# Lopez

> District Court, M.D. Louisiana · January 14, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11241271

## Case

- **Full name:** Rolando Lopez v. Quality Construction & Production, LLC et al.
- **Court:** District Court, M.D. Louisiana
- **Decided:** January 14, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

ROLANDO LOPEZ CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS

QUALITY CONSTRUCTION &
PRODUCTION, LLC. ET AL. NO. 20-00250-BAJ-EWD

RULING AND ORDER
Before the Court is Defendants’ Motion For Final Summary Judgment on
Plaintiff’s Remaining Claims (Doc. 106). The Motion is opposed. (Doc. 113).
Defendants filed a Reply Brief. (Doc. 116). For the following reasons, Defendants’
Motion is DENIED.
I. BACKGROUND
This case arises out of Plaintiff’s alleged slip and fall aboard a vessel. The
following facts are undisputed, as set forth in Defendants’ Statement of Material
Facts (Doc. 106-7), Plaintiff’s Response to Statement of Material Facts (Doc. 114), and
Defendants’ Reply Statement of Material Facts (Doc. 117).
In February 2020, Plaintiff worked on a platform moored to the vessel
Ms. Isabella Rose as a rigger.1 (Doc. 113 at 5–6). While working on the platform,

1 According to the Occupational Health and Safety Administration, “[r]iggers prepare ships’
equipment, components or sections for lifting by cranes, hoists or other material handling
equipment. Riggers also act as signalman.” U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY &
HEALTH ADMIN., SAFETY AND HEALTH INJURY PREVENTION SHEETS:
RIGGING, https://www.osha.gov/sites/default/files/rigging_ships.pdf.
Plaintiff ate and slept aboard the vessel Ms. Isabella Rose. (Doc. 106-7 at p. 4).
Plaintiff’s employer was Defendant Quality Construction & Production, LLC
(“Quality Construction”).2 (Id. at p. 3).

The alleged accident occurred as follows. “[Plaintiff] allegedly slipped and fell
aboard the vessel on a wet exterior step leading from the back deck of the boat to the
galley/passenger area on what he believes was water or humidity,” not a foreign
substance. (Id. at 8–9). Plaintiff was allegedly holding a door handle with his right
hand and the doorframe with his left hand when he slipped. (Id. at 10). “The exterior
step [Plaintiff] allegedly slipped on was made of a ‘diamond plate’ metal tread
surface.” (Id. at 11). Plaintiff took pictures on his cell phone of both the exterior step

and interior step of the vessel, which show that the steps were indeed made of this
diamond plate metal tread, which is “commonplace and standard equipment on
offshore vessels in the Gulf of Mexico.” (Id. at 12–13).
Plaintiff was off duty at the time of the alleged accident. (Doc. 106-7 at 6). “The
performance of [Plaintiff’s] work [] necessitated that he eat and sleep onboard a
vessel, the Ms. Isabella Rose, on which he would use its bunk and mess facilities.” (Id.

at p. 4).
The Ms. Isabella Rose is a U.S. Coast Guard Inspected vessel. (Id. at 19–20).
Plaintiff’s liability expert does not assert that the vessel violated any U.S. Coast
Guard standard, regulation, or guideline in the design or makeup of the exterior step
at issue. (Id.). The vessel’s doorway where the alleged accident occurred, however,

2 Quality Construction has been dismissed from this case. (Doc. 28).
lacked a handrail. (Doc. 114 at 25).
In the operative Complaint, Plaintiff asserts the following claims: (1) vessel
negligence under the Longshore and Harbor Workers Compensation Act (“LHWCA”),

33 U.S.C. § 905(b); and (2) general maritime law negligence. (Doc. 59).
II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On April 6, 2020, Plaintiff filed suit in state court against the following named
Defendants: (1) Quality Construction, Plaintiff’s employer; (2) C&G Boats, Inc.
(“C&G Boats”), the alleged vessel owner or operator; and (3) the companies’ yet to be
identified insurers, ABC Insurance Company and XYZ Insurance Company,
respectively. (Doc. 1-1). On April 28, 2020, Defendants removed the case to this Court,

asserting federal question jurisdiction. (Doc. 1).
On September 2, 2022, the Court granted Plaintiff’s Unopposed Motion for
Partial Dismissal of Quality Construction and its insurer ABC Insurance Company.
(Doc. 28). Thus, the Court dismissed these Defendants from this case, with prejudice.
(Doc. 28).
On March 27, 2024, the Court granted C&G Boats’ Motion for Partial

Summary Judgment on Seaman Status and dismissed Plaintiff’s Jones Act
unseaworthiness claims. (Doc. 52). Thus, Plaintiff’s only remaining claims include
negligence under LHWCA § 905(b) and general maritime law negligence. (Id.).
Thereafter, Plaintiff filed a Second Amended Complaint (Doc. 59), adding Defendant
M N M BOATS, INC. (“M N M BOATS”) to the case as the alleged vessel owner. (Id.
at 8).
Now, Defendants C&G Boats and M N M BOATS move for summary judgment,
asserting that they did not owe a duty to Plaintiff under LHCWA § 905(b) and that
they did not breach a duty. (Doc. 106). Defendants further assert that Plaintiff’s

remaining claims do not amount to negligence. (Id.). Plaintiff opposes the Motion.
(Doc. 113). For the following reasons, Defendants’ Motion (Doc. 106) is DENIED.
III. LEGAL STANDARD
A. Summary Judgment.
A district court should “grant summary judgment if the movant shows that
there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see Funches v. Progressive Tractor

& Implement Co., L.L.C., 905 F.3d 846, 849 (5th Cir. 2018) (“This occurs when a party
fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential
to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.”).
Where the nonmovant bears the burden of proof at trial, the moving party must
offer evidence that undermines the nonmovant’s claim or point out the absence of
evidence supporting essential elements of the claim. See Lujan v.

Nat’l Wildlife Federation, 497 U.S. 871, 885 (1990). Once the movant shows
entitlement to judgment as a matter of law, the nonmovant must bring forward
evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact. Giles v. Gen. Elec. Co.,
245 F.3d 474, 493 (5th Cir. 2001). “The evidence of the non-movant is to be believed,
and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in [its] favor.” Darden v.
City of Fort Worth, 880 F.3d 722, 727 (5th Cir. 2018).
In resolving a motion for summary judgment, “the court may not undertake to
evaluate the credibility of the witnesses, weigh the evidence, or resolve factual
disputes; so long as the evidence in the record is such that a reasonable jury drawing

all inferences in favor of the nonmoving party could arrive at a verdict in that party’s
favor, the court must deny the motion.” Int’l Shortstop, Inc. v. Rally’s, Inc.,
939 F.2d 1257, 1263 (5th Cir. 1991).
B. Vessel Negligence under LHWCA § 905b.
To prevail on a vessel negligence claim under the LHWCA, a longshoreman
must prove that a vessel owner breached at least one of three narrow duties owed.
Scindia Steam Navigation Co. v. De Los Santos, 451 U.S. 156 (1981). These include:

“(1) a turnover duty, (2) a duty to exercise reasonable care in the areas of the ship
under the active control of the vessel, and (3) a duty to intervene.” Kirksey v.
Tonghai Mar., 535 F.3d 388, 391 (5th Cir. 2008). These standards assume, however,
that an “expert and experienced stevedore will be able by the exercise of reasonable
care to carry on its cargo operations with reasonable safety to persons and property.”
Scindia, 451 U.S. at 167.

C. General Maritime Law Negligence.
“General maritime law applies ‘general principles of negligence law to tort
actions.’” Humphrey v. Tidewater GOM, Inc., 616 F.Supp.3d 538, 544 (M.D. La. 2022)
(deGravelles, J.) (quoting Deperrodil v. Bozovic Marine, Inc., 842 F.3d 352, 356
(5th Cir. 2016) (cleaned up)). To state a claim for negligence under maritime law,
Plaintiff must first demonstrate that there was a duty owed by Defendants to
Plaintiff, a breach of that duty, an injury sustained by Plaintiff, and finally a causal
connection between Defendants’ conduct and Plaintiff’s injury. See In re Great Lakes
Dredge & Dock Co. LLC, 624 F.3d 201, 211 (C.A.5 (La.), 2010), citing Canal Barge Co.

v. Torco Oil Co., 220 F.3d, 370, 376 (5th Cir. 2000) (quoting In re Cooper/T. Smith,
929 F.2d 1073, 1077 (5th Cir. 1991)) (alteration in original). “Generally, the question
of negligence in a maritime case is a question of fact for the factfinder.” Gusman v.
Archer Shipping, Ltd., 553 F.Supp.3d 315, 320 (E.D. La. 2021) (internal quotation
marks removed).
IV. DISCUSSION
Defendants move for summary judgment, arguing that Plaintiff “has no claim

for general maritime negligence or gross negligence allegedly caused by wet surfaces
and other conditions inherent to work at sea[.]” (Doc. 106-1 at 8). Defendants also
assert that “there is no genuine issue of material fact supporting any duty owed to
[Plaintiff] under these circumstances, or any duty breached by [Defendants] such that
the [D]efendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” (Id.).
Plaintiff opposes the Motion, arguing that “Defendants breached both the

‘active control’ duty, as well as the ‘turnover duty,’ by failing to warn about or remedy
the unreasonably defective means of access/egress to the galley” where Plaintiff
slipped. (Doc. 113 at 4). Plaintiff further contends that sufficient evidence establishes
that Defendants did not exercise reasonable care under the circumstances. Id.
The parties appear to disagree regarding the nature of the duty Defendants
owed Plaintiff. Defendants argue that, as a longshoreman, Plaintiff’s exclusive
remedy for vessel negligence lies under LWHCA § 905(b), a more restricted standard
than general maritime negligence. (Doc. 106-1 at 22). Defendants contend, however,
that even if general maritime negligence law applies, the Court should still grant

summary judgment in their favor. (Id. at 26).
In his Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiff asserts claims of both vessel
negligence under LHWCA § 905(b) and general maritime negligence. (Doc. 59). It is
not clear from Plaintiff’s opposition brief which standard he believes should apply,
but he asserts that under either standard, Defendants breached their duties to
Plaintiff. (Doc. 113 at 10).
For purposes of the instant motion, it is not necessary for the Court to

determine which standard applies. Regardless of the standard applied, the Court
finds that there are genuine issues of material fact which make summary judgment
inappropriate under either general maritime law negligence or a theory of negligence
under LHWCA § 905(b). See Humphrey v. Tidewater GOM, Inc., 616 F.Supp.3d 538,
546 (M.D.La. 2022) (deGravelles, J.) (finding that regardless of the parties’ dispute
regarding which liability standard applied, “there [were] questions of fact which

[made] summary judgment inappropriate under either general maritime law
negligence or 905(b) negligence.”).
A. Issues of Fact Preclude Summary Judgment Regarding Whether
Defendants Breached Scindia Duties.

In Scindia, the U.S. Supreme Court narrowed the duties owed by vessel owners
to longshoremen into three categories: (1) turnover duty; (2) active control duty; and
(3) duty to intervene. 451 U.S. 156 (1981). Defendants contend that Plaintiff has no
claim under any of the Scindia duties. (Doc. 106-1 at 23–26). Plaintiff disagrees,
arguing that Defendants breached both the turnover and active control duties.
(Doc. 113 at 4). The duty to intervene is not at issue.

1. The Turnover Duty.
The turnover duty is twofold. First, the vessel owner “owes a duty to exercise
ordinary care under the circumstances to turn over the ship and its equipment in
such condition that an expert stevedore can carry on his stevedoring operations with
reasonable safety.”3 Kirksey v. Tonghai Mar., 535 F.3d 388, 392 (5th Cir. 2008).
Second, a vessel owner must warn of latent or hidden dangers which are known or
should have been known to it, exclusive of dangers which are open and obvious or

which a reasonably competent stevedore should anticipate encountering. Id.
Here, Defendants contend that because “there are no hidden defects alleged”
in this case and the “humidity or seawater” on the step was “a product of the open
and obvious work environment,” Plaintiff cannot meet his burden to prove a breach
of the turnover duty. (Doc. 106-1 at 24–25).
Plaintiff disagrees, arguing that Defendants breached the turnover duty

because the “stairway at issue was 1) constructed only of diamond-plate, and
2) lacked a handrail,” creating a hidden or latent defect that Defendants knew or
should have known about. (Doc. 113 at 15). Plaintiff relies on U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit precedent to argue that Defendants should have known of the
defect, and even if the defect is “open and obvious,” Plaintiff may still recover because

3 Stevedore is another word used to refer to longshoremen. See, e.g., https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/stevedore.
there was no practical alternative to Plaintiff traversing the allegedly defective
stairway. (Doc. 113 at 14). See Greenwood v. Societe Francaise De, 111 F.3d 1239,
1245 (5th Cir. 1997) (shipowners are deemed to have actual knowledge of dangerous

conditions if condition existed from the outset [of the job]); Moore v. M/V ANGELA,
353 F.3d 376, 381 (5th Cir. 2003) (the open and obvious exception “does not apply if
the longshoreman’s only alternatives to facing the hazard are unduly impracticable
or time-consuming or would force him to leave the job.”).
At bottom, the parties disagree regarding whether the condition of the
stairway was defective such that Defendants breached the turnover duty. Plaintiff
submits his own deposition testimony as well as reports and deposition testimony

from his proffered expert, Dr. Andres, to raise questions about whether the step was
unreasonably slippery and whether the lack of handrail created an unreasonably
dangerous condition.4 (See Doc. 113-1; Doc. 113-10; Doc. 113-11). For example,
Plaintiff’s expert, Dr. Andres, asserts in his expert report that diamond plating is not
adequately slip resistant and that the lack of a handrail compounded the hazard
because Plaintiff did not have adequate means to arrest his fall. (Doc. 113-11 at 13).

The weight to afford this testimony and whether the condition of the area
ultimately amounted to a breach of Defendants’ duty is for the finder of fact, in this
case, a jury, to determine. Because Plaintiffs’ proffered evidence could support a
finding by a reasonable jury that the galley entryway was unreasonably unsafe or

4 The Court notes that Dr. Andres’ opinion is the subject of a Daubert Motion. (Doc. 76). For
reasons to follow, Defendants’ Daubert Motion and Motion in Limine to Exclude or Limit the
Testimony of Robert Andres, Ph.D. (Doc. 76) will be denied.
defective, the Court finds that summary judgment on this issue is not appropriate.
2. The Active Control Duty.
“A vessel also has a duty to ‘exercise reasonable care to prevent injuries to

longshoremen in areas that remain under the ‘active control of the vessel.’”
Sobrino-Barrera v. Anderson Shipping Co., 495 F. App’x 430, 434 (5th Cir. 2012)
(quoting Howlett v. Birkdale Shipping, Co., S.A., 512 U.S. 92, 98 (1994)).
Whether Defendants were in active control of the area of the vessel where
Plaintiff was injured remains a highly contested issue between the parties.
Defendants contend that they were not exercising active control over the area of
Plaintiff’s injury at the time of said injury because they “did not issue any orders or

directions to [Plaintiff] to engage in any specific work practices; did not provide any
of the personnel, tools or equipment used in [Plaintiff]’s work and did not exercise
supervision or control over [Plaintiff] during his work or otherwise.” (Doc 106-1 at
25).
However, Plaintiff provides evidence to credibly call this contention into
question. For instance, Plaintiff testified that only the back deck, not the galley in

which the incident occurred, was included in his area of his assigned work. (Doc. 113
at 12). He also points to his employer’s contract with Defendants which outlines that
“the whole of each Vessel shall be under owner’s sole control” and that the owner
remains responsible to maintain the vessel. (Id.). Testimony from other crewmembers
also supports that Defendants exercised active control over the vessel by “making
sure the boat was in good shape and working properly” and that a deckhand under
control of Defendants took measures to remedy the allegedly slippery step. (Id. at 13).
The Court finds that a genuine issue of material fact precludes summary
judgment. A reasonable jury could find that Defendants were in active control of this

area of the vessel at the time of Plaintiff’s injury, and, coupled with other evidence
described herein, that Defendants breached the active control duty. Accordingly,
summary judgment on this issue is not appropriate.
B. Issues of Fact Preclude Summary Judgment Regarding Whether
Defendants Breached Duties Under General Maritime Negligence
Law Principles.

“Generally, the question of negligence in a maritime case is a question of fact
for the factfinder.” Gusman v. Archer Shipping, Ltd., 553 F. Supp. 3d 315, 320
(E.D. La. 2021) (quoting Randolph v. Laeisz, 896 F.2d 964, 971 (5th Cir. 1990)).
Under general maritime law, vessel owners owe a general duty of reasonable care
under the circumstances to passengers on board. Kermarec v. Compagnie Generale
Transatlantique, 358 U.S. 625, 630 (1959). Defendants themselves acknowledge that
“the question of whether an alleged tortfeasor exercised reasonable care under the
circumstances is determined by the factfinder,” necessarily precluding a resolution
on summary judgment in this case. (Doc. 106-1 at 26). Still, Defendants maintain that
Plaintiff cannot meet his burden to establish a prima facie case of negligence.
(Id. at 28).
However, as previously described, Plaintiff’s own deposition testimony as well
as reports and deposition testimony from his proffered expert, Dr. Andres, raise
questions about whether the step was unreasonably slippery and whether the lack of
handrail created an unreasonably dangerous condition. (See Doc. 113-1; Doc. 113-10;
Doc. 113-11). Again, Plaintiff need not ultimately prevail on these contentions to
defeat the instant motion. It is sufficient that Plaintiff has submitted evidence that
calls these material facts into question such that a reasonable jury could rule in
Plaintiffs favor. Here, Plaintiff has done so, precluding summary judgment.
V. CONCLUSION
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion for Final Summary Judgment
on Plaintiff's Remaining Claims (Doc. 106) is DENIED.

Baton Rouge, Louisiana, this 14th day of January, 2026

JUDGE BRIAN A. J SON
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11241271. Public record. Not legal advice.