# FINNEMAN

> District Court, D. New Jersey · January 8, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11239272

## Case

- **Full name:** Nasir Finneman v. Ms. Reilly, Mr. Dean, and Ms. Murphy
- **Court:** District Court, D. New Jersey
- **Decided:** January 8, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
CAMDEN VICINAGE

NASIR FINNEMAN,

Plaintiff,
Civil A. No. 24-10871
v. (RMB-EAP)

MS. REILLY, MR. DEAN, and OPINION
MS. MURPHY,

Defendants.

RENÉE MARIE BUMB, Chief United States District Judge:
This matter comes before the Court upon the filing of a Complaint and
application to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) by pro se Plaintiff Nasir Finneman.
[Compl. (Docket No. 1); IFP (Docket No. 1-3).] Plaintiff’s IFP application establishes
Plaintiff’s financial eligibility to proceed without prepayment of the filing fee and will
be granted. 28 U.S.C. § 1915. For the reasons explained herein, upon screening,
Plaintiff’s Complaint will be dismissed without prejudice.
I. SCREENING FOR DISMISSAL
When a person files a complaint and is granted IFP status,
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) requires courts to review the complaint and dismiss claims
that: (1) are frivolous or malicious; (2) fail to state a claim on which relief may be
granted; or (3) seek monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such
relief. Courts, however, must liberally construe pleadings that are filed pro se.
Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007).
The legal standard for dismissing a complaint for failure to state a claim,

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), is the same as that for dismissal under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See Schreane v. Seana, 506 F. App’x 120, 122
(3d Cir. 2012). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient
factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678
(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). And while “detailed factual allegations” are not

necessary, a “plaintiff’s obligation to provide the grounds of his entitle[ment] to relief
requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements
of a cause of action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Legal conclusions,
together with threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, do not suffice to
state a claim. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

II. THE COMPLAINT
Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges that the three named Defendants, apparently
employed at a Social Security Administration office in Egg Harbor Township,
New Jersey, did not assist him when he presented to said office claiming that money
had been stolen from his checking account. [Compl. at 3–5.] It is unclear whether
Plaintiff contends that the named Defendants allegedly stole the missing funds or
simply did not assist him in recovering said funds. The Complaint further alleges that
Plaintiff earns money from regular plasma donations and that he is entitled to the full

amount earned in return for his plasma donations. [Id.] He appears to allege that
someone – perhaps Defendants, the Social Security Administration (the “SSA”) itself,
or some other third-party – unlawfully took $270.00 out of a direct deposit payment of
$974.25 for his plasma donations. [Id. at 3.] Plaintiff requests that the Court
“investigate & punish” what he views to be criminal behavior in connection with his

checking account. [Id. at 8.]
III. SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION
The Court has an independent obligation to satisfy itself of its subject matter
jurisdiction, and the Court “always has jurisdiction to determine its [own]
jurisdiction.” Zambelli Fireworks Mfg. Co. v. Wood, 592 F.3d 412, 418 (3d Cir. 2010)

(citing United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 628 (2002)). “A federal court has subject
matter jurisdiction over civil actions arising under ‘the Constitution, laws, or treaties
of the United States’ (federal question jurisdiction) and civil actions between citizens
of different states with the amount in controversy exceeding the sum or value of
$75,000 (diversity jurisdiction).” Rockefeller v. Comcast Corp., 424 F. App’x 82, 83

(3d Cir. 2011) (citing 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332(a)). “If a federal district court
determines at any time that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss
the action.” Finneman v. Fuller, 2025 WL 3055029, at *1 (D.N.J. Oct. 31, 2025)
(citing FED. R. CIV. P. 12(h)(3)).
Here, Plaintiff asserts that this Court has federal question jurisdiction over his
claims.1 [Compl. at 2.] “Federal question jurisdiction exists only if a federal question
is presented on the face of the complaint.” Rockefeller, 424 F. App’x at 83

(citing Club Comanche, Inc. v. Gov’t of V.I., 278 F.3d 250, 259 (3d Cir. 2002)).
While courts must liberally construe pro se pleadings, this requirement does not excuse
pro se plaintiffs from complying with the standard rules of civil procedure.
See McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106, 113 (1993); Thakar v. Tan, 372 F. App’x 325,

328 (3d Cir. 2010) (a plaintiff is “not absolved from complying with Twombly and the
federal pleading requirements merely because s/he proceeds pro se.”). As such,
Plaintiff must sufficiently establish this Court’s subject matter jurisdiction over his
Complaint.
A. Title XVI Claim
Plaintiff claims that his suit arises under Title XVI of the Social Security Act

(the “Act”), according to the civil cover sheet accompanying his Complaint
[Docket No. 1-1]. Based on the Complaint, it appears that Plaintiff receives
supplemental security income (“SSI”) benefits under Title XVI of the Act. “Title XVI
provides [SSI] benefits ‘to financially needy individuals who are aged, blind, or

1 Plaintiff does not assert that this Court has diversity jurisdiction over his case.
Nor could he. All named parties are citizens of New Jersey, precluding diversity
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1332.
disabled regardless of their insured status.” Smith v. Berryhill, 587 U.S. 471, 475 (2019)
(quoting Bowen v. Galbreath, 485 U.S. 74, 75 (1988)).
Plaintiff alleges that certain funds were “stolen out of [his] SSI direct deposit

income” that was reflected in his checking account and that “Social Security does not
take money out of plasma donations.” [Compl. at 3, 4.] The Court liberally construes
these allegations as challenging the amount of SSI benefits he received.
This Court, however, has “subject matter jurisdiction over claims arising under
the Social Security Act only after a claimant has exhausted administrative remedies and

obtained a final decision of the Commissioner [of Social Security].” Cope v. SSI-SSA,
2013 WL 775760, at *5 (D.N.J. Feb. 28, 2013) (emphasis in original), aff’d sub nom.
Cope v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 532 F. App’x 58 (3d Cir. 2013). Plaintiffs “must generally
proceed through a four-step process before they can obtain review from a federal

court.” Smith, 587 U.S. at 475–76.
This process is set forth in 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), which “provides the exclusive
basis for judicial review of decisions issued by the [SSA].” Cope, 2013 WL 775760,
at *4. “First, the claimant must seek an initial determination as to his eligibility.
Second, the claimant must seek reconsideration of the initial determination.

Third, the claimant must request a hearing, which is conducted by an ALJ.
Fourth, the claimant must seek review of the ALJ’s decision by the Appeals Council.
If a claimant has proceeded through all four steps on the merits, . . . § 405(g) entitles
him to judicial review in federal district court.” Smith, 587 U.S. at 476 (internal
citations omitted).
There is no indication that Plaintiff has even attempted to undertake any of
these administrative steps prior to seeking federal court review. Indeed, Plaintiff
specifically alleges that he has not. As set forth in the Complaint, Defendants told

Plaintiff that he could appeal any determination of the SSA and even provided him
with the forms to initiate the administrative process, which he refused to complete.
[Compl. at 4–5.] Clearly, based on the allegations before the Court, Plaintiff has not
exhausted his administrative remedies or obtained a final decision from the
Commissioner of Social Security prior to filing this action. Accordingly, the Court

lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s claims insofar as they challenge a
decision of the SSA. See, e.g., Edwards v. Kijakazi, 2022 WL 1213329, at *2 (D.N.J.
Apr. 25, 2022); Alvarez v. Berryhill, 2018 WL 2411605, at *2 (D.N.J. May 29, 2018);
Carter v. Hartman, 2013 WL 1501926, at *1 (D.N.J. Apr. 10, 2013).

B. No Other Federal Questions
The Court has carefully reviewed the Complaint and liberally construed
Plaintiff’s allegations to determine whether there is any other viable claim pled over
which it has subject matter jurisdiction. Despite having done so, the Court cannot
discern any other violation of federal law, the Constitution, or treaty of the United
States pled in the Complaint over which this Court may properly exercise federal
question jurisdiction.2 Accordingly, the Complaint must be dismissed for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction.
IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated herein, Plaintiff’s IFP application is GRANTED.
Upon screening, however, Plaintiff’s Complaint is DISMISSED WITHOUT
PREJUDICE for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Plaintiff may amend his
pleadings to remedy the deficiencies identified herein within thirty (30) days.
Should he fail to timely do so, this matter will be deemed dismissed with prejudice.

An appropriate Order shall issue on this date.

Dated: January 8, 2026 s/Renée Marie Bumb
RENÉE MARIE BUMB
Chief United States District Judge

2 Plaintiff’s allegations that his money was stolen arise under state law, such as a
claim for conversion. And to the extent Plaintiff accuses Defendants of criminal
conduct, he has no standing to assert criminal law claims in this civil action. See, e.g.,
Itiowe v. Daniel, 2017 WL 4179811, at *1 (D.N.J. Sept. 21, 2017); Ali v. Jersey City
Parking Auth., 2014 WL 1494578, at *4 (D.N.J. Apr. 16, 2014) (“a private party may
not bring a criminal action against another individual or entity as Plaintiff attempts to
do here.”), aff’d, 594 F. App’x 730 (3d Cir. 2014).

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11239272. Public record. Not legal advice.