# United States v. Christian Isaiah Carter

> Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit · January 14, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11241008

## Case

- **Court:** Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
- **Decided:** January 14, 2026
- **Precedential status:** Unpublished
- **Opinion:** Opinion
- **Nature of suit:** NEW
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11241008

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- reversing Eighth Circuit, which had rejected district court’s reasonable finding that “imprisonment was not necessary to deter [the defendant] from en- gaging in future criminal conduct or to protect the public from fu- ture . . . criminal acts”

## Opinion text

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NOT FOR PUBLICATION

In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 24-13951
____________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus

CHRISTIAN ISAIAH CARTER,
Defendant-Appellant.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Florida
D.C. Docket No. 3:24-cr-00046-TKW-1
____________________

Before NEWSOM, BRASHER, and ABUDU, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Christian Isaiah Carter appeals his 78-month sentence for
possession of a firearm and ammunition by a convicted felon
18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) & 924(a)(8). On appeal, Carter makes two
arguments. He first contends the district court erred in classifying
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2 Opinion of the Court 24-13951

one of his prior convictions, for aggravated assault under Georgia
law, as a “crime of violence” under the Sentencing Guidelines. He
acknowledges that our court, in United States v. Hicks, 100 F.4th
1295 (11th Cir. 2024), already has ruled that a Georgia conviction
for aggravated assault is a “crime of violence” for purposes of the
Guidelines. However, in his view, aggravated assault in Georgia
includes ordinary recklessness whereas generic aggravated assault
under federal law is narrower than the state crime. Therefore, he
asserts, Hicks should not apply because we have not decided the
necessary mens rea for the purposes of the Guidelines. Second, he
argues the district court abused its discretion and imposed a sub-
stantively unreasonable sentence. After careful review, we affirm.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND & PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The facts of Carter’s case began when police were called to
recover a stolen vehicle in April 2024. The stolen vehicle was driv-
ing through Escambia County, Florida, and, once police arrived, it
ignored police emergency lights, fleeing at a high rate of speed
through a red light. Ultimately, the vehicle struck a stop sign and
Carter exited the vehicle and fled on foot. Police chased and seized
Carter—who was bit by a K-9 officer—and began handcuffing him.
As police did so, they discovered that Carter was carrying a 9-
milimeter firearm loaded with 15 rounds of ammunition. The fire-
arm and the ammunition had each been transported in interstate
or foreign commerce before Carter’s possession of them. Carter
was charged with violating 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) & 924(a)(8) and
pled guilty pursuant to a written plea agreement.
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24-13951 Opinion of the Court 3

A probation officer prepared a presentence investigation re-
port (“PSI”), which calculated a guidelines range of 63 to 78
months’ imprisonment. In doing so, the PSI enhanced the guide-
lines range because Carter had a prior conviction for aggravated
assault under Georgia law which, the PSI explained, counted as a
“crime of violence” under U.S.S.G. §§ 2K2.1(a)(2) & 4B1.2. The PSI
also noted that the statutory maximum sentence was 15 years’ im-
prisonment. As part of its calculations, the PSI noted that Carter
previously was convicted of several crimes, including petit theft,
grand theft auto, fleeing/eluding law enforcement, reckless driv-
ing, leaving the scene of an accident, unarmed burglary of an un-
occupied conveyance, battery, grand theft auto, criminal mischief,
possession of a weapon or ammunition by a convicted felon, deal-
ing in stolen property, aggravated assault, terroristic threats and acts,
and criminal trespass. The PSI also described Carter’s upbringing
and personal history, which included the fact that he had suffered
from depression and post-traumatic stress disorders, as well as pol-
ysubstance use.
The PSI identified several mitigating and aggravating factors
that might warrant consideration for sentencing. As for mitigating
factors, it noted that Carter had a strong support system, including
numerous family members willing and able to assist him after his
release. It also stated that Carter had the means to obtain mean-
ingful employment, as shown by his employment history, and had
expressed the desire to change his behavior and avoid future
crimes. As for aggravating factors, the PSI noted that Carter’s crim-
inal history was “significant” and that he had fled from law
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4 Opinion of the Court 24-13951

enforcement at a high rate of speed and “nearly struck other vehi-
cles and went airborne at various locations” during the chase.
Carter objected to the PSI, arguing that aggravated assault
under Georgia law was broader than generic aggravated assault
and thus not a crime of violence under the Guidelines. He con-
ceded, however, that the district court was bound by this Court’s
precedent, which foreclosed his overarching argument. At sen-
tencing, the district court overruled Carter’s objection to the
Guidelines calculations, concluding that it was bound by precedent
in ruling that Carter’s conviction for aggravated assault in Georgia
is a crime of violence under the Guidelines. It then adopted the PSI
and asked the parties for their arguments about what a reasonable
sentence would be.
Carter began by giving an allocution and apologizing for his
behavior. He explained that he had taken the time to reflect on his
behavior and found religion, and he expressed that he planned to
complete his education and work toward creating a business that
he could run once he was released. The government did not argue
for a specific sentence, but noted that there were aggravating cir-
cumstances, including the police chase and Carter’s prior convic-
tions. The government asked the court to impose a sentence that
would give Carter an opportunity to receive mental health and sub-
stance abuse treatment, and it noted that Carter had pending
charges in state court, so it recommended the district court order
the sentences to run concurrently.
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Carter, through his attorney, argued for a low-end guide-
lines sentence. He maintained that he had been suffering from
“long-term substance abuse issues” and “long-term mental health
issue[s],” which had precipitated the offense conduct here. More-
over, he contended that he was optimistic because he would have
a chance to receive drug treatment and mental health treatment
that would help him turn his life around. Finally, he noted that his
Guidelines range had been nearly doubled by the court’s ruling that
aggravated assault was a crime of violence and urged the court to
consider that fact in choosing the appropriate sentence.
The district court then explained its sentencing decision,
noting that, under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), it “need[ed] to come up with
a sentence that is not too harsh, but not too lenient.” It determined
that, while it was sentencing Carter for possession of a firearm by
a convicted felon, the “things that went on outside of that posses-
sion” made the crime “more serious.” Specifically, Carter’s con-
duct and the high-speed chase he was part of had put many peo-
ple—including himself, law enforcement, and other citizens—at
risk, which made the crime more serious than simple possession of
a firearm. As for mitigating factors, the court noted that Carter had
suffered from mental health and substance abuse issues. It also
noted that Carter’s mother and family seemed supportive and
wanted him to turn his life around.
On the other hand, the court noted that there were “a lot of
aggravating circumstances” in Carter’s history, as he had “been en-
gaged in making poor decisions for most of [his] life.” It noted that
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6 Opinion of the Court 24-13951

there were multiple theft offenses, fleeing offenses, and violent of-
fenses as well. The court then explained that this criminal history:
creates some concern in my mind that, for one reason
or another, that’s just how you’re wired and absent
some sort of significant punishment, this is going to
continue over and over and over again. And that’s
troubling. You know, the fact that you’ve served fairly
substantial prison terms [in the past]—44 months, 54
months, 48 months—yet that was not enough to dis-
suade you from continuing to engage in criminal ac-
tivity is another thing that’s very concerning to me
because it again raises the issue of what punishment
is going to be enough until your behavior changes.

The court also noted that Carter had committed this crime
while on a term of supervision, which was aggravating as well. It
explained that, given these concerns, an appropriate sentence
would need “to protect the public” from more crimes and it would
need “to be serious—substantial enough that” Carter has “gotten
the message.” It explained that it thought a sentence longer than
Carter had received in the past was “necessary” for Carter to “get
the message.”
The court, for these reasons, imposed a sentence of
78 months’ imprisonment. It reiterated that it had taken into ac-
count the guidelines range, which it believed was appropriately cal-
culated, as well as the mitigating and aggravating facts present in
the case. The court also sentenced Carter to three years of super-
vised release to follow the term of imprisonment. It ruled that
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24-13951 Opinion of the Court 7

Carter’s federal sentence was to run concurrent with any state term
of imprisonment imposed by Florida for conduct arising out of the
same circumstances. The court later entered a written judgment
to this effect. It also prepared a “statement of reasons” which in-
cluded Carter’s “history of mental health and substance abuse ad-
diction” as mitigating factors. The court further considered
Carter’s “extensive criminal history” and overall recidivism as ag-
gravating factors, as well as the fact that Carter committed the in-
stant offense while on probation. Carter appealed.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
We follow a “two-step process” when reviewing a sentence.
United States v. Trailer, 827 F.3d 933, 935 (11th Cir. 2016). First, we
review the sentence for procedural reasonableness, determining
“whether the district court committed any significant procedural
error, such as miscalculating the advisory guideline range . . . , fail-
ing to consider the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors, selecting a sentence
based on clearly erroneous facts, or failing to adequately explain
the chosen sentence.” Id. at 936. We review de novo the proper
interpretation and application of the Sentencing Guidelines and
this de novo review also includes the question of whether a prior
conviction qualifies as a “crime of violence” under the Guidelines’
definition of that term. United States v. Pulido, 133 F.4th 1256, 1279
n.20 (11th Cir. 2025); United States v. Hicks, 100 F.4th 1295, 1297
(11th Cir. 2024).
In the second step of our “two-step process,” we determine
“whether the sentence is substantively reasonable in light of the
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8 Opinion of the Court 24-13951

totality of the circumstances and the § 3553(a) factors.” Trailer,
827 F.3d at 935–36. “We review the substantive reasonableness of
a sentence for an abuse of discretion.” United States v. Butler,
39 F.4th 1349, 1354–55 (11th Cir. 2022). “In reviewing the [substan-
tive] reasonableness of a sentence, we will not substitute our own
judgment for that of the sentencing court and we will affirm a sen-
tence so long as the court’s decision was ‘in the ballpark of permis-
sible outcomes.’” Id. at 1355 (quoting United States v. Rosales-Bruno,
789 F.3d 1249, 1257 (11th Cir. 2015) (Opinion of E. Carnes, J.)).
A party arguing a sentence is unreasonable bears “the burden of
establishing the sentence is unreasonable in light of the record and
the § 3553(a) factors.” United States v. Gonzalez, 550 F.3d 1319, 1324
(11th Cir. 2008). “[W]e have identified three ways in which a dis-
trict court can abuse its discretion” and “impos[e] a substantively
unreasonable sentence: (1) failing to properly consider a relevant
sentencing factor that was due significant weight, (2) giving signif-
icant weight to a factor that was not relevant, or (3) committing a
clear error of judgment by weighing the sentencing factors unrea-
sonably.” Butler, 39 F.4th at 1356; see also United States v. Irey,
612 F.3d 1160, 1189 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc).
III. DISCUSSION
A. Carter has not shown procedural error in his sentence.
As noted above, Carter’s first argument on appeal is that ag-
gravated assault under Georgia law is broader than the federal law
of generic aggravated assault, thus rendering an increase in his sen-
tence based on that prior crime improper. He makes several
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24-13951 Opinion of the Court 9

distinct contentions on this point—primarily about the mens rea
necessary for Georgia aggravated assault as compared to generic
aggravated assault. He maintains that, because neither Hicks nor
its precursor cases addressed the necessary mens rea for federal ge-
neric aggravated assault, the state law is broader and should not
have counted as a crime of violence when calculating his sentence.
Given our precedent, the district court did not err by finding
Carter’s prior conviction for aggravated assault qualified as a
“crime of violence” under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(2) for purposes of
§ 2K2.1(a)(2). Hicks, 100 F.4th at 1297. In United States v. Morales-
Alonso, we held that “the elements of aggravated assault [under
Georgia law] are substantially the same as the elements of generic
aggravated assault,” meaning that the defendant’s aggravated as-
sault conviction satisfied the Guidelines’ definition of a “crime[] of
violence.” 878 F.3d 1311, 1316–20 (11th Cir. 2018). While we did
not explicitly address the question of mens rea in Morales-Alonso, we
subsequently did so in Hicks. There, a defendant argued that his
two prior Georgia convictions for aggravated assault with a deadly
weapon did not qualify as “crimes of violence” under §§ 2K2.1(a)(2)
& 4B1.2(a)(2) because the mens rea requirement of that crime under
Georgia law rendered it categorically broader than the generic fed-
eral offense, as the term is used in the Guidelines. 100 F.4th at
1298–99. We rejected that argument and affirmed, holding that
Morales-Alonso foreclosed the defendant’s argument. Id. at 1299–
1301.
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Like the defendant in Hicks, Carter is arguing that his prior
conviction does not qualify as a “crime of violence” under
§ 4B1.2(a)(2) because of the state statute’s mens rea requirement. Id.
at 1299. Accordingly, the district court was bound to conclude, as
we did in Hicks, that the Georgia crime of aggravated assault is a
“crime of violence.” Therefore, we affirm on this issue.
B. Carter has not shown his sentence is substantively
unreasonable.
Carter’s second argument is that his sentence is substan-
tively unreasonable. 1 He raises several distinct points on this front,
all of which are unavailing.
Under § 3553(a), a district court must impose a sentence
“sufficient, but not greater than necessary,” to reflect the serious-
ness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, to provide just
punishment for the offense, to afford adequate deterrence, and to
protect the public from future crimes of the defendant. 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a). In addition, the court must consider, among other fac-
tors, the nature and circumstances of the offense, the history and
characteristics of the defendant, and the need to avoid unwarranted
sentence disparities among similarly situated defendants. Id.
Though the district court must consider all relevant
§ 3553(a) factors, “the weight given to each factor is committed to

1 As part of this argument, Carter argues that the district court started from an

incorrect guidelines range, relying on his procedural argument. Because we
have already rejected that argument, we need not revisit the issue.
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the sound discretion of the district court,” and it may attach great
weight to one factor over the others. Butler, 39 F.4th at 1355.
A court’s “failure to discuss . . . ‘mitigating’ evidence” does not in-
dicate that the court “erroneously ‘ignored’ or failed to consider
th[e] evidence in determining [the defendant’s] sentence.” United
States v. Amedeo, 487 F.3d 823, 833 (11th Cir. 2007). Instead, a
“court’s acknowledgment that it has considered the §3553(a) fac-
tors and the parties’ arguments” is typically sufficient to show it has
considered the issues and arguments before it. Butler, 39 F.4th at
1355 (citing United States v. Sarras, 575 F.3d 1191, 1219 (11th Cir.
2009)); cf. United States v. Wetherald, 636 F.3d 1315, 1323 (11th Cir.
2011) (“The district court is not required to utter a set of magic
words . . . .”).
A court may base its factual findings at sentencing on facts
admitted in the defendant’s guilty plea, undisputed statements in
the PSI, or evidence presented at the sentencing hearing, and from
reasonable inferences from these sources. United States v. Matthews,
3 F.4th 1286, 1289 (11th Cir. 2021); United States v. Philidor, 717 F.3d
883, 885 (11th Cir. 2013). However, “[t]here is no requirement that
sentencing judges confine their consideration to empirical [evi-
dence] and ignore what they have learned from similar cases over
the years.” United States v. Brenes-Colon, 136 F.4th 1343, 1346 (11th
Cir. 2025) (quoting United States v. Shaw, 560 F.3d 1230, 1237 (11th
Cir. 2009)). “The seriousness of an offense, its incidence in the
community, and the potential seriousness of additional offenses
commonly derive from a sentencing court’s own experience and
common sense.” Id.
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In assessing the reasonableness of a sentence, we “ordinarily
expect a sentence within the Guidelines range to be reasonable.”
Gonzalez, 550 F.3d at 1324; see also United States v. Castaneda,
997 F.3d 1318, 1332 (11th Cir. 2021). For similar reasons, a sentence
imposed “well below” the statutory maximum also can indicate
reasonableness. Gonzalez, 550 F.3d at 1324; see also United States v.
Dougherty, 754 F.3d 1353, 1362 (11th Cir. 2014).
Carter first argues that the district court abused its discretion
by “giving significant weight to a factor that was not relevant . . . .”
Butler, 39 F.4th at 1356. 2 Noting that we have found that a sentence
based on erroneous information or assumptions that are unsup-
portable can violate due process, 3 Carter argues that this error oc-
curred when “the district court relied on its belief that prison sen-
tences deter crime and that longer sentences produce more

2 While Carter frames his challenge as relating to substantive reasonableness,

it is possible, as the government notes, that this argument could be character-
ized as a procedural reasonableness challenge. See United States v. Curtin,
78 F.4th 1299, 1314–26 (11th Cir. 2023) (Newsom, J., concurring) (noting that
our precedent has not always been consistent in its categorization of proce-
dural and substantive reasonableness challenges). In any event, we have con-
sidered the argument at each step of our reasonableness review and find no
reversible error. See Trailer, 827 F.3d at 935. That said, to the extent that
Carter’s brief raises a standalone due process claim, no such claim was pre-
sented in the district court, so our review is only for plain error. See United
States v. Utsick, 45 F.4th 1325, 1332 (11th Cir. 2022) (laying out the elements of
plain-error review).
3 See United States v. Darby, 744 F.2d 1508, 1532 (11th Cir. 1984); United States v.

Tobias, 662 F.2d 381, 388 (5th Cir. Unit B 1981).
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deterrence.” However, the record does not reflect that the district
court focused on an improper factor.
In the relevant portion of the transcript, the district court ex-
pressed its concern with factors within § 3553(a), which are clearly
relevant to its sentencing determination. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).
For instance, the court focused on whether past prison terms had
been “enough to dissuade” Carter from committing further crimi-
nal activity. These comments were directly responsive to Con-
gress’s instruction that sentencing courts must consider whether a
sentence “afford[s] adequate deterrence to criminal conduct.”
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(B). While Carter argues why deterrence
should—or perhaps could—be weighed differently by a sentencing
court, “the weight given to each factor is committed to the sound
discretion of the district court,” and it may attach weight to one
factor over the others. Butler, 39 F.4th at 1355. That is what the
court did here. Moreover, the court’s comments reflect its view,
rationally based on its own experience, that a longer sentence here
was necessary to afford deterrence to Carter specifically. We have
permitted district courts to reasonably rely on their own “experi-
ence, common sense, and good judgment” in crafting its sentence,
Brenes-Colon, 136 F.4th at 1346, so the district court’s comments on
this issue did not amount to “giving significant weight to a factor
that was not relevant,” Butler, 39 F.4th at 1356.
Carter also argues that the district court “gave insufficient
weight to [his] compelling mitigation evidence.” Yet, the district
court does not “erroneously ‘ignore[]’ or fail[] to consider”
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14 Opinion of the Court 24-13951

mitigation evidence by failing to discuss it explicitly. Amedeo,
487 F.3d at 833; see also Wetherald, 636 F.3d at 1323. In any event,
the district court did explicitly discuss much of the mitigation evi-
dence Carter cites on appeal during the sentencing hearing. To the
extent that it was unclear, the district court’s statement of reasons
further clarifies that it had reviewed and factored that mitigation
evidence into its sentence. See Butler, 39 F.4th at 1355.
Finally, Carter’s sentence was within the Guidelines range
and we “ordinarily expect a sentence within the Guidelines range
to be reasonable.” Gonzalez, 550 F.3d at 1324. It was also “well
below” the statutory maximum, which also suggests that the dis-
trict court did not abuse its broad discretion. See id.; Dougherty,
754 F.3d at 1362. At bottom, our review of the substantive reason-
ableness of sentences is deferential, and Carter has not shown that
the district court abused its broad discretion or imposed a sentence
outside the ballpark of permissible and reasonable sentences. But-
ler, 39 F.4th at 1355; Rosales-Bruno, 789 F.3d at 1257; Gonzalez,
550 F.3d at 1324. Accordingly, we affirm on this issue as well.
***
For these reasons, we affirm Carter’s sentence.
AFFIRMED.
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24-13951 ABUDU, J., Concurring 1

ABUDU, Circuit Judge, Concurring:
I concur in the majority opinion because, under our defer-
ential standard of review, Christian Carter has not shown his sen-
tence is substantively unreasonable. See United States v. Butler,
39 F.4th 1349, 1354–55 (11th Cir. 2022) (“We review the substan-
tive reasonableness of a sentence for an abuse of discretion.”); see
also United States v. Beaufils, 160 F.4th 1147, 1163 (11th Cir. 2025)
(“This standard allows for a ‘range of choice for the district court,’
as long as that choice is not a ‘clear error of judgment.’” (quoting
Rasbury v. IRS (In re Rasbury), 24 F.3d 159, 168 (11th Cir. 1994))).
However, Carter’s substantive reasonableness argument, while in-
sufficient to establish reversible error on appeal, is not wholly with-
out merit.
Carter cites a report from the Department of Justice which
summarizes research showing that “[i]ncreasing the severity of
punishment does little to deter crime.” See Appellant’s Brief at 27. 1
In fact, according to this body of research, the certainty of punish-
ment, rather than its length, is much more important in deterring

1 NATIONAL INST. OF JUSTICE, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, Five Things About Deter-

rence (2016), https://nij.ojp.gov/topics/articles/five-things-about-deterrence
[https://perma.cc/V65H-QS7N]. This report relies on, and is consistent with,
other literature on the topic. See, e.g., Daniel S. Nagin, Deterrence in the Twenty-
First Century, 42 CRIME & J. AM. 199, 199–254 (2013); see also Marc Mauer, Long
Term Sentences: Time to Reconsider the Scale of Punishment, 87 UMKC L. REV. 113,
121–25 (2018) (arguing that “long sentences are counterproductive for public
safety”); cf. also United States v. Craig, 703 F.3d 1001, 1004 (7th Cir. 2012) (Pos-
ner, J., concurring) (“Sentencing judges should try to be realistic about the in-
cremental deterrent effect of extremely long sentences. (emphasis in original)).
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2 ABUDU, J., Concurring 24-13951

crime.2 The fact that longer sentences are not particularly effective
at deterring future crime can be highly relevant in formulating a
sentence “sufficient, but not greater than necessary” to accomplish
deterrence goals that Congress has instructed courts to consider.
See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(B), (C). Accordingly, we and lower
courts should more carefully analyze this body of research to en-
sure that the sentences meted out actually advance the public in-
terest by lessening criminal behavior and reducing recidivism. See,
e.g., Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 59 (2007) (reversing Eighth
Circuit, which had rejected district court’s reasonable finding that
“imprisonment was not necessary to deter [the defendant] from en-
gaging in future criminal conduct or to protect the public from fu-
ture . . . criminal acts”). Given the decades of “tough on crime”
laws which have neither stopped the revolving door of recidivism
for some criminal defendants nor made the public appreciably
safer, the current regime clearly is not working well enough.

2 See VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, A NEW PARADIGM FOR SENTENCING IN THE UNITED

STATES 23 (Feb. 2023), https://www.vera.org/publications/a-new-paradigm-
for-sentencing-in-the-united-states [https://perma.cc/4T5z-TZGV] (conclud-
ing that “severe sentences do not deter crime”).

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11241008. Public record. Not legal advice.