# Opinion

> District Court, C.D. California · January 7, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11239342

## Case

- **Full name:** Mel Marin v. Trustees of the Santa Barbara City College District, et al.
- **Court:** District Court, C.D. California
- **Decided:** January 7, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

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- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11239342

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding that state officials sued in their official capacities are not “persons” within the meaning of § 1983 unless sued for prospective injunctive relief
- holding that community college districts are entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity as dependent instrumentalities of the state of California

## Opinion text

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CIVIL MINUTES – GENERAL

Case No. 2:25-cv-11035-JWH-SSC Date: January 7, 2026
Title Mel Marin v. Trustees of the Santa Barbara City College
District, et al.

Present: The Honorable Stephanie S. Christensen, U.S. Magistrate Judge

Teagan Snyder n/a
Deputy Clerk Court Reporter / Recorder

Attorneys Present for Plaintiffs: Attorneys Present for Defendants:
None Present None Present

Proceedings: (IN CHAMBERS) Order to Show Cause Why
Complaint Should Not Be Dismissed in Whole or Part For
Pleading Deficiencies on Screening
Mel Marin brings this suit pro se and has filed an application to
proceed in forma pauperis. (ECF 1; ECF 2.) He sues Santa Barbara
City College and its trustees alleging disability discrimination, civil
rights violations, and state law violations based on incidents that
occurred in 2022 and 2025. He admits that he is not domiciled in
California. (ECF 1 at 1.)
As to 2022, Plaintiff alleges that he “made calls” to unspecified
admissions staff and professors before classes started in 2022, but was
refused a disability accommodation because the school had a custom
and policy of not considering special accommodation requests until a
student was enrolled in classes. (Id. at 2.) The accommodation was
seemingly extra testing time because of a severe eye injury that created
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CIVIL MINUTES – GENERAL

Case No. 2:25-cv-11035-JWH-SSC Date: January 7, 2026
Title Mel Marin v. Trustees of the Santa Barbara City College
District, et al.

a reading and learning disability. (Id. at 3, 11.) He alleges that he took
only one class in 2022 because of delays caused by the policy. (Id.)
He alleges that he attempted to re-enroll in June 2025 but faced
enrollment obstacles, though, as discussed below, he does not allege
that those obstacles were due to his disability. (ECF 1 at 4–5
(administrative obstacles regarding shortened name, lack of “4 digit
number code,” and lack of California driver’s license meant that he
could not seek accommodation request)). His complaint for the 2025
period seems to be that this local city college refused to let him enroll
while he was domiciled out of state which violated his federal due
process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. (ECF 1 at 2–3, 15–
16, 18.)
Plaintiff seeks $4.3 million, a declaration that defendants violated
his rights, and an injunction barring “arbitrary hoops.” (ECF 1 at 19.)
Plaintiff has filed suits against other California community
colleges, some with similar allegations. See, e.g., Mel Marin v. Ben
Prang, et al., Case no. 2:07-cv-05797-JVS-JEM (C.D. Cal. filed 09/06/07)
(suit against persons at Santa Monica College, closed 08/31/09); Mel
Marin v. Darroch Young, et al., Case no. 2:08-cv-00082-UA-JWJ (C.D.
Cal. filed 01/07/08) (suit against persons at Los Angeles Community
College, El Camino Community College, and Southern California
Regional Occupational College, closed 01/31/08); Mel Marin v. Geetha
Rajaram, et al., Case no. 2:22-cv-07044-JWH-SHK (C.D. Cal. filed
09/28/22) (suit against administrators at Long Beach City College,
closed 01/17/23); Mel Marin v. Gary C. Ovitt, et al., Case no. 5:22-cv-
00631-JWH-SHK (C.D. Cal. filed 04/11/22) (suit against Chaffey College
district and its trustees, closed 11/15/23); Mel Marin v. Constance
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CIVIL MINUTES – GENERAL

Case No. 2:25-cv-11035-JWH-SSC Date: January 7, 2026
Title Mel Marin v. Trustees of the Santa Barbara City College
District, et al.

Carroll, et al., Case no. 3:21-cv-01453-JO-DEB (S.D. Cal. filed
8/16/2021) (suit against the San Diego Community College District and
trustees/employees of various colleges therein, closed 04/17/25); Marin
v. Grossmont-Cuyamaca College Bd. of Trs., Case No. 22cv401-LAB
(JLB), 2022 WL 1608560 (S.D. Cal. May 19, 2022); Mel Marin v. Geetha
Rajaram, et al., Case no. 3:24-cv-01651-JAH-BJW (S.D. Cal. filed
09/13/24) (suit against administrators at Long Beach City College).1
THE STATUTORY SCREENING REQUIREMENT
The Court is required to screen any civil action in which a plaintiff
proceeds in forma pauperis and dismiss any claims that are frivolous,
malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or seek
monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Review for failure to state a claim under
§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) uses the same standard as that which is applied
under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Watison v.
Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012). A complaint may be
dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim for two
reasons: (1) lack of a cognizable legal theory or (2) insufficient facts

1 Plaintiff is also seemingly a prolific filer in state courts as in one
federal suit, Plaintiff alleged that he has been declared to be a vexatious
litigant in both New York and California state courts and “is now an
outlaw in the state courts of California, Arizona, Pennsylvania, and
New York.” Mel Marin v. Constance Carroll, et al., Case no. 3:21-cv-
01453-JO-DEB (S.D. Cal. filed 8/16/2021) (ECF 40 (Second Amended
Complaint) at 4–5)).
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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Case No. 2:25-cv-11035-JWH-SSC Date: January 7, 2026
Title Mel Marin v. Trustees of the Santa Barbara City College
District, et al.

under a cognizable legal theory. Mendiondo v. Centinela Hosp. Med.
Ctr., 521 F.3d 1097, 1104 (9th Cir. 2008).
In determining whether a plaintiff has stated a claim, courts
accept as true the factual allegations contained in the complaint and
view all inferences in a light most favorable to the plaintiff. Sprewell v.
Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001). A court does
not, however, “accept as true allegations that are merely conclusory,
unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable inferences.” Id.
DEFICIENCES
I
Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim alleging a Fourteenth Amendment due
process violation is deficient.
As pleaded against Santa Barbara City College and the trustees in
their official capacities, the claim for money damages and injunctive
relief2 is barred by the Eleventh Amendment.
The Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution sets
out the principle of State sovereign immunity, and states that “[t]he
Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to
any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the
United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of

2 A party may seek prospective injunctive relief against a state
official in their official capacity for an ongoing violation of federal law
under the Ex Parte Young doctrine. Doe v. Lawrence Livermore Nat’l
Lab’y, 131 F.3d 836, 839 (9th Cir. 1997).
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CIVIL MINUTES – GENERAL

Case No. 2:25-cv-11035-JWH-SSC Date: January 7, 2026
Title Mel Marin v. Trustees of the Santa Barbara City College
District, et al.

any Foreign State.” U.S. Const. Amend. XI. In other words, “[t]he
Eleventh Amendment prohibits federal courts from hearing suits
brought against an unconsenting state.” Brooks v. Sulphur Springs
Valley Elec. Co-op., 951 F.2d 1050, 1053 (9th Cir. 1991). “[A]gencies of
the state, such as California state colleges and universities, are
similarly immune from private damage actions or suits for injunctive
relief brought in federal court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.” Seater v.
Cal. State Univ., Fullerton, Case No. 93-56688, 1995 WL 72356, at *1
(9th Cir. 1995) (unpublished) (citing Mitchell v. L.A. Cmty. Coll. Dist.,
861 F.2d 198, 201 (9th Cir. 1988)). The Ninth Circuit has explicitly held
that Eleventh Amendment immunity applies to California community
college school districts. Cerrato v. San Francisco Cmty. Coll. Dist., 26
F.3d 968, 972 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that community college districts
are entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity as dependent
instrumentalities of the state of California); Johnson v. Rancho
Santiago Cmty. Coll. Dist., 623 F.3d 1011, 1021 n.4 (9th Cir. 2010); cf.
Belanger v. Madera Unified Sch. Dist., 963 F.2d 248, 254 (9th Cir. 1992)
(holding that school districts in California are considered agents of the
state to which Eleventh Amendment immunity extends).
Further, a state official sued in his or her official capacity for
damages is not a “person” for the purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 69 n.24 (1997);
Doe v. Lawrence Livermore Nat’l Lab’y, 131 F.3d 836, 839 (9th Cir.
1997) (holding that state officials sued in their official capacities are not
“persons” within the meaning of § 1983 unless sued for prospective
injunctive relief). The Supreme Court has determined that official-
capacity suits filed against state officials are merely an alternative way
of pleading an action against the entity of which the defendant is an
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CIVIL MINUTES – GENERAL

Case No. 2:25-cv-11035-JWH-SSC Date: January 7, 2026
Title Mel Marin v. Trustees of the Santa Barbara City College
District, et al.

officer. Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 27 (1991); Kentucky v. Graham, 473
U.S. 159, 165 (1985). Thus, a defendant sued in his or her official
capacity possesses the same sovereign immunity as that governmental
entity, and the Eleventh Amendment prohibits damages actions against
him or her. See Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 n.10
(1989).
To overcome the Eleventh Amendment bar on federal jurisdiction
over suits by individuals against a State and its instrumentalities,
either the State must have “unequivocally expressed” its consent to
waive its sovereign immunity or Congress must have abrogated it. See
Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 99–100
(1984); Va. Office for Protect. & Advoc. v. Stewart, 563 U.S. 247, 253–54
(2011). California has consented to be sued in its own courts pursuant
to the California Tort Claims Act, but this does not extend to consent to
be sued in federal court. See BV Eng’g v. Univ. of Cal., L.A., 858 F.2d
1394, 1396 (9th Cir. 1988). Further, the U.S. Congress has not
abrogated, or waived, State sovereign immunity against suits under
§ 1983.
Here, under Mitchell and Cerrato, Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim for
damages and injunctive relief against the college itself and the trustees
in their official capacities is barred and is frivolous. Claims arising
under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and § 504 of the
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CIVIL MINUTES – GENERAL

Case No. 2:25-cv-11035-JWH-SSC Date: January 7, 2026
Title Mel Marin v. Trustees of the Santa Barbara City College
District, et al.

Rehabilitation Act3 are not so barred generally4 though such claims
may be subject to other failings as detailed herein. See United States v.
Georgia, 546 U.S. 151 (2006); Kohn v. State Bar of California, 119 F.4th
693, 698 (9th Cir. 2024) (requiring courts to conduct a case-by-case
inquiry to evaluate whether Eleventh Amendment immunity applies to
claims under Title II of the ADA); Phiffer v. Columbia River Corr. Inst.,
384 F.3d 791, 793 (9th Cir. 2004) (a state “waive[s] its Eleventh
Amendment immunity under [§ 504] by accepting federal funds”).
Plaintiff has been warned of similar deficiencies in similar suits.
Marin v. Ovitt, Case no. 5:22-cv-00631-JWH-SHK, 2022 WL 17216818,
at *7–8 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 1, 2022); Grossmont-Cuyamaca College Bd. of
Trs., 2022 WL 1608560, at *4.5

3 A college district is subject to § 504 where it is a recipient of
federal funds, see Hayden v. Redwoods Cmty. Coll. Dist., No. C-05-
01785 NJV, 2007 WL 61886, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 8, 2007), and in the
present case, Plaintiff alleges that Santa Barbara City College receives
federal financial assistance. (ECF 1 at 11.)
4 Waiver of sovereign immunity under the ADA requires a case-by-
case inquiry that the Court declines to undertake at this time on
screening. See Rivera v. Thornell, Case no. 24-cv-1560-PHX-JJT (JFM),
2025 WL 1135256, at *4 (D. Ariz. Jan. 13, 2025), report and
recommendation adopted, No. CV-24-01560-PHX-JJT (JFM), 2025 WL
1135158 (D. Ariz. Apr. 16, 2025).
5 If Plaintiff chooses to re-plead a due process claim, he should
make clear whether he is alleging a violation of substantive or
procedural due process, and what liberty or property interest he alleges
is protected by the U.S. Constitution. United States v. Guillen-
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CIVIL MINUTES – GENERAL

Case No. 2:25-cv-11035-JWH-SSC Date: January 7, 2026
Title Mel Marin v. Trustees of the Santa Barbara City College
District, et al.

II
The ADA or the Rehabilitation Act claims are also deficient.
Title II of the ADA provides that “no qualified individual with a
disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from
participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or
activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any
such entity.” 42 U.S.C. § 12132. Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act
similarly prohibits disability discrimination by recipients of federal
funds. 29 U.S.C. § 794. The “two laws are interpreted coextensively
because there is no significant difference in the analysis of rights and

Cervantes, 748 F.3d 870, 872 (9th Cir. 2014). As to a liberty interest,
under the “stigma-plus” test, a plaintiff has a liberty interest in
avoiding “reputational harm only when [that] plaintiff suffers stigma
from governmental action plus alteration or extinguishment of a right
or status previously recognized by state law.” Endy v. County of L.A.,
975 F.3d 757, 764 (9th Cir. 2020) (citation modified). As to a property
interest, because the Due Process Clause does not create freestanding
property interests, a plaintiff must identify a cognizable property
interest based on an “independent source such as state law[.]” Bd. of
Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972); see Goss v.
Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 572–73 (1975). Plaintiff is cautioned that the
Ninth Circuit recently affirmed a grant of qualified immunity to
administrators of a California university, holding that California law
did not clearly establish an interest in continued attendance at a state
university. Doe v. White, 859 F. App’x 76, 77–78 (9th Cir. 2021)
(unpublished).
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CIVIL MINUTES – GENERAL

Case No. 2:25-cv-11035-JWH-SSC Date: January 7, 2026
Title Mel Marin v. Trustees of the Santa Barbara City College
District, et al.

obligations created by the two Acts.” Payan v. L.A. Cmty. Coll. Dist., 11
F.4th 729, 737 (9th Cir. 2021) (citation modified).
To state a claim for monetary relief under Title II of the ADA, a
plaintiff must show that (1) he is a qualified individual with a
disability; (2) he was intentionally excluded from participation in or
otherwise discriminated against with regard to a public entity’s
services, programs, or activities; and (3) such intentional exclusion or
discrimination was by reason of his disability. See Lovell v. Chandler,
303 F.3d 1039, 1052 (9th Cir. 2002). The ADA defines a disability as:
(a) “a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or
more major life activities of such individual”; (b) “a record of such an
impairment”; or (c) “being regarded as having such an impairment.” 42
U.S.C. § 12102(1).
To recover monetary damages under the ADA, Plaintiff must show
intentional discrimination on the part of state officials. Duvall v.
County of Kitsap, 260 F.3d 1124, 1138 (9th Cir. 2001). The test for
intentional discrimination is deliberate indifference. Id. A defendant
acts with deliberate indifference only if (1) the defendant has knowledge
from which an inference could be drawn that a harm to a federally
protected right is substantially likely, and (2) the defendant actually
draws that inference and fails to act upon the likelihood. See id. at
1138–39. “When the plaintiff has alerted the public entity to his need
for accommodation (or where the need for accommodation is obvious, or
required by statute or regulation), the public entity is on notice that an
accommodation is required, and the plaintiff has satisfied the first
element of the deliberate indifference test.” Id. at 1139. “[I]n order to
meet the second element of the deliberate indifference test, a failure to
act must be a result of conduct that is more than negligent, and involves
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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Case No. 2:25-cv-11035-JWH-SSC Date: January 7, 2026
Title Mel Marin v. Trustees of the Santa Barbara City College
District, et al.

an element of deliberateness.” Id. In sum, “notice combined with
failure to provide appropriate facilities may violate Title II[.]” Id. at
1139–40 (citing Matthews v. Jefferson, 29 F. Supp. 2d 525, 535–36 (W.D.
Ark. 1998)). In other words, the “deliberate refusal” to accommodate a
plaintiff’s disability-related needs can violate the ADA. See Georgia,
546 U.S. at 157 (finding it “quite plausible” that “the alleged deliberate
refusal of prison officials to accommodate [a plaintiff]’s disability-
related needs in such fundamentals as mobility, hygiene, medical care,
and virtually all other prison programs constituted [an ADA violation]”
(emphasis added)).
Further, “[a] plaintiff bringing suit under § 504 must show (1) he
is an individual with a disability; (2) he is otherwise qualified to receive
the benefit; (3) he was denied the benefits of the program solely by
reason of his disability; and (4) the program receives federal financial
assistance.” Duvall, 260 F.3d at 1135. A person is “otherwise qualified”
under § 504 if he is “able to meet all of a programs’ requirements in
spite of his handicap.” Southeastern Cmty. Coll. v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397,
406 (1979); see also Jacobson v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1202, 1205
(9th Cir. 1984) (defining “otherwise qualified” as meeting all program
requirements other than those that are “unreasonable and
discriminatory”).
Plaintiff seemingly alleges individualized, rather than systemic
injuries, and thus the allegations must be viewed in the context of a
failure to accommodate. See Payan, 11 F.4th at 740. A failure to
accommodate claim requires allegations showing that a reasonable
accommodation existed. Zukle v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 166 F.3d
1041, 1046–47 (9th Cir. 1999). Furthermore, a school may be held
vicariously liable for violations of both § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CIVIL MINUTES – GENERAL

Case No. 2:25-cv-11035-JWH-SSC Date: January 7, 2026
Title Mel Marin v. Trustees of the Santa Barbara City College
District, et al.

and Title II of the ADA, committed by acts of its employees, through the
doctrine of respondeat superior. Bonner v. Lewis, 857 F.2d 559, 567
(9th Cir. 1988) (allowing for the doctrine of respondeat superior in § 504
claims.); Duvall, 260 F.3d at 1141 (allowing for the doctrine of
respondeat superior in Title II claims).
Here, as to the 20256 attempted enrollment, the complaint fails to
allege that the enrollment failure was solely because of a disability or
that he was “qualified” to attend Santa Barabara City College. As
discussed above, Plaintiff admits that it was his out-of-state residency,
lack of proper codes, lack of a California driver’s license, and name-
variation problems that prevented enrollment in 2025 not his alleged
disability. Plaintiff has been warned of similar pleading failures in
similar suits that he has attempted to bring against other community
colleges. Ovitt, 2022 WL 17216818, at *7–8; Grossmont-Cuyamaca

6 As to the 2022 failure(s) to accommodate, the Court notes that
claims based thereon may be time barred. Plaintiff admits that “the
2022 causes of action were known to [him] by Fall 2022.” (ECF 1 at 7.)
He filed this suit more than three years later, on November 12, 2025.
(ECF 1.) See Taylor v. Regents of University of California, 993 F.2d 710,
711 (1993) (one year limitations period in California for § 1983 claims);
Sharkey v. O’Neal, 778 F.3d 767, 771 (9th Cir. 2015) (three year
limitations period in California for ADA Title II claims); Alexopulos ex
rel. Alexopulos v. S.F. Unified Sch. Dist., 817 F.2d 551, 554 (9th Cir.
1987) (three year limitations period in California for § 504 claims).
However, because Plaintiff makes tolling arguments within the
complaint (ECF 1 at 7–8), the Court declines to consider the limitations
period on screening.
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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Case No. 2:25-cv-11035-JWH-SSC Date: January 7, 2026
Title Mel Marin v. Trustees of the Santa Barbara City College
District, et al.

College Bd. of Trs., 2022 WL 1608560, at *4 (dismissing nearly identical
claims brought by Plaintiff against another college because he “allege[d]
that he was . . . ultimately dropped from his class ‘for lack of residency
proof’” and thus was not “otherwise qualified to enroll” at the college).
Though Plaintiff appears to claim that these obstacles were a
pretext for discrimination, as alleged the complaint does not support an
inference that Santa Barbara City College or its trustees denied
Plaintiff enrollment and/or accommodation in 2025 by reason of his
unspecified disability. See Duvall, 260 F.3d at 1135.
III
There are also pleading problems related to the trustees.
A
It is unclear which trustees are being sued. Under Rule 10 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure “[t]he title of the complaint must name
all the parties . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(a). A complaint that does not
comply with Rule 10 is subject to dismissal. See C.D. Cal. L. R. 83-2.2.4
(pro se litigant’s failure to comply with the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure “may be grounds for dismissal”).
Here, the caption does not list the names of the trustees that
Plaintiff seeks to sue in their individual and official capacities but
discusses some by name in the complaint. Any amended complaint
must list all named defendants in the pleading caption. To aid Plaintiff
in complying with Rule 10, the Court encourages Plaintiff to submit any
amended complaint on the Court’s standardized form complaint, CV-66,
a copy of which is included with this order.
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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Case No. 2:25-cv-11035-JWH-SSC Date: January 7, 2026
Title Mel Marin v. Trustees of the Santa Barbara City College
District, et al.

B
Plaintiff’s claims against the trustees are subject to dismissal
because the complaint fails to make allegations necessary to hold each
liable for wrongdoing. The complaint also fails to allege deliberate
indifference sufficiently.
Rule 8 requires that a complaint contain a short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). While Rule 8 does not require detailed factual
allegations, at a minimum, a complaint must allege sufficient facts to
provide “fair notice” of both the particular claim being asserted and “the
grounds upon which [the particular claim] rests.” Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 & n.3 (2007) (citation modified). If a
complaint does not clearly and concisely set forth factual allegations
sufficient to provide defendants with notice of which defendant is being
sued, on which theory, and what relief is being sought against them, the
complaint fails to comply with Rule 8. See, e.g., McHenry v. Renne, 84
F.3d 1172, 1177–78 (9th Cir. 1996) (a complaint must make clear “who
is being sued, for what relief, and on what theory, with enough detail to
guide discovery”); Exmundo v. Kane, 553 F. App’x 742, 743 (9th Cir.
2014) (unpublished) (affirming district court dismissal of § 1983 claims
where plaintiff’s allegations “were unclear as to the timing and nature
of [the defendant’s] actions”). Where a plaintiff sues multiple
defendants, “[s]pecific identification of the parties to the activities
alleged by [a plaintiff] is required . . . to enable the defendant to plead
intelligently.” Sherrell v. Bank of Am., N.A., No. CV F 11-1785 LJO
JLT, 2011 WL 6749765, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 22, 2011) (citation
modified).
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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Case No. 2:25-cv-11035-JWH-SSC Date: January 7, 2026
Title Mel Marin v. Trustees of the Santa Barbara City College
District, et al.

Here, Plaintiff fails to identify each individual trustee as having
engaged in any wrongdoing or taking any specific actions. For example,
Plaintiff alleges that he “complained to . . . trustees in the middle of
2022 about the college’s pretense of refusing to impose a disability
accommodation on its teachers” (ECF 1 at 3), and further that he made
a “demand . . . to the trustees . . . on November 4, 2025 by e-mail to the
address they provide to the public, to process his AB540 discount and
the related fee waiver because he could not take any course without it”
but they “‘blew it off’ as not worthy of a response of any kind at all’” (id.
at 3–4). But such allegations fail to specify which wrongful conduct is
attributed to which trustee.
They also fail to allege that any trustee was deliberately
indifferent. While a plaintiff seeking damages under § 504 or Title II
can demonstrate intentional discrimination by plausibly pleading notice
and a failure to act,7 Duvall, 260 F.3d at 1138–39, he fails to do so. His
vague claim of having complained to unspecified persons through an
unspecified means, and having sent an email to unspecified persons to a
seemingly generic school email account, are not sufficient to show that
any trustee was even aware of the alleged discrimination. The Court
need not accept as true such conclusory allegations and unreasonable

7 A plaintiff establishes the notice or knowledge element by
showing that he “alerted the public entity to his need for
accommodation (or where the need for accommodation is obvious, or
required by statute or regulation)[.]” Duvall, 260 F.3d at 1139. The
“failure to act” element is satisfied by alleging the defendant did not
undertake the “fact-specific investigation” necessary to determine what
constitutes a reasonable accommodation. Id.
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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Case No. 2:25-cv-11035-JWH-SSC Date: January 7, 2026
Title Mel Marin v. Trustees of the Santa Barbara City College
District, et al.

inferences. See In re Gilead Scis. Sec. Litig., 536 F.3d 1049, 1055 (9th
Cir. 2008) (court need not accept as true “allegations that are merely
conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable inferences”
(citation modified)).
ORDER
For all these reasons, Plaintiff is ORDERED TO SHOW CAUSE
no later than February 9, 2026, why this action should not be
dismissed—in whole or in part—based on the deficiencies outlined
above.
Plaintiff may satisfy this order by voluntarily dismissing this
action using the attached form CV-09. Alternatively, Plaintiff may file
an amended complaint containing only well-pleaded, actionable claims
against non-immune defendants that fix the curable deficiencies.
Plaintiff is advised that any amended complaint entirely replaces
the prior complaint in this action. Any amended complaint must:
(a) be labeled “First Amended Complaint”;
(b) be complete in and of itself and not refer in any manner to the
original complaint, i.e., it must include all of the claims on which
Plaintiff seeks to proceed, (see Local Rule 15-2);
(c) contain a “short and plain” statement of the claim(s) for relief,
Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a);
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CIVIL MINUTES – GENERAL

Case No. 2:25-cv-11035-JWH-SSC Date: January 7, 2026
Title Mel Marin v. Trustees of the Santa Barbara City College
District, et al.

(d) make each allegation “simple, concise, and direct,” Fed. R. Civ.
P. 8(d)(1);
(e) set forth clearly the sequence of events (including specific
relevant dates) which allegedly gives rise to the claim(s) for relief,
including how each defendant’s specific conduct injured Plaintiff; and
(f) not add defendants or claims, except as contemplated by this
order.
Plaintiff is cautioned, though, that he may be denied further leave
to amend if he cannot “state a viable claim without contradicting any of
the allegations of his original complaint.” Garmon v. County of L.A.,
828 F.3d 837, 846 (9th Cir. 2016) (citation modified).
Plaintiff is further cautioned that failure to file a timely
response to this order to show cause will result in a
recommendation to the district judge to dismiss this case for
failure to comply with a court order. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b); L.R.
41-1.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

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Initials of Preparer ts

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11239342. Public record. Not legal advice.