# Humphrey

> District Court, N.D. Indiana · January 12, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11240768

## Case

- **Full name:** Allen Humphrey, et al. v. Navpreet Singh Thind, et al.
- **Court:** District Court, N.D. Indiana
- **Decided:** January 12, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
FORT WAYNE DIVISION

ALLEN HUMPHREY, et al., )
)
Plaintiffs, )
)
v. ) Cause No. 1:25-cv-00595-ALT
)
NAVPREET SINGH THIND, et al., )
)
Defendants. )

OPINION AND ORDER

This matter is before the Court on Defendant The BLM Group, Inc.’s (“BLM”) Motion to
Strike Portions of Plaintiffs’ Complaint (ECF 14) filed on December 12, 2025, pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f). Plaintiffs responded to the motion on December 31, 2025.
(ECF 18). BLM then filed a reply on January 7, 2026. (ECF 19). Accordingly, the motion is ripe
for adjudication, and it will be DENIED.
A. Factual and Procedural Background
On November 7, 2025, Plaintiffs brought this motor vehicle accident case against
Defendants. (ECF 1). Plaintiffs then filed an amended complaint on November 14, 2025. (ECF
4).
On December 12, 2025, BLM filed a motion to strike portions of Plaintiffs’ complaint.
The Court construes BLM’s motion as one to strike the amended complaint (ECF 4) as the
controlling complaint. The motion alleges that numerous paragraphs in Plaintiffs’ complaint are
immaterial and impertinent, so much so that they “blur the difference between mere allegation
and actual factual supposition.” (ECF 14 at 2). It contends that because Plaintiffs’ claims “muddy
the waters between fact and fiction by casting Defendants in an unnecessary and derogatory
light, . . . [r]etention of these allegations will unfairly prejudice Defendants, and may further risk
confusing the trier of fact as to any potential disputes of material fact.” (Id. at 2-3). Plaintiffs
respond by arguing their inclusion of auto safety-related allegations is not prejudicial, the
description of the collision fairly characterized the events, the inclusion of “Rule of the Road”
allegations are material, allegations concerning corporate legal duties are relevant, and the notice

of intent to use U.S. Life Tables is relevant and nonprejudicial. (ECF 18 at 3, 6-9).
B. Applicable Legal Standard
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f) “permits a district court to strike portions of a
pleading ‘[u]pon motion made by a party before responding to a pleading, or, if no responsive
pleading is permitted by these rules, upon motion made by a party within 20 days after the
service of the pleading upon the party.’” Williams v. Jader Fuel Co., 944 F.2d 1388, 1399 (7th
Cir. 1991) (alteration in original) (citation omitted).
Rule 12(f) states that the Court “may strike from a pleading an insufficient defense or any
redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f); see Delta

Consulting Grp., Inc. v. R. Randle Constr., Inc., 554 F.3d 1133, 1141 (7th Cir. 2009). Motions to
strike are generally disfavored because they consume scarce judicial resources, see Custom
Vehicles, Inc. v. Forest River, Inc., 464 F.3d 725, 727 (7th Cir. 2006), and “potentially serve only
to delay[,]” Heller Fin., Inc. v. Midwhey Powder Co., 883 F.2d 1286, 1294 (7th Cir. 1989)
(citation omitted). “But where . . . motions to strike remove unnecessary clutter from the case,
they serve to expedite, not delay.” Id.
“A motion to strike should not be granted unless the language in the pleading has no
possible relation to the controversy and is clearly prejudicial.” Wilkins v. City of Chicago, 736 F.
Supp. 3d 616, 626 (N.D. Ill. 2024) (citation, brackets, and internal quotation marks omitted); see
also Volling v. Antioch Rescue Squad, 999 F. Supp. 2d 991, 1007 (N.D. Ill. 2013). “Striking a
portion of a pleading is considered a drastic remed[y]”. Wilkins, 736 F. Supp. at 626 (alteration in
original) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). On a Rule 12(f) motion, the movant
bears the burden to demonstrate “that the challenged allegations are so unrelated to plaintiff’s
claim as to be devoid of merit, unworthy of consideration, and unduly prejudicial.” Wilkins, 736

F. Supp. at 626 (citation omitted); Vakharia v. Little Co. of Mary Hosp. & Health Care Ctrs., 2 F.
Supp. 2d 1028, 1033 (N.D. Ill. 1998) (citing Talbot v. Robert Matthews Distrib. Co., 961 F.2d
654, 664 (7th Cir. 1992)).
“A party will be prejudiced if the allegation at issue will confuse the issues in the case or
is so lengthy and complex that it places an undue burden on the party.” LeSEA, Inc. v. LeSEA
Broad. Corp., 379 F. Supp. 3d 732, 742 (N.D. Ind. 2019) (citation omitted); Stop Illinois Health
Care Fraud, LLC v. Sayeed, 2016 WL 4479542, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 25, 2016) (citation
omitted). “Even what could be called colorful descriptive language is not stricken where it is
material and pertinent to the claims at issue.” LeSEA, Inc., 379 F. Supp. 3d at 742 (citation

omitted). See, e.g., Kuhlmey v. City of Hammond, No. 2:16 CV 56, 2016 WL 5724484, at *2-3
(N.D. Ind. Sept. 30, 2016) (denying motion to strike characterization of defendants’ conduct as a
“shoot first, ask questions later” policy because case hinged in fact on “whether defendants
promulgated an improper pattern or practice”); Jordan v. VanWinkle, No. 3:04-CV-647 RM, 2005
WL 1500860, at *1-2 (N.D. Ind. Jun. 23, 2005) (denying motion to strike description of
defendant’s conduct as “sadistic” where wrongfulness of defendant’s conduct and use of force
were at issue in the lawsuit).
C. Analysis
a. Auto Safety Related Facts and Company History, Paragraphs 8, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, and 16
In the “Factual “Background” section of the complaint, Plaintiffs list statistics of vehicle
accidents, BLM’s company information, FMCSA-reflected driver, compliance, and maintenance

issues based on recorded collisions. (ECF 4 ¶¶ 8, 11-16). Plaintiffs explain in their response brief
that this information comes from publicly available databases. (ECF 18 at 3-5). BLM argues the
use of these statistics invites the trier of fact to use emotion to decide the case as opposed to the
merits. For instance, take paragraph 8:
8. More than 100,000 vehicle collisions involving commercial vehicles occur annually in
the United States, which result in as many serious injuries and more than 5,000 deaths per
year. In the state of Indiana alone, more than 100 people die each year as a result of
commercial motor vehicle collisions. 94% of these commercial motor vehicle collisions
are caused by driver-related errors.

(ECF 4 ¶ 80). BLM points out that no plaintiff died in this case, so citing this statistic is a “clever
red herring” and thus prejudicial. (ECF 14 at 3). However, at this juncture, the Court is able to
discern the facts of the case as opposed to persuasive writing by Plaintiffs. There is little risk of
prejudice. Additionally, the case at hand does deal with a vehicle collision in the United States
and Indiana and crash statistics may be “material and pertinent to the claims at issue.” See
LeSEA, Inc., 379 F. Supp. 3d at 742. There is a possible relation to the controversy. See Wilkins,
736 F. Supp. 3d at 626 (explaining a motion to strike should not be granted unless the language
has no possible relation to the controversy and is clearly prejudicial).
Paragraphs 11 through 16 present BLM’s company information and FMCSA-reflected
driver, compliance, and maintenance issues based on recorded collisions involving BLM. (ECF 4
¶¶ 11-16). BLM argues the inclusion of their company information is irrelevant and takes issue
with Plaintiffs’ characterization of BLM as an “unsafe motor carrier” and BLM’s record as
“poor.” (ECF 14 at 3-4). However, with BLM company information potentially relevant to
corporate-negligence claims, driver-negligence claim, and gross negligence claims, and mere use
of colorful descriptive language to describe BLM, there is no reason to strike. See LeSEA, Inc.,
379 F. Supp. 3d at 742 (“colorful descriptive language is not stricken where it is material”).
Although BLM may not like the language in the complaint, these allegations are not irrelevant

and immaterial. Further, to the degree to which BLM is concerned the trier of fact will be
confused by the content of Plaintiffs’ complaint, the Court assures BLM it is more than capable
of identifying the pertinent facts at this stage of the case. As such, the motion to strike is denied
as to paragraphs 8, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, and 16 of the amended complaint (ECF 4).
b. Description of Collision, Paragraph 22
BLM takes issue with Plaintiffs’ language such as “plowed violently” and “wholly
ignored” in paragraph 22, calling the language inflammatory. (ECF 14 at 6).
22. Despite traffic slowing and/or stopping, Defendant Thind failed to slow or stop his
vehicle, wholly ignored the stopped vehicles and plowed violently into multiple vehicles,
including the Silver Nissan Truck.

(ECF 4 ¶ 22). However, Plaintiffs’ complaint obviously must describe the events giving rise to
the case. Although BLM may not like the characterization of the accident, disliking Plaintiffs’
descriptive language is not enough. See LeSEA, Inc., 379 F. Supp. 3d at 742. “The Court declines
to engage in judicial editing of Plaintiffs’ complaint.” Wilkins, 736 F. Supp. 3d at 626. The
motion to strike is denied as to paragraph 22 of the amended complaint (ECF 4).
c. Rules of the Road and Responsibilities of Corporations, Paragraphs 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 40, 41,
and 42
In paragraphs 28 to 32, the Plaintiffs’ complaint details various rules of the road such as a
driver must “always keep a proper lookout,” “always keep a safe distance,” and “always keep
from becoming distracted.” (ECF 4 ¶¶ 30-32). Similarly in paragraphs 40 to 42, Plaintiffs’
complaint details responsibilities of corporations like BLM to “hire qualified drivers,” “properly
train their drivers,” and “properly supervise their drivers.” (Id. ¶¶ 40-42). BLM argues these

rules are obvious and these statements only create prejudicial inferences that BLM does not
abide by rules of the road or follow proper hiring or supervisory practices. (ECF 14 at 7-9).
Plaintiffs argue these facts are important for their negligence claims as rules of the road
and corporate responsibilities are material to establish duty. (ECF 18 at 7-9). BLM has not met
its burden to dispute this. Even though these facts could be considered obvious, Plaintiffs are
correct that their pleading standard under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8, requires “more than
an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
678 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). By calling the
facts obvious or expressing concerns about prejudicial inferences, BLM has not shown “that the

challenged allegations are so unrelated to plaintiff’s claim as to be devoid of merit, unworthy of
consideration, and unduly prejudicial.” Wilkins, 736 F. Supp. at 626 (citation omitted). The
motion to strike is denied as to paragraphs 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 40, 41, and 42 of the amended
complaint (ECF 4).
d. Inclusion of the Life Table, Paragraph 63
BLM next argues that Plaintiffs’’ notice of intent to use the U.S. Life Tables from the
United States Department of Health and Human Services should be stricken as extraneous. (ECF
14 at 9). “However, mere redundancy or immateriality is not enough to trigger the drastic
measure of striking the pleadings or parts thereof; in addition the pleading must be prejudicial to
the defendant.” Hardin v. Am. Elec. Power, 188 F.R.D. 509, 511 (S.D. Ind. 1999) (citations
omitted). Thus, BLM has not met its burden by simply calling this notice extraneous. The motion
to strike is denied as to paragraph 63 of the amended complaint (ECF 4).
D. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant The BLM Group, Inc.’s Motion to Strike Portions
of Plaintiffs’ Complaint (ECF 14) is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.
Entered this 12th day of January 2026.

/s/ Andrew L. Teel
Andrew L. Teel
United States Magistrate Judge

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11240768. Public record. Not legal advice.