# Suarez-Duarte

> District Court, W.D. Tennessee · January 12, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11240123

## Case

- **Full name:** Franyor Sneyber Suarez-Duarte v. Mellissa B. Harper
- **Court:** District Court, W.D. Tennessee
- **Decided:** January 12, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
WESTERN DIVISION

FRANYOR SNEYBER SUAREZ-DUARTE, )
)
Petitioner, )
) No. 2:25-cv-03142-TLP-tmp
v. )
)
MELLISSA B. HARPER, )
)
Respondent. )

ORDER GRANTING PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

Petitioner Franyor Sneyber Suarez-Duarte, an alien detained in the West Tennessee
Detention Facility in Mason, Tennessee, petitions for a Writ of Habeas Corpus under 28 U.S.C. §
2241. (ECF No. 1.) A few weeks ago, the Court ordered Respondent to show cause why the
Writ should not be granted. (ECF No. 4.) She responded.1 (ECF No. 6.) Petitioner replied.
(ECF No. 7.) And for the reasons stated below, the Court GRANTS the Petition.
BACKGROUND
In November 2023, the U.S. Customs and Border Protection (“CBP”) paroled Petitioner,
a Venezuelan citizen, into the United States. (ECF No. 6-1 at PageID 41.) And in October 2024,
he filed applied for asylum. (Id.) But CBP did not renew his parole after it expired on April 18,
2025. (Id.) And in November 2025, Memphis law enforcement stopped the car Petitioner was

1 In her response, Respondent stated that “further briefing and oral argument on the legal issues
addressed [in the Court’s previous cases on similar habeas petitions] would not be a good use of
judicial or party resources.” (ECF No. 7 at PageID 47.) Petitioner agreed. See email from
Chelsea Sparkman, Counsel for Petitioner (Jan. 9, 2026) (on file with the Court). So the Court
decides this case without oral argument.
driving. (Id.) He gave the officers his Tennessee’s driver’s license. (Id.) Law enforcement had
a record of Petitioner before that traffic stop—“he [was] the suspect in a recent shooting in
Memphis, where several rounds were fired into the air.” (Id.) The officers did not arrest
Petitioner for that shooting. (Id.) But Homeland Security Investigations (“HSI”) determined that
Petitioner “had entered the U.S. without permission or inspection, and [was] illegally present in

the United States.” (Id.)
So on November 8, 2025, HSI turned Petitioner over to U.S. Immigrations and Customs
Enforcement (“ICE”).2 (Id.) The Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) alleges that his
presence in the United States violates 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i) and § 1182 (a)(7)(A)(i)(I)3
because he is “an alien present in the United States without being admitted or paroled” and is
without “a valid unexpired passport, or other suitable travel document, or document of identity
and nationality.” (Id. at PageID 42.) On that basis, ICE continues to detain Petitioner at the
West Tennessee Detention Facility in Mason, Tennessee. (ECF No. 6 at PageID 25.)
Yet DHS and the Executive Office of Immigration Review (“EOIR”) have not held a

bond hearing for Petitioner. (ECF No. 7 at PageID 48.) That is because DHS and EOIR
determined that he is subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A), a change
from the decades-long practice of affording noncitizens in Petitioner’s position with bond
hearings before their removal proceedings. (Id.) The government changed its practice in July
2025, when DHS, the Department of Justice (“DOJ”), and ICE issued a new policy.4 See, e.g.,

2 HSI turned Petitioner over to Memphis Enforcement and Removal Operations, (id.) which is
part of ICE.
3 The United States Code codifies the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) §§
212(a)(6)(A)(i) and 212(a)(7)(A)(i)(I).
4 American Immigration Lawyers Association, ICE Memo: Interim Guidance Regarding
Detention Authority for Applications for Admission, AILA (July 8, 2025),
https://www.aila.org/ice-memo-interim-guidance-regarding-detention-authority-for-applications-
Monge-Nunez v. Ladwig, No. 25-3043, 2025 WL 3565348, at *1 (W.D. Tenn. Dec. 12, 2025).
According to the new policy, noncitizens who have resided in the United States for over two
years and who are apprehended in the interior of the country are subject to mandatory detention
under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). Id. But before July 2025, DHS afforded those same persons
bond hearings under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). Id.; Godinez-Lopez v. Ladwig, No. 25-2962, 2025 WL

3047889, at *1 (W.D. Tenn. Oct. 31, 2025). The Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) upheld
this new policy in the case of Matter of Yajure Hurtado, 29 I. & N. Dec. 216 (BIA 2025).
And for Petitioner, who has resided in the United States for a little over two years with no
criminal charge or conviction, this means that he now faces continued detention without the
possibility of bond. Petitioner alleges that his continued detention under § 1225(b) violates his
Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable seizure and his Fifth Amendment right to
procedural due process.5 (ECF No. 1 at PageID 6.) He asks the Court to order Respondent to
“release Petitioner on reasonable bond or parole, or, alternatively, to provide a meaningful bond
hearing before an impartial adjudicator within a reasonable time.” (Id. at PageID 7.)

This is not an issue of first impression before the Court. And Respondent detaining
Petitioner under § 1225(b) instead of § 1226(a) is not an isolated event. Indeed, the Court has
recently considered this same legal question many times and consistently held that Ҥ 1226
governs the arrest and detention of a noncitizen without an apparent criminal history who has

for-admission (“For custody purposes, these aliens are now treated in the same manner that
‘arriving aliens’ have historically been treated.”) (last visited Jan. 7, 2026).
5 As explained in the Order to Show Cause, this habeas petitioner is not the appropriate
procedural tool to challenge the conditions of his confinement. (ECF No. 4 at PageID 20 (citing
Velasco v. Lamanna, 16 F. App’x 311, 314 (6th Cir. 2001).) And because the Court finds that
Petitioner is entitled to the discretionary bond process under § 1226 as a matter of statutory
interpretation and procedural due process, it is unnecessary to consider Petitioner’s Fourth
Amendment claim for now.
been residing in the United States for over a year.” Padilla-Ugsha v. Ladwig, No. 25-3045, 2025
WL 3638007, at *7 (W.D. Tenn. Dec. 15, 2025); see Monge-Nunez, 2025 WL 3565348, at *6;
Cordova v. Ladwig, No. 25-3037, 2025 WL 3679764, at *7 (W.D. Tenn. Dec. 18, 2025); Rios
Pena v. Ladwig, No. 25-3082, 2025 WL 3679766, at *7 (W.D. Tenn. Dec. 18, 2025); Moreno-
Espinoza v. Ladwig, No. 25-3093, 2025 WL 3691452, at *9 (W.D. Tenn. Dec. 19, 2025);

Urrutia-Diaz v. Ladwig, No. 25-3098, 2025 WL 3689158, at *7 (W.D. Tenn. Dec. 19, 2025)
(“So even though Petitioner here has resided in the United States for less than a year, § 1226
governs because he is not seeking admission but is already in this country.”).
Because of the increasing frequency of these habeas petitions, other district courts in this
circuit have also been asked to consider which statutory provision governs. They too have
determined that § 1226(a) fits in this scenario. See, e.g., Godinez-Lopez, 2025 WL 3047889;
Lopez-Campos, 797 F. Supp. 3d at 784. Other district courts across the country have concluded
the same. As one court observed:
By a recent count, the central issue in this case – the administration's new position
that all noncitizens who came into the United States illegally, but since have been
living in the United States, must be detained until their removal proceedings are
completed – has been challenged in at least 362 cases in federal district courts.
The challengers have prevailed, either on a preliminary or final basis, in 350 of
those cases decided by over 160 different judges sitting in about fifty different
courts spread across the United States. Thus, the overwhelming, lopsided
majority have held that the law still means what it always has meant.

Barco Mercado v. Francis, -- F. Supp. 3d --, 2025 WL 3295903, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 26, 2025)
(footnotes omitted) (collecting cases). But the Sixth Circuit has yet to decide whether § 1225(b)
or § 1226(a) applies under these circumstances.
LEGAL STANDARD
A petition for habeas corpus enables a person to challenge the legality of their custody.
See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 745 (2008) (quoting Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475,
484 (1973)). And its traditional function “is to secure release from illegal custody.” Preiser,
411 U.S. at 484; see 28 U.S.C. 2241(c)(3) (“The writ of habeas corpus shall not extend to a
prisoner unless . . . [h]e is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the
United States[.]”). Petitioner here asserts that his custody under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) is
unlawful.

Sections 1225 and 1226 of the INA typically govern the detention of noncitizens during
removal proceedings. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225, 1226. Section 1225(b)(2)(A) governs the
mandatory detention of an “applicant for admission” after an immigration officer has determined
that the applicant is not entitled to admission in the United States.
(b) Inspection of applicants for admission
. . .
(2) Inspection of other aliens
(A) In general
Subject to subparagraphs (B) and (C), in the case of an
alien who is an applicant for admission, if the examining
immigration officer determines that an alien seeking
admission is not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be
admitted, the alien shall be detained for a proceeding under
section 1229a of this title.
8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). The INA defines an “applicant for admission” as an alien “present in
the United States who has not been admitted or who arrives in the United States.” 8 U.S.C. §
1225(a)(1). And “admission” and “admitted” are defined as “the lawful entry of the alien into
the United States after inspection and authorization by an immigration officer.” 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101(a)(13)(A). Again, detention is mandatory under this section. See 8 U.S.C. §
1225(b)(2)(A).
Section 1226(a) provides for discretionary detention:
(a) Arrest, detention, and release
On a warrant issued by the Attorney General, an alien may be arrested and
detained pending a decision on whether the alien is to be removed from
the United States. Except as provided in subsection (c) and pending such
decision, the Attorney General—
(1) may continue to detain the arrested alien; and
(2) may release the alien on—
(A) bond of at least $1,500 with security approved by, and
containing conditions prescribed by, the Attorney General .
. . .
8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). But § 1226(c), known as the Laken Riley Act, provides for the mandatory
detention of aliens found inadmissible or deportable under specific provisions and who have
been “charged with,” “arrested for,” “convicted of,” or admit to “having committed” certain
listed crimes. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c). Aliens arrested and detained under this section “have a right
to request a custody redetermination (i.e., bond hearing) before an Immigration Judge.” Lopez-
Campos v. Raycraft, 797 F. Supp. 3d 771, 777 (E.D. Mich. 2025) (citing 8 C.F.R. § 1236.1(c)(8),
(d)(1)). That immigration judge “evaluates whether there is a risk of nonappearance or danger to
the community.” Id. (citing Matter of Guerra, 24 I. & N. Dec. 37, 40 (BIA 2006)). With those
provisions in mind, the Court now turns to the Petition.
ANALYSIS
The issue here is whether § 1225(b)(2)(A) or § 1226(a) applies to Petitioner’s detention.
These facts are not distinguishable from those in Padilla-Ugsha, Cordova, Rios Pena, Morena-
Espinoza, or Urrutia-Diaz. And as Respondent correctly notes, “the questions of law in this
case, and the challenges to the government’s policy and practice, substantially overlap with those
at issue” in this Court’s previous cases. (ECF No. 6 at PageID 28.) So in the interest of judicial
economy, the Court addresses the main arguments at issue here—administrative exhaustion,
statutory interpretation, and procedural due process6—in a more succinct manner than before.

6 Respondent devoted several pages of its briefing to argue that Maldonado Bautista v. Santacruz
Jr., -- F. Supp. 3d --, 2025 WL 3713987 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 18, 2025) is inapplicable here. (ECF
No. 6 at PageID 30–37.) But the Court need not determine whether Petitioner is part of the
Maldonado Bautista class because it finds for Petitioner on the merits of his individual claim.
I. Administrative Exhaustion
Petitioner has not exhausted his administrative remedies. (See ECF No. 1 at PageID 4.)
To do so, he would need to appeal his denial of a bond hearing to the Board of Immigration
Appeals (“BIA”). Respondent argues that the Court should require Petitioner to go through that
process before considering his Petition. (ECF No. 6 at PageID 26–27.)

When Congress mandates it, courts require petitioners to exhaust their administrative
remedies. See McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 140, 144 (1992). But when, as here, Congress
has not imposed a statutory exhaustion requirement, the decision whether to require a petitioner
to exhaust lies within “sound judicial discretion.” Id. In exercising that discretion, the Supreme
Court has explained that “federal courts must balance the interest of the individual in retaining
prompt access to a federal judicial forum against countervailing institutional interests favoring
exhaustion.” Id. at 146. Those institutional interests are “protecting administrative agency
authority and promoting judicial efficiency.” Id. at 145.
The Supreme Court also identified situations in which the interest of the individual

weighs heavily against the institutional interests. See id. at 146–49. Relevant here, “an
administrative remedy may be inadequate where the administrative body . . . has otherwise
predetermined the issue before it.” Id. at 148 (citing Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564, 575, n.
14 (1973); Houghton v. Shafer, 392 U.S. 639, 640 (1968) (in view of Attorney General's
submission that the challenged rules of the prison were “validly and correctly applied to
petitioner,” requiring administrative review through a process culminating with the Attorney
General “would be to demand a futile act”); see also Herr v. U.S. Forest Serv., 803 F.3d 822–23
(6th Cir. 2015) (“If administrative review would come to naught, if any efforts before the agency
would be pointless, the courts do not insist that litigants go through the motions of exhausting the
claim anyway.”) (internal quotations omitted).
Petitioner argues that the BIA’s decision in Matter of Yajure Hurtado, 29 I. & N. Dec.
216 (2025) makes requesting a bond hearing from the immigration court futile. (ECF No. 7 at
PageID 49.) The Court agrees. That is because the BIA’s decision—which is binding on

immigration judges—upholds the very policy Petitioner is challenging here. See Matter of
Yajure Hurtado, 29 I. & N. Dec. at 228 (holding that aliens “who surreptitiously cross into the
United States remain applicants for admission until and unless they are lawfully inspected and
admitted by an immigration officer” because “[r]emaining in the United States for a lengthy
period of time following entry without inspection, by itself, does not constitute an ‘admission”’);
see also Lopez-Campos v. Raycraft, 797 F. Supp. 3d 771, 778 (E.D. Mich. 2025) (reasoning that
“administrative review is not likely to change Respondents’ position that § 1225(b)(2)(A) applies
in this context”). What is more, the BIA lacks authority to review constitutional challenges. See
Sterkaj v. Gonzales, 439 F.3d 273, 279 (6th Cir. 2006). This means that Petitioner can only

bring his due process claim in federal court.
It follows that requiring exhaustion in this case would not further the ends of judicial
efficiency and protecting administrative authority because it would only delay the resolution of
Petitioner’s legal questions. His individual interest in having prompt access to this forum
outweighs any institutional interests at stake. Requiring Petitioner to wait for the BIA to address
an issue it has already decided creates hardship for hardship’s sake. The Court declines to
impose such a result here.7

7 Respondent points the Court to a line of cases out of the Northern District of Ohio that require
immigration habeas petitioners to exhaust their bond-related administrative remedies before
considering their habeas claims. (ECF No. 6 at PageID 26 (citing Monroy Vaillalta v. Greene, --
II. Statutory Interpretation
The Parties disagree about whether § 1225(b)(2)(A) or § 1226(a) controls Petitioner’s
detention here. In short, Petitioner argues that § 1225 governs the detention of recent noncitizens
at or near the border and that § 1226 governs the pre-removal detention of noncitizens already
present in the United States. (ECF No. 7 at PageID 50–54.) Respondent counters that § 1225

applies to Petitioner because “he is an alien who entered the United States without inspection or
parole and thus was and remains an ‘applicant for admission’ who is treated . . . as if stopped at
the border.” (ECF No. 6 at PageID 27–28.)
Familiar principles of statutory interpretation control the analysis. Courts construe
statutory text “so that effect is given to all its provisions, so that no part will be inoperative or
superfluous, void or insignificant.” Corley v. United States, 556 U.S. 303, 314 (2009) (quoting
Hibbs v. Winn, 542 U.S. 88, 101 (2004)); see Antonin Scalia and Bryan A. Garner, Reading
Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 174 (2012) (“If possible, every word and every provision
is to be given effect.”). To apply this approach, courts give each word within the statute “‘its

ordinary, contemporary, common meaning,’ while keeping in mind that ‘statutory language has
meaning only in context.’” Kentucky v. Biden, 23 F.4th 585, 603 (6th Cir. 2022) (citation
modified) (citing Star Athletica, L.L.C. v. Varsity Brands, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1002, 1010, (2017)).
This includes the presumption “that [the] legislature says in a statute what it means and means in

- F. Supp. 3d ---, No. 25-1594, 2025 WL 2472886, at *2– 3 (N.D. Ohio Aug. 5, 2025);
Hernandez Torrealba v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 25-1621, 2025 WL 2444114, at *8–
12 (N.D. Ohio Aug. 25, 2025); see also Laguna Espinoza v. Dir. of Detroit Field Off., U.S.
Immigration & Customs Enforcement, No. 25-2107, 2025 WL 2878173, at *2–3 (N.D. Ohio Oct.
9, 2025)). The Court has reviewed those cases and finds the reasoning unpersuasive for the
reasons discussed above.
a statute what it says.” Connecticut Nat. Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253–54 (1992). For
the reasons below, these principles resolve the dispute in Petitioner’s favor.
Detention under § 1225(b)(2)(A) applies “in the case of an alien who is an applicant for
admission, if the examining immigration officer determines that an alien seeking admission is not
clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted[.]” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) (emphasis

added). This means that the alien must be an “applicant for admission” who is “seeking
admission” and one who is “not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted.”
Section 1225(a)’s definition of “applicants for admission” does not match Petitioner. The
statute defines an “applicant for admission” as “[a]n alien present in the United States who has
not been admitted or who arrives in the United States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1). And the statute
defines “admission” and “admitted” as “with respect to an alien, the lawful entry of the alien into
the United States after inspection and authorization by an immigration officer.” 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101(a)(13)(A) (emphasis added). So read together, “applicants for admission” means “aliens
who have unlawfully entered into the United States after inspection and authorization by an

immigration officer.” It does not follow that Petitioner is an “applicant for admission” simply
because he has resided in the interior of this country for so long without inspection or
authorization by an immigration officer.
That is because “applicant for admission” governs those noncitizens who are “seeking
admission.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). “Seeking,” of course, implies “some sort of present-
tense action.” Barco Mercado, -- F. Supp. 3d. --, 2025 WL 3295903, at *5. And “seeking”
suggests action. With that in mind, to fall under § 1225(b)(2)(A), the alien must be actively
seeking admission, not simply residing in the country after entering it unlawfully. Because
Petitioner’s unlawful entry occurred two years ago, the Court is not persuaded that he was
actively seeking admission when ICE detained him.8
The plain meaning of § 1226 better captures Petitioner’s situation. For example, it
applies to the “apprehension and detention of aliens,” providing that, upon “a warrant issued by
the Attorney General, an alien may be arrested or detained pending a decision on whether the

alien is to be removed from the United States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). Again, ICE detained
Petitioner in the interior of the country after residing here for over two years. So the Attorney
General has the discretion under this section to “continue to detain [him]” or she “may release
[him] on bond.” (Id.) She may not, though, deny him the bond hearing to which he is entitled.
See 8 C.F.R. § 1236.1(c)(8), (d)(1).
The titles of the statutory provisions also supports this distinction. See Godinez-Lopez,
2025 WL 3047889, at *4. “[T]he title of a statute in the heading of a section [is a] tool[]
available for the resolution of a doubt” about a statute’s meaning. Dubin v. United States, 599
U.S. 110, 121 (2023). Section 1225’s title is “Inspection by immigration officers; expedited

removal of inadmissible arriving aliens; referral for hearing.” 8 U.S.C. §1225 (emphasis added).
Section 1225’s title then envisions arriving aliens placed in expedited removal. But again,
Petitioner was detained far from the border over two years after he had crossed it. See Jennings
v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 287 (2018). Meanwhile, § 1226’s title is “Apprehension and
detention of aliens.” 8 U.S.C. § 1226. That title fits here. Petitioner was apprehended, not while

8 To be sure, the INA recognizes two classes of aliens who are not seeking admission—those
who are arriving yet found to be inadmissible because of fraud, misrepresentation, or lack of
valid documents, and those that are designated by the Attorney General who have not been
admitted or paroled and have not been present in the United States for two years. See 8 U.S.C.
§§ 1225(b)(1)(A)(i) and 1225(b)(1)(A)(iii). But that does not preclude the existence of other
alien classes that do not fall under § 1225. See, e.g., Padilla-Ugsha, 2025 WL 3638007.
arriving in the United States, but years later. And he is only now detained. Section 1225’s
therefore seems inapplicable to aliens in Petitioner’s shoes, but § 1226’s title seems spot on.
That is not all. Respondent’s interpretation of § 1225(b) makes § 1226(c)’s mandatory
detention provision superfluous. To be sure, subsections 1226(c)(1)(E)(i)–(ii) provide for
mandatory detention of certain aliens. But it applies only to those aliens who both entered the

country without inspection under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A), (C), and (7) and who are also
“charged with, . . . arrested for, . . . convicted of . . .” certain crimes. 8 U.S.C. §
1226(c)(1)(E)(i)–(ii). And so to interpret § 1225(b)(2)(A) as Respondent argues would subject
mandatory detention to every alien who did not lawfully enter the country. This reading would
strip 1226(c) of meaning. What is more, Congress only recently added subsection 1226(c)(1)(E)
when it passed the Laken Riley Act. Pub. L. No. 119-1, 139 Stat. 3 (2025). The Court declines
to presume that Congress pointlessly amended the statute with a redundant provision when it
most recently considered it. See Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 607–08 (2019) (“This would
violate the cannon against interpreting any statutory provision in a manner that would render

another provision superfluous.”).
At bottom, §§ 1225 and 1226 are different statutory provisions that apply to different
contexts. And the Supreme Court has already distinguished the two. In Jennings, the Court
determined that the government may “detain certain aliens seeking admission into the country”
and that the § 1225 process “generally begins at the Nation’s borders and ports of entry, where
the Government must determine whether an alien seeking to enter the country is admissible.”
583 U.S. at 287, 289. Whereas § 1226 “authorizes the Government to detain certain aliens
already in the country pending the outcome of removal proceedings.” 583 U.S. 281, 289 (2018)
(emphasis added). Respondent has articulated no compelling reason to stray from this
commonsense understanding.
So the Court finds § 1226 governs the detention of an alien like Petitioner, who has no
criminal history and who has been residing in the United States for years. Petitioner is therefore
subject to the discretionary bond process under § 1226.

III. Due Process
Because the Court has found that § 1226(a) applies to Petitioner’s detention, he is owed
the process given to him under the statute. See, e.g. Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Thuraissigiam,
591 U.S. 103, 140 (2020) (“[A]n alien in [Petitioner’s] position has only the rights . . . that
Congress has provided by statute.”). Petitioner alleges that Respondent violates his due process
rights by continuing to detain him without a bond hearing. (ECF No. 1 at PageID 16; ECF No. 7
at PageID 54–57.) Respondent counters that because Petitioner complains that he is detained
under the wrong statute, even if his detention is unlawful, it is not unconstitutional. (ECF No. 6
at PageID 28–29.) Or put another way, Respondent asserts that § 1225(b)(2)(A) has already

afforded Petitioner the due process that Congress chose to provide him. (Id. (citing Dep’t of
Homeland Sec. v. Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. 103, 138–40 (2020); Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S.
21, 32 (1982); United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 544 (1950).)
The Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution protects every person from being
“deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. Const. amend. V. And
to evaluate the level of process owed to a noncitizen, the Sixth Circuit generally “applies the
balancing test from Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976).” Godinez-Lopez, 2025 WL
3047889, at *6 (citing United States v. Silvestre-Gregorio, 983 F.3d 848, 852 (6th Cir. 2020)).
Matthews considers (1) “the private interest that will be affected by the official action” (2) “the
risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest,” and (3) “the Government’s interest, including
the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute
procedural requirement would entail.” 424 U.S. at 335.
All three factors weigh in Petitioner’s favor here. He has a strong liberty interest in being
free from physical detention. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 529 (2004); Zadvydas v.

Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001). The risk of erroneous deprivation is high here considering that
Respondent and the BIA’s current position is to afford him no bond hearing whatsoever. And
bond hearings are a significant procedural safeguard to balance the Government’s interest in
immigration enforcement against individual liberties. So the Court finds that the Government’s
interest in detaining Petitioner without that procedural safeguard does not outweigh Petitioner’s
liberty interest or the risk of erroneous deprivation. In fact, as it stands, Petitioner has no
meaningful opportunity for an immigration judge to consider whether he is a danger to society or
a flight risk. And the fact that Petitioner has been residing in the United States for over two
years with no criminal charge further tips the scales in his favor.

This all makes clear that Petitioner is entitled to a bond hearing before an immigration
judge. And not only that, but his continued detention without that bond hearing violates his due
process rights. The Court therefore GRANTS the Petition.
IV. Attorney’s Fees and Costs
Petitioner seeks attorney’s fees and costs under the Equal Access to Justice Act, 28
U.S.C. § 2412. (ECF No. 1 at PageID 7.) Section 2412(b) allows a court to award “reasonable
fees and expenses of attorneys, in addition to the costs which may be awarded pursuant to
subsection (a), to the prevailing party in any civil action brought by or against the United States.”
28 U.S.C. § 2412(b). The Federal Rules require that claims for attorney’s fees and related
expenses be made by motion. Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d)(2)(A). So Petitioner must timely file a
motion that complies with Local Rule 54.1(b) to seek attorney’s fees and costs. See L.R. 54.1(b).
CONCLUSION
For the reasons above, the Court GRANTS the Petition and ORDERS Respondent to
provide Petitioner with a bond hearing under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) and 8 C.F.R. § 1236.1(c)(8),

(d)(1) within 14 days of the entry of this Order or immediately release him from custody. See
Velazquez v. Olson, No. 25-205, 2026 WL 27349, at *9 (E.D. Ky. Jan. 5, 2026); Singh v. Noem,
No. 25-1861, 2026 WL 41126, at *3 (W.D. Mich. Jan. 7, 2026).
The Court further ENJOINS Respondent from pursuing Petitioner’s detention under 8
U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A).
The Court also ORDERS Respondent to file a status report within 21 days of entry of
this Order to certify compliance. The status report must include: (1) when the bond hearing
occurred; (2) if the bond was granted or denied; and (3) if denied, the reasons for that denial. See
Velazquez, 2026 WL 27349, at *9; Singh, 2026 WL 41126, at *3.

SO ORDERED, this 12th day of January, 2026.
s/Thomas L. Parker
THOMAS L. PARKER
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11240123. Public record. Not legal advice.