# Satterfield

> District Court, W.D. North Carolina · January 12, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11241812

## Case

- **Full name:** Marcus Antonio Satterfield v. Avery Mitchell Correctional Institution, et al.
- **Court:** District Court, W.D. North Carolina
- **Decided:** January 12, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
CHARLOTTE DIVISION
3:25-cv-00977-MR

MARCUS ANTONIO SATTERFIELD, )
)
Plaintiff, )
vs. )
) MEMORANDUM OF
) DECISION AND ORDER
AVERY MITCHELL CORRECTIONAL ) ON INITIAL REVIEW
INSTITUTION, et al., )
)
Defendants. )
________________________________ )

THIS MATTER is before the Court on initial review of Plaintiff’s
Complaint, [Doc. 1], filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See 28 U.S.C. §§
1915(e)(2) and 1915A. Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis. [Docs. 2,
5].
I. BACKGROUND
Pro se Plaintiff Marcus Antonio Satterfield (“Plaintiff”) is a prisoner of
the State of North Carolina currently incarcerated at Johnston Correctional
Institution in Smithfield, North Carolina. On December 9, 2025, he filed this
action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, based on alleged events at
Avery/Mitchell Correctional Institution (“AMCI”) in Spruce Pine, North
Carolina. [Doc. 1]. Plaintiff names the following AMCI officials as
Defendants: Richard Ellis, Sergeant; Matthan Hicks,1 Correctional Officer;
Danny Strafford, Correctional Officer; Landon Brown,2 Unit Manager; Loren

Aldrige, Unit Manager; Derrick E. Fox, not otherwise identified; Robert B.
Bullis, Warden, and FNU Crow, Assistant Warden, all in their individual and
official capacities. [Id. at 1-3]. Plaintiff also names the Department of Adult

Correction (“NCDAC”) and AMCI as Defendants. [Id. at 1]. Plaintiff appears
to allege as follows.
On July 21, 2023, between 5:00 and 6:30 p.m., Defendants Strafford,
Hicks, and Ellis “[g]anged up” on the Plaintiff, calling him out of the dorm and

into the hallway. [Id. at 4]. These Defendants verbally assaulted the Plaintiff
and Defendant Ellis threatened him. [Id. at 4-5]. Plaintiff “contact[ed] their
superior officers,” who ignored the Plaintiff and his plea for help. [Id. at 5].

Plaintiff was ordered to submit to handcuffs “under false Allegations [sic].”
[Id. at 4-5]. After Plaintiff submitted to handcuffs, Defendant Hicks “twisted
[Plaintiff’s] wrist and Butterflied [his] Hands before placing The Hand Cuffs

1 In docketing Plaintiff’s Complaint, the Clerk listed this Defendant as “Nathan” Hicks. This
Defendant, however, consistently appears throughout the Complaint as “Matthan” Hicks.
Additionally, the Clerk docketed Defendant “Aldrige” as “Aldridge.” The Court will direct
the Clerk to correct these errors.

2 Plaintiff inconsistently refers to Defendant Brown in the Complaint. That is, he identifies
this Defendant as Landon “Brown” in the caption of the Complaint but later refers to him
as Landon “Browning.” [See Doc. 1 at 1, 4]. Plaintiff is directed to correct this Defendant’s
name in the docket if necessary.
on,” “[j]acked [Plaintiff’s] shoulder,” and ignored his medical issues. [Id.].
Defendant Stafford carried Plaintiff to isolation alone. [Id.].

On August 21, 2023, after receiving Plaintiff’s complaints, presumably
regarding the alleged July 21, 2023 incident, Defendants Brown and Aldrige
attempted to cover up the matter by falsifying documents and placing Plaintiff

in isolation again “for making complaints about the Actions going on in Their
unit, which caused [Plaintiff] To Be Assaulted By use of force Handcuffs
process.” [Id. at 4]. Plaintiff also noticed that after the “Institution Head
Leaders” insisted that the accused officers “Deal with It,” Plaintiff was

“Harassed and Targeted For senseless Infractions showing Deliberate
Indifference.” [Id. at 5].
Plaintiff also alleges that the Defendants at AMCI have a custom of

using excessive force and false documentation and allegations to cover up
their actions, as well as shredding grievances and denying process to all
complaints. [Id. at 4].
Plaintiff claims violation of his rights under the First, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth,

and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution.3 [Id. at 3]. For
injuries, Plaintiff claims that he suffered physical pain and various physical

3 The Court will address only those claims fairly raised by Plaintiff’s Complaint.
injuries, emotional and mental stress, “lost time being in the hole,” monetary
loss from infraction payment, and medical copayment. [Id. at 5]. Plaintiff

seeks monetary and injunctive relief.4 [Id.].
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Because Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, the Court must review the

Complaint to determine whether it is subject to dismissal on the grounds that
it is “frivolous or malicious [or] fails to state a claim on which relief may be
granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Furthermore, § 1915A requires an initial
review of a “complaint in a civil action in which a prisoner seeks redress from

a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity,” and
the court must identify cognizable claims or dismiss the complaint, or any
portion of the complaint, if the complaint is frivolous, malicious, or fails to

state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or seeks monetary relief from
a defendant who is immune from such relief.
In its frivolity review, this Court must determine whether the Complaint
raises an indisputably meritless legal theory or is founded upon clearly

baseless factual contentions, such as fantastic or delusional scenarios.

4 Plaintiff also purports to seek “over 20 million” in damages as a “class action lawsuit …
[f]or all inmates who suffered from the same incidents … at [AMCI].” [Doc. 1 at 5]. Plaintiff
cannot recover damages for injuries suffered by individuals who are not joined as plaintiffs
in this matter.
Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327-28 (1989). Furthermore, a pro se
complaint must be construed liberally. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520

(1972). However, the liberal construction requirement will not permit a
district court to ignore a clear failure to allege facts in his Complaint which
set forth a claim that is cognizable under federal law. Weller v. Dep’t of Soc.

Servs., 901 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1990).
III. DISCUSSION
To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that he was
deprived of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States,
and that the alleged deprivation was committed by a “person” acting under

color of state law. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983; Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan,
526 U.S. 40, 49-50 (1999); Health & Hosp. Corp. of Marion Cnty. v. Talevski,
599 U.S. 166, 143 S.Ct. 1444 (2023).

Plaintiff attempts to name the NCDAC as a Defendant. However,
“neither a state nor its officials acting in their official capacities are ‘persons’
under § 1983.” Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989).
Therefore, NCDAC is not a “person” under § 1983. See Fox v. Harwood,

2009 WL 1117890, at *1 (W.D.N.C. April 24, 2009). Plaintiff's claims against
NCDAC are, therefore, dismissed with prejudice.
Additionally, NCDAC facilities are not “persons” under § 1983.
See Fox v. Harwood, 2009 WL 1117890 at *1 (W.D.N.C. April 24, 2009). As

such, Defendant AMCI is also dismissed with prejudice.
Plaintiff purports to sue Defendants, who are state officials, in their
individual and official capacities. However, “a suit against a state official in

his or her official capacity is not a suit against the official but rather is a suit
against the official’s office.” Will v. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71
(1989). Because a state is not a “person” under § 1983, state officials acting
in their official capacities cannot be sued for damages thereunder. Allen v.

Cooper, No. 1:19-cv-794, 2019 WL 6255220, at *2 (M.D.N.C. Nov. 22, 2019).
Furthermore, the Eleventh Amendment bars suits for monetary damages
against the State of North Carolina and its various agencies. See Ballenger

v. Owens, 352 F.3d 842, 844-45 (4th Cir. 2003). As such, Plaintiff’s claims
against Defendants in their official capacities do not survive initial review and
will be dismissed.
To establish liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff “must

affirmatively show that the official charged acted personally in the deprivation
of [his] rights.” Williamson v. Stirling, 912 F.3d 154, 171 (4th Cir. 2018)
(cleaned up); see Vinnedge v. Gibbs, 550 F.2d 926, 928 (4th Cir. 1977)

(citation omitted). Mere knowledge of a deprivation is insufficient.
Williamson, 912 F.3d at 171. Plaintiff fails to make any allegations against
Defendants Fox, Bullis, or Crow. [See Doc. 1]. The Court, therefore, will

dismiss these Defendants for Plaintiff’s failure to state a claim for relief
against them.
A. Excessive Force and Failure to Protect

The Eighth Amendment prohibits the infliction of “cruel and unusual
punishments,” U.S. CONST. amend. VIII, and protects prisoners from the
“unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.” Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312,
319 (1986). To establish an Eighth Amendment claim, an inmate must satisfy

both an objective component–that the harm inflicted was sufficiently serious–
and a subjective component–that the prison official acted with a sufficiently
culpable state of mind. Williams v. Benjamin, 77 F.3d 756, 761 (4th Cir.

1996). In adjudicating an excessive force claim, the Court must consider
such factors as the need for the use of force, the relationship between that
need and the amount of force used, the extent of the injury inflicted, and,
ultimately, whether the force was “applied in a good faith effort to maintain or

restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of
causing harm.” Whitley, 475 U.S. at 320-21.
Furthermore, the Supreme Court has made clear that “[a]n inmate who

is gratuitously beaten by guards does not lose his ability to pursue an
excessive force claim merely because he has the good fortune to escape
without serious injury.” Wilkins v. Gaddy, 559 U.S. 34, 38 (2010).

The Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause also
imposes on prison officials a duty to protect prisoners from violence at the
hands of other prisoners and other prison officials. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at

833. Still, not “every injury suffered by one prisoner at the hands of another
. . . translates into constitutional liability for prison officials responsible for the
victim’s safety.” Id. at 834. To state a claim against a prison official for failure
to protect, an inmate must show: (1) “serious or significant physical or

emotional injury,” and (2) that prison officials exhibited deliberate indifference
to inmate health or safety.” De’Lonta v. Angelone, 330 F.3d 630, 634 (4th
Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks omitted). To show deliberate

indifference, the inmate “must show both (1) ‘that the [prison] official in
question subjectively recognized a substantial risk of harm’ and (2) that the
official also ‘subjectively recognized’ that any actions he took in response
‘were inappropriate in light of that risk.’” Ford v. Hooks, --- F.4th ---, 2024

WL 3260902, at *4 (Jul. 2, 2024) (quoting Parrish ex rel. Lee v. Cleveland,
372 F.3d 294, 303 (4th Cir. 2004) (cleaned up)). It is not enough that the
prison official should have recognized the risk and the inadequacy of his

response. Id. Instead, the official “actually must have perceived” both.
Parrish, 372 F.3d at 302-03 (“Deliberate indifference is a very high standard,”
and “a showing of mere negligence will not meet it”) (quoting Grayson v.

Peed, 195 F.3d 692, 695 (4th Cir. 1999)).
Taking Plaintiff’s allegations as true and giving him the benefit of every
reasonable inference, Plaintiff’s excessive force claim against Defendant

Hicks survives initial review as not clearly frivolous. Plaintiff, however, has
failed to state an Eighth Amendment claim against Defendants Strafford and
Ellis. That is, Plaintiff alleges only that these Defendants verbally assaulted
him, and that Defendant Ellis threatened him. The law is well-established

that taunting comments, slurs, threats, and other verbal harassment by
correctional facility staff, without more, are not actionable under § 1983.
Wilson v. United States, 332 F.R.D. 505, 520 (S.D. W.Va. Aug. 19, 2019)

(collecting cases). The Court, therefore, will dismiss this claim against
Defendants Strafford and Ellis.
Furthermore, Plaintiff’s allegations are insufficient to state a claim
based on the failure to protect him from harm. While he alleges that

Defendants Strafford and Ellis were present when Defendant Hicks allegedly
used excessive force in applying the handcuffs, Plaintiff’s allegations do not
reflect that the force used by Defendant Hicks was of sufficient duration or

severity that Defendant Strafford and Hicks could or should have appreciated
a substantial risk of harm or that they had the opportunity to act differently in
light of that risk. The Court, therefore, will also dismiss this claim.

B. Access to Grievance Procedure
“[T]he Constitution creates no entitlement to grievance procedures or
access to any such procedure voluntarily established by a state.” Adams v.

Rice, 40 F.3d 72, 75 (4th Cir. 1994). “An inmate thus cannot bring
a § 1983 claim alleging denial of a specific grievance procedure.” Booker v.
S.C. Dep't of Corr., 855 F.3d 533, 541 (4th Cir. 2017). Plaintiff, therefore,
has failed to state a claim based on the denial of access to or interference

with the grievance procedure. The Court, therefore, will dismiss this claim.
C. Retaliation
An inmate has a clearly established First Amendment right to be free

from retaliation for filing lawsuits. See Booker v. S.C. Dep’t of Corrs., 855
F.3d 533, 540 (4th Cir. 2017); Thompson v. Commonwealth of Va., 878 F.3d
89, 110 (4th Cir. 2017). Inmates also have a protected First Amendment right
to complain to prison officials about prison conditions and improper treatment

by prison employees that affect them. See Patton v. Kimble, 717 Fed. App’x
271, 272 (4th Cir. 2018).
To state a colorable First Amendment retaliation claim, a plaintiff must

allege that (1) he engaged in protected First Amendment activity, (2) the
defendant took some action that adversely affected his First Amendment
rights, and (3) there was a causal relationship between his protected activity

and the defendant’s conduct. Martin v. Duffy, 977 F.3d 294, 299 (4th Cir.
2020) (quotation marks and citation omitted). The causation element
“requires that a plaintiff plausibly allege that the defendants were aware of

the plaintiff’s engaging in a protected activity and show some degree of
temporal proximity to suggest a causal connection.” Gowen v. Winfield, 130
F.4th 162, 173 (2025) (cleaned up).
Retaliation claims brought by prisoners are treated with skepticism

because every act of discipline by a prison official is retaliatory in that it
responds directly to prisoner misconduct. See Adams v. Rice, 40 F.3d 72,
74 (4th Cir. 1994). More, bare or conclusory assertions of retaliation are

insufficient to establish a retaliation claim. Id., 40 F.3d at 74.
Taking Plaintiff’s allegations as true and giving him the benefit of every
reasonable inference, his First Amendment retaliation claim against
Defendants Brown and Aldrige survives initial review as not clearly frivolous.

To the extent Plaintiff purports to state a retaliation claim against any other
Defendant, he has failed to do so.
D. Disciplinary Charges
To the extent Plaintiff seeks to state a claim based on false disciplinary

charges, this claim appears to be barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477
(1994). In Heck, the United States Supreme Court held as follows:
[I]n order to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional
conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions
whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence
invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction and
sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by
executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to
make such determination, or called into question by a federal
court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254. A
claim for damages bearing that relationship to a conviction or
sentence that has not been so invalidated is not cognizable
under § 1983. Thus, when a state prisoner seeks damages in a
§ 1983 suit, the district court must consider whether a judgment
in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his
conviction or sentence; if it would, the complaint must be
dismissed unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the conviction
or sentence has already been invalidated. But if the district court
determines that the plaintiff's action, even if successful, will not
demonstrate the invalidity of any outstanding criminal judgment
against the plaintiff, the action should be allowed to proceed, in
the absence of some other bar to the suit.

Id. at 485-87 (footnotes omitted). In Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641
(1997), the Supreme Court extended the Heck rule to claims alleging
constitutional deficiencies in prison disciplinary proceedings that have
resulted in the loss of good time credits.
Here, if the Plaintiff were to prevail on a claim that any disciplinary
charges were unfounded, that would necessarily imply the invalidity of the
disciplinary convictions. See, e.g., Edwards, 520 U.S. at 646-47 (plaintiff’s
claims that he was denied the opportunity to put on a defense and that there

was deceit and bias by the hearing officer would necessarily imply the
invalidity of the disciplinary proceedings); Moskos v. Hardee, 24 F.4th 289
(4th Cir. 2022) (prisoner could not bring § 1983 due process claim that prison

officials fabricated evidence so that plaintiff would be wrongfully convicted of
prison disciplinary infractions, causing him to lose good-time credits,
because the disciplinary conviction had not been invalidated). The Plaintiff,
however, has not alleged that any disciplinary convictions have been

reversed or otherwise invalidated. Therefore, Plaintiff’s claim appears to be
barred by Heck.
E. Due Process

Prison disciplinary proceedings are not part of a criminal prosecution
and the full array of rights due a defendant in such proceedings does not
apply. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974) (citing Morrissey
v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 488 (1972)). Where a prison disciplinary hearing

may result in loss of good time credits or solitary confinement, however, an
inmate is entitled to certain due process protections. These include: (1)
advance written notice of the disciplinary charges; (2) an opportunity, when

consistent with institutional safety and correctional goals, to call witnesses
and present documentary evidence in his defense; and (3) a written
statement by the factfinder of the evidence relied on and the reasons for the

disciplinary action. See Wolff, 418 U.S. at 564-71. There is no constitutional
right, however, to confront and cross-examine witnesses or to retain and be
appointed counsel. See Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 322 (1976);

Brown v. Braxton, 373 F.3d 501, 505-06 (4th Cir. 2004). If the hearing
officer’s decision contains a written statement of the evidence relied upon,
due process is satisfied. See Baxter, 425 U.S. at 323 n.5. Moreover,
substantive due process is satisfied if the disciplinary hearing decision was

based on “some evidence.” Superintendent, Mass. Corr. Inst. v. Hill, 472
U.S. 445, 455 (1985).
Taking Plaintiff’s allegations as true and giving him the benefit of every

reasonable inference, he has nonetheless failed to state a due process claim
based on the conduct of any disciplinary proceedings. Plaintiff’s allegations
are too vague and conclusory to state a claim for relief in the first place. See
Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) (requiring a “short and plain statement of the claim

showing that the pleader is entitled to relief”); Simpson v. Welch, 900 F.2d
33, 35 (4th Cir. 1990) (conclusory allegations, unsupported by specific
allegations of material fact are not sufficient); Dickson v. Microsoft Corp., 309

F.3d 193, 201-02 (4th Cir. 2002) (a pleader must allege facts, directly or
indirectly, that support each element of the claim). Plaintiff alleges only that
his “Rights To fair and Impartial Hearings” have been violated and that he

“Lost Time Being in The Hole.” [Id.].
Moreover, to establish liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must
show that the defendants “acted personally” to cause the alleged violation.

See Vinnedge v. Gibbs, 550 F.2d 926, 928 (4th Cir. 1977) (citation omitted).
Plaintiff does not allege who was responsible for the conduct of the
disciplinary proceeding(s) that allegedly resulted in “lost time.”
Plaintiff’s allegations fail to state a due process claim in any event.

That is, Plaintiff fails to allege facts showing that he was deprived of advance
written notice of the disciplinary charges, the opportunity to call witnesses
and present documentary evidence in his defense, or a written statement by

the factfinder of the evidence relied on and the reasons for the disciplinary
action. See Wolff, 418 U.S. at 564-71.
For these reasons, Plaintiff has failed to state a due process claim.
The Court, therefore, will also dismiss this claim.

IV. CONCLUSION
In sum, Plaintiff’s individual capacity Eighth Amendment excessive
force claim against Defendant Hicks and Plaintiff’s First Amendment

individual capacity retaliation claim against Defendants Brown and Aldrige
survive initial review. The Court will dismiss all remaining claims and the
remaining Defendants in this matter.

ORDER
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that Plaintiff’s individual capacity
Eighth Amendment excessive force claim against Defendant Hicks and

Plaintiff’s First Amendment individual capacity retaliation claim against
Defendant Brown and Aldrige survive initial review.
IT IS FURTHERED ORDERED that all remaining claims are
DISMISSED on initial review for Plaintiff’s failure to state a claim for relief.

See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2), 1915A.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants Fox, Bullis, Crow,
Stafford, Ellis, Avery Mitchell Correctional Institution, and Department of

Adult Correction are hereby DISMISSED as Defendants in this matter.
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that Clerk of Court shall commence
the procedure for waiver of service as set forth in Local Civil Rule 4.3 for
Defendants Hicks, Brown, and Aldrige, who are alleged to be current or

former employees of the North Carolina Department of Adult Corrections.
The Clerk is respectfully instructed to update the docket to reflect
Defendant “Nathan” Hicks’s name as “Matthan” Hicks and Defendant

“Aldridge” as “Aldrige.”
The Clerk is also instructed to mail Plaintiff an Opt-In/Opt-Out form
pursuant to Standing Order 3:19-mc-00060-FDW.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Signed: January 12, 2026

Martifi Reidinger Le,
Chief United States District Judge “lly

17

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11241812. Public record. Not legal advice.