions, which barred reunification with the
child.

The child was removed from the custody of the parents on November
3, 2023, and it has been more than 6 months since the removal of the child
from the parents. Environmental concerns and drug use were the reasons for
the removal of the child from the custody of Mother and Father. Initially the
environmental concerns were addressed, and may still be addressed;
however, no one has been in the parents’ home in some time despite efforts
to visit the home by [DCS]. Mother pled guilty and admitted even that she
had exposed the child to methamphetamine. There has been no change in 18
months for the parents. The parents have failed drug screens throughout the
case, and have not gone for 6 consecutive months without failing a drug
screen. The use of methamphetamine has not been eradicated from the home.

The conditions that led to the removal of this child still exist and other
conditions exist in the homes of the parents that, in all reasonable probability,
would lead to further neglect or abuse of the child. There is little chance that
these conditions will be remedied soon so that the child can be returned safely
to the custody of either parent, and continuation of the parent/child
relationship greatly diminishes the child’s chances of being placed into a
safe, stable and permanent home. Based on the evidence, this Court finds
that clear and convincing evidence has been established that [Mother] and
[Father] have not remedied the persistent conditions that prevent
reunification with the child.

Regarding the condition of the parents’ home, DCS caseworker, Ms. O’Neill,
testified that the parents had moved residences and had “worked the [homemaker]
services” to the satisfaction of the homemaker service facilitator, Judy Gurien, and that Ms.
Gurien had reported that the parents’ new home environment had improved. However, the
record demonstrates that Mother and Father had not allowed DCS to enter their home since

-9-
October 2024 such that there was no evidence between October 2024 and May 2025 that
the home remained in good condition. To this point, Ms. O’Neill testified that she had
attempted to visit the parents’ home “probably six times” since October 2024, and again
on the morning of the trial, but that she had not been granted access. Despite these
concerns, this Court has determined that a “record ‘devoid of proof’” about a parent’s home
environment or other conditions does not suffice to prove the ground of persistent
conditions by clear and convincing evidence. See In re Evandor C., No. M2022-01697-
COA-R3-PT, 2024 WL 678014, at *12 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 20, 2024). This is so even if
the lack of proof is due to the parents’ failure to cooperate. See id. We therefore conclude
that the evidence, as it specifically relates to the environmental conditions of the parents’
home, was insufficient to prove the ground of persistence of conditions.

As this ground relates to Father’s conduct, the evidence of his continued drug use
following removal of the Child does preponderate in favor of the trial court’s findings.
After the Child was removed into DCS custody, Father did not comply with the drug screen
requirements set forth in the permanency plans and continued to test positive for
methamphetamine. This included testing positive on February 21, 2025, just three months
before the termination trial. We find that Father’s continued drug use throughout the
proceedings indicates that (1) return of the Child into Father’s custody would have placed
the Child at risk of substantial harm, (2) there was little likelihood that Father’s drug use
would be remedied at an early date such that the Child could be safely returned to him in
the near future, and (3) continuation of the relationship between Father and the Child would
greatly diminish the Child’s opportunity to be placed in a safe and stable home. Each
element of this statutory ground, as it pertains to Father, has been met. See § 36-1-
113(g)(3)(A)(i)-(iii). Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s determination that clear and
convincing evidence supported this ground for termination of Father’s parental rights to
the Child.

The analysis is more difficult with respect to Mother. Although Mother tested
positive for methamphetamine on September 13, 2024, she later tested negative for any
illicit substances in January 2025. Mother did not report for a drug screen in February
2025, but this was because she had been incarcerated on the child neglect charges that had
been brought against her in 2023. During the intervening months, the Board repeatedly
noted that Mother had been making progress toward the permanency plan goals and that
she had substantially complied with plan requirements.

However, despite Mother’s commendable efforts to discontinue her drug use and
the evidence that she had made some improvements in this regard, Mother continued to
live with Father—an active drug user—until the termination trial. Mother did not indicate
any plan to extricate herself from her relationship with Father or to move to a different
residence so that she could eventually be reunited with the Child in a drug-free home. Thus,
returning the Child to Mother’s custody would put the Child at risk of substantial harm and
would diminish the Child’s chances for early integration into a safe and stable home for

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the same reasons that returning the Child to Father’s custody would do so. As noted above,
Father’s continued drug use appeared unlikely to improve such that the Child could be
safely restored to his custody in the future, and the same was true for Mother as long as
Mother continued to reside with Father. For these reasons, we find clear and convincing
evidence supports the trial court’s determination that this ground had been established as
to Mother as well as to Father.

B. Severe Child Abuse

The trial court concluded that the evidence clearly and convincingly demonstrated
that Mother and Father had committed severe child abuse against the Child by exposing
the Child to methamphetamine. The version of Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1-
113(g)(4) (West July 1, 2024, to June 30, 2025) that was in effect at the time the
Termination Petition was filed provided that this ground had been proven when:

Under a prior order of a court or by the court hearing the petition to terminate
parental rights or the petition for adoption, a child has been found to be a
victim of severe child abuse, as defined in § 37-1-102, and the parent or
guardian has been found to have knowingly or with gross negligence either
committed severe child abuse or failed to protect the child from severe child
abuse.

At the time the Termination Petition was filed, § 37-1-102(b)(27)(E) (West July 1, 2024,
to December 31, 2024) included the following definition of “severe child abuse”:

The ingestion of an illegal substance or a controlled substance by a child
under eight (8) years of age that results in the child testing positive on a drug
screen[.]

Here, the trial court found that clear and convincing evidence supported termination
of Mother’s and Father’s parental rights relative to this ground, stating:

Pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(4) and 37-1-
102(b)(27)(E), there is clear and convincing evidence that [Mother] and
[Father] have committed severe child abuse as defined in TCA § 37-1-
102(b)(27)(E).

***

[T]he evidence as presented today shows that [Mother] and [Father] have
both committed severe abuse against the child pursuant to TCA § 37-1-
102(b)(27)(E) as evidenced [by proof of positive drug screens from Father,
Mother, and the Child] along with the certified guilty plea of Mother[].

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According to the testimony of Shimeka Foster, the testimony of the Mother
and Father, and a review of the exhibits consisting of the hair follicle results
of the child, the mother and the father, the Court specifically finds: that the
child was under the age of 8 at the time she was exposed to and tested positive
for methamphetamine on her hair screen, in fact the child was 3 years old at
the time; that the Mother and Father both testified they were using drugs,
specifically methamphetamine, at that time; and all three failed hair follicle
drug screens for methamphetamine. Further, Mother testified that the child
was in her care 100% of the time and if not with her then the child was only
with the Father. The parents knowingly and recklessly exposed this child to
their methamphetamine use, shown both through the drug screen results for
the parties and based on Mother’s admission in pleading guilty. Based on
these facts, this ground has been met [by] clear and convincing evidence.

The undisputed evidence in the record supports the trial court’s determination that
this ground was established by clear and convincing evidence as to both parents. The Child
tested positive for methamphetamine in October 2023. Prior to that drug test, the Child
had been under the exclusive care and control of Mother and Father. On May 1, 2024, the
trial court found clear and convincing evidence that the Child was “dependent and
neglected due to drug exposure by the parents,” specifically finding that Mother, Father,
and the Child “were all 3 positive for methamphetamine and that the [C]hild was under the
care and control of the parents during the time she tested positive for methamphetamine.”
Significantly, neither Mother nor Father raised any objection to these findings in the
proceedings below. Neither appellant disputes that Father, Mother, and the Child all tested
positive for methamphetamine while all three were residing together.

On appeal, Father asserts that this Court should reverse the trial court’s findings as
this ground relates to him because “there is nothing in the record that would establish drug
use by the Father in the presence of the [C]hild” and “there is nothing in the record that
would establish a reason for the Father to know of the potential for any drug use by the
mother around the Child.” Thus, according to Father, he did not “knowingly” expose the
Child to methamphetamine. However, “a parent’s failure to protect can be considered
knowing if the parent was deliberately ignorant, as where the parent avoids actual
knowledge of the abuse or neglect but is aware of facts, circumstances, or information that
would put a reasonable parent on notice of the risk and the need to protect the child.” See
In re Markus E., 671 S.W.3d 437, 463 (Tenn. 2023). Here, there is one glaringly obvious
reason that Father should have known that the Child was at risk of severe child abuse from
exposure to methamphetamine, and that is that Father himself had been using
methamphetamine while living with the Child. Furthermore, the record established that
Mother had been going to a suboxone clinic prior to the Child’s removal because of her
addiction to methamphetamine, and Father, who resided with Mother, should have been
aware of these facts and circumstances.

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Moreover, this Court has determined that it is not the “method or level of exposure
of the child to drugs” upon which the determination of severe child abuse turns, but rather
it is “the exposure of the child to harm that matters[.]” See In re A.L.H., No. M2016-01574-
COA-R3-JV, 2017 WL 3822901, at *4 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 31, 2017). Indeed, “[t]his
Court has repeatedly held that exposure of a child to drugs constitutes severe child abuse.”
See id.; see, e.g., In re Ezmaie F., No. M2023-01731-COA-R3-PT, 2024 WL 5183675, at
*7 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 20, 2024) (affirming a finding of severe child abuse when the
parents’ two children had tested positive for methamphetamine and other drugs and
determining that “each parent was, at minimum, grossly negligent in allowing each child
to ingest an illegal substance”); In re Kailey A., No. E2021-00801-COA-R3-PT, 2022 WL
773617, at *10 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 14, 2022) (finding by clear and convincing evidence
that the mother had severely abused her children based on “their exposure to
methamphetamine in the family home as shown by, among other things, their subsequent
drug test results being positive for methamphetamine”).

The Child’s October 2023 positive hair follicle drug test definitively proved that the
Child had been exposed to methamphetamine while in Mother’s and Father’s exclusive
care. Neither Mother nor Father deny that they each used methamphetamine during the
time when they both resided with the Child or that the Child was exposed to
methamphetamine while in their care. Whether it was Mother or Father who exposed the
Child to methamphetamine, and whether each knew of the other’s drug use, is of no import.
The controlling determination is that while the Child was in the exclusive care of Mother
and Father, both parents failed to protect the Child from exposure to drugs. See In re
A.L.H., 2017 WL 3822901, at *4. Therefore, Father’s arguments concerning this ground
are unavailing, and we affirm the trial court’s determination that this ground was
established by clear and convincing evidence as to both parents.

C. Failure to Manifest an Ability and Willingness to Assume
Legal and Physical Custody of or Financial Responsibility for the Child

The trial court also determined that Mother and Father had failed to manifest an
ability and willingness to assume custody of or financial responsibility for the Child.
Regarding this statutory ground, Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1-113(g)(14) provides
for termination of parental rights when:

A parent or guardian has failed to manifest, by act or omission, an ability and
willingness to personally assume legal and physical custody or financial
responsibility of the child, and placing the child in the person’s legal and
physical custody would pose a risk of substantial harm to the physical or
psychological welfare of the child[.]

To prove this ground, DCS was required to show, by clear and convincing evidence, that
(1) Mother and Father failed to manifest either an ability or willingness to assume custody

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of or financial responsibility for the Child and (2) returning the Child to Mother’s or
Father’s custody would pose a risk of substantial harm to the Child’s welfare. In re Neveah
M., 614 S.W.3d 659, 674, 677 (Tenn. 2020); In re Jeremiah S., No. W2019-00610-COA-
R3-PT, 2020 WL 1951880, at *6 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 23, 2020) (“Under this ground for
termination, the petitioner must prove each element by clear and convincing evidence.”).

As to the first prong, our Supreme Court has instructed:

[S]ection 36-1-113(g)(14) places a conjunctive obligation on a parent or
guardian to manifest both an ability and willingness to personally assume
legal and physical custody or financial responsibility for the child. If a person
seeking to terminate parental rights proves by clear and convincing proof that
a parent or guardian has failed to manifest either ability or willingness, then
the first prong of the statute is satisfied.

In re Neveah M., 614 S.W.3d at 677 (citing In re Amynn K., No. E2017-01866-COA-R3-
PT, 2018 WL 3058280, at *13 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 20, 2018)). Concerning the
“substantial harm” requirement of the second prong, this Court has observed:

The courts have not undertaken to define the circumstances that pose a risk
of substantial harm to a child. These circumstances are not amenable to
precise definition because of the variability of human conduct. However, the
use of the modifier “substantial” indicates two things. First, it connotes a
real hazard or danger that is not minor, trivial, or insignificant. Second, it
indicates that the harm must be more than a theoretical possibility. While
the harm need not be inevitable, it must be sufficiently probable to prompt a
reasonable person to believe that the harm will occur more likely than not.

In re Maya R., No. E2017-01634-COA-R3-PT, 2018 WL 1629930, at *8 (Tenn. Ct. App.
Apr. 4, 2018) (quoting Ray v. Ray, 83 S.W.3d 726, 732 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001) (footnotes
omitted in Maya R.)).

In the instant action, the trial court articulated the following relative to this ground:

Pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(14), clear and convincing
evidence has established that [Mother] and [Father] have failed to manifest
an ability and willingness to care for the child and placing the child in either
of their custody would pose a substantial harm to the child. There are two
parts to the analysis of this ground which will be addressed below.

This matter began approximately 18 months ago with drug use by the
parents which resulted in the child testing positive for methamphetamine.
[DCS] offered services to the parents, and whether it was enough is

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debatable, but the fact is that the parents continue to have positive drug
screens after participating in the services offered. If drug use is still there,
then the parents are not manifesting an ability and willingness to assume
custody or care for the child in any manner. This child was positive for
methamphetamine at 3 years old. The Court is not a scientist and does not
know all medical effects of exposure to methamphetamine. If we assume
that was the first exposure, then maybe there will not be long term effects,
but we do not know that it was the first exposure, especially considering that
the parents still have not passed consecutive drug screens. Both parents were
charged with child abuse and neglect; Mother has entered a plea and has been
sentenced while Father has a hearing date in September. Drug screens have
been failed by both parents throughout this case, with neither passing
consecutive drug screens for even a period of 6 months. This continued drug
use has prevented the parents from assuming legal and physical custody or
financial responsibility for the child.

Placing the child in either Mother or Father’s custody would pose a
risk of substantial harm to the physical or psychological welfare of the child.
The parents continue to engage in drug use. Mother was just released from
jail for child abuse and neglect in April of 2025. Father has pending criminal
charges for child abuse and neglect. There is a history of drug use by both
parents. All of these behaviors exhibited by the parents pose a risk of
substantial harm to the child, and there is no indication that these behaviors
would cease as they have not ceased in the 18 months the child has been in
foster care. The Court concludes that there is clear and convincing evidence
that [Mother] and [Father] have failed to manifest an ability and willingness
to assume custody of the child pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g).

The evidence supporting termination discussed above pursuant to the grounds of
persistent conditions and severe child abuse also supports termination relative to this
statutory ground. After the Child was removed and placed into DCS custody in November
2023, both Mother and Father continued to test positive for methamphetamine, with
Mother’s latest positive test result in September 2024 and Father’s most recent positive
screen in February 2025. This demonstrates that neither parent was willing or able to take
the necessary steps to cease using drugs so that he or she could assume physical custody
of the Child. We acknowledge that Mother had made progress toward conquering her drug
addiction, as demonstrated by her occasional ability to return a clean drug screen.
However, Mother had not demonstrated consistency in ending her drug use during the
entirety of the proceedings. Even more troubling, Mother continued to reside with Father,
who was proven to be actively using methamphetamine just three months before the
termination trial.

Mother’s and Father’s continued drug use also supports termination as to the second

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prong of this ground because return of the Child to the parents would pose a risk of
substantial harm to the Child. Furthermore, the Child had resided with Foster Mother and
her family for eighteen months by the time of the termination trial, during which time the
Child had bonded with the Foster Parents. This Court has previously determined that
removing a child who has “bonded and thrived” with her current family amounts to
substantial harm. See In re Braelyn S., No. E2020-00043-COA-R3-PT, 2020 WL 4200088,
at *17 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 22, 2020) (finding that the child would be at risk of substantial
psychological harm if custody were restored to the father who had been apart from the
child for five years and was a “virtual stranger”); In re Antonio J., No. M2019-00255-
COA-R3-PT, 2019 WL 6312951, at *9 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 25, 2019) (concluding that
placing the children in the mother’s custody would put them at risk of substantial harm
because the children were “very young” when they were removed and had “little to no
contact” with the mother for more than a year).

The Child had come to live with Foster Parents at the age of three. At trial, Foster
Mother testified that the Child was “thriving,” with her foster family and that she was “in
daycare,” playing “t-ball,” and “very active with the church.” Foster Mother further
articulated that the Child had “bonded” with the Foster Parents’ infant child and that she
got along “great” with both Foster Parents, actively participating in family events. Ms.
O’Neill testified that the Child had exhibited a “healthy parental attachment” to Foster
Parents and that their home was a “safe, secure environment” for the Child. By contrast,
Ms. O’Neill testified that the Child referred to Mother and Father by “their first names”
such that the Child did not appear to consider them parental figures. For the above-stated
reasons, we affirm the trial court’s conclusion that both prongs of this ground were
established by clear and convincing evidence as to both parents.

V. Best Interest of the Child

When, as here, a parent has been deemed unfit by establishment of at least one
statutory ground for termination of parental rights, the interests of parent and child diverge,
and the focus shifts to what is in the child’s best interest. In re Audrey S., 182 S.W.3d 838,
877 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005); see also In re Carrington H., 483 S.W.3d at 523 (“The best
interests analysis is separate from and subsequent to the determination that there is clear
and convincing evidence of grounds for termination.” (quoting In re Angela E., 303 S.W.3d
240, (Tenn. 2010))). Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1-113(i) provides a list of factors the
trial court is to consider when determining if termination of parental rights is in a child’s
best interest. This list is not exhaustive, and the statute does not require the court to find
the existence of every factor before concluding that termination is in a child’s best interest.
See In re Carrington H., 483 S.W.3d at 523; In re Audrey S., 182 S.W.3d at 878 (“The
relevancy and weight to be given each factor depends on the unique facts of each case.”).
Furthermore, the best interest of a child must be determined from the child’s perspective
and not the parent’s. White v. Moody, 171 S.W.3d 187, 194 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2004).

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Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1-113(i)(1) (West July 1, 2021, to current) lists the
following factors for consideration:

(A) The effect a termination of parental rights will have on the child’s
critical need for stability and continuity of placement throughout the
child’s minority;

(B) The effect a change of caretakers and physical environment is likely
to have on the child’s emotional, psychological, and medical
condition;

(C) Whether the parent has demonstrated continuity and stability in
meeting the child’s basic material, educational, housing, and safety
needs;

(D) Whether the parent and child have a secure and healthy parental
attachment, and if not, whether there is a reasonable expectation that
the parent can create such attachment;

(E) Whether the parent has maintained regular visitation or other contact
with the child and used the visitation or other contact to cultivate a
positive relationship with the child;

(F) Whether the child is fearful of living in the parent’s home;

(G) Whether the parent, parent’s home, or others in the parent’s household
trigger or exacerbate the child’s experience of trauma or post-
traumatic symptoms;

(H) Whether the child has created a healthy parental attachment with
another person or persons in the absence of the parent;

(I) Whether the child has emotionally significant relationships with
persons other than parents and caregivers, including biological or
foster siblings, and the likely impact of various available outcomes on
these relationships and the child’s access to information about the
child’s heritage;

(J) Whether the parent has demonstrated such a lasting adjustment of
circumstances, conduct, or conditions to make it safe and beneficial
for the child to be in the home of the parent, including consideration
of whether there is criminal activity in the home or by the parent, or
the use of alcohol, controlled substances, or controlled substance

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analogues which may render the parent unable to consistently care for
the child in a safe and stable manner;

(K) Whether the parent has taken advantage of available programs,
services, or community resources to assist in making a lasting
adjustment of circumstances, conduct, or conditions;

(L) Whether the department has made reasonable efforts to assist the
parent in making a lasting adjustment in cases where the child is in
the custody of the department;

(M) Whether the parent has demonstrated a sense of urgency in
establishing paternity of the child, seeking custody of the child, or
addressing the circumstance, conduct, or conditions that made an
award of custody unsafe and not in the child’s best interest;

(N) Whether the parent, or other person residing with or frequenting the
home of the parent, has shown brutality or physical, sexual,
emotional, or psychological abuse or neglect toward the child or any
other child or adult;

(O) Whether the parent has ever provided safe and stable care for the child
or any other child;

(P) Whether the parent has demonstrated an understanding of the basic
and specific needs required for the child to thrive;

(Q) Whether the parent has demonstrated the ability and commitment to
creating and maintaining a home that meets the child’s basic and
specific needs and in which the child can thrive;

(R) Whether the physical environment of the parent’s home is healthy and
safe for the child;

(S) Whether the parent has consistently provided more than token
financial support for the child; and

(T) Whether the mental or emotional fitness of the parent would be
detrimental to the child or prevent the parent from consistently and
effectively providing safe and stable care and supervision of the child.

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The statute further provides: “When considering the factors set forth in subdivision (i)(1),
the prompt and permanent placement of the child in a safe environment is presumed to be
in the child’s best interest.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(i)(2).

As our Supreme Court has instructed regarding the best interest analysis:

These statutory factors are illustrative, not exclusive, and any party to the
termination proceeding is free to offer proof of any other factor relevant to
the best interests analysis. In re Carrington H., 483 S.W.3d at 523 (citing In
re Audrey S., 182 S.W.3d 838, 878 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005)). Facts considered
in the best interests analysis must be proven by “a preponderance of the
evidence, not by clear and convincing evidence.” In re Kaliyah S., 455
S.W.3d [533,] 555 [(Tenn. 2015)] (citing In re Audrey S., 182 S.W.3d at 861).
“After making the underlying factual findings, the trial court should then
consider the combined weight of those facts to determine whether they
amount to clear and convincing evidence that termination is in the child’s
best interest[s].” Id. When considering these statutory factors, courts must
remember that “[t]he child’s best interests [are] viewed from the child’s,
rather than the parent’s, perspective.” In re Audrey S., 182 S.W.3d at 878.
Indeed, “[a] focus on the perspective of the child is the common theme”
evident in all of the statutory factors. Id. “[W]hen the best interests of the
child and those of the adults are in conflict, such conflict shall always be
resolved to favor the rights and the best interests of the child. . . .” Tenn.
Code Ann. § 36-1-101(d) (2017).

Ascertaining a child’s best interests involves more than a “rote
examination” of the statutory factors. In re Audrey S., 182 S.W.3d at 878.
And the best interests analysis consists of more than tallying the number of
statutory factors weighing in favor of or against termination. White v.
Moody, 171 S.W.3d 187, 193-94 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2004). Rather, the facts and
circumstances of each unique case dictate how weighty and relevant each
statutory factor is in the context of the case. See In re Audrey S., 182 S.W.3d
at 878. Simply put, the best interests analysis is and must remain a factually
intensive undertaking, so as to ensure that every parent receives
individualized consideration before fundamental parental rights are
terminated. In re Carrington H., 483 S.W.3d at 523. “[D]epending upon the
circumstances of a particular child and a particular parent, the consideration
of one factor may very well dictate the outcome of the analysis.” In re
Audrey S., 182 S.W.3d at 878 (citing White v. Moody, 171 S.W.3d at 194).
But this does not mean that a court is relieved of the obligation of considering
all the factors and all the proof. Even if the circumstances of a particular
case ultimately result in the court ascribing more weight—even outcome
determinative weight—to a particular statutory factor, the court must

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consider all of the statutory factors, as well as any other relevant proof any
party offers.

In re Gabriella D., 531 S.W.3d 662, 681-82 (Tenn. 2017).

In the case at bar, the trial court considered each of the best interest factors and
determined that several of them weighed in favor of terminating Mother’s and Father’s
parental rights. The trial court then concluded, by clear and convincing evidence, that
termination of Mother’s and Father’s parental rights was in the Child’s best interest.

The trial court weighed factor (A)—the effect termination will have on the child’s
critical need for stability and continuity of placement—in favor of termination, noting that
there “has continued to be drug use in the parents’ home, which does not give rise to
stability.” The court also weighed factor (B)—the effect a change of caretakers and
physical environment is likely to have on the child’s emotional, psychological, and medical
condition—in favor of termination, noting that the Child had “thrived over the last 18
months with the foster family” and that when she came into DCS custody, the child “was
bruised, thin, dirty and hungry” but that those characteristics were no longer present. For
the reasons stated above relative to all three statutory grounds for termination, we agree
with the trial court that factors (A) and (B) weigh in favor of termination as to both parents.

The trial court determined that factor (C), which considers whether the parent has
demonstrated continuity and stability in meeting the child’s basic needs, weighed in favor
of termination as to both parents. The court noted that although the parents had “made
changes to the home environment,” they had not been able to present “a drug free home”
and that this constituted a “safety issue.” The parents continued to live together throughout
the proceedings. Mother tested positive for methamphetamine eight months before trial,
and Father tested positive for methamphetamine a mere three months before trial. The
evidence preponderates in favor of the trial court’s determination.

The trial court weighed both factors (D) and (E) against termination. Factor (D)
considers whether the parents and child have a secure and healthy parental attachment and
if not, whether there is a reasonable expectation that the parent can create such attachment.
Factor (E) considers whether the parent has maintained regular visitation or other contact
with the Child. In weighing these factors against termination, the trial court noted that the
parents had “maintained regular supervised contact and visitation” with the Child
throughout the proceedings. Regarding factor (E), we agree that this factor weighs against
termination. The parents consistently visited with the Child, even reaching out with Foster
Mother’s consent and assistance to speak to the Child outside of their regularly scheduled
supervised visits. Both parents appear to have fostered and maintained a positive
relationship with the Child.

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However, we disagree with the trial court as to factor (D). Since the Child was
placed into DCS custody, Mother and Father had enjoyed only supervised visits with the
Child for four hours per week plus occasional video calls facilitated by Foster Mother.
According to Ms. O’Neill, the Child did not refer to Mother and Father as her parents
during the visits but instead called them by their first names. By contrast, the Child referred
to her Foster Parents as “mom and dad.” Although the parents’ efforts to visit the Child
regularly are commendable and they clearly maintained a positive relationship with the
Child, there was no evidence that the Child had developed a “secure and healthy parental
attachment” to Mother and Father. Moreover, the parents’ continued drug use cuts against
any reasonable expectation that the parents could create such an attachment in the near
future. Therefore, Factor (D) weighs in favor of termination. By virtue of the bond
between the Child and Foster Parents, we also agree with the trial court that factor (H)—
whether the Child has created a healthy parental attachment with another person or
persons—weighs in favor of termination.

The trial court determined that factors (F) and (G) weighed neutrally because there
had been no evidence presented about whether the Child was fearful of living in the
parents’ home. The record is consistent with the trial court’s determination, and we will
not disturb its findings regarding these factors.

With respect to factor (I)—whether the child has emotionally significant
relationships with persons other than parents and caregivers and how these relationships
affect the child’s access to information about the child’s heritage—the trial court weighed
this factor in favor of termination, reiterating the Child’s growing parental attachment to
Foster Parents. Regarding the Child’s access to her family heritage, there was no evidence
presented about Mother’s family except Mother’s testimony that she had family in the area
but did not “talk to them that much.”

As to Father’s cultural heritage, Father and Foster Mother testified that Father and
the Child would communicate in Spanish during their video calls. Father expressed a desire
for the Child to learn “Spanish tradition and culture” and “the Spanish language.” We are
sensitive to the fact that if the Child loses access to Father’s family, there would possibly
be aspects of Father’s Mexican heritage that may be lost to the Child. However, Father’s
closest family resided in Colorado at the time of trial, and there was no evidence that Father
maintained a close relationship with those family members such that the Child would
necessarily have access to her heritage through them. Regarding the Child’s exposure to
the Spanish language, Foster Mother testified that Foster Parents had “engaged a tutor” to
teach the Child Spanish and to “preserve her culture.” Such action on the part of Foster
Parents indicated their intention to help the Child know about her family of origin and
heritage. The evidence preponderates in favor of the trial court’s findings regarding factor
(I).

As to factor (J), the trial court stated:

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Factor (J) is this case in a nutshell. These parents have not
demonstrated a lasting adjustment of circumstances, conduct, or conditions
to make it safe and beneficial for the child to be in the home of the parent.
There continues to be the use of controlled substances, namely
methamphetamine, which renders the parents unable to consistently care for
the child in a safe and stable manner. The parents have not shown that they
are able to remain drug free in this matter. This factor weighs in favor of
termination.

Upon careful review, and for the reasons stated above relative to all three statutory grounds
for termination, we agree with the trial court’s conclusions respecting factor (J).

Turning to factor (K), which considers whether the parent has taken advantage of
available programs, services, or community resources to assist in making a lasting
adjustment of circumstances, conduct, or conditions, the trial court weighed this factor in
favor of termination. The trial court reasoned that although the parents “did take advantage
of services offered to them,[] they made no lasting adjustment and were unsuccessful in
implementing and demonstrating the skills learned.” The trial court stated that the parents
had “completed [A&D] assessments and did 1-2 months of IOP services” but then failed
hair follicle drug screens.

As factor (K) pertains to Mother, it is undeniable that Mother worked with DCS to
improve her circumstances and that she took steps to overcome her drug habit so that she
could be reunited with the Child. The most detailed evidence of Mother’s progress toward
reunification can be found in the three foster care Board review reports. All three of the
Board reports stated that Mother had complied with her most significant responsibilities in
the permanency plan. In the February 23, 2024 report, the Board commended mother in
“actively pursuing” her action steps. In the August 20, 2024 report, the Board wrote to
Mother: “Keep up the good work!” In the February 27, 2025 report, which occurred
shortly after Mother tested positive once again for methamphetamine, the Board
encouraged Mother to “focus on her sobriety” and to seek legal counsel regarding steps she
could take to “increase her chances of reunification” with the Child. Additionally, Mother
consistently reported for drug screens following removal of the Child, regularly attended
supervised visitation, completed an IOP, and completed homemaker services. It is
unfortunate that Mother’s efforts to improve her life were hampered by her inability to end
her unlawful drug use or to extract herself from Father’s influence. However, it would be
inaccurate to state that Mother did not avail herself of the services offered by DCS or that
she did not try. Factor (K) weighs against termination as to Mother.

Father made fewer efforts toward improving his circumstances. The latter two of
three Board reports concluded that Father had failed to comply with his most significant
responsibilities in the permanency plan. Father tested positive for methamphetamine on

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February 5, 2024, and February 21, 2025. Father has raised on appeal that he was not
provided a Spanish interpreter by DCS and that this caused him to misunderstand what was
required of him. We will address that important issue in more detail in a subsequent section
of this Opinion. However, considering Father’s purported language barrier, we find
Father’s argument that he did not understand what was required of him by DCS
disingenuous as it relates to his continued drug use. Father admitted during trial that after
he had tested positive for methamphetamine, DCS had offered him assistance in addressing
his drug use and that he refused that assistance:

Attorney: You understand part of what you were asked to do were some
drug screens in [February 2024 and February 2025]. You
submitted to those and failed them, didn’t you.

Father: Here is my point. After those drug tests, we had a video chat
meeting. It was a phone call maybe. It is what they asked me
if I needed help in that matter or was it something I would be
able to address on my own. I told them I could do it by myself
but from [February 2025] until here, there has been no more
drug tests, no contact, no nothing.

When questioned about the failed drug screens again later during his testimony, the
following interaction ensued:

Attorney: [W]ere you using methamphetamine during that time period
[between February 2024 and February 2025] when you failed
tests for it?

Father: When I failed the drug test, yes, that’s why I failed it. . . . Right
after that one time over the phone when I told them I would be
able to get clean and help on my own, from then on if you were
to give me a test now, I will do it right now, clean.

These exchanges demonstrate that Father understood that he had failed a drug screen, that
he further understood that getting “clean” was the desirable outcome, and that DCS was
offering him assistance to address his unlawful drug use. By Father’s own admission, he
had declined DCS’s offer of assistance because he had intended to “get clean and help on
[his] own.” Thus, Father intentionally and knowingly refused to avail himself of DCS’s
services on the paramount issue relative to his termination case: his continued drug use.
We agree with the trial court that Factor (K) weighs in favor of termination as to Father.

Moving to factor (N), which considers whether the parent or any other person in the
parent’s home has shown brutality or any other form of abuse or neglect toward the child
or any other child, the trial court simply stated that the parents had “shown neglect” toward

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the Child as evinced by the Child “testing positive” for methamphetamine “at 3 years old”
and the parents’ “continued failure of drug screens over a period of 18 months.” For the
reasons articulated above relative to the ground of severe child abuse, we agree that this
factor weighs in favor of termination as to both parents.

The trial court found that factor (O)—whether the parent has ever provided safe and
stable care for the child or any other child—weighed in favor of termination for both
parents as well. The trial court noted that at the time the Child was placed into foster care
in November of 2023, the Child had “presented as dirty, bruised, thin, and hungry”; she
had recently “tested positive for methamphetamine on a hair follicle drug test”; the parents’
home had been “dirty, there was trash all around; clutter, water standing on the floor, old
food on the counters and surfaces, the refrigerator did not work, there was garbage in the
rooms”; and “there was no bed for the Child.” We additionally note that Mother testified
to having two children other than the Child, one of whom was with the child’s maternal
grandmother and the other, Mother’s “second son,” had been “adopted out” due in part to
Mother’s use of methamphetamine. Mother had been living with Father when her second
son was adopted due to Mother’s drug use. The evidence in the record supports the trial
court’s conclusion that factor (O) weighed in favor of termination as to both parents.

The trial court determined that there was “no proof presented” respective of factor
(P), which concerns whether the parents have demonstrated understanding of the basic and
specific needs required for the child to thrive, or factor (Q), which considers whether the
parent had demonstrated the ability and commitment to creating and maintaining a home
that meets the child’s basic and specific needs and in which the child can thrive. The trial
court declined to weigh either factor for or against termination. However, we find it quite
apparent that Mother and Father, who both tested positive for methamphetamine during the
proceedings, failed to demonstrate, by their continued drug use alone, a basic
understanding of or an ability and commitment to creating and maintaining a home that
would meet the basic and specific needs of the Child. A child cannot thrive in a home
wherein one parent, and certainly both parents, are using methamphetamine. Factors (P)
and (Q) weigh in favor of termination. For the same reasons, we agree with the trial court
that factor (R)—whether the physical environment of the parent’s home is healthy and safe
for the child—also weighs in favor of termination.

As to factor (S), whether the parent has consistently provided more than token
financial support for the child, the trial court weighed this factor against termination as to
Father, noting that he had “provided consistent child support payments” for the Child. The
evidence preponderates in favor of the trial court’s determination as to Father. With respect
to Mother, the trial court stated there was “no proof presented as to Mother for child
support” and determined the factor did not weigh in favor of termination as to Mother.
Although we agree with the trial court’s ultimate conclusion, we note that the record does
include some proof respective of Mother’s child support obligation. Beginning in
November 2023, the permanency plans required that Mother pay $100.00 per month for

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the financial support of the Child. The trial court reiterated the child support requirement
when it ratified the permanency plans in February and October 2024 and included in each
ratification order an instruction that both parents should pay their respective child support
obligations directly to the ”State Disbursement Unit.” In June 2024, DCS filed a petition
for contempt against Mother, alleging that she had failed to make any payment toward her
child support obligation and seeking an arrearage of $300.00. Attached to the petition was
a notice of civil contempt signed by a child support enforcement officer. However, it is
unclear how or whether Mother’s alleged child support arrearage or the petition for
contempt was resolved. We therefore find that the proof regarding Mother’s child support
obligation is insufficient to weigh this factor either for or against termination, and we agree
with the trial court that it weighs neutrally as to Mother.

Factor (T) considers whether the mental or emotional fitness of the parent would
be detrimental to the child or prevent the parent from consistently and effectively providing
safe and stable care and supervision of the child. The trial court weighed this factor in
favor of termination of both Mother’s and Father’s parental rights predicated on the
“impact their continued drug use has on the child,” which the court found to be
“significant.” The parents’ continued drug use was proven, inter alia, by the positive drug
screens and the admission of the parents under oath. For the same reasons that we weighed
factors (P) and (Q) in favor of termination, factor (T) also weighs in favor of termination
as to both parents.

Concerning factor (L)—whether DCS has made reasonable efforts to assist the
parent in making a lasting adjustment in cases where the child is in the custody of the
department, the trial court determined:

[DCS] did make reasonable efforts to assist the parents. Could [DCS]
have done more, possibly. However, the parents did not successfully engage
in the services offered as evidenced by their continued use of drugs. This
factor weighs in favor of termination.

On appeal, Father asserts that DCS failed to make reasonable efforts to help him reunite
with the Child in two main areas: (1) failure to provide adequate “assistance and support”
in helping Father “overcome allegations of drug abuse or addiction” and (2) failure “to
provide translators or other reasonable methods of communication” to Father, who “spoke
Spanish and had limited communication skills in English.” We will address each postulate
in turn.

Tennessee Code Annotated § 37-1-166(g), the statute governing dependency and
neglect proceedings before a juvenile court, defines “reasonable efforts” as “the exercise
of reasonable care and diligence by [DCS] to provide services related to meeting the needs
of the child and the family.” DCS bears the burden to demonstrate that reasonable efforts
have been made to either “(1) prevent the need for removal of the child from such child’s

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family; or (2) make it possible for the child to return home.” See Tenn. Code Ann. § 37-
1-166(a) and (b). In determining what constitutes “reasonable efforts,” the statute instructs
that “the child’s health and safety shall be the paramount concern.” See § 37-1-166(g).

Regarding the “reasonable efforts” requirement in the context of a parental
termination proceeding, our Supreme Court has held that the “extent of DCS’s efforts to
reunify the family is weighed in the court’s best-interest analysis but proof of reasonable
efforts is not a precondition to termination of the parental rights of the respondent parent.”
See In re Kaliyah S., 455 S.W.3d 533, 555 (Tenn. 2015). Thus, “the extent of DCS’s efforts
remains a factor to be weighed in the best interest analysis, not an essential element that
must be proven in order to terminate [parental rights].” See id. at 556. In other words,
parental rights may still be terminated even if the trial court finds that DCS did not make
reasonable efforts toward reunification. See id.

However, in so holding, the In re Kaliyah S. Court cautioned:

In many circumstances, the success of a parent’s remedial efforts is
intertwined with the efforts of the Department’s staff to provide assistance
and support. Reasonable efforts entail more than simply providing parents
with a list of service providers and sending them on their way. The
Department’s employees must use their superior insight and training to assist
parents with the problems the Department has identified in the permanency
plan, whether the parents ask for assistance or not.

Id. at 556 (quoting In re C.M.M., No. M2003-01122-COA-R3-PT, 2004 WL 438326, at *7
(Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 9, 2004)).3 The Court continued that a lack of reasonable efforts
“may weigh heavily enough to persuade the trial court that termination of the parent’s
rights is not in the best interest of the subject child.” See id.

Father relies on this excerpt from In re Kaliyah S. to argue that his lack of success
in passing drug screens was “intertwined with the efforts of [DCS] staff to provide
assistance and support.” Father asserts that his “stance that he could [end his drug
addiction] on his own was not a legitimate reason for DCS to simply ignore the need for
more attention to these matters.” Father refers here to the fact that after he tested positive
for methamphetamine in February 2025, he declined an offer of assistance from DCS to
address his drug problem. Father expounds that his refusal of help after this last drug screen
was not a “legitimate reason” for DCS to “simply ignore” Father’s needs in this area.

3
The Supreme Court overruled In re C.M.M. by holding that the State is not required, as a precondition to
termination, to prove that it made reasonable efforts to reunify the parent with the child. See In re Kaliyah
S., 455 S.W.3d at 535. Nevertheless, the Court quoted this excerpt from C.M.M. with approval in an effort
to avoid “minimiz[ing] the importance of DCS’s efforts to assist parents who lose custody of their child
and seek to regain it.” See id. at 556.
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We note that Father has narrowed the focus of his argument to the three-month
period between his positive drug screen and the termination trial in May 2025. In so doing,
Father ignores the preceding fifteen-month period that included the many documented
efforts made by DCS to assist him with his drug problem and other needs. Between
November 2023 and February 2025, DCS funded, facilitated, and monitored the parents’
participation in homemaker services, parenting assessment services, mental health
assessments, alcohol and drug assessments, an online parenting class, and intensive
outpatient services. DCS also met with the parents to form two permanency plans,
participated in numerous court hearings to ratify and review the parents’ progress, and
participated in three foster care Board review sessions. DCS caseworker Ms. O’Neill
testified that she personally attempted to visit the parents’ home “probably six times” in
addition to the home visit she attempted, at Mother’s request, on the morning of trial.

In the case at bar, DCS clearly did more for Mother and Father than “simply
providing parents with a list of service providers and sending them on their way.” See In
re Kaliyah S., 455 S.W.3d at 556. And although we agree that DCS does bear the
responsibility to assist parents with problems like drug addiction and other needs that are
identified in a permanency plan, see id., parents also bear responsibility to take advantage
of the help offered. See, e.g., In re Jah’Lila S., No. W2021-01199-COA-R3-PT, 2022 WL
4362839, at *13 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 21, 2022) (“Reasonable efforts are not tantamount
to Herculean efforts . . . and parents are also required to make reasonable efforts to
rehabilitate themselves.”) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); In re Nicholas
C., No. E2019-00165-COA-R3-PT, 2019 WL 3074070, at *20 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 15,
2019) (“This court has previously stated that DCS’s duty to make reasonable efforts is a
two-way street. A parent’s response to and cooperation with the Department’s
reunification efforts is one of the factors to be considered when evaluating the
reasonableness of DCS’s efforts.”) (citation omitted). Father admits that he continued to
use methamphetamine during the pendency of the termination proceedings and that when
DCS asked him if he required assistance with his drug addiction, he declined that help.
Father did not make reasonable efforts to rehabilitate himself. See In re Jah’Lila S., 2022
WL 4362839, at *13.

As the trial court stated, perhaps DCS could have done more to assist these parents.
But DCS could not prevent the parents from using drugs. That goal was the parents’
responsibility to accomplish. Upon careful consideration of the record as a whole, we find
that DCS did make reasonable efforts to assist both parents in battling their drug addiction.

Father next contends that DCS did not make reasonable efforts to assist him with
his language barrier. Specifically, Father claims that DCS failed to provide Father with a
Spanish interpreter. At trial, Father testified that he had lived in the United States for “26
years” and that he was able to “function in [the United States] culture to some degree with
English speaking people.” However, Father explained that his “primary language” was
Spanish and that he could understand “maybe 50 percent” of what was said to him in

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English. Father added that due to this language barrier, he had been “very confused” during
the termination proceedings and did not understand how “grave” the situation had become
until “maybe three weeks” before trial. Notably, the trial court did provide a Spanish
interpreter during the termination trial in accordance with Tennessee Supreme Court Rule
42 § 3 (“It is the responsibility of the court to determine whether a participant in a legal
proceeding has a limited ability to understand and communicate in English. If the court
determines that a participant has such limited ability, the court should appoint an
interpreter[.]”).

DCS acknowledges that it did not provide Father with an interpreter during the pre-
trial proceedings. In its defense, DCS points out that “both Mother and Father signed the
[Criteria and Procedures document]” indicating that the document had been explained to
them. At trial, Father’s attorney handed him a copy of the Criteria and Procedures, which
bore Father’s signature. Father acknowledged that the signature was his but explained that
he was unable to read the document or “understand it fully” because it was written in
English. When asked whether DCS had reviewed the Criteria and Procedures with the
parents at the time of the Child’s removal, Ms. O’Neill merely answered that the document
was “in the file.” There was no further testimony regarding whether DCS had reviewed or
explained the Criteria and Procedures document to Mother or Father. Father also recounted
that at one point, he had approached a DCS employee with a request for an interpreter but
“no one ever got back” to him and that on another occasion, Father had asked his former
attorney for an interpreter, but none was ever provided.

Given that parents have a fundamental, constitutional interest in the care and
custody of their children, see Keisling, 92 S.W.3d at 378, we take very seriously Father’s
contention that DCS should have provided him with an interpreter so that he could fully
participate in the proceedings leading up to the trial. There is no statutory or regulatory
requirement in Tennessee that DCS provide an interpreter for parents who face termination
of their parental rights. However, DCS has in some instances provided interpreters and
Spanish-language versions of relevant documents to parents. See, e.g., In re Jose L., No.
E2016-00517-COA-R3-PT, 2016 WL 6426774, at *2 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 31, 2016)
(affirming termination when a DCS interpreter had thoroughly explained the criteria and
procedures for termination of parental rights and each of the permanency requirements to
the father in Spanish and DCS had provided Spanish copies of each of the relevant
documents to the father); In re D.P.M., No. M2005-02183-COA-R3PT, 2006 WL
2589938, at *2 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 8, 2006) (affirming termination when DCS had
employed an interpreter to read the permanency plans to the mother in Spanish and explain
them). These examples notwithstanding, this Court has not directly addressed the issue of
whether DCS should provide an interpreter to parents of limited English-speaking ability
as part of the department’s “reasonable efforts to assist” in a termination proceeding.

Although we find no authority requiring DCS to provide an interpreter, this Court
has emphasized the importance of providing an interpreter “at all stages” of a termination

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proceeding. See In re Valle, 31 S.W.3d 566, 570, 573 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000) (considering
whether “due process requires that a translator be provided a non-English speaking parent
in a termination of parental rights case” and reversing the trial court’s termination of the
parental rights in part because the court failed to do so). In In re Valle, we determined:

While we have found no case dealing with the precise issue before us,
we generally recognize that the party litigant is entitled to be present in all
stages of the actual trial of the case. Warren v. Warren, 731 S.W.2d 908,
909 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1985). Thus, a party must be in a position to understand
the nature of the case and the testimony of the witnesses. When this question
presents itself, the trial court must determine whether an interpreter is
necessary, based upon the nature and extent of any alleged disability of the
parties. Considering the drastic nature of a termination of parental rights
case, it is particularly incumbent upon the trial court to be careful in
exercising discretion for the appointment of an interpreter.

31 S.W.3d at 573 (emphasis added).

We recognize that In re Valle dealt with the question of whether the trial court, not
DCS, violated the parent’s constitutional rights by failing to provide an interpreter. See id.
However, in cases when a child has been removed into DCS custody, a parent’s
understanding of the nature of the case necessarily involves a parent’s understanding of
DCS’s criteria and procedures for termination. As Father asserts, DCS’s reasonable efforts
prior to a parental termination trial are often “intertwined” with a parent’s success in
avoiding termination of his or her parental rights. See In re Kaliyah S., 455 S.W.3d at 556.
This is particularly so in a case such as the instant action wherein the Child had been placed
into DCS custody, DCS had initiated the Termination Petition, and DCS had maintained a
pivotal role in assisting the parents in completing the requirements set forth in the
permanency plans.

Upon reviewing the facts before us, we find that the better practice for DCS would
have been for the department to provide Father with a Spanish interpreter for the specific
purpose of (1) explaining the general criteria and procedures for termination of parental
rights (including an explanation of the Criteria and Procedures document) and (2)
explaining to Father what was expected of him to avoid termination of his parental rights.
Also, a better practice would have been to provide a written, Spanish version of the Criteria
and Procedures document and the permanency plans to Father so that Father could review
those critical documents in his native language.

We do not intend to suggest that DCS should have provided Father with an
interpreter for every check-in, meeting, supervised visitation, service, or class. Such a
requirement would be impractical, if not impossible, considering that many of the services
and referrals provided by DCS are facilitated by third-party organizations over which DCS

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has no direct control. We are also mindful that Father was represented by counsel during
every stage of the termination proceedings, such that Father’s attorney could have asked
for an interpreter for Father during DCS meetings. However, in our estimation, it would
have been reasonable for DCS to provide Father with an interpreter, at the minimum, to
translate for Father the Criteria and Procedures document and to interpret the requirements
expected of Father pursuant to the permanency plans. Had DCS provided Father a Spanish
interpreter for these discrete purposes, Father would have been better placed “in a position
to understand the nature of the case” against him. See In re Valle, 31 S.W.3d at 573.

Cognizant of the due process and constitutional implications that are inherent to a
parental termination action, we conclude that by failing to provide Father with a Spanish
interpreter to (1) explain to Father the Criteria and Procedures document and (2) explain to
Father what was expected of him to regain custody of the Child, including the requirements
laid out in the permanency plans, DCS fell short of its responsibility to make reasonable
efforts to assist Father in making lasting adjustments toward reunification with the Child.
Accordingly, we conclude that factor (L) weighs against termination of Father’s parental
rights.

However, we reiterate that the reasonableness of DCS’s efforts is but one factor to
be considered among twenty factors in the best interest analysis. See In re Kaliyah S., 455
S.W.3d at 555. Furthermore, when reasonable efforts are being evaluated, the “child’s
health and safety” is of “paramount concern.” See Tenn. Code Ann. § 37-1-166(g).
Regardless of any deficiency on the part of DCS, Mother and Father continued to test
positive for methamphetamine after the Child was removed from their care. Thus, the
parents demonstrated an inability to eradicate drugs from their home, and this fact proved
fatal to their case. Considering the totality of the best interest factors, we determine that
the evidence preponderates in favor of the trial court’s conclusion, by clear and convincing
evidence, that termination of Mother’s and Father’s parental rights was in the Child’s best
interest.

VI. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court’s judgment in all respects,
including termination of Mother’s and Father’s parental rights. This case is remanded to
the trial court, pursuant to applicable law, for enforcement of the trial court’s judgment
terminating Mother’s and Father’s parental rights to the Child and for collection of costs
assessed below. Costs on appeal are assessed one-half to the appellant, Angela M.C., and
one-half to the appellant, Hector M.C.

s/Thomas R. Frierson, II
_________________________________
THOMAS R. FRIERSON, II, JUDGE

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11241973. Public record. Not legal advice.