# United States v. Nidal Hatum

> Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit · January 14, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11240912

## Case

- **Court:** Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
- **Decided:** January 14, 2026
- **Precedential status:** Unpublished
- **Opinion:** Opinion
- **Nature of suit:** NEW
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11240912

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- stating that Rule 32.2 “requires that the forfeiture order be made a part of the sentence and included in the judgment”
- holding that the federal bank-fraud statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1344, does not require that the victim suffer an ultimate financial loss

## Opinion text

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NOT FOR PUBLICATION

In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 22-13312
Non-Argument Calendar
____________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus

NIDAL AHMED WAKED HATUM,
Defendant-Appellant.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
D.C. Docket No. 1:15-cr-20189-RNS-1
____________________

Before NEWSOM, BRASHER, and BLACK, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
In 2017, Nidal Ahmed Waked Hatum (“Waked”) pled guilty
to conspiracy to commit money laundering, in violation of 18
U.S.C. §§ 1956(h) and 1957(a). As part of his guilty plea, Waked
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2 Opinion of the Court 22-13312

admitted that on multiple occasions he borrowed money from a
bank in Panama based on fraudulent representations, transferred
that money into the United States and back to Panama through
Florida-based corporations that he owned, and then repaid the
money with interest to the Panamanian bank.
As part of Waked’s sentence, the government sought a
forfeiture money judgment for the total amount of money that he
laundered. The district court denied the government’s motion and
refused to impose a forfeiture money judgment against Waked.
The government appealed, and we reversed, holding that the
district court was required to impose forfeiture under 18 U.S.C.
§ 982(a)(1). United States v. Waked Hatum, 969 F.3d 1156 (11th Cir.
2020), cert. denied, 142 S. Ct. 72 (2021). However, we left it for the
district court to (1) calculate in the first instance the amount of the
forfeiture money judgment that it was required to impose, and
(2) determine whether a judgment of that amount would be an
excessive fine in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Id. at 1169.
On remand, the district court imposed a forfeiture money
judgment of $10,426,000, the undisputed sum total of Waked’s
money laundering transactions. The district court also concluded
that the judgment was not an excessive fine in violation of the
Eighth Amendment. Waked appeals the forfeiture money
judgment. After review, 1 we affirm.

1 “We review the validity and scope of an appeal waiver de novo.” King v. United

States, 41 F.4th 1363, 1366 (11th Cir. 2022). “We review de novo the subject
matter jurisdiction of the district court.” United States v. Mims, 143 F.4th 1311,
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I. BACKGROUND2
In March 2015, Waked was indicted for, among other
charges, conspiracy to commit money laundering, in violation of
18 U.S.C. §§ 1956(h) and 1957(a). In October 2017, Waked pled
guilty to that charge pursuant to a plea agreement in exchange for
the dismissal of the remaining charges.
In pleading guilty, Waked agreed to a proffer of the
following facts. From approximately 2000 to 2009, Waked was the
general manager of the Panamanian corporation Vida Panama,
Z.L., S.A. (“Vida Panama”) and the owner of two Miami-based
corporations, Star Textile Manufacturing (“Star Textile”) and
Global World Import & Export (“Global World”). During that
time period, on multiple occasions Waked drew from Vida
Panama’s line of credit at the International Bank of China (“ICBC”)
in Panama for sums of money ranging from approximately $22,000
to $550,000. Waked then transferred those funds via wire transfer
to Star Textile and Global World at Ocean Bank in Miami.

1315 (11th Cir. 2025) (quotation marks omitted). “We review the factual
findings underlying a forfeiture order for clear error, but we review any legal
conclusions de novo.” United States v. Philossaint, 141 F.4th 1334, 1339 (11th Cir.
2025). We review whether a fine is excessive under the Eighth Amendment
de novo. United States v. Schwarzbaum, 127 F.4th 259, 275 (11th Cir. 2025).
2 We limit our summary of this case’s factual and procedural history to those

facts that are directly relevant to this appeal. For a more complete summary
of the background of this case, see our decision in the first appeal that arose
from this case. See Waked Hatum, 969 F.3d at 1159-61.
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In order to justify the credit draws and wire transfers,
Waked claimed to ICBC that the purpose of the transfers was that
Vida Panama was purchasing goods from Star Textile and Global
World. Waked submitted invoices to ICBC in support of that
representation. However, no such purchases occurred, and the
invoices were fraudulent. If ICBC had known the truth, it would
not have authorized the credit draws and wire transfers.
Therefore, Waked admitted that the funds he transferred “were
derived from fraud on a bank in Panama.”
After transferring the funds to Star Textile and Global World
in Florida, Waked arranged for those funds to be promptly
deposited back in Vida Panama’s bank account in Panama via
check. Waked then repaid the credit draws to ICBC with interest,
so ICBC did not suffer any net financial losses.
In the plea agreement, Waked agreed to negotiate with the
government regarding the amount of money that would be subject
to forfeiture, but he reserved the right to present arguments before
the district court regarding forfeiture if they did not reach an
agreement. Waked also agreed to waive his right to appeal any
sentence the district court imposed with three exceptions: (1) if his
sentence included an upward departure or variance, (2) if his
sentence exceeded the statutory maximum, and (3) “if the United
States exercise[d] its statutory rights to appeal.”
The district court then entered a preliminary order of
forfeiture, which stated that a forfeiture money judgment would
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22-13312 Opinion of the Court 5

be imposed, with the amount to be determined at a later date under
Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.2(b)(2)(C) and (e)(1).
In the presentence investigation report (“PSI”) prepared for
Waked’s sentencing, the probation officer included additional
details about Waked’s offense conduct not contained in the factual
proffer. As is relevant for this appeal, the PSI listed each of the
transactions in which Waked drew funds from ICBC based on Vida
Panama’s credit line and transferred those funds to Star Textile and
Global World. The PSI stated that, through these transactions,
Waked transferred approximately $10,426,000 to Star Textile and
Global World, all of which was sent back to Vida Panama and
repaid to ICBC with interest. Waked objected to various facts in
the PSI, but he did not specifically object to the $10,426,000
calculation.
The district court sentenced Waked to 27 months’
imprisonment. The parties and the court agreed that they would
address forfeiture after sentencing.
The district court ultimately rejected the government’s
request for a forfeiture money judgment and vacated the
preliminary order of forfeiture. The court recognized that
forfeiture was mandatory but decided not to impose any forfeiture
money judgment against Waked because Waked returned the
funds that he laundered to ICBC with interest. Additionally, the
court stated that, if it was required to impose a forfeiture money
judgment, the amount requested by the government—
$20,852,000—was excessive under the Eighth Amendment. The
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court explained that, because Waked returned all funds he
borrowed from ICBC on Vida Panama’s credit line with interest,
the bank suffered little harm, and so a forfeiture money judgment
of $10,000 per transaction, for a total of $520,000, would be
appropriate.
The government appealed the district court’s forfeiture
ruling.
On appeal, we reversed the district court’s forfeiture ruling
and held that the district court erred by failing to impose
mandatory forfeiture against Waked. Waked Hatum, 969 F.3d at
1162-67. Waked raised multiple arguments in support of the
district court’s decision not to impose forfeiture, all of which we
rejected. Specifically, we held that (1) the district court was
required to impose forfeiture against Waked based on his
conviction under § 982(a)(1), (2) § 982(a)(1) permitted forfeiture
money judgments, and (3) the money that Waked laundered was
property “involved in” his laundering scheme that was subject to
forfeiture. Id. at 1162-65.
In reaching the third holding, we concluded that (1) it was
not “impermissible double counting” to impose forfeiture against
Waked even though he returned all of the laundered funds to
ICBC; (2) it did not matter that the funds were technically
possessed by Vida Panama, not Waked, because Waked had
sufficient personal interest in the funds as Vida Panama’s general
manager; and (3) the requirement in Honeycutt v. United States, 581
U.S. 443 (2017), that property must be “tainted” to be forfeitable
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did not apply to this case because that decision concerned 21 U.S.C.
§ 853(a), while this case was based on § 982(a)(1). Id. at 1164-65.
We also held that the government could seek substitute asset
forfeiture under § 853(p) even though the “third party” to whom
Waked transferred the laundered money was the victim, ICBC. Id.
at 1166.
After holding that the district court erred by failing to
impose forfeiture against Waked, we then held that the district
court also erred in holding that a fine of $10,000 per transaction was
the constitutional ceiling for a forfeiture judgment under the
Eighth Amendment. Id. at 1167-69. Applying the factors for the
Eighth Amendment analysis, we first concluded that Waked was
within the class of persons whom the money laundering statutes
were meant to cover. Id. at 1167.
We then stated that the maximum fine for Waked’s money
laundering conviction was twice the amount of money “involved
in” his offense, which appeared to be $20,852,000, i.e., twice the
amount of the total transferred funds as listed in the PSI. Id. at
1167-68. However, we noted that the district court did not make
the necessary findings of fact as to the proper forfeiture amount, so
we could not determine whether that was the correct statutory
maximum. Id. at 1168. Lastly, we explained that the district court
erred by only considering the direct economic harm that ICBC
suffered as a result of Waked’s scheme because the court should
have looked “beyond the impact on [ICBC’s] bottom line when
considering whether Mr. Waked’s conduct was harmful.” Id. at
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1168-69. Specifically, we stated that the court should have
considered the general harm to society that money laundering
causes. Id. at 1169.
Based on the above holdings, we remanded for the district
court in the first instance to (1) engage in the necessary factfinding
to calculate the proper amount for the forfeiture money judgment,
and (2) determine whether that judgment would be an excessive
fine under the Eighth Amendment. 3 Id.
On remand, the government moved for an amended
preliminary order of forfeiture, which the district court granted on
January 13, 2022. Pursuant to our opinion in the government’s
appeal, the district court determined that it was required to impose
a forfeiture money judgment against Waked. The court calculated
that the money judgment should be for $10,426,000 because that
was the unobjected-to total amount of Waked’s laundering
transactions as stated in the PSI. The court then scheduled a date
for a separate hearing to address Waked’s objections to the
forfeiture judgment under the Eighth Amendment.
On September 16, 2022, the district court entered a “Final
Order of Forfeiture” in which it confirmed its imposition of the
$10,426,000 forfeiture money judgment.4 The court again

3 Waked petitioned for a writ of certiorari before the Supreme Court, which

the Court denied. Waked Hatum v. United States, 142 S. Ct. 72 (2021).
4 Although the district court titled the order as the “Final Order of Forfeiture,”

the order was not the type of “final order of forfeiture” that Fed. R. Crim. P.
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concluded that $10,426,000 was the correct amount for the
forfeiture money judgment because that was the amount of money
that Waked laundered as part of his offense.
Then, applying the appropriate factors, the court
determined that the forfeiture money judgment was not an
excessive fine under the Eighth Amendment. First, the court stated
that Waked was within the class of persons whom the money
laundering statutes intended to cover, as we concluded in the
government’s appeal. Second, the court stated that the amount of
the money judgment was well below the maximum penalty
authorized by Congress. The court stated that under 18 U.S.C.
§ 1957(b)(2), the maximum fine it could impose was twice the
amount of the criminally derived property involved in the
laundering transactions. Because Waked laundered a total of
$10,426,000, the maximum fine was $20,852,000, and so the
amount of the money judgment was well below the authorized
statutory maximum fine. Lastly, the court stated that the amount
of the forfeiture money judgment was appropriate in light of the
harm that Waked’s laundering scheme caused. Although Waked’s
laundering caused little to no economic harm to ICBC, the court
explained that it caused harm to society generally.
Waked then filed a notice of appeal challenging the
forfeiture money judgment.

32.2(c)(2) states should be entered after ancillary forfeiture proceedings are
completed.
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On appeal, Waked initially argued, among other things, that
the district court’s forfeiture judgment was jurisdictionally
defective because the court did not amend the sentencing
judgment to include the remand forfeiture order. In response,
prior to filing its appellate merits brief, the government moved to
stay the appeal, which we granted, and then moved the district
court to enter an amended sentencing judgment that incorporated
the remand forfeiture order.
Over Waked’s objection, the district court granted the
government’s motion and on October 18, 2024, entered an
amended sentencing judgment that incorporated the remand
forfeiture order. The court concluded that it was permitted to
amend the sentencing judgment under Fed. R. Crim. P. 36 because
its failure to incorporate the remand forfeiture order into the
sentencing judgment was a clerical error that it could resolve
immediately even though Waked’s appeal was pending.
II. DISCUSSION
Waked challenges the district court’s imposition of the
forfeiture money judgment against him on seven grounds. He first
argues that the district court lacked jurisdiction to enter the
amended sentencing judgment that incorporated the remand
forfeiture order because this appeal was already pending at that
time. Second, he argues that there was no factual basis to support
the forfeiture money judgment. Third, he argues that the district
court’s calculation of the forfeiture money judgment constituted
impermissible double counting. Fourth, he argues that the district
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court could not impose substitute asset forfeiture against him.
Fifth, he argues that the district court could not impose forfeiture
against him because he never personally received the funds that he
laundered. Sixth, he argues that the forfeiture money judgment
was an excessive fine under the Eighth Amendment. And lastly, he
argues that the district court was not authorized under the
forfeiture statute to impose a forfeiture money judgment.
In response, the government argues that we should dismiss
this appeal because it is barred by the sentence-appeal waiver
contained in Waked’s plea agreement. We address each issue in
turn.
A. Threshold Issues
Before reaching the merits of Waked’s appeal, we address
the two threshold issues that the parties raise: whether this appeal
is barred by a sentence-appeal waiver, and whether the district
court had jurisdiction to amend the sentencing judgment to
include the remand forfeiture order.
1. Sentence-Appeal Waiver
The government argues that we should not reach the merits
of Waked’s appeal because we should enforce the sentence-appeal
waiver contained in the plea agreement. It acknowledges that it
appealed Waked’s sentence when the district court initially refused
to impose forfeiture, but it asserts that its prior appeal did not
release Waked from the waiver as to his new sentence imposed on
remand.
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Sentence-appeal waivers that are made knowingly and
voluntarily must be enforced if they are raised by the government.
King v. United States, 41 F.4th 1363, 1367 (11th Cir. 2022). Plea
agreements are like contracts between the government and
criminal defendants, and so such agreements “must be construed
according to the intent and reasonable expectation of the parties.”
Id.
We disagree with the government that Waked’s
sentence-appeal waiver bars his appeal of the forfeiture money
judgment imposed on remand. The plea agreement states that
Waked agreed to waive his right to appeal any sentence that the
district court imposed unless, among other exceptions, “the United
States exercises its statutory rights to appeal.” The plea agreement
does not specify whether the waiver remains effective if (1) the
government successfully appeals Waked’s sentence, (2) the district
court resentences Waked on remand, and (3) the government does
not appeal Waked’s new sentence. The language of the plea
agreement is ambiguous on this issue, and “ambiguities in plea
agreements should be resolved against the government.” Allen v.
Thomas, 161 F.3d 667, 671 (11th Cir. 1998).
Construing the ambiguity in Waked’s favor, we read the
plea agreement to state that if the government appeals, Waked is
no longer barred from appealing his sentence, including if he is
resentenced on remand after an earlier successful appeal by the
government. See United States v. Vazquez, 558 F.3d 1224, 1227 (11th
Cir. 2009) (holding that a sentence-appeal waiver did not bar a
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defendant from appealing his sentence after he was resentenced on
remand from a successful appeal by the government because the
plea agreement, which stated that the defendant was released from
the waiver if the government appealed “the sentence imposed,”
was ambiguous, and any ambiguity should be construed in the
defendant’s favor), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 558 U.S.
1144 (2010). Therefore, we may reach the merits of Waked’s
appeal.
2. District Court’s Jurisdiction
Waked argues as a threshold matter that the district court
lacked jurisdiction to enter the October 18, 2024, amended
sentencing judgment to incorporate the remand forfeiture order
because this appeal was already pending at that time. He asserts
that the district court was divested of jurisdiction to amend the
sentencing judgment when he filed his notice of appeal, so it was
not authorized to amend the judgment as the government
requested.
“The filing of a notice of appeal is an event of jurisdictional
significance—it confers jurisdiction on the court of appeals and
divests the district court of its control over those aspects of the case
involved in the appeal.” Griggs v. Provident Consumer Disc. Co., 459
U.S. 56, 58 (1982). However, this principle does not prevent a
district court from amending a judgment to fix a clerical error
pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 36 while an appeal is pending. United
States v. Pease, 331 F.3d 809, 816 (11th Cir. 2003) (“It is settled law
that the appeal of a judgment in a criminal case deprives the district
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14 Opinion of the Court 22-13312

court of jurisdiction to amend the judgment (except for clerical
errors pursuant to Rule 36).”), superseded by rule on other grounds,
Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.2 (2009).
Although Waked’s notice of appeal that he filed after the
September 16, 2022, forfeiture order generally divested the district
court of jurisdiction over the case, the court did not lack
jurisdiction to amend the sentencing judgment to incorporate the
remand forfeiture order. See Griggs, 459 U.S. at 58. Rule 32.2 of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure requires that a district court
include any forfeiture order imposed in the case in the judgment.
Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.2(b)(4)(B); see also United States v. Petrie, 302 F.3d
1280, 1284 (11th Cir. 2002) (stating that Rule 32.2 “requires that the
forfeiture order be made a part of the sentence and included in the
judgment”). However, Rule 32.2 also provides that the failure to
include a forfeiture order in the judgment is an error that “may be
corrected at any time under Rule 36.” Fed. R. Crim. P.
32.2(b)(4)(B). Rule 36 allows a district court to “at any time correct
a clerical error in a judgment, order, or other part of the record, or
correct an error in the record arising from oversight or omission.”
Fed. R. Crim. P. 36.
Under Rule 32.2(b)(4)(B), the district court’s failure to
incorporate the remand forfeiture order into the sentencing
judgment was a clerical error that could be corrected at any time
under Rule 36. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.2(b)(4)(B), 36. The district
court therefore had jurisdiction to amend the sentencing judgment
as it did even though Waked had already filed a notice of appeal
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because the filing of a notice of appeal does not divest the district
court of jurisdiction to correct clerical errors under Rule 36. 5
See Pease, 331 F.3d at 816.
B. Merits Challenges to the Forfeiture Money Judgment
We next turn to the merits of Waked’s various arguments
challenging the validity of the forfeiture money judgment.
1. Factual Basis for the Forfeiture Judgment
First, Waked argues that there was an insufficient factual
basis to support the imposition of the forfeiture money judgment.
Specifically, he asserts that there was no basis in the record to
support the conclusion that he was responsible for any substantive
violations of the money laundering statutes such that any of the
funds that he transferred from Vida Panama to Star Textile and
Global World were “involved in” any money laundering offense
and so forfeitable under § 982(a)(1). He reasons that (1) the
government failed to establish that any of the credit draws from
ICBC constituted bank fraud under Panamanian or U.S. law, and
(2) the credit draws could not constitute bank fraud because ICBC
did not suffer any net economic loss as a result of the transactions.

5 In Pease, we held that a district court lacked jurisdiction to amend a
sentencing judgment to include a forfeiture order that was inadvertently
omitted because an appeal was pending. 331 F.3d at 815-17. However, Pease
was decided before Rule 32.2 was amended to clarify that amending a
judgment to include an omitted forfeiture order was a correction of a clerical
error under Rule 36. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.2(b)(4)(B) (2009). Therefore, that
holding in Pease was superseded by the amended Rule 32.2.
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Waked also argues that the district court erred by relying on the
PSI’s calculation that he transferred a total of $10,426,000 from
Vida Panama to Star Textile and Global World in determining the
amount of the forfeiture money judgment.
Waked did not raise any of these arguments before the
district court, so we review them for plain error. See United States
v. Malone, 51 F.4th 1311, 1318-19 (11th Cir. 2022) (“We find plain
error when (1) an error has occurred, (2) the error was plain, and
(3) it affected the defendant’s substantial rights, and if those prongs
are met, we then have discretion to correct the error if it
(4) seriously affected the fairness of the judicial proceedings.”).
Under 18 U.S.C. § 982(a)(1), a district court must order a
person who has been convicted of an offense in violation of 18
U.S.C. §§ 1956 or 1957 to forfeit to the government “any property,
real or personal, involved in such offense, or any property traceable
to such property.” 18 U.S.C. § 982(a)(1). Waked pled guilty to a
conspiracy to violate 18 U.S.C. § 1957(a), which criminalizes
“knowingly engag[ing] or attempt[ing] to engage in a monetary
transaction in criminally derived property of a value greater than
$10,000 [that] is derived from specified unlawful activity.” 18
U.S.C. § 1957(a); see also 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h) (criminalizing
conspiring to violate § 1957). “Specified unlawful activity” includes
any offense against a foreign nation involving “fraud, or any
scheme or attempt to defraud . . . a foreign bank” that occurred in
whole or in part in the United States. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1957(f)(3),
1956(c)(7)(B)(iii).
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Waked has not shown that the district court plainly erred by
failing to conclude that there was no factual basis for the imposition
of the forfeiture money judgment against him under § 982(a)(1). In
pleading guilty, Waked admitted that he borrowed funds from
ICBC via Vida Panama’s credit line by falsely representing to ICBC
that those funds would be used to purchase goods from Star Textile
and Global World. Waked also admitted that the funds were
derived from bank fraud on ICBC and that he transferred the funds
into and out of the United States through Star Textile and Global
World. The district court could rely on these admissions to
conclude that Vida Panama’s credit draws from ICBC based on
fraudulent misrepresentations constituted fraud sufficient to
trigger mandatory forfeiture under § 982(a)(1). See United States v.
Evans, 958 F.3d 1102, 1109 (11th Cir. 2020) (stating that a sentencing
court may base its factual findings on, among other things, “facts
admitted by a defendant’s plea of guilty” (quotation marks
omitted)). Waked does not cite to any legal authority supporting
his argument on this ground, so he has failed to establish plain
error. See United States v. Johnson, 694 F.3d 1192, 1195 (11th Cir.
2012) (“In order for an error to be obvious for purposes of plain
error review, it must be plain under controlling precedent or in
view of the unequivocally clear words of a statute or rule.”
(quotation marks omitted)).
Waked has also not shown that the district court plainly
erred by failing to conclude sua sponte that the government needed
to prove that ICBC suffered a net economic loss as a result of his
credit draws to trigger mandatory forfeiture under § 982(a)(1). The
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Supreme Court has held that certain federal fraud statutes do not
require that the victim suffer a net economic loss. See Shaw v.
United States, 580 U.S. 63, 67-68 (2016) (holding that the federal
bank-fraud statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1344, does not require that the
victim suffer an ultimate financial loss); Kousisis v. United States, 605
U.S. 114, 123-35 (2025) (holding that the federal wire-fraud statute,
18 U.S.C. § 1343, does not require that the victim suffer a net
economic loss). Given that Waked’s argument is inconsistent with
relevant Supreme Court precedent, and Waked has not cited to any
binding precedent in support of his argument, Waked has failed to
establish plain error. 6 See Johnson, 694 F.3d at 1195.
Lastly, the district court did not err, let alone plainly err, by
relying on the PSI to calculate the amount of the forfeiture money
judgment. Forfeiture is part of a defendant’s sentence, and facts
not objected to in the PSI are admitted for purposes of sentencing.
See Libretti v. United States, 516 U.S. 29, 39 (1995) (“Our precedents
have . . . characterized criminal forfeiture as an aspect of
punishment imposed following conviction of a substantive
criminal offense.”); United States v. Gilbert, 244 F.3d 888, 924 (11th

6 Additionally, to the extent that Waked argues that the district court erred by

imposing the forfeiture money judgment based on his laundering transactions,
such an argument is foreclosed by the law of the case doctrine because we
explicitly held in the government’s appeal that the district court was required
to impose a forfeiture money judgment based on those transactions.
See Waked Hatum, 969 F.3d at 1162-67; United States v. Jordan, 429 F.3d 1032,
1035 (11th Cir. 2005) (“The law of the case doctrine bars relitigation of issues
that were decided, either explicitly or by necessary implication, in an earlier
appeal of the same case.”).
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Cir. 2001) (“It is beyond doubt that criminal forfeiture is part of a
defendant’s sentence.”), superseded by rule on other grounds as
recognized in United States v. Marion, 562 F.3d 1330, 1340-41 (11th
Cir. 2009); United States v. Wade, 458 F.3d 1273, 1277 (11th Cir.
2006) (“It is the law of this circuit that a failure to object to
allegations of fact in a PSI admits those facts for sentencing
purposes.”). Therefore, in calculating the amount of the forfeiture
money judgment, the district court could rely on the unobjected-to
fact in the PSI that Waked transferred a total of $10,426,000 to Star
Textile and Global World in the laundering transactions to which
he admitted as part of his guilty plea.
Waked asserts that the district court could not rely on that
unobjected-to calculation in the PSI because (1) the PSI merely
addressed relevant conduct that was only pertinent to sentencing,
not forfeiture, and (2) the PSI did not include any forfeiture
calculations or conclusions about the scope of forfeiture.
However, those arguments are inconsistent with the above-cited
law, and, regardless, Waked does not cite to any binding precedent
in support of his arguments. Therefore, Waked has failed to
establish plain error. See Johnson, 694 F.3d at 1195.
2. Double Counting
Next, Waked argues that the district court engaged in
impermissible double counting when it calculated the amount of
the forfeiture money judgment. He asserts that, because he
acquired all of the money that he laundered by drawing on Vida
Panama’s single credit line at ICBC, the total amount of money
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20 Opinion of the Court 22-13312

“involved in” his laundering offense was not the total aggregated
amount of money that he transferred through his laundering
transactions, but rather was limited to the largest single amount of
money that he ever borrowed from ICBC based on Vida Panama’s
credit line, which was a “static pool of funds.” Waked reasons that
his credit draws and subsequent laundering transactions
constituted a “repeated utilization of the same fungible property,”
which was like “repeatedly borrowing and returning the same bar
of gold.”
The property that is subject to forfeiture under § 982(a)(1)
includes “the money or other property being laundered (the
corpus), any commissions or fees paid to the launderer, and any
property used to facilitate the laundering offense.” United States v.
Puche, 350 F.3d 1137, 1153 (11th Cir. 2003) (quotation marks
omitted). In this case, the government is seeking the “corpus” of
funds that Waked laundered. Waked Hatum, 969 F.3d at 1163.
Waked is incorrect that the district court engaged in
impermissible double counting. Waked’s various laundering
transactions were not limited to a single “static pool of funds.” On
multiple separate occasions, Waked borrowed money from ICBC
based on Vida Panama’s credit line and then returned the
borrowed funds to ICBC with interest. Each credit draw was a
discrete transaction with ICBC to borrow an amount of money
separate from the funds that he borrowed on other occasions. Each
of Waked’s separate laundering transactions thus involved a
discrete, separate amount of money, even if each was derived from
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the same source—Vida Panama’s credit line. Therefore, Waked’s
multiple laundering transactions did not constitute a “repeated
utilization of the same fungible property.”
However, even if Waked’s analogy comparing his credit
draws and repayments to the borrowing and returning of a single
gold bar was apt, which it is not, he would still not be entitled to
reversal of the forfeiture money judgment. Under § 982(a)(1), the
district court was required to order forfeited all “money or other
property” that Waked “laundered,” which includes the aggregated
amount of all of his laundering transactions. See Puche, 350 F.3d at
1153; 18 U.S.C. § 982(a)(1).
In United States v. Martin, we rejected a similar argument in
reviewing a district court’s calculation of the total amount of
money for which a defendant convicted of money laundering
under 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i) was accountable for purposes of
determining the defendant’s sentencing guideline base offense
level under U.S.S.G. § 2S1.1. 320 F.3d 1223, 1225-26 (11th Cir.
2003). On multiple separate occasions, the defendant laundered
funds that he derived from a single stolen check in transactions
whose aggregate amount exceeded the original check amount. Id.
at 1226. The defendant argued that he should not be held
accountable for an amount greater than the value of the single
check. Id.
We rejected the defendant’s argument and concluded that
the district court correctly calculated the amount for which the
defendant was accountable by aggregating the amount of each
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22 Opinion of the Court 22-13312

individual transaction. Id. at 1226-27. We explained that “money
laundering is not a continuing offense” because “each transaction
or transfer of money constitutes a separate offense” and cited to a
persuasive case in which a district court rejected a similar
argument. Id. (quotation marks omitted) (citing United States v. Li,
973 F. Supp. 567, 574 (E.D. Va. 1997) (“It does not make sense to
look only at the amount of capital injected or infused into the
money laundering scheme, as [defendant] suggests, and ignore
what happens to that capital. Clearly, the magnitude of the
criminal enterprise is larger for a conspiracy involving a hundred
unlawful transfers of $100 or $99 compared to a conspiracy
involving one unlawful transfer of $100.” (quotation marks
omitted))). We reasoned that because “[e]ach unlawful monetary
transaction harms society by impeding law enforcement's efforts to
track ill-gotten gains,” the district court did not err by aggregating
the total amount of each individual transaction even though that
total was greater than the value of the single check that was the
source of all of the laundered funds. Id. at 1227.
Although Martin is procedurally distinct from this case, its
reasoning is highly relevant. The district court did not err in
calculating the amount of the forfeiture money judgment by
aggregating all of Waked’s laundering transactions.
3. Arguments Rejected in the Prior Appeal
Waked also raises multiple arguments that we rejected in
the government’s earlier appeal. Specifically, he argues that
(1) substitute asset forfeiture is unavailable in this case because his
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return of the laundered funds did not constitute transference to a
third party under 21 U.S.C. § 853(p)(1)(B); 7 (2) the district court
should not have ordered forfeiture against him based on the funds
that he laundered because he never personally received those
funds; and (3) the relevant forfeiture statute does not permit the
imposition of forfeiture money judgments.
Waked is barred from relitigating these issues pursuant to
the law of the case doctrine. See United States v. Jordan, 429 F.3d
1032, 1035 (11th Cir. 2005) (“The law of the case doctrine bars
relitigation of issues that were decided, either explicitly or by
necessary implication, in an earlier appeal of the same case.”); This
That And The Other Gift And Tobacco, Inc. v. Cobb Cnty., Ga., 439 F.3d
1275, 1283 (11th Cir. 2006) (“Under the law of the case doctrine,

7 Additionally, Waked argues that the government abandoned the right to

seek substitute asset forfeiture against him because it failed to do so before the
district court during the remand forfeiture proceedings. Waked is incorrect
because “at any time” the government can request the district court to amend
the preexisting forfeiture order to include any property subject to substitute
forfeiture. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.2(e)(1)(B) (“On the government's motion,
the court may at any time enter an order of forfeiture or amend an existing
order of forfeiture to include property that . . . is substitute property that
qualifies for forfeiture under an applicable statute.”); see also United States v.
Misla-Aldarondo, 478 F.3d 52, 75 (1st Cir. 2007) (“[A] court may properly issue
a money judgment as part of a forfeiture order, whether or not the defendant
still retains the actual property involved in the offense, or any property at all.
Furthermore, the money judgment can be used in the future to seek forfeiture
of substitute assets by court order under § 853(p) and Rule 32.2, even where the
government has not expressed an intent to do so at any time before it seeks such an
order.” (emphasis added)).
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24 Opinion of the Court 22-13312

the findings of fact and conclusions of law by an appellate court are
generally binding in all subsequent proceedings in the same case in
the trial court or on a later appeal. . . . The doctrine’s central
purposes include bringing an end to litigation, protecting against
the agitation of settled issues, and assuring that lower courts obey
appellate orders.” (quotation marks omitted)).
In the government’s earlier appeal, we explicitly held in a
published, precedential opinion that (1) the government could seek
substitute forfeiture under § 853(p) because Waked’s transference
of the laundered funds to ICBC satisfied § 853(p)(1)(B); (2) it did not
matter that Waked never personally received the laundered funds
because he had a strong personal interest in the funds; and (3) the
district court was permitted to, and in fact was required to, impose
a forfeiture money judgment against Waked. Waked Hatum, 969
F.3d at 1163-67. Additionally, none of the exceptions to the law of
the case doctrine apply here. See United States v. Anderson, 772 F.3d
662, 668-69 (11th Cir. 2014) (“There are limited exceptions to the
law-of-the-case doctrine: where there is new evidence, an
intervening change in controlling law dictates a different result, or
the appellate decision, if implemented, would cause manifest
injustice because it is clearly erroneous.” (quotation marks omitted
and alteration adopted)). Accordingly, we will not address these
arguments again. See also United States v. Archer, 531 F.3d 1347, 1352
(11th Cir. 2008) (stating that under the prior-panel precedent rule
“a prior panel’s holding is binding on all subsequent panels unless
and until it is overruled or undermined to the point of abrogation
by the Supreme Court or by this court sitting en banc.”).
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C. Eighth Amendment
Lastly, Waked argues that the district court erred by
concluding that the $10,426,000 forfeiture money judgment was
not an excessive fine under the Eighth Amendment. He asserts
that “the forfeiture bore no relationship to the underlying criminal
law concerns and significantly exceeded the harm at issue given the
actual fungible amount involved and the complete absence of any
loss.”
“Forfeitures are subject to the Eighth Amendment’s
prohibition against excessive fines if they constitute punishment for
an offense.” United States v. Browne, 505 F.3d 1229, 1281 (11th Cir.
2007) (quotation marks omitted). “Subject forfeitures violate the
Excessive Fines Clause if they are grossly disproportional to the
gravity of the defendant’s offense.” Id. (quotation marks omitted).
In determining whether a fine is excessive under the Eighth
Amendment, we examine three factors: “(1) whether the defendant
falls into the class of persons at whom the criminal statute was
principally directed; (2) other penalties authorized by the
legislature (or the Sentencing Commission); and (3) the harm
caused by the defendant.” Id. (citing United States v. Bajakajian, 524
U.S. 321, 337-40 (1998)).
As to the first factor, we already decided in the first appeal
that Waked is within the class of persons whom the money
laundering statutes were intended to cover, and Waked does not
dispute that conclusion. Waked Hatum, 969 F.3d at 1167.
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26 Opinion of the Court 22-13312

As to the second factor, the maximum penalty that Congress
and the Sentencing Commission authorized for Waked’s § 1957
conspiracy conviction is $20,852,000—twice the amount of funds
that the district court properly concluded were involved in
Waked’s laundering transactions. See 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h)
(providing that a defendant convicted of conspiracy to violate
§ 1957 “shall be subject to the same penalties as those prescribed
for the offense the commission of which was the object of the
conspiracy.”); id. § 1957(b)(2) (authorizing a fine “of not more than
twice the amount of the criminally derived property involved in
the transaction”); U.S.S.G. § 5E1.2(c)(4) (providing that the
maximum of the fine guideline range for defendants convicted
under statutes that authorize a maximum fine of greater than
$500,000 is the statutory maximum fine). The fact that the
$10,426,000 forfeiture money judgment is well below the statutory
maximum fine that the district court could have imposed is a
consideration that we give “great weight” to. 8 See United States v.
Chaplin’s, Inc., 646 F.3d 846, 852 (11th Cir. 2011) (“Congress, as a
representative body, can distill the monetary value society places
on harmful conduct; forfeitures falling below the maximum
statutory fines for a given offense therefore receive a strong
presumption of constitutionality.” (quotation marks omitted)). It
is also significant that the statutory maximum sentence that the

8 The district court did not impose any other fines against Waked as part of his

sentence other than the standard $100 assessment.
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22-13312 Opinion of the Court 27

district could have imposed on Waked for his money laundering
offense was 10 years’ imprisonment. 18 U.S.C. § 1957(b)(1).
As to the third factor, while it is uncontested that ICBC did
not suffer any net economic harm from Waked’s actions, Waked’s
laundering caused some harm to society generally.
In Martin, we rejected the defendant’s argument that the
district court erred by aggregating the total sum of his laundering
transactions even though that sum was greater than the value of
the single stolen check that was the sole source of the laundered
funds. 320 F.3d at 1225-27. We reasoned that the purpose of the
money laundering statute under which the defendant was
convicted, 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i), was “to punish defendants
who, after the completion of the underlying specified unlawful
activity, take the additional step of attempting to legitimize their
proceeds so that observers think their money is derived from legal
enterprises.” Id. at 1226-27 (quotation marks omitted). We also
stated that the harm caused by money laundering “does not
generally fall upon an individual, but falls upon society in general,”
and “[e]ach unlawful monetary transaction harms society by
impeding law enforcement’s efforts to track ill-gotten gains.” Id. at
1227 (quotation marks omitted). Based on these general principles,
it is clear that Waked’s actions in transferring money that he
undisputedly acquired through bank fraud into the United States
and then back to Panama via two Florida-based corporations
caused at least some harm to society.
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In United States v. Bajakajian, the Supreme Court considered
whether a forfeiture award was an unconstitutionally excessive fine
in violation of the Eighth Amendment. 524 U.S. at 324. In that
case, the defendant pled guilty to failure to report that he was
transporting more than $10,000 outside of the United States, in
violation of 31 U.S.C. § 5316(a). Id. at 324-25. The defendant had
attempted to transport a total of $357,144 outside of the United
States without reporting it to customs inspectors. Id. The
government sought forfeiture of the entire $357,144 based on 18
U.S.C. § 982(a)(1). Id. at 325. The district court rejected the
government’s request because the funds were not connected to
any other crime, and therefore the government’s requested
forfeiture would be “extraordinarily harsh” and “grossly
disproportionate to the offense in question.” Id. at 325-26. Instead,
the court ordered forfeiture of $15,000 in addition to 3 years of
probation and a fine of $5,000. Id. at 326. The government
appealed, seeking full forfeiture of the relevant funds. Id.
The Supreme Court held that the full forfeiture of the
relevant funds would be an excessive fine under the Eighth
Amendment. Id. at 334-44. First, the Court reasoned that the
defendant did not fit into the class of persons for whom the
forfeiture statute was principally designed because he was not “a
money launderer, a drug trafficker, or a tax evader.” Id. at 337-38
(footnote omitted). Second, the Court noted that the maximum
fine that the district court could have imposed under the
Sentencing Guidelines was only $5,000, which was significantly
lower than the government’s requested forfeiture of $357,144. Id.
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at 338-39. Lastly, the Court concluded that the harm that the
defendant caused was minimal because he was guilty of a mere
reporting offense that only caused relatively minor harm to the
government. Id. at 339.
In this case, while the harm that Waked caused by his
laundering transactions was not necessarily as severe as the harm
caused by the defendant in Martin, given that the defendant in that
case did not return the laundered money that he stole from the
victim voluntarily, the harm Waked caused was more severe than
that caused by the defendant in Bajakajian. See Waked Hatum, 969
F.3d at 1169 (distinguishing this case from Bajakajian and
comparing it to Martin); Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 337-39. Waked did
not commit a mere reporting offense when he laundered a total of
$10,426,000 into and out of the United States, and the money
involved in his laundering scheme was directly connected to
criminal activity—bank fraud against ICBC. Unlike the defendant
in Bajakajian, Waked is exactly the type of person for whom the
Supreme Court stated the forfeiture statute was principally
designed—a money launderer. 9 See Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 337-38.

9 Waked relies primarily on the unpublished decision in United States v.
Ramirez, 421 F. App’x 950 (11th Cir. 2011), which, like Bajakajian, involved a
defendant who committed a mere reporting offense with funds unrelated to
any other criminal activity. That unpublished decision is not precedential. See
United States v. Morris, 131 F.4th 1288, 1293 n.3 (11th Cir. 2025). Regardless,
Ramirez does not support Waked’s argument because that decision is
distinguishable from this case for the same reasons that Bajakajian is
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30 Opinion of the Court 22-13312

Applying all of the relevant factors, we conclude that the
district court did not err by determining that the $10,426,000
forfeiture money judgment was not an unconstitutional fine in
violation of the Eighth Amendment. Waked has failed to show
that the forfeiture judgment was grossly disproportional to the
gravity of his offense, especially in light of the highly significant fact
that, unlike in Bajakajian, the amount of the forfeiture money
judgment is well below the statutory maximum fine the district
court could have imposed. See United States v. 817 N.E. 29th Drive,
Wilton Manors, Fla., 175 F.3d 1304, 1310 (11th Cir. 1999)
(“[A]lthough we retain a duty under the Eighth Amendment
independently to examine fines for excessiveness, a defendant
would need to present a very compelling argument to persuade us
to substitute our judgment for that of the United States Sentencing
Commission. Thus, in a forfeiture action, if the value of the
property forfeited is within or near the permissible range of fines
under the sentencing guidelines, the forfeiture almost certainly is
not excessive.”); United States v. Schwarzbaum, 127 F.4th 259, 284
(11th Cir. 2025) (stating that the presumption that a fine is not
constitutionally excessive under the Eighth Amendment “is
particularly strong when the specific penalty sought by the
Government is less than the statutory maximum”).

distinguishable. See Waked Hatum, 969 F.3d at 1169 (distinguishing this case
from both Ramirez and Bajakajian).
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III. CONCLUSION
The district court did not err by imposing the $10,426,000
forfeiture money judgment against Waked. The court also did not
err by concluding that the forfeiture judgment was not an
unconstitutionally excessive fine under the Eighth Amendment.
Accordingly, we affirm the forfeiture money judgment.
AFFIRMED.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11240912. Public record. Not legal advice.