# P.

> District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania · January 9, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11239757

## Case

- **Full name:** Michael P., a minor, by and through his mother, ELIZABETH A., and ELIZABETH A., individually v. EAST STROUDSBURG AREA SCHOOL DISTRICT
- **Court:** District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania
- **Decided:** January 9, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11239757

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- noting that it is not proper, on summary judgment, to consider evidence that is not admissible at trial

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

MICHAEL P., a minor, by and
through his mother, ELIZABETH
A., and ELIZABETH A., CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:21-cv-00902
individually,
(SAPORITO, J.)
Plaintiffs,

v.

EAST STROUDSBURG AREA
SCHOOL DISTRICT,

Defendant.

MEMORANDUM
On June 5, 2019, Michael P., a minor with disabilities, was severely
injured when he allegedly “threw himself down the bus steps and landed
face-first on the pavement” causing himself significant brain injuries.
(Doc. 1, ¶ 3). On May 18, 2021, the plaintiffs, Michael P. and his parent
and natural guardian Elizabeth A., filed this action against the East
Stroudsburg Area School District (the “District”) asserting claims under
§ 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (“RA”), 29 U.S.C. § 794, and the
Americans with Disabilities Action (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131 .,
state-law negligence and recklessness claims, and a state-law breach of
fiduciary duty claim.1 ( ). The plaintiffs allege that the District’s bus

driver and Michael P.’s aide, a District employee, knew or should have
known of Michael P.’s disabilities and transportation safety needs
including dangerous issues with elopement, on the date of Michael’s

injuries. ( , ¶¶ 19―22). Now before the Court are both parties’ cross
motions for summary judgment. (Doc. 50; Doc. 51). The motions have
been fully briefed (Doc. 52; Docs. 56–61) and are ripe for review.

I. Background2
On September 27, 2017, Michael P. was enrolled in the East
Stroudsburg Area School District. Michael is diagnosed with Down

syndrome and holds an IQ of 52, placing him below the first percentile as
compared to other children at his age. Due to Michael’s disabilities, the
District educated him in a full-time life skills classroom for very low-

1 On September 20, 2022, the Court dismissed the plaintiffs’
recklessness subclaim within Count III and the plaintiffs’ breach of
fiduciary duty claim set out in Count IV. (Doc. 24). The plaintiffs’
remaining claims are as follows: (1) claims based upon Section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act (Count I); (2) claims under the Americans with
Disabilities Act (Count II); and (3) state-law negligence claims (Count
III).
2 The facts included within this section are all undisputed and
taken from the parties’ statements of material facts. (Doc. 56-2; Doc.
57).
functioning students. Michael’s disabilities also required transportation

accommodations to and from school.
At the time of the events leading up to Michael P.’s injury on June
5, 2019, Michael P. was receiving specialized door-to-door transportation

service on a small vehicle with a booster seat that secured him during
transit. Michael P.’s individualized education program3, written in
January of 2019, noted the following: “Due to Michael’s limited ability to

understand and express language, sensory issues with noise and his lack
of safety awareness (including issues of elopement that could be
dangerous) the team feels it would benefit him to have specialized

transportation as stated within the related services of this document.”
Indeed, Michael P.’s parents had previously informed the District that
they “expressed concerns regarding the regular bus stop with regard to

Michael’s tendency to run (elope) and run into the road.” Moreover,
Michael P.’s bus driver had noted that Michael P. would sometimes jump

3 “An IEP consists of a specific statement of a student’s present
abilities, goals for improvement of the student’s abilities, services
designed to meet those goals, and a timetable for reaching the goals by
way of the services.” , 602 F.3d 553, 557 (3d
Cir. 2010) (quoting , 205 F.3d 583, 589
(3d Cir. 2000)) (citations omitted).
out of the bus into his father’s arms when arriving home at the end of the

day.
On June 5, 2019, the date of the injury, Michael P. arrived at the
District on his assigned bus.4 At some point, Michael P.’s bus driver

parked the vehicle on the curb of the school and began to fill out a form.
After completing the form, the bus driver walked over to Michael P. and
removed Michael P. from his booster seat harness. He then walked

Michael P. to the bus stairs. The parties disagree on what happens next.
The plaintiffs allege that Michael P. leaped from the top stairs of
the bus and landed face down on the pavement. (Doc. 57, ¶ 23)

(“Michael was entirely unattended as he leaped out of the bus and landed
face first on the pavement.); ( , ¶ 27) (“… and [Michael] jumped out of
the bus, injuring himself.”); ( , ¶ 41) (“… [Michael] jumped from the top

step with no one to help him and he landed face down on the
pavement….”). The District contends that Michael P. accidentally fell
after losing his balance. (Doc. 56-2, ¶ 92) (“There were no warning signs

4 The description of the events surrounding Michael’s injury are
based on two videos provided by both parties. (Doc. 51-8). The parties,
unsurprisingly, have two different interpretations of the events based on
those videos, and thus, we have included a neutral version of the events
within this section.
before Student fell….”); ( , ¶ 93) (“[I]t appears that Student either

stopped short or lost his balance causing him to fall.”). In either event,
Michael landed on the pavement and suffered significant brain injuries
due to his fall. These injuries include, according to the plaintiffs, “a

Traumatic Brain Injury (“TBI”), brain hemorrhage, orbital fracture,
frontal bone (forehead) fracture, long-term behavior changes, long-term
post-concussion syndrome, and other injuries and long-term

consequences.” (Doc. 1, ¶ 3).
As noted above, the plaintiffs allege that the District knew or
should have known of Michael P.’s disabilities and transportation safety

needs. They seek compensatory damages and reasonable attorneys’ fees
and costs under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, the
Americans with Disabilities Act, and a state-law claim for negligence.

II. Legal Standard
Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure dictates summary
judgment should only be granted if “there is no genuine dispute as to any

material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A fact is “material” only if it might affect the outcome
of the case. , 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A
dispute of material fact is “genuine” only if the evidence “is such that a

reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party.” at
248. In deciding a summary judgment motion, all inferences “should be
drawn in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, and where the

non-moving party’s evidence contradicts the movant’s, then the non-
movant’s must be taken as true.” , 24 F.3d
508, 512 (3d Cir. 1994).

Parties seeking summary judgment bear “the initial responsibility
of informing the district court of the basis for its motion,” and
demonstrating the absence of a genuine dispute of material fact.

, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). If the movant makes such a
showing, the non-movant must set forth specific facts, supported by the
record, demonstrating that “the evidence presents a sufficient

disagreement to require submission to the jury.” , 477 U.S. at
251–52. A court must first determine if the moving party has made
showing that it is entitled to summary judgment when evaluating

such a motion. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); , 477 U.S. at 331. Only
once that showing has been made does the burden shift to the
nonmoving party to demonstrate the existence of a genuine dispute of
material fact. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); , 477 U.S. at 331.

Parties may cite to “particular parts of materials in the record,
including depositions, documents, electronically stored information,
affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those made for the

purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers or other
materials.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A). “An affidavit or declaration used to
support or oppose a motion must be made on personal knowledge, set out

facts that would be admissible in evidence, and show that the affiant or
declarant is competent to testify on the matters stated.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(c)(4). “Although evidence may be considered in a form which is

inadmissible at trial, the content of the evidence must be capable of
admission at trial.” , 994 F. Supp. 2d 593, 599
(M.D. Pa. 2014); , 192 F.3d

378, 387 n.13 (3d Cir. 1999) (noting that it is not proper, on summary
judgment, to consider evidence that is not admissible at trial).
III. Discussion

Both parties have moved for summary judgment concerning the
plaintiffs’ remaining three claims: (1) claims based upon Section 504 of
the Rehabilitation Act (Count I); (2) claims under the Americans with
Disabilities Act (Count II); and (3) a state-law negligence claim (Count

III).
A. The RA and ADA Claims
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act provides that “[n]o otherwise

qualified individual with a disability … shall, solely by reason of her or
his disability, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the
benefits of, or be subject to discrimination under any program or activity

receiving Federal financial assistance.” 29 U.S.C. § 794(a). Title II of the
ADA states that: “no qualified individual with a disability shall by reason
of such disability be excluded from participation in or be denied the

benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity or be
subjected to discrimination by any entity.” 42 U.S.C. § 12132.
Claims under the ADA and the RA are generally subject to the same

substantive standard. , 729
F.3d 248, 260 (3d Cir. 2013);
522 F. Supp. 3d 78, 103 (M.D. Pa. 2021). A student

alleging that he has been discriminated against by a school under the
ADA and the RA must prove that he “(1) has a disability; (2) was
otherwise qualified to participate in a school program; and (3) was denied
the benefits of the program or was otherwise subject to discrimination

because of [his] disability.” ,
587 F.3d 176, 189 (3d Cir. 2009). Although claims under the RA and the
ADA are otherwise generally the same, the causation elements of the RA

and the ADA differ in that the “RA allows a plaintiff to recover if he or
she were deprived of an opportunity to participate in a program on
the basis of disability, while the ADA covers discrimination on the basis

of disability, even if there is another cause as well.”
, 734 F.3d 229, 235―36 (3d Cir. 2013) (emphasis added). Both
statutes require plaintiffs to prove “that they were treated differently

based on the protected characteristic, namely the existence of their
disability.” at 237. A claim under the RA also requires that the school
or board of education receives federal financial assistance.

, 191 F. Supp. 3d 375, 389 (M.D. Pa. 2016).
To obtain compensatory monetary damages under § 504 of the RA
and the ADA, however, the Third Circuit requires a plaintiff to prove

intentional discrimination, which is analyzed under a deliberate
indifference standard. , 729 F.3d at 261, 263 (“[A] showing of
deliberate indifference may satisfy a claim for compensatory damages
under § 504 of the RA [and the ADA.]”);

, 765 F.3d 260, 269 (3d Cir. 2014). To satisfy the deliberate
indifference standard:
A plaintiff “must present evidence that shows both: (1)
knowledge that a federally protected right is
substantially likely to be violated…, and (2) failure to
act despite that knowledge.” at 265 (citing
, 260 F.3d 1124, 1139 (9th Cir. 2001)).
“Deliberate indifference does not require a showing of
personal ill will or animosity toward the disabled
person.” at 263 (quoting
, 639 F.3d 384, 389 (8th Cir. 2011) (internal
quotation marks omitted)). It does, however, require a
“‘deliberate choice, rather than negligence or
bureaucratic inaction.’” (quoting
, 582 F.3d 268, 276 (2d Cir. 2009)).

, 765 F.3d at 269.
Here, the plaintiffs have alleged similar claims under the RA and
the ADA against the District. In essence, the plaintiffs argue that the
District discriminated against Michael P. and denied him the equal
benefits of his transportation program by failing to provide him with safe
and properly supervised transportation free from injury and bodily harm.
(Doc. 1, ¶¶ 39, 41―43, 47―48, 49―50, 60―63). Specifically, the plaintiffs
contend that the District showed deliberate indifference to Michael P.’s
federally protected rights because Michael P. had a “long-standing and
specific habit of rushing off the bus and leaping from the top step” and

that the District failed to assist him during the transportation process
despite its awareness of Michael’s disabilities causing him to jump
dangerously off the bus. (Doc. 52, at 11). Indeed, both parties’ cross

motions for summary judgment concern the dispute about whether the
District had knowledge of Michael P.’s propensity to jump. The plaintiffs
have moved for summary judgment on the basis that the District had

adequate awareness of Michael P.’s tendency to jump from the bus; the
District moves for summary judgment on the basis that it never had that
awareness. Nonetheless, upon review of the record, there remains a

genuine dispute of material fact about the District’s awareness of Michael
P.’s propensity to leap that precludes the granting of either party’s
motion.

There is no dispute that Michael P.’s Down syndrome diagnosis
required transportation-related safety measures while riding the bus.
(Doc. 56-2, ¶ 33); (Doc. 57, ¶ 4). At the time of the injury, the District had

provided Michael P. transportation accommodations consisting of “curb-
to-curb transportation on a small vehicle [with] a booster seat.” (Doc. 56-
2, ¶¶ 33, 34); (Doc. 57, ¶ 11). One of those reasons for the
accommodations, as the District concedes, is that Michael P. had a

“tendency to run (elope) and run into the road.” (Doc. 57, ¶ 13); (Doc. 58,
¶ 13). Michael P.’s most recent individualized education program noted
that “[d]ue to Michael’s limited ability to understand and express

language, sensory issues with noise and his lack of safety awareness
including [issues with] elopement that could be dangerous), the team
feels it would benefit him to have specialized transportation….” (Doc. 56-

2, ¶ 39) (emphasis included); (Doc. 57, ¶ 10). Moreover, the District also
concedes that Michael P. would sometimes jump into his father’s arms
when dropped off at home after school. (Doc. 56-2, ¶ 54); (Doc. 57, ¶¶

19―21). Therefore, it would appear that the District had knowledge of
both Michael P.’s propensity to elope into the street and jump into his
father’s arms upon arrival of his home. The plaintiffs have moved for

summary judgment arguing that the District should have been aware
that there was a substantial risk that Michael P. could leap out of the bus
causing himself injuries based in part on these prior tendencies and his

disabilities. But the plaintiffs’ categorization of the events occurring on
June 5, 2019, are not that simple. Many of the plaintiffs’ interpretations
of facts are disputed by the District and are better left to be determined
by a factfinder. , 477 U.S. at 255 (“Credibility

determinations, the weighing of evidence, and the drawing of legitimate
inferences from the facts are jury functions, not those of a judge, whether
he is ruling on a motion for summary judgment or for a directed verdict.”).

First, there is a genuine dispute of material fact about whether the
District had, or should have had, awareness that Michael P. would jump
from the top of the bus onto the pavement. As noted above, the District

concedes that it had awareness that Michael P. had a propensity to run
into the road or jump into his father’s arms at the end of the school day.
But the District notes that on June 5, 2019, Michael P. did not jump into

his father’s arms upon arrival to his home but rather when the bus
arrived at school. (Doc. 56-2, ¶ 55). According to the District, “[f]rom his
time at Pocono Mountain School District, to his start at the School

District in fall 2017, through June 4, 2019 (and arguably June 5),
[Michael] never once jumped from the top of the bus steps, or eloped from
the bus, while being dropped off at school.” ( ). Moreover, the District

contends that Michael P. never had any prior problems with navigating
the bus stairs throughout the years. (Doc. 56, at 10) (“Ms. Thompson[, a
classroom aid,] never shared any concerns about Student’s ability to get
off the bus, and specifically, never mentioned issues with navigating the

stairs or jumping.”). Therefore, the determination of whether the District
had prior knowledge that Michael P. could jump from the bus steps on
June 5, 2019, upon arrival to the school remains better left to a jury.

Second, there remains a question about whether Michael P. actually
jumped from the bus or whether he fell inadvertently. The District argues
that Michael P. “either stopped short or lost his balance causing him to

fall.” (Doc. 56-2, ¶ 93). Moreover, it contends that “[t]here were no
warning signs before Student fell, and … that because it happened so
fast… [no one] could have done anything else to stop the fall.” ( , ¶ 92).

The plaintiffs argue that “Michael leaped head-first from the top step of
his school bus.” (Doc. 52, at 2). This issue, again, is better left to the
determination of a factfinder.

For these reasons, there are genuine disputes as to the material
facts whether the District was aware of Michael P.’s propensity to jump
and whether Michael P. did in fact jump that prevents the Court from

granting either party’s motion for summary judgment for the plaintiffs’
RA and ADA claims.5

B. The Negligence Claim
The plaintiffs also allege that the District and its employees had a
duty, under applicable law, to appropriately supervise and transport

Michael P. safely and free from unreasonable and foreseeable risks of
harm; to hire, train, and supervise employees that would transport him
safely; and to refrain from taking unreasonable actions that would cause

him injury. (Doc. 1, ¶ 66). They further allege that the District breached
its duties, and its negligence caused injuries to Michael P. ( , ¶¶ 68―70).
Here, the District has moved for summary judgment by asserting that

the Political Subdivision Torts Claim Act (“PSTCA”) bars the plaintiffs’
negligence claim, and it argues that the “vehicle liability” exception
under 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 8542(b)(1) does not apply to this action

because Michael P.’s injuries did not arise from the of the bus.
The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and its agencies, officials, and

5 While the plaintiffs argue that the undisputed facts show that the
District had awareness of Michael’s propensity to jump from the steps,
the District contends that those same facts prove that the District had no
awareness. Our analysis applies equally to both parties’ arguments that
there remains a genuine dispute of material fact as to the District’s
awareness.
employees are generally immune from suits for damages when acting

within the scope of their duties.
, 320 A.3d 872, 876 (Pa. Commw.
Ct. 2024). “The Judicial Code lists exceptions to sovereign immunity,

which apply to ‘damages arising out of a negligent act where the damages
would be recoverable under the common law or a statute creating a cause
of action if the injury were caused by a person not having available the

defense of sovereign immunity.’” (quoting 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. §
8522(a)). One of these exceptions is known as the “vehicle liability”
exception. 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 8542. The vehicle liability

exception provides that liability may be imposed on a local agency where
injury is caused by the “operation of any motor vehicle in the possession
or control of the local agency.”6 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 8542(b)(1).

Pennsylvania courts have defined “operation” as follows:
The process of operating a vehicle encompasses more
than simply moving the vehicle. When a person
“operates” a vehicle, he makes a series of decisions and
actions, taken together, which transport the individual
from one place to another. The decisions of where and
whether to park, where and whether to turn, whether to

6 The dispute between the parties lies solely on the definition and
application of the word “operation” in the statute. Neither party contests
whether it was in the “possession or control of the local agency.”
engage brake lights, whether to use appropriate signals,
whether to turn lights on or off, and the like, are all part
of the “operation” of a vehicle.

, 191 A.3d 799, 810 (Pa. 2018).7
Courts have also articulated that the term “operation” includes failures
to act. , 320 A.3d at 873 (holding that a failure to engage
attachments, such as a handicap ramp, constitutes the “operation” of a
public bus). But here, upon review of the record, there is still a dispute of

material fact as to whether Michael P.’s accident arose from any
“operation” of the bus, preventing the Court from granting either party’s
motion for summary judgment.

The plaintiffs argue that sovereign immunity is inapplicable in this
action because Michael P.’s injuries resulted from the District’s failure to
act and thus, fall outside the scope of the vehicle liability exception. (Doc.

52, at 12). In support, they cite , where the court found that
a driver’s refusal (and failure) to lower a handicapped ramp for a plaintiff
weakened by cancer fell under the definition of “operation” for purposes

7 In , the Pennsylvania Supreme Court adopted the
definition of “operation” as previously articulated by former Justice
Sandra Schultz Newman in a dissenting opinion in
, 739 A.2d 127 (Pa. 1999) (Newman, J., dissenting).
of sovereign immunity. ( , at 13) (citing , 320 A.3d at 874,

879). The court in articulated that a party’s “failure to act”
in the context of the vehicle liability exception must concern a “failure to
engage attachments [of the vehicle], such as a handicap ramp” rather

than a general negligent act that may indirectly involve the vehicle.
at 879. Here, the plaintiffs allege that the bus driver’s negligent use of
the bus doors contributed to Michael P.’s injuries, (Doc. 1, ¶¶ 18, 68), and

upon review of the evidence provided to the Court (Doc. 51-8), we find
that a reasonable factfinder could conclude that Michael P.’s injuries
could have arisen from the bus driver’s “operation” of the bus doors. Much

like the decisions of “where and whether to park, where and whether to
turn, [and] whether to engage brake lights…,” the decision of whether to
open and close bus doors constitutes an “operation” of a vehicle.

, 191 A.3d at 810. But, “a plaintiff must demonstrate that their
injury was by the negligent operation of a sovereign party’s
vehicle” to invoke the vehicle liability exception.

, 779 F. Supp. 3d 509, 536 (E.D. Pa. 2025)
(emphasis added). Indeed, while a factfinder could determine the opening
of the doors played no role in Michael P.’s injuries, a reasonable factfinder
could equally conclude that the opening of the bus doors served as a

potential catalyst to Michael P. jumping out of the bus, or at the very
least, contributed to the extent of Michael P.’s injuries. Therefore, the
determination of whether the bus driver’s operation of the vehicle’s bus

doors contributed to Michael P.’s injury is better suited for the jury rather
than this Court. We will deny both parties’ motions for summary
judgment as to the plaintiffs’ negligence claim.

IV. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the parties’ cross motions for summary
judgment will be denied.

An appropriate order follows.

Dated: January 9, 2026
JOSEPH F. SAPORITO, JR.
United States District Judge

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11239757. Public record. Not legal advice.